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PERCEPTIONS OF INDIA'S CONTRIBUTION AND RELATIONSHIP TO THE
BRITISH EMPIRE IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR: AN ANALYSIS OF INDIAN,
BRITISH, AND AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS

By

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To the Graduate Faculty:

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Abstract

PERCEPTIONS OF INDIA'S CONTRIBUTION AND RELATIONSHIP TO THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR IN INDIAN, BRITISH AND AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS

This thesis examines how India's contribution and relationship to the British Empire was perceived and understood during the First World War in India, Great Britain and the United States. This is done by examining a collection of Indian newspapers from the Punjab region, the *Times of London* and the *New York Times*. Demands from Indian liberals for reform grew as India increasingly sacrificed for the Empire. The evolution of these perspectives is crucial in understanding the impact that the First World War had on how the British Empire was seen, not only within the Empire, but in the wider world. Primary documents demonstrate that the events and attitudes that drove India's split from the British Empire in India and Britain was determined by the divergent ways they saw India's involvement in the First World War. This in turn made the Indian independence movement stronger, leading toward Indian independence.

Introduction

During the First World War the British called upon India for men, material and financial support. Thousands of Indians supported the British war effort, in many cases traveling to distant lands to do battle for the British on fronts around the world. Their contributions and sacrifice for the British Empire has been an understudied area of the war and Indian history. This thesis uses a transnational lens to develop our understanding of how Great Britain, the United States, and India itself perceived India's contribution and relationship to the British Empire during the war. A large collection of Indian newspapers from the Punjab region of India, the *Times Of London*, and the *New York Times* serve as the windows to approach the past because of their use in shaping public opinion and their reflection of the reality of living during the period.¹

The history of India in the First World War is understudied. The work of writing the story of the First World War began to be published during the war itself, with newspapers printing what they referred to as histories of the war periodically. After the war many participants produced histories of their own. The most popular of these were by writers such as Winston Churchill and B. H. Liddell Hart, who focused on the fighting on the western front.² This was a natural reflection of Britain's dedication of the large part of its own manpower to that area, an area that India only had limited involvement in. Churchill's clearly influenced the popular understanding of the First World War,

¹ Karen Roggenkamp, *Narrating the News: New Journalism and Literary Genre in Late Nineteenth-Century American Newspapers and Fiction* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2005), xiv–xv.

² Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis*, Bloomsbury Revelations, 6 vols. (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015); B.H. Liddell Hart, *The Real War: 1914-1918* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1930).

empowered by his literary skill and historical flair.³ But India's part in the war does not feature in many of the histories such as Churchill's, focused as they are on events in Europe. India's part in the fighting was general covered in less widely read unit histories, such as W.S. Thatcher's history, *The Fourth Battalion Duke of Connaught's Own Tenth Baluch Regiment In The Great War* which focuses narrowly on the author's specific unit.⁴ As a result they did not have a wide audience, especially when compared to newspapers. These unit histories only shaped the way India's contributions were seen to a very limited extent for future scholarship.

George Morton-Jack was the first historian to describe the four beliefs about the performance of the Indian Army on the western front that is found in the work of many historians. The first of these beliefs is that the Indian soldiers were unable to cope with the cold climate of western France; the second, that their morale collapsed to dangerously low levels quickly as they could not take the strain of modern combat; third, that they were unprepared for modern combat, and finally that they were treated with particular injustice by the British generals.⁵ Books that survey the First World War such as *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire* focused on some aspects of this interpretation without going deeper, reproducing and spreading these myths of Indian participation

An example of the few twentieth-century studies of Indian military history is Jeffery Greenhut's 1984 examination of the relationship between the European officers

³ Bernadotte E. Schmitt, review of *Review of The World Crisis*, by Winston S. Churchill, *Political Science Quarterly* 38, no. 4 (1923): 690, doi:10.2307/2142492.

⁴ W.S. Thatcher, *The Fourth Battalion Duke of Connaught's Own Tenth Baluch Regiment in the Great War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932).

⁵ George Morton-Jack, "The Indian Army on the Western Front, 1914–1915: A Portrait of Collaboration," *War in History* 13, no. 3 (July 2006): 330, doi:10.1191/0968344506wh344oa.

and the Indians they led. However, it and others like it reiterate several of the standard opinions of the historians of the First World War about the Indian Army, especially about morale. Greenhut attributes the collapse in morale to the death of British officers who had close relationships with the Indian soldiers.⁶ The article examines how the white man enters into a relationship of respect with soldiers of a different culture and society, rather than of the Indians under their command. In this way it continues along with a trend established by memoirs written by these officers, with the inherent biases that followed from that view point, and is representative of scholarship drawn from such sources.

The edited volume *The Indian Army in the Two World Wars*, is one of the first works of its kind to deal with India and the First World War as a military history in almost 30 years.⁷ The military context of the Indian Army is crucial to understand the effect the army had on Indian society. Such analysis of the military history of the Indian Army also allows authors to challenge the preconceptions that appear so often in the broad surveys of the First World War. Careful analysis of the campaign conducted by the Indian Army in Mesopotamia serves to challenge the commonly accepted picture of bungling officers and poor morale amongst the Indians, especially the Muslim Indians fighting their fellow Muslims, were responsible for the initial failure of the Mesopotamia campaign. Andrew Syk and Ross Anderson instead point to a logistics system that was unprepared for the difficulties of supplying armies at the end of supply lines that ran for

⁶ Jeffrey Greenhut, "Sahib and Sepoy: An Inquiry into the Relationship between the British Officers and Native Soldiers of the British Indian Army," *Military Affairs* 48, no. 1 (January 1, 1984): 18, doi:10.2307/1988342.

⁷ Kaushik Roy, ed., *The Indian Army in the Two World Wars*, History of Warfare 70 (Boston: Brill, 2012), 2.

hundreds of miles before ending up in a Mesopotamian desert.⁸ George Morton-Jack takes on the most entrenched opinion about the Indian Army by focusing on reports from officers serving with the Indian soldiers, and officials who had experience dealing with the Indian Army revealing a much less negative image of the fighting quality of the Indian soldier.⁹ Morton-Jack also suggests that other historians are willfully ignoring the writings of people who fought with the Indians in favor of their own, differently biased understandings. Perhaps this is going too far in the other direction, as the study of the Indian Army is attracting new scholarship and gaining new understandings.¹⁰ Future scholarship can be turned to for a new, improved insight, and for history that challenges the assumptions of old.

Two main schools of thought in Indian history have grown in the years since independence. Both views focus on divergent understandings of how to approach India. The Subaltern school takes a bottom up approach to Indian history with a focus on a social history of the lower levels of the colonized society. The introduction to *A Subaltern Studies Reader 1986-1995* states that the project was inaugurated by marginalized academics taking a stand against the elitism that they saw dominating the history of India, and turning to history of the people instead of a history of the colonial

⁸ Andrew Syk, "Command in the Indian Expeditionary Force D: 1915-16," in *The Indian Army in the Two World Wars*, ed. Kaushik Roy (Boston: Brill, 2012), 103; Ross Anderson, "Logistics of the Indian Expeditionary Force D in Mesopotamia: 1914-18," in *The Indian Army in the Two World Wars*, ed. Kaushik Roy (Boston: Brill, 2012), 143.

⁹ George Morton-Jack, *The Indian Army on the Western Front: India's Expeditionary Force to France and Belgium in the First World War*, Cambridge Military Histories (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 299–302.

¹⁰ Rob Johnson, ed., *British Indian Army: Virtue and Necessity* (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars, 2014), xvii.

and bourgeois elites.¹¹ Marxist histories such as Dipesh Chakrabarty's *Rethinking Working-Class History: Bengal 1890-1940* fit comfortably within the school because of the approach from the worker's perspective.¹² The bottom-up perspective gives the whole school a comfortable flexibility and breadth of subject matter. For example, discussions of the nationalist devī religious movement in the Bombay presidency during the 1920's and poetry from Dewan Manulla Mandal writing in 1842-43 are both approachable topics for the subaltern scholar despite their wide separation in time and context, as they deal with how the colonized respond to colonialism, and the postcolonial world.¹³ Other works within this school such as Niel Green's article "Jack Sepoy and the Dervishes: Islam and the Indian Soldier in Princely India" examine the individual's place in society, especially the non-elite individual who is absent from sources such as newspapers. Subaltern studies is inherently a reaction to a more established way of doing history, one that Subaltern scholars believe is distorting and obscuring the true history of India, a history of the disenfranchised.

What the Subalterns are rebelling against is the Cambridge school. The Cambridge school is not as set as the Subaltern School, not the least because there are Cambridge schools associated with the analysis of the history of political ideas, as well as

¹¹ Ranajit Guha, ed., *A Subaltern Studies Reader, 1986-1995* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), xiv–xv.

¹² Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Rethinking Working-Class History: Bengal, 1890-1940* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).

¹³ David Hardiman, "Origins and Transformations of the Devī," in *A Subaltern Studies Reader: 1986-1995*, ed. Ranajit Guha (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 100–139; Gautam Bhadra, "The Mentality of Subalternity: Kantanama or Rajdharma," in *A Subaltern Studies Reader: 1986-1995*, ed. Ranajit Guha (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 63–99.

political economy.¹⁴ Works such as *Indian Society and the making of the British Empire* by C. A. Bayly exemplify this tendency in the scholarship. The broad areas of Indian history combine with a focus in the bibliographic note on scholarship that is related to the highest areas of politics and economics.¹⁵ This more top down approach contributes to understanding the trends and forces that shaped India's relation to England and the world, but the limitation that comes with that is that the real situation for the majority of the population of the country is obscured.

Other approaches studying and writing about Indians occurred during this period. For instance Sukanya Banerjee refers to Indians only and attempts to discuss Indian citizenship in the Empire without reference to any separation based on race or religion.¹⁶ This discussion of a broader identity reflects India's developing nationalism, but Banerjee rests the argument on a monolithic view of identity that is central to the author's discussion on the actions of reformers in Canada. Jon Wilson effectively demonstrates the widespread nature of this monolithic representation of Indian-British relations in scholarship by charting a long history of discourse about their interaction. One of the main problems Wilson finds is the tendency to simplify British- Indian

¹⁴ Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "One for the Money, Two for the Show. On Postcolonial Studies and South Asian History," *L'Homme*, no. 187/188 (2008): 95. The Subaltern School has an editorial council and publications dedicated to the school and forms a collective of scholars dedicated to the approach it takes, not only to Indian history, but to other areas of the world. In contrast the Cambridge school is an older approach with a focus on the elites of society, both Indian and European. The benefit of this focus on the elite is that sources about British rule and the Indian elites are plentiful, and accessible to scholars outside of India.

¹⁵ Christopher Alan Bayly, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire*, vol. 1, *The New Cambridge History of India Indian States and the Transition to Colonialism 2* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003), 212–23.

¹⁶ Sukanya Banerjee, *Becoming Imperial Citizens: Indians in the Late-Victorian Empire* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010).

interactions into understandable modes, but they also simplify both parties into a two different groups.¹⁷ In contrast, Alex Padamsee focuses narrowly on Muslims resting the analysis entirely on the examination of the specific relation between Muslims and the British.¹⁸ This focus has various benefits. The generalization does not help the author argue for any specifics. Speaking of a broad Indian identity during the Victorian era is too general and lacking of a willingness to address the complexity found in India. The subcontinent contains a multitude of different groups which the British manifestly reacted differently. Approaching all of these aspects is difficult given sources that treat these groups monolithically as well. These approaches touch at different aspects of how Indians existed in the empire, be it through society or government.

My focus on the upper levels of society is a result of its study of newspapers. Indian newspapers were products of the urban educated classes, and not the majority of Indians, who did not have access to education. The *London Times* and the *New York Times* are both upper class newspapers, more respected and less widely read than their contemporaries. This gives access to the thoughts of those making policy, or attempting to make policy. It is through these lenses that we can best examine how views and perceptions changed over time. The newspaper communicates understandings as they were in the moment, at regular intervals, and in a way intended to be popular and authoritative. This means they must reflect the views and understandings of the readership back at them in some fashion to remain well read, while also shaping their views. Thus the perceptions in the newspaper are a day by day reflection of their reader's

¹⁷ Jon E. Wilson, "Early Colonial India beyond Empire," *The Historical Journal* 50, no. 4 (2007): 952.

¹⁸ Alex Padamsee, *Representations of Indian Muslims in British Colonial Discourse* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

perception. These perceptions give important insight into how Britons and Indians perceived the relationship between Britain and India in this critical period for the Indian independence movement, as well as insight into how this relationship was seen in the wider world. This put this thesis within both the Cambridge and Subaltern schools of thought, as it deals with both the history of the upper levels of the colonial society, as well as addressing the response of the subaltern to that society.

Chapter one examines how India understood their contribution and relationship to the war, by examining Indian newspapers. Approaching Indian newspapers is the most difficult because of the variety of languages and individual groups that made up the British Raj, which ruled British India. Most Indian newspapers of the period have not been digitized or are inaccessible outside India. It is fortunate that a large selection of newspaper articles have been collected by Andrew Tait Jarboe in the book *War News in India: The Punjab Press During World War I*.¹⁹ The collection draws a selection of articles from over a hundred English, Urdu, Gurmukhi, and Hindi newspapers in the Punjab region during the First World War. The majority of the Indian Army was drawn from this region of India, and it was therefore deeply connected to the British war effort. This narrows the focus from all of India to the Punjab region, but that is acceptable for my argument due to the centrality of that region to the war, and it still allows insight into the wider effect in India.²⁰ The effect of the war would have a significant impact on how many Indians viewed their place in the British Empire and the Raj. The war was seen by many of the educated Indians as a great opportunity to earn a place of honor and respect

¹⁹ Andrew Tait Jarboe, *War News in India: The Punjabi Press during World War I* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2016).

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 5–6.

within the British Empire, and to bring reform and political participation to the British Raj. When these promises of the war proved false, independence replaced home rule as the objective of Indian liberals.

Chapter Two examines the British perception of India's part in the Great War by analyzing articles in the *Times of London*. The *London Times* was one of the largest and most well respected newspapers in London, and it reflects the conservative political views of the time. The *London Times* is also easily accessible, with the newspapers for 1914 – 1918 fully digitized. This valuable resource, with the aid of analysis, offers a valuable window into how the British view of India evolved over the war. The British initially saw India as a loyal ally, fighting the enemy with a dedication and resolve that fit with the British understanding of the spirit of the British Empire. By the end of the war this perception faltered as opposition in India came into greater focus, and the reform efforts of British liberals were met with what conservatives saw as impertinent and ungrateful demands for independence.

To supplement the standard approach to the newspaper articles I applied basic text analysis techniques to the headlines of articles from the *Times* that concerned India and the war. I conducted the text analysis by using the program R, an open source software environment for statistical computing and graphics with several packages that allow for text mining and the creation of various graphics to present the information.²¹ I collected and processed corpus by the removal of punctuation and stop words, and making the text all lower case. The latter was a response to the limitation of the programming software, as R is case sensitive. The data was not stemmed, a process that reduces words to their

²¹ R Core Team, *R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing* (Vienna: R Foundation for Statistical Computing, 2017), <https://www.R-project.org>.

common root: the crude process that the stemming algorithms available use would have, for example, reduced words *India*, *Indian* and *Indians* to the stem of *Indi*. The distinction between references to India and Indians thus justifies the choice not to stem the data.

I used the headlines of the articles rather than analyze the full text because of the large number of articles that appeared about India and the war. The full corpus of collected articles numbers 680 articles. Limiting the analysis to headlines has several advantages. The headline is many cases the first and only part of an article that the reader engages with, and thus forms an abstract of the article, informing the reader what the content will be. The headline is the creation of the paper editorial staff and therefore is shaped by the constraints of the newspaper layout and the bias of the editors.²² This bias can have a great effect on how the headline is shaped, as the headline is a reflection of what the editor believes the article means.²³ The process of text analysis helps see clearly the priorities of the coverage and also the relationships between topics.

Chapter Three examines how India's position in the British Empire and role in the war was perceived outside of the British imperial system through analysis of American newspaper articles. America was the largest neutral power during the initial years of the war, from 1914- 1916. Therefore, both the Entente and the Central Powers attempted to influence public opinion there through the newspapers. The *New York Times* archive is available online for all, and contains the articles published from this period. Seen as the source for the educated and globally involved among the Americans, the *New*

²² Allan Bell, *The Language of News Media*, Language in Society 16 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 186,189.

²³ Alireza Bonyadi and Moses Samuel, "Headlines in Newspaper Editorials: A Contrastive Study," *SAGE Open* 3, no. 2 (April 15, 2013): 1, doi:10.1177/2158244013494863.

York Times offers insight into how India was viewed in a wider world. During the war, coverage of India involved a battle of conflicting narratives about Indian loyalty or revolution, with Indian contributions to the British war effort continuously occluded by India's subordinate position within the Empire. German messages of revolt and Indian nationalist messages of repression struggled against the British message of loyalty and good government. While the British message dominated the pages of *The New York Times* there was doubt about both the wisdom and justice of British rule.

Examining these perspectives demonstrates the divergent understandings of India's place in the British Empire that developed under the strains of the First World War. Indians were very hopeful during the war that India would be rewarded with greater rights within the British Empire. This hope was dashed after the war, as the British responded to the end of the war with repression, rather than reform. This reflects how the British public saw India during the war, a loyal and subservient part of the Empire. When liberal Indians greeted British reforms with rejection it clashed with the British understanding, and recalled concerns about Indian loyalty. The Indian Armies participation on the western front attracted much attention, but towards the end of the war the attention became more focused on reforming efforts of the British, and the ingratitude of the Indians towards that reform. Together these aspects explain much of India's post-war liberal reformers' attitudes. I argue that this conflict of perception is critical for understanding that the post war Indian independence movement. Added to that was the perspective shown by the *New York Times* as the issue of India played itself out as part of the world wide propaganda conflict between German and Britain. Eventually Indians would step out from behind the Europeans to make their perspective felt. The First World

War brought many changes to how India's relationship with the British Empire was perceived, changes that reverberated into the post-war world

Chapter One: Indian Newspapers in the Punjab: Hope in War

By the time of the First World War, British rule in India had come to a critical stage. The influx of western ideas and education had reached a point where Indians' perception of their place within the greater British Empire would shape India's future to a greater extent than before. Many Indians hoped for reform within the British Empire to grant them the same status as the Dominions, and saw the war as a chance to earn these rights through supporting the Empire at its time of crisis. These views expressed by Indian papers during the war are crucial in understanding why Indian liberals began to favor independence over reform after the war was over. This chapter will demonstrate India's evolving view of the First World War and the empire that Indians fought the war for, by examining newspaper articles in a hundred and forty newspapers from the Punjab region of India collected by Professor Andrew Tait Jarboe in *War News In India: The Punjab Press During World War I*. While the use of one source is problematic, it is a necessity given the inaccessibility of these sources in other ways, and the important perspective that Indian newspapers add to the understanding. The Punjab was the main recruiting region for the Indian Army, and was deeply affected by the war as a result. Before the articles from the Punjab can be examined, it is important to understand India's context during the First World War as part of the British Empire.

India was, at the time, a part of the British Empire, at first under the control of the East India Company and then under the British Raj, where Indian policy was set by the British government ministers. Direct British rule began in 1858 after the mutiny of a large number of the East India Company's Indian soldiers, widely known as the Great Indian Mutiny. The Indian Mutiny effected a drastic change in how British India was

ruled and its relation to the Crown: no longer was India under the control of a company focused on profit over good governance, but it was now directly controlled by the British government. In the old system, policy was set by the major stockholders of the company and a board of control.²⁴ When the British government took over, it established an office and cabinet position were established to govern India, and Queen Victoria became Empress of India. This made the Indian population British subjects, bringing them closer into the Empire yet without offering the majority of Indian much in the way of political participation. Reforms in 1861 and 1882 allowed Indians further participation in local government by granting opportunities for holding office. By 1914 many Indians were participating in government not only in land belonging to the princes, but also British territory. This brought India's elite further into the wider world as well as the politics of India.

India's educated and literate elite required information to participate in Indian politics and the world at large which was best provided at the time by newspapers. India had a strong print culture that reflected the British influence on India, with the newspaper serving in much the same role as British newspapers that were their predecessors, and exemplar.²⁵ This makes Indian newspapers one of the few areas where Indians could present their perspectives of India's place in the war.

Many of the newspapers were reform minded, and tied to the Indian National Congress, formed in 1885. The Congress had started as an association of educated Indians meeting annually to discuss issues related to India, but it would develop into an

²⁴ Burton Stein, *A History of India*, Blackwell History of the World (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998), 228.

²⁵ Julie F. Codell, "Introduction: The Nineteenth-Century News from India," *Victorian Periodicals Review* 37, no. 2 (2004): 107.

Indian nationalist organization, pushing for greater Indian participation in government. It, and the educated Indians it represented, was seen as a disruptive body in British India.²⁶

At the start of the First World War the Indian National Congress only represented the opinions of the powerful. It did not have the support of the majority of Indians, or the charismatic leadership needed to mobilize the illiterate public. The newspapers of India provide a way to access the thoughts of a variety of Indians and give some insight into how they viewed the war.

The way that Indians viewed the war could not be communicated without being filtered by censorship. As Robert Darnton has stated “literature under the Raj was political in itself, down to its very syntax.”²⁷ The newspapers were an area of intense concern for a British government anxious about potential revolution as well as an Indian press that was becoming more liberal and modern. British censorship was focused on limiting criticism of the government and heading off a revolt in the army. There had been fears that a revolt might be fueled by newspapers published in the soldiers’ languages.²⁸ British censorship had attempted to favor the spread of English-language newspapers, subjecting Indian-language newspapers to the Vernacular Press Act of 1878 that limited their ability to criticize the government while exempting English language papers.

By the start of the First World War, British censorship was no longer as intent at stifling all criticism. The vernacular press proved useful to British government as a way to monitor the opinions of the Indian people, and Indian-language papers were allowed to

²⁶ Lawrence James, *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire* (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2005), 232.

²⁷ Robert Darnton, “Literary Surveillance in the British Raj: The Contradictions of Liberal Imperialism,” *Book History* 4 (2001): 143.

²⁸ Codell, “Introduction,” 111.

report on and criticize the government for this reason. The papers freedom to criticize was limited, and the papers were monitored constantly by the Indian government to insure that they remained within those limits In the city of Lahore in the Punjab region the Criminal Investigation Department filled out weekly reports on the content of hundreds of newspapers from around the region, which kept British officials aware of potential problems and newspapers that might be exceeding their limits. During the war Indian papers were free to report on and criticize the government for the most part, but in 1915 the regional government was empowered to close any newspaper.²⁹ This kept the editors from approaching areas the British government would find a danger to the safety and stability of the Empire. This was especially important in the Punjab region, given its importance to India's contributions to the British war effort.

The Punjab was targeted for extensive recruitment into the Indian Army, deeply affecting the people of the region and making the population's views especially important to the British as the Indian Army was an essential part of British India's contribution to the British Empire's war effort in the First World War. It had its roots in the armies of the East India Company that had created British India. Following the 1857 Indian Mutiny the British government reorganized and reformed these armies. These reforms would by World War 1 make the Punjab region the region most deeply connected with the Indian Army in all of India.

The first reform instituted by the British focused on the number of British Army units needed in India to prevent future mutinies. The new ratio was around one British

²⁹ Andrew Tait Jarboe, *War News in India: The Punjabi Press during World War I* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016), 7,10.

soldier for every two or three Indians, where before the 1857 Mutiny it had been one British soldier to every five or six Indian soldiers.³⁰ Concern spread in Britain about the trustworthiness of Indians, and white men were needed to ensure loyalty. This lack of trust lies behind much of the reorganization of India following the Indian Mutiny. The three armies of the East India Company were eventually combined into one overarching institution, the Indian Army.

Indian Army units were drawn from all of India, not just the location the specific army was based in so as to disrupt the relationship between units and the local population. This new army answered to the representative of the crown and the leader of the Indian government, the viceroy of India. In addition, the Indian government paid all of the army's expenses, and the expenses of the British Army units that were loaned to fill out the ratio.³¹ As before British officers led companies and regiments, while Indian officers were in supporting roles. Indian princes continued to raise armies, but these armies could not have artillery and served within the British Army.

As the Indian Army was reorganized it was being integrated into the broader defense of the British Empire. As the "English barracks in the Oriental Sea," India accounted for well over half of all British garrisons in the Empire. This reserve of manpower was drawn on for expeditions around the world, as well as defending and

³⁰ Stanley A. Wolpert, *A New History of India*, 5th ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 241; Edward John Thompson and Geoffrey Theodore Garratt, *Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India* (New York: AMS Press, 1971), 437.

³¹ George Morton-Jack, *The Indian Army on the Western Front: India's Expeditionary Force to France and Belgium in the First World War*, Cambridge Military Histories (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 39–40.

expanding that boarder of the Raj.³² Indian troops were dispatched to Egypt in 1882, the Sudan in 1885 and 1896, as well as China in 1900 to suppress the Boxer Rebellion.³³

Indian troops also helped suppress rebellions in British East Africa in 1896, 1897, 1898 and 1900 before the creation of the King's African Rifles in 1902.³⁴ This new formation was created to defend British colonies in Africa in much the same way that the Indian Army defended India's frontiers. Recruitment was focused on the perceived martial races in the same style.

Action overseas could be undertaken at the agreement of the secretary of state for India and the viceroy, or for longer expeditions the permission of the British Parliament, with negotiations between the British and Indian government about who paid for the expense.³⁵ India was therefore tied deeply into supporting the British Empire for most of the century. In addition to this, Indians had traveled all across the British Empire. This was especially true after the abolition of slavery in 1834. Cheap labor was needed for farms and plantations in East and South Africa, and the East Indies, spreading Indian laborers throughout the British Empire and further tying them into the Empire.

The Indian Army had been prepared to fight two different types of war. For most of its existence the Indian Army fought small wars with poorly-equipped native groups on the frontiers of the British Empire in East Africa and northern India, suppressing revolts and pacifying difficult groups. This had forced the Indian Army to conduct almost constant small-scale military operations, as well as deployments overseas as small

³² Niall Ferguson, *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World* (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 171.

³³ Wolpert, *A New History of India*, 253.

³⁴ Charles Hordern and H. Fitz M. Stacke, *Military Operations, East Africa*, (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1941), 8.

³⁵ Morton-Jack, *The Indian Army on the Western Front*, 40.

numbers to fight enemies from around the world.³⁶ The army had also been preparing to fight the Russian threat from the northern border across Afghanistan. Therefore it had been given much the same equipment as the British Army of the time, in preparation for a battle with a modern European army. However, there were fewer specialist weapons such as machine guns and artillery in Indian regiments due to the expense.

The units of the Indian Army were recruited from specific groups of Indian society. Regiments and companies would, in general, be made of only one race or caste each.³⁷ The larger formations that were created during the war were formed of regiments from a variety of these backgrounds. This separation enabled the British to divide their subjects from each other. This also fit within a newly developing idea about “martial races.” The theory was that some races were more warlike and had more virtues in common with the British soldier than others. The British attributed certain traits such as great endurance or a sporting temperament to the martial races, and focused recruitment on them.³⁸ A majority of these groups were made up of country peasants and farmers.³⁹ In addition the British valued groups that they had fought wars against and so impressed them with their martial qualities. This group included the Gurkhas and the Sikhs. In this regard, India’s Punjab region was targeted for extensive recruitment. The region’s mountainous terrain and larger farming population gave recruits the traits that British recruiters desired. In the First and Second Anglo-Sikh Wars the Punjabis had demonstrated their abilities as soldiers, and in the Indian Mutiny they supported the

³⁶ Ibid., 110.

³⁷ Stephen P. Cohen, *The Indian Army; Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 41–42.

³⁸ Morton-Jack, *The Indian Army on the Western Front*, 34.

³⁹ Cohen, *The Indian Army*, 46–49.

British, proving their loyalty. In 1892 more regiments were recruited from the Punjab than from any other region of India; in 1914 there were 57 Indian Army units recruited from the Punjab compared to 64 units recruited from the other regions of India combined.⁴⁰

The Punjab was home to a variety of ethnic, religious, and caste groups and languages for the British to recruit from. Newspapers in the Punjab were being produced in English, Urdu, Gurmukhi and Hindi in 1914 to fit the needs of different groups in the Punjab. The differences between religious groups and castes in India did not cease because of the war, and newspapers give insight into how this affected their relationship to the war itself, discussing the strains brought on by martial-race-based recruitment system.

This had to be done at a great distance, despite how much of the Indian Army was made up of men from the Punjab. The small and poor Indian-language papers lacked the resources to send reporters to France, Africa or Mesopotamia to report directly from the fighting front. Therefore, they relied on rumor, what news filtered back from the Indians fighting for the Empire, and official dispatches from the British. Rumors were especially pervasive in the uncertain early days of the war. According to one article run by the *Vakil* in October, rumors included the destruction of the Indian Army in Egypt, Turks fighting disguised as Germans, and that the commerce raider *Emden* then currently operating off the Indian coast was actually a Turkish cruiser sent by Germany to spread terror.⁴¹

The most attention was drawn to the fighting in Mesopotamia and Palestine, where Indian soldiers were involved in large numbers. The British advances in these

⁴⁰ Ibid., 44.

⁴¹ Ibid., 38.

theaters offered an opportunity for the press to comment on the future of Jerusalem and Mesopotamia and the British Empire itself, offering many different views about what should be the fate of what was assumed to be new additions of the British Empire.⁴² Time was critical for the Indians' response to advances in Mesopotamia as the war developed. In the initial period of the campaign where victory seemed easy, Indian writers expressed the opinion that Mesopotamia should be governed by India, both because of its geographic position and as a reward for services rendered.⁴³ In 1917 opinions were less favorable of the plan, arguing of the danger to the British Empire if it indulged in a spirit of land grabbing, indicating a turn against empire.⁴⁴ The turn was disguised as helpful advice about the dangers of the envy of other powers, rather than any disagreement about the existence of empire in itself. Opinions on the empire had soured as the war began to put more and more strain on India. Religious differences guided the response to Jerusalem's fall, as Muslims called for continued Muslim control of the holy sites, while Sikh and Hindu papers praised the change from Muslim to Christian control.⁴⁵

When Great Britain entered the First World War in August 1914 it called upon the Indian Army, an organized force that numbered around 300,000 fighting men, to fight for the Empire.⁴⁶ Many remained in India in order to provide protection along the northern border, as well as providing security against a possible revolt in India. During the initial stage of the war the Indian office dispatched several expeditionary forces overseas. The largest, Force A, carried 85,000 Indian and 18,500 British combatants, as well as some

⁴² Ibid., 155, 172.

⁴³ Ibid., 71,90.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 163.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 173.

⁴⁶ Ibid., xii.

26,000 noncombatant support personnel to the French port of Marseilles and to the Western Front.⁴⁷ Forces were also dispatched to East Africa in order to carry out the conquest of German East Africa, to Egypt to garrison that country and secure the Suez Canal against Turkish attack, and to the Persian Gulf to begin an advance against the Ottoman Empire. These initial expeditions in total numbered some 200,000 Indian soldiers and another 80,000 British soldiers.⁴⁸

When the war began, newspapers in the Punjab regions responded with calls for loyalty to the British Empire and for the people of India to demonstrate their appreciation for the Empire in a variety of ways. The *Panjabee* paper of Lahore on August 6 1914 ran an article that expressed approval of the viceroy's declaration that the British have nothing to fear about Indian loyalty, but also "How much more fitting would it be if this assurance could be conveyed by an Indian."⁴⁹ The assurance of loyalty softened the criticism of the government or in some cases criticizes it indirectly. Another Lahore newspaper, the *Observer*, urged its readers to stop discussing political questions in order avoid embarrassing the authorities or making them anxious, silencing dissent while implying that there was plenty of cause of concern, elements that needed to be addressed. One article from the *Zamindar* expressed the wish that India would benefit from the war in many ways including the repeal of the Press Act of 1910, "and other distasteful measures."⁵⁰ Other articles such as one published the *Akhbar-i- 'Am* in August 1914 called for the lessening of restrictions on the press, as under the level of censorship the press was subjected to during the period, "it cannot be said with certainty that the news of

⁴⁷ Morton-Jack, *The Indian Army on the Western Front*, 1.

⁴⁸ Thompson and Garratt, *Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India*, 600.

⁴⁹ Jarboe, *War News in India*, 20.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 25.

victory or defeat is true.”⁵¹ The end of censorship would be the end of the publication of sensational rumors when the truth of the situation would be allowed to occupy the page.⁵²

The Press Act of 1910 would be repealed in 1921 as part of the Montford reforms after the war, an effort to reform the government of India and set the British policy as self-government for India.⁵³

Reforms during the early part of the war were a large area of focus for many of the papers; not just reforms to the censor office, but for all of India. There was an expectation that the end of the war would lead to great things for Indians. According to the *Zamindar*, “We are convinced that self-government will be granted to this country – even if it be compensation for the services of Indians during the war ... We hail with joy the approaching day of our liberty and we feel that it is not far distant.”⁵⁴ The theme of the benefits that would be granted to India after the war was a popular one. The way this benefit would show itself took many shapes. For some, it was self-government; for others, it came in the form of equal citizenship with the British in British colonies over the world. Others suggested grants of land for the families of those killed at the front as an appropriate reward for service.⁵⁵ This certainly expressed the hopes of Indians in the current conflict, as the call to volunteer for service with the British went out and people hoped that good would come of it. But this was also a message for the British authorities who used the newspapers as a way to stay up to date on Indian opinion.⁵⁶ This fact

⁵¹ Ibid., 27.

⁵² Ibid., 25–26.

⁵³ Vincent A. Smith, *The Oxford History of India*, ed. Percival Spear et al., 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), 791.

⁵⁴ Jarboe, *War News in India*, 42.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 40, 44.

⁵⁶ Codell, “Introduction,” 115.

allowed discussion of the benefits India would accrue after the war to serve both as reassurance for the Indian reader and a way to inform the British government about the expectations of the Indians. By discussing the benefits that will accrue to the Indians in specifics not only are they telling the British that they expect some reward for service, but give helpful suggestions. In this way they are attempting to guide British policy, communicating what they saw as an acceptable reward.

Indian expectations reflected a variety of opinions and viewpoints throughout the war. In some cases, it was limited to certain groups. One article from the *Sher-i-Punjab* published in 1915 argued that there was a need for land to be set aside for Indian settlement in German East Africa, because the Sikhs and the Punjabis needed a colony of their own.⁵⁷ Others saw Mesopotamia as the area of Indian colonization. The paper *Desh* argued that India's population (constantly referenced as three hundred million) could greatly benefit from this territory and that it would be a conveniently near place for Indian trade. The question should be decided soon "as in the past Indians have not received rewards proportionate to their energies they devoted in colonizing certain British colonies."⁵⁸ The basis of the argument in 1915 before the Mesopotamian campaign had begun to encounter serious issues was that because Indian troops are conquering Mesopotamia, rewards for their participation should come from that territory. Over three hundred thousand Indians served in Mesopotamia, more than twice the number that would serve in France or Palestine, which gave the campaign an Indian character.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Jarboe, *War News in India*, 65.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 71–72.

⁵⁹ Nikolas Gardner, "Morale and Discipline in a Multiethnic Army: The Indian Army in Mesopotamia (1914–1917)," *Journal of the Middle East & Africa* 4, no. 1 (January 2013): 3, doi:10.1080/21520844.2013.772980.

By November 1915 the campaign had run into difficulties. Before the British and Indian armies could drive the Ottoman Army away from Baghdad they were forced to retreat to Kut Al Amara where the Ottoman Army besieged them. The siege would continue until April 29, 1916, when starvation eventually compelled General Townshend, the garrison commander, to surrender to the victorious Ottoman Army. The *Tribune* of Lahore cautioned readers against assuming that there would be no reverses in the war, assuring its readers “Though India suffers greatly in the Mesopotamian disaster, we are sure that the people will bear the loss and sorrow it has caused with manly and loyal endurance in the in the satisfaction that we have done our duty and will continue to do it until we win.”⁶⁰ The suffering from the Kut disaster was quite large for India; at least two and a half thousand of the over nine thousand Indian soldiers and support staff perished while prisoners of the Ottoman Turks.⁶¹ This military disaster ended the hope in India for a quick conquest in Mesopotamia, as well as the hope for Indian control of Mesopotamia.

Despite these setbacks, Indians still had great expectations for reward from the war. The sacrifices and contributions had deepened their expectations of a movement toward self-government and the reforms desired. The *Desh* of Lahore argued that, “those who want India to contribute to the expenditure should also promote the cause of India by seeking such changes in her administration as Indians desire.”⁶² In 1917, the secretary of state for India Edwin Montagu addressed the House of Commons regarding the policy of the British government towards India. He would unveil a new policy of Indian reforms that would eventually be named the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. The new policy would

⁶⁰ Jarboe, *War News in India*, 120.

⁶¹ Eugene L. Rogan, *The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2015), 272.

⁶² Jarboe, *War News in India*, 137.

be to favor the development of the institutions of self-government with a view toward the establishment of responsible government. Legislation would be entrusted to two new legislative bodies, the Assembly and Council of State; though the viceroy could make laws he felt was necessary. Provinces were also given their own legislative bodies. Issues such as finance and law and order were retained under the control of provincial governors, but other responsibilities would be passed on to ministers who reported to the legislature instead.⁶³ The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms would be finalized only in 1921.⁶⁴ The delay in the reforms and their limited nature caused widespread discontent in India, to which the government replied with repression. Large noncooperation campaigns were organized as the Indian National Congress acquired widespread support, which helped push aside the moderates in the Congress.⁶⁵ Leadership of the Indian National Congress fell to the inspirational figure of Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhi was not a supporter of home rule within the Empire, and he moved the Congress to call for complete independence in a stronger voice.⁶⁶

As reforms began to become a reality in 1917, starting with Indian representation on the Imperial War Council, they were greeted with a mixed response from Indian papers. One writer for the *Tribune* in Lahore urged that careful attention be paid to make certain that the reforms would be more than “a mere symbol without substance.”⁶⁷ Unlike the *Tribune*, which published in English, Urdu language papers such as the *Hindustan*

⁶³ Thompson and Garratt, *Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India*, 603–4.

⁶⁴ Smith, *Oxford History of India*, 780–81.

⁶⁵ Gopal Krishna, “The Development of the Indian National Congress as a Mass Organization, 1918-1923,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 25, no. 3 (1966): 413, 419, doi:10.2307/2051999.

⁶⁶ James, *Rise and Fall of the British Empire*, 420.

⁶⁷ Jarboe, *War News in India*, 159.

and the *Arya Gazette* take a much harder approach. The *Arya Gazette* rails against the choice of representative in London, the Maharaja of Bikaner, after he stated that India was unfit for self-government, demanding that the maharaja “take the trouble of telling us who sent him to England as representative.”⁶⁸ It is important that the criticism was directed at the maharaja, not at those who accepted the maharaja as a representative of India, as the paper tried to criticize government policy without criticizing the British government directly. The papers were attempting to communicate with the British the disapproval felt by Indian reformers toward their representation. This failed for several reasons. The first was that the selection of a maharaja as the Indian representative was in line with a British understanding of India as a feudal society ruled by caste and the gentry. The British were comfortable dealing with the Indian aristocracy and the aristocracy was willing partners with the British.⁶⁹ The second reason is that at this time reform movements were small, made up of the educated and literate, not the great mass of the Indian people. The Indian National Congress would not become a movement that could organize the masses until after the war.

The final year of the war was dominated by the events of the war, rather than hopes for after the war, reflecting the intensity of the war’s crescendo. Reforms had been proposed and were being considered. The issue for 1918 was to make sure that the war would be won, and much attention was placed on the events of the war. The dramatic German Spring offensives and the Allied counteroffensive required of the British Empire another great effort to secure victory. Many Indians were disappointed at the delay, a

⁶⁸ Ibid., 162.

⁶⁹ David Cannadine, *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 44–45.

point reflected in newspapers such as the *Panjabee*. While expressing this disappointment the *Panjabee* still came out in favor of serving the war effort, saying “in spite of their disappointment, Indians of all shades of opinion are united in their determination to do their duty to their country and Empire to their utmost capacity.”⁷⁰ Calls for Indians to serve the British Empire and support the war continued. Now they included calls for the government to carry out what it had promised, from pension and restrictions on recruitment to greater countrywide reforms that India was promised.⁷¹ The newspapers continue to communicate to the government about their expectations even as at the end of the war there were greater demands for loyalty and support, and a more limited framework of permissible opinions.

Throughout the war there was also a great concern among the Indian newspapers about their being excluded from volunteering. The paper’s audience was the educated and the urban, two groups that were not targeted for recruitment by the British. After the 1857 Mutiny the British had begun to focus recruitment among ethnic groups that had stayed loyal to the British, such as the Punjabis. These groups were seen as martial races, and the British believed these races possessed the self-sufficiency, physical and moral resilience, tenacity, courage and loyalty that the nonmartial races lacked.⁷² The other races of India, according to British general Sir George MacMunn in 1933, suffered from the effect of “prolonged years of varying religions on their adherents, or early marriage, of premature brides, and juvenile eroticism, or a thousand years of malaria and hook-

⁷⁰ Jarboe, *War News in India*, 198.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 200,209-10.

⁷² Philip Constable, “The Marginalization of a Dalit Martial Race in Late Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Western India,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 60, no. 2 (2001): 439, doi:10.2307/2659700.

worm, and other ills of neglected sanitation in a hot climate, and the deteriorating effect of aeons of tropical sun on races that were once white and lived in uplands and on cool steppes.”⁷³ Less than 10 percent of the population of British India was classified as martial, and the vast majority of the population was considered nonmartial and was not recruited into the Indian Army.⁷⁴ The men that served with the British were rewarded with a regular wage, a varied diet and a full pension and grants of fertile land after a long service.⁷⁵ The majority of the Indian people were excluded from these opportunities, and from the opportunity to participate in the defense of India. The inhabitants of the lowlands were excluded because they were seen by the British as too unwarlike, flabby, and dark-skinned for military service. The hard life of the Gurkha and the Punjabi made men tough and disciplined, traits that the British believed important for soldiers and that city dwellers did not possess. Ethnic groups that were considered serious agitators were also excluded from recruitment.⁷⁶ Therefore, when the war began and a wave of enthusiasm began to move through the Indian population, the best educated and the larger section of the population were excluded from participation.

The groups excluded from the army found that a cause of great concern. This concern was evident from the very beginning of the war. On August 6 an article appeared in the *Panjabee* proclaiming the loyalty of India to the British, but then complaining

⁷³ Sir George Macmunn, *The Martial Races Of India* (Sampson Low Marston Company Limited, 1933), 2, <http://archive.org/details/martialracesofin030605mbp>.

⁷⁴ Amar Farooqui, “‘Divide and Rule’? Race, Military Recruitment and Society in Late Nineteenth Century Colonial India,” *Social Scientist* 43, no. 3/4 (2015): 53.

⁷⁵ Morton-Jack, *The Indian Army*, 335.

⁷⁶ Omar Khalidi, “Ethnic Group Recruitment in the Indian Army: The Contrasting Cases of Sikhs, Muslims, Gurkhas and Others,” *Pacific Affairs* 74, no. 4 (2001): 530, doi:10.2307/3557805.

It is the loyalty of men who are inalienably attached to the British connection, but who are not to have an opportunity of doing anything – except for the handful of Indians in the army – to demonstrate their love of England and the Empire in an active manner. Everywhere else – from every other part of the Empire – offers of help will come from individuals and communities. The people of India can make no offer of the kind, because they are not permitted to do so.⁷⁷

The rejection of Indians from British service was something that Indian papers complain bitterly about as the war continued to progress. An article published by the *Panjabee* in August 1915 pointed to the discrimination against Indians volunteers as “a great hindrance in the way of his thinking ‘imperially’ and having that Imperial patriotism which he has been asked by friends... to cultivate.”⁷⁸ Indian papers would continue to insist that they were willing to fight loyally for the Empire in what was seen as great challenge of the empire.⁷⁹

The discrimination against the majority of Indians had long been a problem for the Indian National Congress, which pushed for the opening of the Indian Army to all Indians.⁸⁰ Military service had many benefits that came with it, benefits that the Congress wanted to be offered to all Indians, including the educated that represented the majority of the Congress’ members at the time. The newspaper reporting is a facet of this, a means of communicating the desire for access to the British. It was hoped that the war would provide an opportunity to roll back this discrimination and open up military service by presenting it to the British as a great good for the Empire. The *Panjabee*, used

⁷⁷ Jarboe, *War News in India*, 20.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 23.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 79.

⁸⁰ Khalidi, “Ethnic Group Recruitment in the Indian Army,” 531.

the beginning of British conscription to argue for wider Indian recruitment, saying, “We cannot help thinking that if the Government had withdrawn the restriction on volunteering in India, it might not have been necessary for them to resort to compulsion in England.”⁸¹ However, British attitudes towards Indian service did not change. The strain of war caused the British to expand the recruitment population to a slightly larger portion of the population, but the expansion was mostly to groups either closely related to groups already being recruited or groups that had been recruited in the past. When the war ended and the Indian Army was downsized almost the entirety of the groups added during the war were cut, and the recruitment base was narrowed again.⁸² This caused much consternation among the ethnic groups that had hoped to be given access to the benefits of military service.

While papers cater to specific religious and ethnic groups, there is not much evidence of tension between these groups. However, there was a great antipathy towards Anglo-Indians. Anglo-Indians were, as the name suggest, an ethnic group formed of descendants of Europeans and Indians. They existed in an area outside of both Indian and British culture, culturally attached to Britain, but socially marginalized from it, while both culturally and socially marginalized from Indian culture.⁸³ They appear in Indian newspapers such as the *Punjabee* and the *Zamindar* as an enemy to the Indian cause. The Anglo-Indian newspapers had consistently taken the side of the government, and had a great tendency towards racist attacks on Indians.⁸⁴ Unnamed Anglo-Indian newspapers

⁸¹ Jarboe, *War News in India*, 104.

⁸² Cohen, *The Indian Army*, 72–73, 76.

⁸³ Noel P. Gist, “Cultural versus Social Marginality: The Anglo-Indian Case,” *Phylon* (1960-) 28, no. 4 (1967): 365, doi:10.2307/274288.

⁸⁴ Codell, “Introduction,” 114.

were described by the *Panjabee* as repaying “the debt it owes to this country by making a stupid and senseless attack upon His Majesty’s Indian troops.”⁸⁵ In addition to insulting the Indian soldiers fighting for the Empire, Anglo-Indians are described as ridiculing Indian desires for commissions as officers, and the newspapers editors are “largely responsible for the ill-feeling which at present exists between the rulers and the ruled.”⁸⁶ This marginalized group was an easy target for Indian antipathy. The recounted attacks on Indians are easy to imagine, as the Anglo-Indians were described as looking down on the Indians “with a scorn that is acid with hatred.”⁸⁷ Thus a communal distinction between two disadvantaged groups was created that was stronger than many of the distinctions between the various groups of Indians, none of which are attacked as holding back India.

How the war would affect racial distinctions after the war was an important topic in the papers as well. Many papers concluded that the war would be the end of racial discrimination. One article in the *Tribune* insisted that the war would end prejudice of all kinds, because the Germans “white people, *par excellence* [emphasis in original] live on an ethical level with the Huns and possess the moral evils of the Zulus and Masai.”⁸⁸ This, according to the author, ended all the credibility of the white people’s moral superiority. In this the author accomplished the delicate act of criticizing Europeans without directly criticizing the British for ascribing to the theories, and blaming the atrocities of their enemies for the downfall of the prestige of the white race.

⁸⁵ Jarboe, *War News in India*, 32.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 63.

⁸⁷ Elmer L. Hedin, “The Anglo-Indian Community,” *American Journal of Sociology* 40, no. 2 (1934): 168.

⁸⁸ Jarboe, *War News in India*, 64.

Other Indians did not see the atrocities of the Germans as the paramount reason discrimination would come to the end, but rather because of the sacrifices and dedication of India. Indeed this is the only accusation found that linked German atrocities to white people in general, preferring to refer to German culture in specific that is to blame for the atrocities and barbarism. This specificity was most likely more appealing to Indian editors concerned about the survival of their newspapers. In August 1914 the *Zamindar* attacked European nations “which had made other nations war against each other while she stood aloof; which had sharpened her weapons of war by cutting the throats of Muhammadans in Persia, Morocco, Tripoli and the Balkans,” and who were now engaging in war, but refrained from attacking the British, instead praising the British Empire for its principled efforts to reach a settlement.⁸⁹ These attacks in the Indian press against European civilization are not common, most likely because they had come close to overstepping the bounds of criticism that the British censor would allow. But the Indians still engaged in the questions about what is civilization brought on by this great shedding of blood between nominally civilized powers.

The complaints about discrimination are a part of a direct conversation with the British government, expressing again and again the regret that the Indian people are unable to serve in the war, their eagerness to do so, and the large numbers that could be raised to participate with the British war. An article from the *Prabhat* puts the question as one of effectiveness, wondering how effective the illiterate can be as fighters against the patriotic Germans as only the literate can have an understanding of patriotism necessary

⁸⁹ Ibid., 22.

to defeat the Germans.⁹⁰ News from the front in 1915 undermined that point, as Indian soldiers proved capable of forcing back the Germans at such desperate battles such as Neuve Chapelle, where the Indian Corps were the first to successfully break into German lines and manage to hold the newly taken positions.⁹¹ Praise for the Indian Army had come in from many sources during the war from King George to Sir John French, commander of the British Expeditionary Force. However, if the Indian Army was going to continue to fight well it needed to replace its fallen leadership, a particularly difficult problem given the way the Indian Army was led.

In peacetime the Indian Army was led by British officers, who spoke at least one Indian language and who served with the Indian Army for a long time. These men provided leadership that was thought to be essential to Indian units. Many in Britain considered the Indian an excellent fighter when led by white men, but a cowardly one without white leadership.⁹² However, casualties among the white officers leading Indians into battle were extensive, far exceeding the ability of the Indian Army to find officers who spoke Indian languages. Each Indian Army battalion had only twelve British officers when it went to France. In combat, these men tended to lead from the front. As a result they took heavy casualties, and it was not uncommon for battalions to suffer heavily in the hard fighting. Two battalions lost half of their officers in their first engagement. This loss of leadership was especially significant for the British given their views on race. They attributed the retreat of those battalions who had lost their officers to some natural

⁹⁰ Ibid., 26.

⁹¹ Gordon Corrigan, *Sepoys in the Trenches: The Indian Corps on the Western Front 1914-1915*, Kindle (London: Endeavour Press, 2014), Epilogue.

⁹² Jeffrey Greenhut, "Sahib and Sepoy: An Inquiry into the Relationship between the British Officers and Native Soldiers of the British Indian Army," *Military Affairs* 48, no. 1 (January 1, 1984): 16–17, doi:10.2307/1988342.

inferiority of the Indian. For Indian Army officers only the leadership of the British made Indians fight hard. The British did not consider the possibility that it was a common reaction of men who had lost leadership in battle. To remain combat effective the British needed to supply additional officers, but there were not enough qualified officers that could speak any of the languages of India. Therefore, steps were taken to open up the king's commission to existing Indian officers, who, until this point, had been in restricted supplementary leadership roles while the army was on garrison duty at the frontier. This was not undertaken by the British quickly.

The sons of the Indian aristocracy had already been allowed to become officers, such as the Maharaja of Idar, whose trip to the front to join the General Staff was a point of discussion for the foreign newspapers such as the *New York Times*. The *Zamindar* expressed a desire that the children of India "should receive commissions in the army and command Indian armies, in the same way Europeans do."⁹³ The trustworthiness of the Indians was said to be proven by the presence of the sons of the nobility of India in the ranks of the king's officers. This opinion of the proof of Indian trustworthiness was unlikely to have any effect on the opinion of the British about Indians in leadership positions. The martial races theory dominate among the British held that no matter how effective the martial races of India were as soldiers they could under no circumstances be allowed to lead, as they lacked the racial characteristics that allow the Europeans to be effective leaders.⁹⁴ The princes and aristocracy of India were exceptions as they were expected to be natural leaders.⁹⁵ Only reluctantly would the British come to bring other

⁹³ Jarboe, *War News in India*, 63.

⁹⁴ Farooqui, "'Divide and Rule'?", 54.

⁹⁵ Cannadine, *Ornamentalism*, 43.

Indians into the leadership of the Indian Army by opening up the ranks of the officers to Indians.

This reluctance was not understood by Indian newspapers, not only because of their proven trustworthiness and loyalty to Britain. The Indian soldier was at the frontline of the war the same way as the British soldier. They faced the common danger in England's hour of need side by side with the British, and while the dangers for both were equal their prospects were not. The *Tribune* objected to the discrimination, writing "The invidious distinction was sufficiently galling already; it will become twice as galling after their return from Europe."⁹⁶ The *Urdu Bulletin* put the situation more softly around the same time, writing "The enthusiasm, bravery and loyalty which Indian armies are displaying in Europe, Asia and Africa have no parallel. Surely these services should be rewarded by granting Indian officers their real rights and by raising them to commissioned rank."⁹⁷ The raising of Indians to equality with the British was very important to many newspapers seeking reforms after the war. Not only would it be a major victory in the battle for equality, but it would be another argument in their hands for the basic equality of Indians and their ability to self-govern, with the Indians demonstrating their ability to lead. Many saw it as the greatest honor that could be given to India. They would finally be treated as a respectable nation, and then "not only the Punjab, but the whole of India will be ready to sacrifice herself."⁹⁸

The king's commission was eventually granted to Indians in 1917. However, this reform was quite limited in a practical sense. At first it was granted to 9 Indian soldiers

⁹⁶ Jarboe, *War News in India*, 83.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 149.

serving in the field, an act that was hailed in Indian papers as the most practical of reforms. Hope was expressed that there would not be any discrimination, but that Indian youths would be commissioned on equal terms with non-Indian subjects of the king.⁹⁹ This hope would not be realized. Indians were believed to be unfit for command, and in 1918 the process was delayed until after the war.¹⁰⁰

The calls for volunteers became more intense during the latter years of the war, when the papers had in large part to shift from calling people to be allowed to volunteer to urging people to volunteer. The flood of calls began in 1917. In 1916 the papers announced that an infantry unit was being raised in Bengal which “removes a disability which Bengal has always keenly resented... and the success of the experiment will necessarily lead the Government to extend and develop it, until Bengalis are put on the same footing as those races from whom the Indian Army is at present recruited.”¹⁰¹ This offered hope that the Indian Army would become a more inclusive.

In January 1917 the same type of unit was being raised in the Punjab. This opportunity was one that the *Akhbar-i-Am* said “Educated Punjabis had been long waiting for,” and lead papers to put out calls for the educated to serve and “maintain the honour of their province.”¹⁰² The *Khalsa Advocate* seized this opportunity to not only call for volunteers but to extoll the virtues of the Punjab. According to the *Advocate*, “the Punjab, the sword-hand of India, is quite different [from Bengal].... the forming of [a double company, about 250 men] can do credit only to the Bengali babus¹⁰³, the Punjab should

⁹⁹ Ibid., 170.

¹⁰⁰ Jarboe, *War News in India*, 195.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 133.

¹⁰² Ibid., 147.

¹⁰³ An office worker or clerk

not rest until there is available a full regiment.”¹⁰⁴ The article was a stirring call for Punjabi volunteers, appealing to the various martial races of the Punjab such as the Sikhs and the Rajputs to urge the educated to volunteer, and ends with the question, “Will the brave Punjab, of whose warlike spirit and traditions the whole of India is so rightly proud, fail to rise to the occasion now that a call has been made?”¹⁰⁵ The Punjab had a long military tradition, especially among the Sikhs for whom the Punjab was their homeland. This self-image of their province as the martial province, the place where India gets its soldiers, was not created by the British, and drove much of the desire that the educated had for participation in the war.¹⁰⁶ The British had done much to enhance this sense of martial tradition because of the benefits that would be found in developing a desire for martial deeds in the same way as their ancestor that would incentivize service with British armies. This had evidently taken root, and helps explain the drive for recruitment into British service and the success that the British had in the Punjab. The other reason was a cause for some concern among Indians.

While nurturing a martial spirit among the martial races of the Punjab, the British had made every attempt to repress it in the rest of India. Legislation such as the Arms Act of 1878 restricted the carrying of arms to those who were granted licenses. Regions and persons could be exempted from the right to bear arms entirely, as the law allowed local government down district magistrates to cancel or suspend the licenses required for all

¹⁰⁴ Jarboe, *War News in India*, 149.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Tan Tai-Yong, “An Imperial Home-Front: Punjab and the First World War,” *Journal of Military History* 64, no. 2 (2000): 377, doi:10.2307/120244.

arms, from daggers to rifles.¹⁰⁷ The licenses duration and the fee that was required were fixed by the Governor General. In addition the law empowered the government to search house of a person believed to possess any arms, or such a person that, “cannot be left in the possession of any such arms... without danger to the public peace,”¹⁰⁸ This effectively disarmed the majority of the population, reducing the risk of rebellion. The disarmament displeased many Indians, and when it came time for men to be recruited to the army in larger numbers Indian journalists could express their displeasure in terms of lost military effectiveness and martial spirit. “The martial spirit of the people,” according to one article from the *Punjab*, “has been killed by the Arms Act,”¹⁰⁹ Another article from the *Tribune* bemoaned, “The fact that the people are prohibited from using arms, even for personal defense against the depredations of wild beasts... shows that for generations the Indians, as a race, have lost all instinct for military service.”¹¹⁰ If this was true then recruitment from the Punjab was even more essential.

The calls for recruitment were not only focused on proving themselves worthy of their traditions, but also on the state of life in India. The *Siraj-ul-Akhbar* called for recruitment by warning of famine, telling its readers “People who lose the opportunity of enlisting in the army will repent afterwards. Signs of famine are visible in the country and it is necessary that young men should gain honour and fame by joining the army and, instead of ... borrowing on interest, should earn money ... by enlistment in the army.”¹¹¹

The economic situation in the Punjab and India was worsening. The food situation in

¹⁰⁷ Office Of The Superintendent Government Printing India, *The Indian Arms Act 1878*, 1892, 8,10, <http://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.8161>.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹⁰⁹ Jarboe, *War News in India*, 151.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 151–52.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 154.

India was still critical after several preceding years of short crops. A major part of the wheat output of India was devoted to export. With the grain of Russia and the Balkans cut off, the British government had seen the need to ensure the supply of grain, which could be extorted out of India at fixed prices, depriving farmers of the profits that could have been available to sustain their farms without taking on debt.¹¹² The price of food rose in India, exacerbated by the increasing demands for India's resources and money. Cash contributions numbered just less than £600,000,000 during the 1914-1918 period in loans and gifts to the British government.¹¹³ In addition there had been a collapse of the export market due to the restrictions of war. Indian newspapers such as the *Akhbar-i-Am* had noticed this economic effect early in the war, commenting in September 1914 to object to rising grain prices.¹¹⁴ By 1915 some papers claimed that industry and credit had collapsed to such an extent that the normal ways of life had been brought to an end.¹¹⁵ The situation in India was getting worse, and the army offered at least steady pay, pensions, and an opportunity for honor.

The Punjab could not continue to bear the majority of the British requirements for manpower. Over the course of the war about 60 percent of the combat troops of the Indian Army were recruited from the Punjab, and the province was mobilized for war and recruitment, which climaxed in 1918.¹¹⁶ Recruitment was still technically voluntary, but a great demand for manpower led to unofficial methods of compulsion to secure the needed

¹¹² Amiya Kumar Bagchi, "Indian Economy and Society during World War One," *Social Scientist* 42, no. 7/8 (2014): 18.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 14.

¹¹⁴ Jarboe, *War News in India*, 31.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 78.

¹¹⁶ Tai-Yong, "An Imperial Home-Front," 374.

number of recruits.¹¹⁷ This unofficial compulsion could be found throughout India, but the Punjab felt the strain especially. Several newspapers insisted that the Punjab had borne more than its share. The *Tribune* of Lahore expressed this in May, saying, “The Punjab is proud of being constantly described as the ‘sword hand of India,’ but equality of sacrifice,... is an accepted principle at the present time, and the Punjabi, while continuing to do his duty to his king and country, has a right to expect that the burden laid on him be equitable.”¹¹⁸ This equality of sacrifice led some Sikhs to favor conscription for India, given that, “So far as the Sikhs are concerned conscription and voluntary recruitment mean the same thing because the flower of the Sikh community is already serving in the Army.”¹¹⁹ Despite the strain that was placed on the Punjab still the call went out for more and more recruits, demonstrating the intense need the British felt for men during 1918. The complaints about the demand are framed in such a way that they call for India to take more of a part, not less. Still in 1918 the expectation was that India should give more and more for the British Empire. Much was expected after the war.

In November 1918, with the war coming to a close, there was cause for much rejoicing in India. According to one article in the *Tribune* of Lahore, “It is no small gratification to us Indians that we have taken a substantial share in bring about the present victory and in the first stage of the war as well as in the last, it is Indian valor and the Indian blood that produced momentous results in France and in Turkey. India’s rejoicings on the present occasion will, therefore, be no less than those of England or

¹¹⁷ Aravind Ganachari, “First World War: Purchasing Indian Loyalties: Imperial Policy of Recruitment and ‘Rewards,’” *Economic and Political Weekly* 40, no. 8 (February 19, 2005): 786.

¹¹⁸ Jarboe, *War News in India*, 194.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 195.

France or America.”¹²⁰ The loyalty and deeds of India were seen as ample evidence of her worthiness for equality and other reforms. The situation was not all positive. The influenza outbreak had already reached India by October, and would ravage the country until 1919, killing twelve million people before the disease burned out.

In the immediate political situation after the war, the reward was not what was expected. Harsh legislation, called the Rowlatt, or Black Acts, was quickly pushed through the Imperial Legislative Council. These acts continued the powers of the Defense of India Act that empowered the government along the lines of martial law, and introduced a tougher Press Act. The Indian elected members of the Legislative Council were all opposed, and several resigned their council seats when the acts were passed.¹²¹ This treatment was seen as a betrayal of the promise of home rule and reform that had been made during the war. That bitter disappointment of the hope evident through Indian newspapers of the period contributed to the Indian revolutionaries change in attitude. Home rule within the British Empire would have required a fundamental change in British attitudes towards India. When the Black Acts were pushed through, it demonstrated that India’s willing and sometimes enthusiastic support for the Empire had not changed how the British Empire saw India.

India’s educated elite desired to sacrifice for Britain, not for some slavish loyalty, but with the expectation for reward for this dedication in the Empire’s time of need. The calls for people to serve the British and to end agitation against the British during the war were in expectation that if India did its part in the war then it could expect to be treated appropriately. The newspapers gave evidence of a certain enthusiasm for Britain’s war

¹²⁰ Ibid., 212.

¹²¹ Wolpert, *A New History of India*, 298.

effort, but this was all predicated on the expectation that by fighting for Britain the situation of India can be improved. The state of affairs as it was before the war was quite unsatisfactory for India, and the war held opportunity and hope for a better future. By dashing that hope in the end, the British demonstrated the need for independence and strengthened that movement.

Chapter Two: India in the *Times of London*: The Spirit of Empire

India had a central position in the British Empire. British statesman Lord Curzon, then viceroy of India, said in 1901 that “As long as we rule India we are the greatest power in the world.”¹²² India had a large role in supporting and expanding the British Empire through its resources and soldiers. Behind the exploitation of the manpower, material and financial resources of India was a conceptual understanding of the British Empire itself that rationalized and justified the actions. This chapter examines how the British understood India during the period of the First World War by looking at its representation in the *Times of London*. The changing focus of the newspaper articles from India’s martial contributions to examining India’s position in the Empire contributes to the post war difficulties in British India, and the turn toward repression that seal the fate of the British Raj. First, it is important to establish the context of the British government of India before delving into their response to India’s participation.

When the British Raj was sent to war in 1914, it did so under the leadership of Lord Crewe, the secretary of state for India, and Lord Hardinge, the viceroy. The position of secretary of state for India was a cabinet position, and directed Indian policy from Great Britain.¹²³ The viceroy served as the representative of the Crown in India and its Governor-General, the leader of the Indian government’s executive branch. The viceroy was in command of the bureaucracy of the Indian government, which was staffed mostly by British government servants, and only a few Indians. The viceroy was advised by the Executive Council, a body made up mostly of the heads of the various ministries of

¹²² Lawrence James, *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire* (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2005), 204.

¹²³ Vincent A. Smith, *The Oxford History of India*, ed. Percival Spear et al., 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), 673.

government, whose future prospects were controlled by the viceroy. The first Indian member of the Executive Council, Lord Sinha, was added in 1909.¹²⁴

Legislative duties were handled by legislative councils at the government and regional levels, but there was no attempt to give these bodies any sort of representative form. The legislative council was also not the only source of laws for India. The viceroy had the power to enact ordinances, and the British government had the power to require the viceroy and council to pass laws it chose.¹²⁵ This system fit with a British conception of a rigid social hierarchy in India, where each caste remained in its established role and social order. On top of the Indian hierarchy, according to David Cannadine, “the British constructed a system of government that was simultaneously direct and indirect, authoritarian and collaborationist, but that always took for granted the reinforcement and preservation of tradition and hierarchy.”¹²⁶ The conservatives in power in the British government in 1914 saw no reason to change the status quo and affect imperial solidarity.¹²⁷ In this they were supported by an imperialistic and conservative press.

This imperialistic and conservative press was reflected in articles published in the *Times* during this period. Which is why it serves as this chapter’s main window into the period. The paper was owned by the conservative media baron Lord Northcliffe and had at the beginning of the war a circulation in London of around 150,000 copies.¹²⁸ Those numbers were not very large compared to the most circulated paper of the time, the *Daily*

¹²⁴ Edward John Thompson and Geoffrey Theodore Garratt, *Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India* (New York: AMS Press, 1971), 529.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ David Cannadine, *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 43.

¹²⁷ James, *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire*, 325.

¹²⁸ John M. McEwen, “The National Press during the First World War: Ownership and Circulation,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 17, no. 3 (1982): 468.

Mail, also owned by Lord Northcliffe. The *Daily Mail* circulated around 950,000 papers for half the price, but the *Times* was one of the most highly regarded and influential papers of the period. According to John M. McEwen, in 1914 the *Times* was one of the two papers “which all who were concerned with public affairs must read.”¹²⁹

While the majority of the articles in the *Times* are written by British reporters, Indians were given some opportunity to have their opinions and perspectives presented in the British press. The opinions of important Indian princes and other figures were the subject of articles such as the November 4, 1914 article titled “Indian Moslem Loyalty. The Action of Turkey Denounced. Not A Religious War.” or the January 2, 1918 article titled “‘The Case For India.’ Mrs. Besant’s Address To National Congress.”¹³⁰ The views Indians profess in articles such as these are filtered by the British press. This limited the Indian’s ability to make their true opinions clear to the British people free of the bias already inherent in the publication.

When the war began in 1914 and the press began to report on the situation in India the first interest was Indian loyalty. On August 6th 1914 the *Times* ran its first article about India and the war, titled “Indian Loyalty,” in which it was stated “The Indian Empire faces the crisis united, and it is believed that no internal trouble will embarrass the Administration.”¹³¹ The *Times*, unlike the *New York Times* as will be discussed in a later chapter, did not find that India’s loyalty during 1914 required much

¹²⁹ Ibid., 462.

¹³⁰ “Indian Moslem Loyalty,” *Times*, November 4, 1914, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1914-11-04/7/7.html>; “The Case For India Mrs. Besant’s Address To National Congress,” *Times*, January 2, 1918, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1918-01-02/5/5.html>.

¹³¹ “Indian Loyalty,” *Times*, August 7, 1914, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/archive/article/1914-08-07/5/7.html>.

attention or comment. The term appears 4 times in the collection of 40 articles that were published about India and the war that year.




Figure 1 - Word counts in 1914 headlines about India for counts over 3

As Figure 1 demonstrates, loyalty is referenced at a much lower rate than France. The articles about Indian loyalty all present their loyalty as obvious and expected, and most of them come from November 1914, immediately after the Ottoman Empire joined Britain's enemies when the German warships *Goeben* and *Breslau* sailed into the Black Sea and raided the Russian cities of Sevastapol, Odessa, and Novorossisk on October 29 and 30. The British Admiralty would send out the orders to commence hostilities with the Ottoman Empire on the October 31^t.¹³² Word of this situation had traveled to India quickly, with the viceroy issuing a communique soon after. In which, according to the article "India Stedfast [sic] Moslem Loyalty to the Empire", "Regret is expressed that Turkey has been decoyed into ranging herself on the side of England's enemies."¹³³ In the same article the writer described the India Muslims as anxious for the preservation of Turkish independence and the protection of the holy places of Islam. Despite these desires, loyalty to the British Empire, which one Muslim leader described as "the great Moslem Power in the world." was expressed by the Indian Muslim leadership.¹³⁴ By November a report had reached the *Times* from Bombay that, "The Nizam of Haidarabad has issued a stirring manifesto, declaring that it is the bounded duty of Indian Mahomedans to adhere firm to their old and tried loyalty to the British Government."¹³⁵

¹³² Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis*, Bloomsbury Revelations (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 398.

¹³³ "India Stedfast Moslem Loyalty to the Empire," *Times*, November 2, 1914, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1914-11-02/10/3.html>.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ "Indian Moslem Loyalty," *Times*, November 4, 1914, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1914-11-04/7/7.html>.

The *Times* could assure its readers that the situation in India was under control and the Indians loyal.

The editors of the times focused on the demonstration of Indian loyalty, the arrival of the Indian Army in France to fight side by side with the British Army. The morale-boosting presence of Indian troops at the fighting front was topic of much comment. The article about the arrival the Indian Army at Marseilles, titled “The Indian Troops at Marseilles, Arrival of Transports, An Army of Happy Warriors, Splendid Welcome by the Population,” is filled with exultations on the quality of the arriving Indian Army, and the joy that the French have in welcoming their new comrades to the fight. Most importantly the author has “seen welded before my eyes, as it were, what may well prove to be the strongest link in that singular and wonderful chain which we call the British Empire.”¹³⁶ Articles such as “‘Taube’ Brought Down by Indians” and “Indian Troops at the Front, An Ingenious Ruse, Wasted German Literature,” tell the reader of the Indian soldier’s fighting ability. In these examples the article describes an Indian bringing down German airplanes with well-aimed shots and deceiving the Germans and escaping from them with important information.¹³⁷ The critical situation in France had demanded a reinforcement of the British Army there, which had already survived the difficult battles on the frontier and at the Marne. When the Indian Army arrived at the front in large numbers in late October and early November 1914 it constituted one third

¹³⁶ “The Indian Troops at Marseilles,” *Times*, October 2, 1914, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1914-10-02/9/14.html>.

¹³⁷ “Taube Brought down by Indians,” *Times*, November 1, 1914, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1914-11-01/1/6.html>; “Indian Troops At The Front,” *Times*, November 25, 1914, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1914-11-25/3/8.html>.

of the British Army on the western front.¹³⁸ The importance of the Indians to the war effort in 1914 was immense as reinforcements to the front and as proof of the might and unity of the British Empire.

This importance was reflected in the words associated with *Indian* in the headlines. The term *Indian* co-occurred with the word *troops* 96 percent of the time in 1914, but by 1915 that association has fallen to 31 percent. By the next year *Indian* co-occurred with *soldiers* only 27 percent of the time, only slightly more than it was associated with *Brighton*, 21 percent, whose hospital cared for Indian wounded. The Indian Corps' withdrawal from the western front caused this drop. With that, Indian Army units fought in theaters such as German East Africa, Egypt and Mesopotamia, which were much more inaccessible to British reporters. Where information for articles such as "Background of a Battle, Neuve Chapelle in a New Light, An Observer's Story," which described the Indian Corps advance during the battle, were much more difficult to obtain. A detached observer from the Royal Artillery told a story of grinning Indian wounded flush with victory and Gurkhas guarding prisoners twice their size only because he happened on an excuse to be there.¹³⁹ With the transport of the Indian Army away from central theater of the war the Indian Army's military contribution slipped away from the view of the British public.

In 1915 the topics covered in relation to India expanded as the war grows, and the battle on the western front no longer dominate India's role in the war. The focus

¹³⁸ George Morton-Jack, "The Indian Army on the Western Front, 1914–1915: A Portrait of Collaboration," *War in History* 13, no. 3 (July 2006): 329, doi:10.1191/0968344506wh344oa.

¹³⁹ "Background of a Battle Neuve Chapelle in a New Light An Observers Story," *Times*, March 20, 1915, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1915-03-20/8/1.html>.

expanded beyond the western front, though as Figure 2 demonstrates the front was still a significant part. The extra months of time and the expansion of India's role in the war caused by its global nature leads to more about India's position in the empire being addressed.




Figure 2 - Word counts in 1915 headlines about India for counts over 3, with the terms *India* and *Indian* removed

The expansion of topics brought India's main theater of war into greater focus. In 1914 the British began advancing on Ottoman territory in the Persian Gulf almost immediately after the declaration of war between the two powers was formalized on November 5, 1914. A force from India had been dispatched to the area to protect British interests in October, with orders to invade Ottoman Mesopotamia if war broke out.¹⁴⁰ An article in the *Times*, titled "Turks Defeated In The Persian Gulf. Enemy's Camp Captured. British Casualties Small," published an official dispatch from the secretary of state for India announcing the capture of Fao in the Persian Gulf, and several battles in the area.¹⁴¹ It is important to note that this information was being released by the India Office, not the War Office. The operation was organized by the government of India, which supplied the troops and directed the operations. There were some concerns about the advisability of the operations within the Indian Office and the government of India, but the operation went forward regardless. The Indian government was concerned about the possible effects of antagonizing the Ottoman Empire and the dangers of Jihad, but London overruled this consideration. More value was placed on the protection of the oil and the prevention of a loss of prestige among the Arabs.¹⁴² Therefore the campaign was set in motion. These doubts were not revealed in the updates on the campaign published in the *Times*, which focused on the events of the campaign, and little on their justification.

¹⁴⁰ Charles Townshend, *Desert Hell: The British Invasion of Mesopotamia* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), 4.

¹⁴¹ "Turks Defeated in the Persian Gulf Enemy's Camp Captured British Casualties Small," *Times*, November 17, 1914, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1914-11-17/7/2.html>.

¹⁴² Townshend, *Desert Hell*, 22.

On January 13, 1915, extracts from an officer's diary were published in the article "Letters from the Front. Fall of Basra. An Officer's Diary," which detailed the course of the campaign from the embarkation at Bombay until December 1. This diary extract covered movements and activities of the expedition from the perspective of "an Officer serving with the British force," covering the ease with which the town of Basra was occupied.¹⁴³ News of the campaign died down until March, when the India Office started to release other statements after the occurrence of further fighting. The situation involved the advance of Ottoman reinforcements which forced British units to retreat, but the news in April was more positive for the British. On April 15 the article "Three Attacks. Renewed Fighting in Mesopotamia. Large Turkish Forces." tells of renewed Ottoman pressure on British forces, but, according to the article, "the General Officer Commanding decided to assume the offensive, which was completely successful, the enemy being driven of northwards by 11 a.m."¹⁴⁴ The successful advance continues to dominate the news, with articles appearing titled "British Victory over Turks. Heavy Fighting on the Euphrates. Enemy in Retreat." and "The March on Baghdad. Turks in Full Flight. Many Men and Guns Captured." until November 30 1915, when the British retreated from Baghdad in the face of approaching Ottoman reinforcements.¹⁴⁵ The

¹⁴³ "Letters from the Front Fall of Basra An Officers Diary," *Times*, January 13, 1915, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1915-01-13/6/1.html>.

¹⁴⁴ "Three Attacks Renewed Fighting in Mesopotamia Large Turkish Forces," *Times*, April 15, 1915, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1915-04-15/9/9.html>.

¹⁴⁵ "British Victory over Turks Heavy Fighting on the Euphrates Enemy in Retreat," *Times*, April 17, 1915, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1915-04-17/8/4.html>; "The March on Baghdad Turks in Full Flight Many Man and Guns Captured," *Times*, September 30, 1915, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1915-09-30/6/10.html>; "Enemy Strength At Baghdad Reinforcements Arriving British Withdrawal To The River Turkish Division Wiped Out," *Times*, November 30, 1915, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1915-11-30/8/6.html>.

reports recreated the main thrust of the campaign accurately, with only a few mistakes regarding the depth of advance. Not much information was given to explain the reasons for fighting beyond the campaign; instead the army goes from victory to victory deeper and deeper into Mesopotamia. The advance had begun to move up the Euphrates in September 1915 with the intention of crushing the Ottoman army there to open the way to Baghdad.¹⁴⁶ Despite what was presented in the articles, in which the term *Baghdad* and *victory* co-occur at a rate of 43 percent, there was no crushing victory that made that possible. The campaign had a great need for reinforcements if Baghdad was going to be taken or held. These reinforcements, like most of the soldiers fighting the campaign would be part of the Indian army.

That fact very rarely found expression in the *Times*. In 1914, while the campaign was young, it still had a definite Indian character beyond the fact that the reports were emanating from the India Office. The article “Persian Gulf Success, Capture of Ports on the Tigris, Surrender of Turkish Forces,” was explicitly “regarding the progress of the Indian Expeditionary Force,” which reflected the reality of the expedition’s make up.¹⁴⁷ This Indian emphasis faded away in 1915. More and more the troops were referenced simply as our troops or our forces. The article from June 4th 1915 titled “Turkish Rout. British Victory in Mesopotamia. Pursuit by Water.” exemplifies this, referring to “Our troops” skillfully executing flanking movements, “Our forces” advancing and “Our casualties,” which combined with the headline indicates a British force, rather than an

¹⁴⁶ F. J. (Frederick James) Moberly, *The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914-1918. Compiled, at the Request of the Government of India, under the Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence* (London H.M. Stationery Office, 1923), 4, <http://archive.org/details/campaigninmesopo02mobe>.

¹⁴⁷ “Persian Gulf Success,” *Times*, December 10, 1914, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1914-12-10/8/5.html>.

imperial force.¹⁴⁸ *British* was the term associated with *Baghdad*, *Turks* and *victory*, not *India*, *Indian* or *Indians*. In effect the Indians were being written out of the fighting for the British reader. This is representative of British views of their Empire as one cohesive force in the war.

The presence of Indian troops in the newspapers has not disappeared entirely from the pages of the *Times*. Tributes to the fighting qualities of the Indian Army fighting for the British appear several times in articles. The article “Loyal India. Troops in Five War Areas. Lord Hardinge’s Tribute,” recounts a speech given by the viceroy to the Indian Legislative Council praising Indian troops that have fighting side by side with the British “in five theatres of war – in France, Egypt, East Africa, the Persian Gulf, and China.”¹⁴⁹ Another article, “The New Tie with India. Lord Bryce on the Deeds of Her Soldiers,” writes of the “ripening in the Indian Army that spirit of loyalty and devotion to its leaders and among us that appreciation of the noble qualities of Indian troops, both of which had now found most remarkable illustration and display,”¹⁵⁰ These articles point to a wider spirit of the Empire, and hoped that the war would bring about the greater solidarity of the British Empire as it stood united in trial of war, a hope that had been held by many of the Empire’s great proponents.¹⁵¹ This idea was strong in the early years of the war, but the strain of the war tested the strength of this idea over a long period. This idea of the war as part of the creation of a wider empire appears in an article “Australian Tribute to

¹⁴⁸ “Turkish Rout British Victory in Mesopotamia Pursuit by Water,” *Times*, June 4, 1915, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1915-06-04/8/8.html>.

¹⁴⁹ “Loyal India Troops in Five War Areas Lord Hardinges Tribute,” *Times*, January 14, 1915, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1915-01-14/7/3.html>.

¹⁵⁰ “The New Tie with India Lord Bryce on the Deeds of Her Soldiers,” *Times*, March 19, 1915, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1915-03-19/7/11.html>.

¹⁵¹ Adam Hochschild, *To End All Wars: A Story of Loyalty and Rebellion, 1914-1918* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011), 29.

Indian Troops.”¹⁵² The article recounted “a fine exhibition of true Empire spirit around the camp fire,” at Gallipoli both of loyal support and the bonds created in combat.

Articles like these heightened the impression for the reader that the war was bringing the Empire closer together, while drawing attention to India’s many actions in support of the Empire.

Articles about the Indian wounded also reflect this Empire spirit. The fighting on the western front produced many wounded, and arrangements had to be made specifically for the Indian wounded. Many of the castes and religions had very specific requirements for their food, water and other requirements, and a hospital was established in Brighton specifically to answer this need.¹⁵³ An article, “Indians in Brighton Hospital. Care for Caste Prejudices,” discussed the treatment Indian religion and caste required. According to the article at Brighton “There were eight different kinds of diet, and separate cookhouses for six different classes. The Hindu cooks must in all cases be of the same caste as the patients ... or of a higher caste.”¹⁵⁴ This attention to custom was part of Britain’s understanding of India and how it justified continual rule. Caste became more rigid during British rule as British adjusted to, and incorporated the caste system in to how it governed India, making caste a part of the census and the legal system.¹⁵⁵ The Indian Army was especially reflective of this, as respect for Indian custom was a way that Indian loyalty was secured, and a lot of effort was made to supply the arrangements

¹⁵² “Australian Tribute to Indian Troops,” *The Times*, September 28, 1915, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1915-09-28/7/5.html>.

¹⁵³ Sir Walter Roper Lawrence, *The India We Served*, 2nd ed. (London: Cassell and Company, 1929), 269–70.

¹⁵⁴ “Indians in Brighton Hospital Care for Caste Prejudices,” *Times*, September 4, 1915, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1915-09-04/3/16.html>.

¹⁵⁵ Cannadine, *Ornamentalism*, 41–42.

needed on campaign.¹⁵⁶ Demonstrating the British respect for Indian culture served as part of the idea of the Empire. It assured the reader that British rule in India was just and accepted by the Indians. The British had not come to impose foreign practices on a people, but treated them as they deserved. This is the most positive view of the British Empire, that of the respectful father, guiding the Empire as a whole.

The spirit of the Empire is shown by the appreciation shown by Indians being cared for. The article, “Wounded Indians. A Visit to Brighton Pavilion,” published in January 1915, remarks at length on the elaborate care given to the Indians. It concluded by highlighting the appreciation shown by the Indians, which was such that, “it remains only to wish that the king himself could be there and see this beautiful childlike faith in his fatherly solicitude for his soldiers.”¹⁵⁷ Another article titled “Grateful Indians. An Appreciation of ‘Nice Arrangements’” validated the view that respect shown for Indian needs makes Indians loyal, as the Indian soldier writing to the paper insists that the efforts of the government to care for the Indian has fired the loyalty of the Indian so that everyone wants to sacrifice and pray for the success of the kind government. The Indian hospital in Brighton was closed in February 1916, and was featured in another series of articles in the *Times*. The articles featuring headlines such as “‘In the King’s Palace.’ Indians Appreciation of the Brighton Hospital” and “Indian Memorial at Brighton. Maharaja of Patiala’s Gift” continued to emphasize the appreciation Indians had felt for their care by the mother country.¹⁵⁸ The article “Indian Memorial at Brighton. Maharaja

¹⁵⁶ Morton-Jack, “The Indian Army on the Western Front, 1914–1915,” 335.

¹⁵⁷ “Wounded Indians a Visit to Brighton Pavilion,” *The Times*, January 2, 1915, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1915-01-02/11/6.html>.

¹⁵⁸ “In the King’s Palace Indians’ Appreciation of the Brighton Hospital,” *The Times*, February 18, 1916, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1916-02-18/3/7.html>;

of Patiala's Gift," described the memorial as marking "the historic fact of Indians coming to this country to fight for the King-Emperor, and also as a way of grateful recognition of the hospitality of the inhabitants towards the thousands of Indian fighting men,"¹⁵⁹ By showing the public demonstrations of the care the government has for the people of the Empire the paper was fostering that spirit of Empire, and showing the public that it was appreciated helped that spirit as well. The British public was assured that the Empire was appreciated, and valued by the Indians. This might dissuade those who were not convinced that the Empire should continue to exist in the same state it had been.

This spirit is found still further in article about Indian soldiers interacting with the heart of the Empire. Wounded Indians recovering in England had the opportunity to travel into London and see the important sights of the Empire. These trips were described in one article, "Indian Pilgrims to the Abbey. Wounded Soldiers in London," as a pilgrimage to Westminster, as the wounded were eager to "see the hallowed place of the Coronation of their King-Emperor and the Throne on which he was seated,"¹⁶⁰ Other articles, such as the article "Wounded Indians in London. At Lord Roberts's Grave," and "Sikh Sightseers. Indian Soldiers' Visit to London," also point to an Indian pilgrimage to London, in this case specifically to visit the grave of a great hero of the Empire.¹⁶¹ These articles reinforced Britain as the center of the Empire. The Indian visitors that had

"Indian Memorial At Brighton Maharaja Of Patiala's Gift," *The Times*, September 27, 1916, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1916-09-27/5/25.html>.

¹⁵⁹ "Indian Memorial at Brighton Maharaja of Patiala's Gift."

¹⁶⁰ "Indian Pilgrims to the Abbey Wounded Soldiers in London," *The Times*, April 22, 1915, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1915-04-22/5/5.html>.

¹⁶¹ "Wounded Indians in London at Lord Roberts Grave," *The Times*, January 6, 1915, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1915-01-06/4/7.html>; "Sikh Sightseers Indian Soldiers Visit to London," *The Times*, April 9, 1915, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1915-04-09/10/9.html>.

traveled a long way to fight for the empire were also demonstrated to be reverent toward the imperial heartland. This reinforced the relationship between empire and subject, and the relative position of the two groups in the Empire. It presented it in the best light.

When the Indian Army units were relocated from the western front in 1915, the events of the war were no longer as conducive towards fostering the spirit of Empire.




Figure 3 - Word counts in 1916 headlines about India for counts over 3, with the terms *India* and *Indian* removed

In 1916 the end of the Indian Army's participation on the western front effect is reflected in the headlines. The word frequency graph in Figure 3 demonstrates the remarkable fall in frequency of terms such as *front* and *wounded*, which reflects the Indian Army's withdrawal, but there is a dramatic rise in the usage of terms such as *Kut*, *Mesopotamia*, and *Tigris*, as well as *relief* and *inquiry*. These all revolve around the continuation of the Mesopotamian campaign, as the initial stage came to a dramatic end around the town of Kut al Amara, as the British public looked on, trying to understand the cause of the reverse.

The initial news in the *Times* that there were difficulties with the advance into Mesopotamia was on November 30 1915 when the article "Enemy Strength at Baghdad. Reinforcements Arriving, British Withdrawal to the River, Turkish Division Wiped Out," appeared in the paper. The article presented the situation in a good light, as the British force was described as having defeated a greatly superior force before retreating. The retreat to Kut was presented as orderly, in the article published on December 14 1915, titled "Turks Held at Kut. Four Days' Artillery Attacks. Reinforcements Pushing Forward." it was reported that reinforcements were already on their way.¹⁶² When 1916 began the main message is that the relief force was advancing from victory to victory, as recounted in articles such as "The Relief of Kut. Advance up The Tigris. Defeat of the Turks. British Force In Pursuit." And "The Kut Rescue Force. 23 Miles Distant. Turkish

¹⁶² "Turks Held at Kut Four Days' Artillery Attacks Reinforcements Pushing Forward," *London*, December 14, 1915, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1915-12-14/8/4.html>.

Attack on British Camp.” that continued without fail until April 1916.¹⁶³ The article “Mesopotamian Dispatches. The Advance to Kut. Battles on the Karun and Euphrates.” implied that the Turks are in flight and relief would be soon at hand.¹⁶⁴ However, the forces besieged at Kut would surrender before the end of April. The situation left many in Britain confused about the failure of the expedition, and who was to blame.

The inquiry into the failure of the Mesopotamia expedition was conducted through 1916 and 1917. The news from 1916 was mainly of the establishment of the commission, and only a little information about the finding was revealed at the time, but there was a general desire to find the one responsible. It was soon established that Major-General C. V. Townshend, the commander of the besieged forces was not to blame, not in the view of the public. The articles that surrounded the news of the surrender such as “The Hero of Kut. General Townshend’s Record.” and “The Efforts to Save Kut. Failure of Old British Aeroplanes. Gen. Townshend Keeps His Sword.” treated him as a hero, saying “No general was ever less to blame for a disastrous enterprise,”¹⁶⁵ If the general was not to blame, then it must be the government. The article, “Mesopotamia. The Government Give Way. Inquiry Granted. A Bill for Full Powers.” reported on the creation of committees to investigate the disasters in Mesopotamia and at the

¹⁶³ “The Relief of Kut Advance up the Tigris Defeat of the Turks British Force in Pursuit,” *The Times*, January 11, 1916, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1916-01-11/8/5.html>; “The Kut Rescue Force 23 Miles Distant Turkish Attack on British Camp,” *The Times*, January 27, 1916, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1916-01-27/8/4.html>.

¹⁶⁴ “Mesopotamian Dispatches the Advance to Kut Battles on the Karun and Euphrates,” *The Times*, April 6, 1916, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1916-04-06/12/2.html>.

¹⁶⁵ “The Hero of Kut General Townshend’s Record,” *The Times*, May 1, 1916, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1916-05-01/8/7.html>; “The Efforts to Save Kut Failure of Old British Aeroplanes Gen. Townshend Keeps His Sword,” *The Times*, May 2, 1916, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1916-05-02/8/7.html>.

Dardanelles. According to the article the government was forced to appoint the committees because of the strength of public feeling, despite the prime minister's feeling that the situation was under control.¹⁶⁶ The testimony before the committee by a variety of officials made the newspaper. These articles, such as "The Mesopotamia Inquiry. Indian Officials' Evidence." could report on nothing more than which witnesses were being examined, as the process of the committee was classified and as such information would come to the British public until 1917.¹⁶⁷ The final results of the inquiry were published in June, 1917. The article "Mesopotamia 1915-16. A Candid Report. The Cabinet and the Viceroy. Gambling on Bad Advice. Horrors of Sick and Wounded." reports the commission laying the blame for the failure on members of the India Office and government of India, such as the viceroy, Lord Hardinge, and the secretary of state for India, Austen Chamberlain.¹⁶⁸ The public blamed the India office for failing to support their fighting men with proper medical care and transport. The whole tragedy became a British story, one about the failure of a British department to support British soldiers. Even discussion about the situation on the ground, such as the article "Letters from the Front. The Men and the Officers. Lack of Tea in Mesopotamia," discussed mostly the British. The letter reproduced in the article complained about the failure to supply tea, something that is inexcusable because, as the author put it "As you know,

¹⁶⁶ "Mesopotamia the Government Give Way Inquiry Granted a Bill for Full Powers," *The Times*, July 21, 1916, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1916-07-21/9/15.html>.

¹⁶⁷ "The Mesopotamia Inquiry Indian Officials Evidence," *The Times*, October 25, 1916, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1916-10-25/7/11.html>.

¹⁶⁸ "Mesopotamia 1915-1916 A Candid Report The Cabinet and the Viceroy Gambling on Bad Advice Horrors of Sick and Wounded Strong Censure," *The Times*, June 27, 1917, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1917-06-27/7/10.html>.

Thomas Atkins is a great tea drinker, especially when he can get no beer,” and he placed the failure to get needed supplies on Indian statesmen.¹⁶⁹

This emphasis on the British aspects of the expedition cut the majority of the force besieged in Kut and in the relief force from the view of the British public. The expedition as a whole was conducted by the government of India with Indian troops. The 6th Indian division besieged at Kut consisted mostly of Indians with some British troops attached in the standard manner. The relief column was centered on the 3rd (Lahore) and 7th (Meerut) Divisions of the Indian Army, veterans of the fighting in France and originally intended to aid in holding Baghdad.¹⁷⁰ But the articles focused on the British, especially the British units and officers attached to the Indians that made up the majority of the fighting force. The contribution of India to the fighting is only occasionally addressed in the *Times* in article such as “India’s Great War Services. Viceroy’s Speech In The Legislative Council.” which drew attention to India’s global contributions to the imperial war effort, maintaining troops in France, Egypt, Mesopotamia and on the Indian frontier.¹⁷¹ However articles such as these are in the minority. The co-occurrence of the term *Indian* and *Brighton*, 21 percent, is almost as high as the co-occurrence of the terms *Indian* and *soldiers*, 27 percent.

While in 1916 the references to Indians fighting on the battle front became fewer and fewer, there start to be references to reforms that are going on in India, specifically

¹⁶⁹ “Letters from the Front the Men and the Officers Lack of Tea in Mesopotamia Formidable Foes on the Tigris,” *The Times*, August 9, 1916, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1916-08-09/5/2.html>.

¹⁷⁰ Moberly, *The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914-1918.*, 126.

¹⁷¹ “India’s Great War Services Viceroy’s Speech In The Legislative Council,” *The Times*, September 8, 1916, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1916-09-08/7/7.html>.

the opening up of the officer ranks to Indians. An examination of Figure 3 shows that the term officer is not an infrequent one in 1916, but most of those references are in articles such as “King and Indian Officers.” which announced that Indian officers were received by the King, or “Indian Commissions. Conditions of Grant to Selected Officers.” which detailed the requirements needed to be granted a commission in the Indian Army from the Territorial Forces and Kitchener’s New Armies.¹⁷² The article “Commissions for Indians”, which ran on June 20 1916 , called for the arrival of commissions to Indians because “After the heroism displayed in the war by Ruling Chiefs, by Indian officers, and by the rank and file of the Indian Army... it would certainly be our duty to give it proper recognition on these lines.” The question of if and how India would be rewarded for its loyalty would be discussed further in 1917.

¹⁷² “King And Indian Officers,” *The Times*, March 30, 1916, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1916-03-30/11/7.html>; “Indian Commissions Conditions of Grant to Selected Officers,” *The Times*, October 3, 1916, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1916-10-03/5/9.html>.

As Figure 4 demonstrates there were a wide variety of new topics being discussed in the *Times*, the most notable being the inclusion of the terms duties and cotton. The resources of India were a recurring topic during the war. The export of Indian wheat was discussed in articles such as “The Control of Indian Wheat Exports,” published on March 25 1915, and “Indian Wheat. The Effects of State Purchases,” published on February 7 1916, which explored Indian shipments of wheat to Britain and government efforts to secure the supply, and argue that it benefited Britain and India.¹⁷³ Other examples of India’s material resources which are devoted space in the *Times* included munitions and jute. But Indian cotton attracted more sustained attention throughout March 1917, because of its effect in Britain. Early in the war the Indian government had offered the British government £100,000,000 partially as a loan. By 1917 there was a need to raise additional revenue to support India’s financial responsibilities. The article “India’s Share in the War Loan of £100,000,000. Cotton Duties Increase.” highlighted India’s financial contributions, both with that gift and its participation in other war loans, before reporting an increase in the duties on imported cotton goods from 3.5 to 7.5 percent.¹⁷⁴ In following articles there was conflict between the needs of the war, and the needs of the mother country. The proposed increase in duties brought forward protests from yarn and cloth producers in Manchester and Lancashire. According to the article “Increased Indian Cotton Duties. A Blow to Lancashire,” India was the greatest market for the yarn and

¹⁷³ “The Control of Indian Wheat Exports,” *The Times*, March 25, 1915, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1915-03-25/7/4.html>; “Indian Wheat the Effects of State Purchases,” *The Times*, February 7, 1916, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1916-02-07/6/2.html>.

¹⁷⁴ “India’s Share in the War Loan of 100000000 Cotton Duties Increase,” *The Times*, March 1, 1917, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1917-03-01/8/4.html>.

cloth industry, and the protection offered by the duty for the cotton industry in India “will gravely menace the prosperity of the country.”¹⁷⁵ Other articles such as “Indian Cotton Duties, Protest Meeting in Manchester Exchange,” reported the concern in England about the consequences of increased duties.¹⁷⁶ In contrast, articles coming from correspondents in India, such as “India’s Contribution to the War. The Import Duty on Cotton. Another Surplus in Sight.” emphasized the need that the Indian government has for this tax in order to contribute to the war, and rule with good government.¹⁷⁷ The article “India and Cotton Duties. High Imperial Issue. The Honesty of British Rule.” connected the cotton duty with the very idea of Empire by writing “All these warm currents of Imperial thought and energy will be turned back if at this moment Parliament refuses the simple act of justice involved in the passage of the new cotton duties and thrusts India back into a position of helplessness,”¹⁷⁸ The question was, what is India in the Empire? The older imperialist position, exemplified by the Manchester cotton industry, holds India as a captive market to be exploited, not developed and improved as part of the spirit of Empire. The war required a more active participation in the empire by India, a participation its people were reported to be willing to do. The idea of the British Empire as a benevolent force for the different parts of the Empire required that the interests of the mother country be minimized when appropriate. In the case of the cotton duties,

¹⁷⁵ “Increased Indian Cotton Duties a Blow to Lancashire,” *The Times*, March 2, 1917, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1917-03-02/5/14.html>.

¹⁷⁶ “Indian Cotton Duties Protest Meeting In Manchester Exchange,” *The Times*, March 10, 1917, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1917-03-10/7/5.html>.

¹⁷⁷ “India’s Contribution to the War the Import Duty on Cotton another Surplus in Sight,” *The Times*, March 5, 1917, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1917-03-05/7/11.html>.

¹⁷⁸ “India and Cotton Duties High Imperial Issue The Honesty of British Rule,” *The Times*, March 16, 1917, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1917-03-16/5/7.html>.

Parliament sided with the Indian government and supported the war effort. The Indian government would be allowed the freedom to make changes that would benefit India.

In 1917 there was also an important change in the Indian government that would set the stage for a discussion in the *Times* changing the government of India itself. The report on Mesopotamia had upset the political position of both the secretary of state for India and the viceroy. The viceroy, Lord Hardinge, had been replaced by Lord Chelmsford in 1916, but when the secretary of state for India, Mr. Chamberlain resigned in 1917 he was replaced by a reformer, Mr. E. S. Montagu.¹⁷⁹ Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford's names would be attached to the package of reforms that were made during their government, the aforementioned Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. On August 20 1917 he declared in the House of Commons a change in British policy toward India. The article "Mr. Montagu to Visit India. Problems of Future Government. A Progressive Policy," reported that "He stated that the policy of the Government, with which the Government of India were in complete accord, was that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the Administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions.... They had decided that substantial steps in this direction should be taken as soon as possible."¹⁸⁰ For that reason Mr. Montagu would visit India, becoming the first secretary of state for India to visit the subcontinent. The mission was in order to conduct the consult closely with the viceroy, the local governments, and representative bodies. At the same time the announcement was made that the commissioned ranks would be opened to Indians, and that the conditions of this were being discussed.

¹⁷⁹ Thompson and Garratt, *Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India*, 602.

¹⁸⁰ "Mr. Montagu to Visit India Problems of Future Government A Progressive Policy," *The Times*, August 21, 1917, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1917-08-21/7/11.html>.

In the *Times* Mr. Montagu's announcement was well received. The paper ran articles on the response to it in various Indian newspapers, but these articles present a cautious optimism for considered and cautious reform. The article "British Policy in India. Advantage of Mr. Montagu's Visit," remarked on the wisdom of reserving to Parliament the right to advance the reform in successive stages, but also warned of resentment from India, saying "A section of Indian opinion, and the most vocal, is querulous of any restriction on political development, however wise and necessary. But the policy here announced will have the support of the great body of sober people."¹⁸¹ When Montagu arrived in India it was reported by the article "Mr. Montagu in India." that he was greeted by "a joint scheme signed by a number of influential Anglo-Indians and Indians, which, it is understood, proposes the formation of a new series of elected Provincial Parliamentary Assemblies."¹⁸² The eagerness of the great variety of Indians for a reform of the government system reinforced the wisdom of reform.

India had also been moved towards a greater position within the Empire by the introduction of an Indian member to the Imperial War Conference. The Maharaja of Bikanir represented India among the gathering of representatives from all over the empire. Unlike Indian papers that rejected the choice of the Maharaja of Bikanir as the Indian representative, there was no indication in the *Times* of a rejection of the choice. The article "India at the War Cabinet. Names of the Members" described the maharaja as "one of the best known of the Ruling Chiefs of India.... His Highness has himself served in France during the war and been mentioned in dispatches... He is an honorary LL.D. of

¹⁸¹ "British Policy in India Advantage of Mr. Montagu's Visit," *The Times*, August 24, 1917, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1917-08-24/5/10.html>.

¹⁸² "Mr. Montagu In India," *The Times*, November 23, 1917, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1917-11-23/5/14.html>.

Cambridge and has been awarded the gold medal of Kaiser-i-Hind for his public services in India.”¹⁸³ In the article “India and the Empire. The Maharaja of Bikanir and His Countrymen.”, the maharaja is quoted arguing that Indians must be proud to be a part of the Empire, and that they should be aware of the good will that all parts of the British Empire have for India.¹⁸⁴ The choice of the Maharaja of Bikanir put forward an image of the Empire unified and devoted to the war effort. The maharaja’s rank as one of the great princes of India made him more respectable. As David Cannadine wrote, “in *individual* [emphasis in original] terms rather than in collective categories, they (the British) were more likely to be concerned with rank than with race, and with the appreciation of status similarities based on perceptions of affinity.”¹⁸⁵ The maharaja’s service, high status and western education established him as a respectable equal in government more than any mandate from the people of India. It also represented the British perception of India, as only royalty was seen as representative.

The rest of the coverage of India’s part in the War Conference served to reinforce that perception, as articles such as “India’s Place in the Sun, Maharaja of Bikanir on the New Era, Special Statement,” and “King’s Message to War Conference. Loyalty of the Dominions,” focused on the unity and common feeling of the Empire. India was being welcomed into the heart of Empire.

¹⁸³ “India at the War Cabinet Names of the Members,” *The Times*, January 23, 1917, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1917-01-23/8/11.html>.

¹⁸⁴ “India and the Empire the Maharaja of Bikanir and His Countrymen,” *The Times*, April 3, 1917, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1917-04-03/5/6.html>.

¹⁸⁵ Cannadine, *Ornamentalism*, 123.




Figure 5 - Word counts in 1918 headlines about India for counts over 3, with the terms *India* and *Indian* removed

In 1918 the *Times*'s coverage of India dramatically changes focus. The other aspects of how it covered India's resources and military participation continue much as they had done, but the discussion of India in the *Times* turns more and more to the question of reforms in India. Comparing the word frequency graph in Figure 5 to the graph in Figure 4 demonstrates the massive growth in the use of term *reform*, and the term *scheme*. These terms co-occur in headlines from 1918 52 percent of the time, and did not occur together before in any significance. This rise in reporting on reform made an impression on the reader of the paper.

The papers reporting on the issue highlights the many different ideas about reform coming out of India. The article "Indian Reform. Views of the European Association.", wrote that "During his Indian mission Mr. Montagu, with the Viceroy, has received representations on reform which are bewildering in the great diversity of views shown to be entertained by many different elements in the population."¹⁸⁶ One of the first articles, "Indian Reforms. A Joint Committee's Scheme. Limited Provincial State Government." described a reform plan constructed by fifteen Europeans and Indians for limited self-government in the provinces, condemned by the Indian National Congress as "calculated not only to postpone, but to impede, the attainment of self-government within a reasonable time." which highlighted the key difference in reform plans put forward.¹⁸⁷ Groups such as the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League called for a swift movement towards home rule. The government favored a gradual reform movement. In

¹⁸⁶ "Indian Reform Views of the European Association," *The Times*, February 1, 1918, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1918-02-01/5/4.html>.

¹⁸⁷ "Indian Reforms A Joint Committee's Scheme Limited Provincial State Government," *The Times*, January 17, 1918, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1918-01-17/5/9.html>.

the article “Indian Constitutional Reform, Proposals for an Advance,” the viceroy expressed the hope “that the Secretary of State for India will take home with him proposals embodying a sane and sober advance, with steps for further duty outlined,”¹⁸⁸ This hesitancy to move forward with democratic reform reflected British views that Indians were not prepared for self-government, and the great mass of the people were not interested. In *The India We Served*, Walter Roper Lawrence who had first arrived in India in 1879 and by 1914 was seen as an expert on India, stated “India never has been, and never will be democratic. She is Aristocratic and loves Kingdoms, and if her peoples knew the real issues, they would prefer to be ruled by Rajas rather than be coerced by Brahmins.”¹⁸⁹ According to the article “Reform in India, Mr. Montagu’s visit. The Pronouncement and After,” the reform effort, “does not, of course, affect the great dumb masses whose horizon has been limited through centuries, and will be limited for generations to come, to the fields they till or to the jungles in which they move and have their being.”¹⁹⁰ This perception of Indians as inherently unprepared for democracy drove the emphasis on safeguards and a gradual approach empathized in articles such as “Reform in India, Government Must Go On, The Russian Example,” which compared the educated Indians that made up the National Congress to the Russian educated elite, and insisted that the creation of responsible governments is more difficult than either suggested.¹⁹¹ The reform scheme that was announced was one of gradual improvement of

¹⁸⁸ “Indian Constitutional Reform Proposal For An Advance,” *The Times*, February 14, 1918, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1918-02-14/5/5.html>.

¹⁸⁹ Sir Walter Roper Lawrence, *The India We Served*, 286.

¹⁹⁰ “Reform In India Mr. Montagu’s Visit The Pronouncement and After,” *The Times*, June 6, 1918, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1918-06-06/5/1.html>.

¹⁹¹ “Reform in India Government Must Go on the Russian Example,” *The Times*, June 10, 1918, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1918-06-10/7/1.html>.

the status in India. The article that announced in the *Times* “The Indian Report, Stages in Home Rule, Responsibility to Go with Power, Provincial Ministries,” laid great emphasis on how India’s loyalty and service during the war was being rewarded by the British, and that both the British and the Indians should be proud of India’s accomplishments in the war. In the article the report described the work of reform going forward as founding India’s government “on the cooperation of her people, and make such changes in the existing order as will meet the needs of the more spacious days to come, not ignoring the difficulties, nor under-estimating the risks.”¹⁹² This sentiment set forward the British liberals desire for a reformed India, one working together in the Empire, but still with the understanding that there was a need for further British guidance.

The cautious reforms that had been decided upon did not satisfy Indian reformers, who attempted to rally against it. The *Times* was hostile to these reformers. The article “Indian Opinion on the Reform Scheme, Warning Against Reaction and Extremism,” referred to those supporting home rule as extremists and radicals that were trying to put an end to the careful study the reforms needed to succeed.¹⁹³ Lord Willingdon, in a comment that the article “Indian Home Rulers and the War. Lord Willingdon’s Plain Speaking.” reproduced, decried the faction calling for home rule, saying “their object seems to have been at every available opportunity to increase the difficulties and

¹⁹² “The Indian Report Stages in Home Rule Responsibility to Go with Power Provincial Ministries,” *The Times*, July 6, 1918, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1918-07-06/7/12.html>.

¹⁹³ “Indian Opinion on the Reform Scheme Warning against Reaction and Extremism,” *The Times*, July 19, 1918, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1918-07-19/5/9.html>.

embarrassment of the Government whenever and wherever they could.”¹⁹⁴ The impression that was meant to be left on the reader from this and other articles such as “Rally to Indian Scheme. Outlines Generally Approved. Home Rulers’s Hostility.” and “Indian Reforms Estrangement Of Hindus And Mahomedans.” is of a group of Indians hostile to the generosity of the British and a continued British presence in India.¹⁹⁵ This hostility challenged the British views of Indian loyalty and happy existence in the British Empire. The British faith that the majority of Indians supported the empire was not challenged during the war. However, a concern about the spread of revolutionary movements in India despite the reform efforts already underway underlies the Black Acts of 1919. These acts continued the Defense of India Acts of the war into the peace, as British conservatives worried about the continued existence of the Empire.

British perceptions of India evolved over the course of the war. At first India was depicted as a loyal ally, willingly fighting with all dedication and resolve that was expected of them. Gradually, as the war situation evolved, the perception of India changed as well, seeing not only the loyalty expected of them, but the expectations of the Indians that they be brought more into the Empire. When reform was proposed it was still shown in the *Times* as the loyal subject, whose support in resources, soldiers and finances should be rewarded by offering the loyal greater say in their government. However, in the final year of the war the opposition in India comes into greater focus. Their rejection of the rewards offered for loyal service in search of something that most British readers

¹⁹⁴ “Indian Home Rulers and the War Lord Willingdon’s Plain Speaking,” *The Times*, August 12, 1918, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1918-08-12/5/1.html>.

¹⁹⁵ “Rally To Indian Scheme Outlines Generally Approved Home Rulers’ Hostility,” *The Times*, July 25, 1918, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1918-07-25/5/1.html>; “Indian Reforms Estrangement Of Hindus and Mahomedans,” *The Times*, December 28, 1918, <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/archive/article/1918-12-28/5/14.html#start>.

would have thought them unprepared or unsuited for soured British views of forces within India such as the National Congress. The ingratitude seen from Indians contrast with the loyalty expected herald a hardening perspective in towards India.

Chapter Three: India and the *New York Times*: Outside Observation

So far, this examination has been limited to newspapers intimately tied into the British system. It is helpful to explore the perception of India's participation in the war from outside of that system. The *New York Times* from the war's beginning to 1917 fits this requirement. The *New York Times* was one of the foremost newspapers of the period, and its coverage of the war was among the best. Its articles allow an examination of the news being spread around the war about India, and one of the most powerful neutral powers viewed India. During the period from 1914 to the beginning of 1917 American coverage of India underwent an evolution. India was seen as less rebellious and more loyal than expected, but its role in the war was obscured behind Britain's domination of the continent, and conflicting narratives about loyalty presented by the British and their opponents.

In the early twentieth century, most people in the United States had little reason to concern themselves with the affairs of British India. The Indian economy had been focused by the British towards exporting raw goods such as jute and rubber, which would have been the limit to most American's interactions with the subcontinent.¹⁹⁶ Not many Indians emigrated to America, choosing instead to remain within the British Empire. The majority traveled from India to other British possessions around the world, especially areas of East Africa opened up by European conquest, and West Indian and Asian colonies, which sought cheap labor after the end of slavery in the British Empire.¹⁹⁷ Only

¹⁹⁶ Smith, *Oxford History of India*, 705.

¹⁹⁷ Prakash C. Jain, "EMIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT OF INDIANS ABROAD," *Sociological Bulletin* 38, no. 1 (1989): 161–63.

the elites were likely to leave India for the West, and then it would most likely be to British possessions such as Canada, or England.

But if they did not have personal experience with India or Indians many Americans knew of India's troubled past with the British through the cultural effect of the Indian Mutiny. As the most critical challenge to British hegemony in India, arguably the most important colony in the nineteenth century, the Indian Mutiny made its imprint on the world. Its course was noted in American newspapers of the period, which commented on the "treacherous and rebellious Indian", and the inevitability of conflict between the British and the Indians.¹⁹⁸ Even if this event had not attracted attention in the period, the 1857 Mutiny loomed large in British literature. Novels about the Indian Mutiny were popular in England, and many contained themes of the lawlessness of Indian men and the need for British domination.¹⁹⁹ These would have informed the common knowledge of Americans, creating a very general view of India as mutinous and unable to govern itself.

Articles from 1914 such as the article, "Reforms for India" published in June 1914, combined with the general American disinterest in foreign news, indicate that Americans had only a general understanding of the subcontinent.²⁰⁰ This understanding had been shaped by the appearance of occasional events in India in their newspapers,

¹⁹⁸ "Mutiny in the Native East Indian Army. The Bombay and Calcuta Papers," *New York Times*, July 6, 1857, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9906E1DE163CEE34BC4E53DFB166838C649FDE&legacy=true>.

¹⁹⁹ Nancy L. Paxton, "Mobilizing Chivalry: Rape in British Novels about the Indian Uprising of 1857," *Victorian Studies* 36, no. 1 (October 1, 1992): 6.

²⁰⁰ "Reforms for India," *New York Times*, June 21, 1914, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9E0DE3DA1F39E633A25752C2A9609C946596D6CF>; Neil MacNeil, "American Newspapers through Two World Wars," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 6, no. 2 (1947): 246.

such as events in India of international importance such as devastating famines or fighting on the frontier and the most important event in India for the last hundred years, the Indian Mutiny. This reinforced a view of India as subordinate within the British Empire, but a potentially rebellious one. Americans then would naturally see India primarily as part of its relationship to the British Empire during the First World War.

The initial question in the American mind would have been if nonwhite troops would be used in battle at all. This period was one of widespread racism, and many had grave concerns about the damage the war would do to the prestige of the white race. Arming nonwhite people and ordering them to kill other Europeans was thought of as damaging to Europeans' dominant position. They needed the colonized races to see them as unshakable and unconquerable by races such as themselves. This concern was not great toward the beginning of the war, but as the fighting went on and on the concern grew.²⁰¹ Therefore it was a question early on if Britain would send Indians to Europe at all. This question would be answered for readers early in August, by special reports from the *New York Times* recounting the announcement from not only the secretary of state for India, the Marquis of Crewe, but also Field Marshal Kitchener, the war secretary. The representations of India in these articles are particularly interesting. An August 28 article titled "England to Use Indian Troops" recounts Lord Crewe's words at length, where he speaks on the Indian enthusiasm for the war, saying, "The wonderful wave of enthusiasm and loyalty at the present time passing over India is largely due to the desire of the Indian

²⁰¹ "'England Traitor to White Race' ---- Dernburg; Employment of Hindu and Other Colored Colonial Troops in Europe Has Killed European Prestige in Africa and Asia, Declares Famous German," accessed February 4, 2016, <http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9B01E0D71739E233A25751C0A9679C946796D6CF>.

people that Indian soldiers should stand side by side with their comrades in the British Army ... it would have been a disappointment to the Hindus if they had been debarred from taking part.”²⁰² Elsewhere in some of the first articles Americans would read about Indian participation. The Indians soldiers were described as well trained and “high-souled” men, representatives of ancient civilization.²⁰³ These articles from August, which also place great emphasis on the loyalty and enthusiasm that these groups had for the British set the trend for articles that favor the British side of the war. Concerns about white prestige would be pushed aside for the needs of the British Empire.

The extent of India’s loyalty to Britain was the most important question about the role India would play in 1914. This was especially true for India’s Muslim population from the beginning. Articles such as “Kaiser Prepares Turkey for War” which was published on September 2 1914, indicated that war between the Ottoman Empire and the Entente was on the horizon.²⁰⁴ Many articles from British sources emphasize the loyalty of the Muslims by pointing to concrete examples. These Examples included telegrams from Indian Muslims to Turkish officials that talked about how loyalty to the crown is the

²⁰² Associated Press, “England to Use Indian Troops,” *New York Times*, August 29, 1914, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9C02E0DE1638E633A2575AC2A96E9C946596D6CF>.

²⁰³ “England to Use Indian Troops; Announcement By Kitchener ; - Some May Already Be in France. Fine Showing Predicted Indian Secretary Crewe Confident the Hindus Will Do Well. No Fear for Frontier and, in the Present State Of Enthusiasm in India, Crewe Thinks Internal Trouble Impossible.,” *New York Times*, August 29, 1914, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9503E0DE1638E633A2575AC2A96E9C946596D6CF>.

²⁰⁴ “Kaiser Prepares Turkey for War,” *New York Times*, September 2, 1914, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9F03E3DC1E3BE631A25751C0A96F9C946596D6CF>.

first duty of Muslims.²⁰⁵ One of the most important figures was the Aga Khan. The Aga Khan was introduced to the American reader as the leader of sixty million Muslims and also as a man who volunteered to fight for the British.²⁰⁶ His quotations show him as a worldly man who justifies his support for the British by not only citing their treatment of people in German Africa, but also a personal dislike for the philosophy of Nietzsche and the German General Staff.²⁰⁷ The Aga Khan implies that India has only two choices in the war, British or German domination, and that German domination would be inevitable in the case of German victory. For the Aga Khan “The one hope of India lies in the King-Emperor and his Government. There will be no united India until England has finished her work of knitting together into one strong nation the confusing jumble of races, religions, and castes she has governed successfully for 150 years.”²⁰⁸ The Aga Khan’s education and respectability were intended to reassure the reader of his importance, and demonstrate the benefits of British rule. They had transformed the strange and barbarous easterner into a respectable, Western-looking, well-educated and well-spoken man who favored the peace and justice brought by Britain.

²⁰⁵ “British Moslems Loyal,” *New York Times*, August 27, 1914, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9D02E3D9143EE033A25754C2A96E9C946596D6CF>.

²⁰⁶ “Aga Khan Would Fight.; Willing To Serve As A Private ;:- Gaekwar Offers All He Has.,” *New York Times*, September 22, 1914, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9907E4DA1430E733A25751C2A96F9C946596D6CF>.

²⁰⁷ “Can Send 7,000,000, Says the Aga Khan; Head of Mohammedans of India Says That Wouldn’t Be Many Men to Supply. Germany’s Great Mistake Thought India Was Disloyal to England ;--- Hindus Know What Would Happen Under Prussian Rule.,” *New York Times*, September 24, 1914, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9A0CE4DA1638E633A25757C2A96F9C946596D6CF>.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

The support being demonstrated by India for the British Empire was a persistent feature of early war reporting on India. Many articles coming out of London, Bombay, or Calcutta referred to the outpouring of support from Indians for the British at the beginning of the war. The gifts of money and men from a fascinating variety of Indian princes represented both what was likely a genuine affection that these princes have toward British rule, and a fantastic opportunity to spread a message about British India to the world, a message that was at the center of headlines such as “Germany Had Counted on a Revolt, but There Is a Wave of Patriotism.” and, “People of India Eager to Fight,”²⁰⁹ There were interviews with royalty, as well as quotations from Indian newspapers and published manifestos all calling for loyalty in other articles such as “Indians Remaining Loyal to Britain; Manifesto by the Nizam” and “Tells Mohammedan Indians to Be Loyal; Influential Native’s Paper Says It Is Their Duty to Fight Britain’s Foes,”²¹⁰ The effort continued to involve reports of offers wondrous in their generosity including military service, as “Nearly all the Indian potentates have expressed a desire for personal service

²⁰⁹ “India Eagerly Supports Empire,” *New York Times*, September 10, 1914, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9402E4DD143EE733A25753C1A96F9C946596D6CF>; Special Cable to the New York New York Times, “Says India’s Army Can Equal Russia’s; Maharaja of Idar Interviewed at Cairo on His Way To Join Allies at Front. Five Princes Now Serving People of India Eager to Fight -Maharaja’s Secretary a Suicide Because Not Allowed to Go with Him,” *New York Times*, November 25, 1914, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9B0DE2DA1E3EE033A25756C2A9679D946596D6CF>.

²¹⁰ “Indians Remaining Loyal to Britain; Manifesto by the Nizam ;----- Aga Khan Says the Germans Coerced Turkey,” *New York Times*, November 4, 1914, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9E05E6D6113FE633A25757C0A9679D946596D6CF>; Special Cable to the New York New York Times, “Tells Mohammedan Indians to Be Loyal; Influential Native’s Paper Says It Is Their Duty to Fight Britain’s Foes.,” *New York Times*, November 3, 1914, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9400E7DF1738E633A25750C0A9679D946596D6CF>.

in the field.”²¹¹ These articles were supposed to demonstrate to the reader the depth of commitment Indian rulers have to the British cause. The promises of aid included not only the personal service of the highest classes of India, but large numbers of soldiers promised by these individuals to fight the Germans, which emphasized the strength and power of the British Empire in the war. When asked if the Indians would be able to stand up to white men, the Aga Khan dismissed the concern and suggested “If need be, there can be 700,000 or 7,000,000,” indicating the willingness of the Indian population to sustain that sacrifice for Britain, as well asserting their importance to the war effort.²¹² According to the Maharaja of Idar, himself on his way to serve at the front, “The size of the Indian Army which will take part in the great war ... depends, of course on the wishes of the King-Emperor, but I may say that every Indian, old and young, would most gladly and enthusiastically respond to the King-Emperor’s call.”²¹³ These articles reflect the importance the British placed on the assurances of the Indian rulers they saw as the true representatives of India. Their word would have been persuasive to their British benefactors, who would hope the American would be as persuaded.

When the Indian Army arrived at the front reports from the *New York Times* continued to demonstrate India’s enthusiasm for war. According to a reporter, when the Indian corps arrived in France “Not a few of the Sikhs, lithe, black-bearded giants, were

²¹¹ Associated Press., “Article 7 ---- No Title,” *New York Times*, September 22, 1914, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9A07E4DA1430E733A25751C2A96F9C946596D6CF>.

²¹² “Can Send 7,000,000, Says the Aga Khan; Head of Mohammedans of India Says That Wouldn’t Be Many Men to Supply. Germany’s Great Mistake Thought India Was Disloyal to England; ---- Hindus Know What Would Happen Under Prussian Rule.”

²¹³ “Says India’s Army Can Equal Russia’s; Maharaja of Idar Interviewed at Cairo on His Way to Join Allies at Front. Five Princes Now Serving People of India Eager to Fight -Maharaja’s Secretary a Suicide Because Not Allowed to Go with Him.”

deeply concerned to know if I thought that the war would be over before they could get to grips with the common enemy,” giving an indication of the enthusiasm that was being presented.²¹⁴ The first charge of the Indians was given an article to itself, where these men were described as being eager to charge, and after the charge one of the cavalrymen was quoted as saying “It was not so exciting as pig-sticking.”²¹⁵ Other articles discussed Gurkha raids behind German lines, or the first experience of Indian cavalrymen under artillery fire.²¹⁶ The emphasis was always on their fighting capability. In some cases, they were described as childlike, where these soldiers do not seem to quite understand what was happening. The pig-sticking comment was one, where the drama and success of the charge was debased by its rather silly comparison, one that makes it into the headline.²¹⁷ The headline of one article emphasizes how these soldiers “TOOK SHELLS FOR FIREWORKS” , which points at their bravery, but also their dedication to Britain even

²¹⁴ “Showered Flowers on Indian Troops; Details of the Warm Welcome Marseilles Gave to the Far East’s Fighting Men. Quick Work in Landing Thousands of Fighting Men Disembarked in A Few Hours without Accident.,” *New York Times*, October 3, 1914, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9E07EED81638E633A25750C0A9669D946596D6CF>.

²¹⁵ “East Indians’ First Charge,-- Successful, but Not So Exciting as Pig-Sticking, They Say.,” *New York Times*, October 25, 1914, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9E03E5D61638E633A25756C2A9669D946596D6CF>.

²¹⁶ “Gurkhas’ Exploit at Night.; Went Behind German Lines and Blew Up Ammunition Park.,” *New York Times*, October 31, 1914, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9F01E5D6143EE033A25752C3A9669D946596D6CF>; “Indian Troops Took Shells for Fireworks; Their First Experience in Trenches in Belgium Described in an Officer’s Letter,” *New York Times*, November 2, 1914, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9B06E0DF153AE633A25751C0A9679D946596D6CF>.

²¹⁷ “East Indians’ First Charge. Successful, but Not So Exciting as Pig-Sticking, They Say.”

though they were fighting in war they did not understand.²¹⁸ There were cases where the skill of these soldiers was respected; the article devoted to the first Indian to be recommended for the Victoria Cross recounts this man's heroism in repulsing a German attack. Gagna Singh was the sole survivor of a group of sixteen men, suffered five bullet wounds and killed eleven Germans, ten with a sword.²¹⁹ The bravery and valor of Gagna Singh was commented on in respectful tones, despite his race. Many Indian soldiers fought well for the British in the initial period of the war, and the *New York Times* respects that reality, showing them undergoing the trials of combat in the battle line along with the other members of the Entente and providing able and loyal support.

India's loyalty and support for the British did not seem to have been expected, as articles were run to explain why India was loyal to the British at all, given the common knowledge of India as mutinous and disloyal. Coningsby Dawson, an English novelist, wrote the article "Why the Troops of India Have Rushed to Aid England" run by the *New York Times* in October 1914. In the opening paragraph he asserts that, "We had come to take it for granted that England's next military crisis would be India's opportunity to shake off the so-called British tyranny."²²⁰ The article insists again that India was fighting for the British because of the benefits of British occupation, and how preferable British rule was to German rule. These articles from British sources attempt to paint the loyalty

²¹⁸ "Indian Troops Took Shells for Fireworks; Their First Experience in Trenches in Belgium Described in an Officer's Letter."

²¹⁹ "Victoria Cross for Indian; First One to Be Recommended Killed Eleven Germans.," *New York Times*, November 26, 1914, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9D05EEDA1438E033A25755C2A9679D946596D6CF>.

²²⁰ Coningsby Dawson, "Why the Troops of India Have Rushed to Aid England," *New York Times*, October 11, 1914, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=950DE5D8153FE233A25752C1A9669D946596D6CF>.

of India as entirely without question in this great crisis and the possibility of revolt remote and tiny in order to assure the reader of the British Empire's victory.

This portrayal of India does not seem to convince an American audience, despite the relatively large number of articles from British sources about how loyal all of India was being to the Empire. There was believed to be a very real possibility of revolt and revolution in India. Articles had, as recently as June 1914, appeared calling for the freedom of India in order to avoid calamity. The article, "England Warned Regarding India; Mrs. Besant Says the Country Must Be Freed or Calamity Will Ensue," was written about Annie Besant, who had experiences in "the mystic and occult world of India," and called for Indian self-government because Indians had learned the lessons of freedom and good government from their British education.²²¹

Indian revolutionaries had also been in the newspapers recently, with the voyage of the *Komagata Maru*. The ship arrived in Vancouver, Canada in May 1914 with 376 passengers, mostly men from India, where its passengers were denied entry to Canada, detained for two months, and the ship was forced to sail for Calcutta where the Bengal Police attacked the passengers as undesirables and revolutionaries.²²² Several articles about the incident appeared in the *New York Times* that paints an image of India on the edge of revolt. According to the article "Hindus to Preach Revolt; 1,000 Deported from British Columbia Plan a Campaign in India," the passengers of the *Komogata Maru* were recruiting volunteers in Canada to join them in returning to India to "preach revolt against

²²¹ "England Warned Regarding India," *New York Times*, June 21, 1914, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9D0DE3DA1F39E633A25752C2A9609C946596D6CF>.

²²² Renisa Mawani, "Specters of Indigeneity in British-Indian Migration, 1914," *Law & Society Review* 46, no. 2 (2012): 370.

the British Empire.”²²³ The story of the *Komogata Maru* was not front page news, but careful readers that the *New York Times* had such as government officials, scholars and other newspapers would have been paying attention to it with an eye to its possible effects.²²⁴ The final stages of the crisis would play out in October 1914, recounting the difficulties that the Indians had in Canada and once they returned to India. The article describes the Indians as a problem, made difficult by the fact that Indians were subjects of Great Britain, and further more mutinous.²²⁵

The people denied entry to Canada were not portrayed sympathetically. Every means was used to exclude them because of their Asiatic origins despite an admitted legal right of entry that was only overcome by a declaration of exclusion. A further article, written after the assassination of a police officer of the Canadian Immigration Department, linked this effort to the Germans. The article says “It is generally believed that the recent Komagata expedition and the operations of the society were aided and abetted by German agents in India, who have been making strenuous efforts to arouse hostility to British rule in India, Egypt, and Africa.”²²⁶

²²³ “Hindus to Preach Revolt,” *New York Times*, July 15, 1914, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9500E1DA133EE733A25756C1A9619C946596D6CF>.

²²⁴ George H. Douglas, *The Golden Age of the Newspaper* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1999), 129.

²²⁵ “16 Sikhs Killed in a Riot in India; Men Who Were Deported From Vancouver Fire on Police Near Calcutta. One European Is Slain Several Others, Including a Police Commissioner, Wounded Rioters Later Rounded Up.,” *New York Times*, October 3, 1914, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9A01EED81638E633A25750C0A9669D946596D6CF>.

²²⁶ “Hindu Feudists Kill a Canadian Official; W. C. Hopkinson, Who Barred the Komagata Immigrants, Is Slain at Vancouver.,” *New York Times*, October 22, 1914,

The British made an effort to pass off reports of revolt and revolution in India as German plotting. Therefore, any disturbance comes from the agitation of German agents, not from any legitimate grievance. This might serve to deflect criticism of British policy and preserve British prestige. The British saw prestige as critical to their rule of the Empire, and efforts to preserve that prestige determined much of British policy. In attacking British prestige, even if it was in a foreign country, these articles were attacking the very existence of the British Empire, making it extremely important for the British to refute their message.

The problem for the British was that many saw the possibility of revolt in India as very large, even with no German intervention. The key was the large Muslim population within India, more likely to revolt after the Ottoman Empire entered the war and the call for jihad began. The Berlin press called for Germany to stir Islamic revolution in India and other places in the British and French empires, revolts that should bring these nations to terms.²²⁷ A *New York Times* article in November reporting that important Muslim dignitaries called for all Muslims to do their duty to their faith in the fighting with the Entente, and that people had already begun to answer that call. German sources reported 170,000 men from Afghanistan were marching on the Indian frontier, and already border

<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9907E0D6143AE633A25751C2A9669D946596D6CF>.

²²⁷ “Would Stir Islam War,” *New York Times*, August 23, 1914, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=990CE0DA153FE233A25750C2A96E9C946596D6CF>.

tribes were joining the Afghans.²²⁸ German papers would challenge the British reports in the *New York Times* for legitimacy.

A not insignificant number of articles from German and Ottoman sources managed to reach the United States, despite the British having cut the Atlantic cables from Germany to the United States. Articles such as, “Hear of Wide Revolt in Army of India Germans Told by Turks Whole Battalions Are Deserting to Join the Insurgents.” reached the United States by wireless telegram, and other articles arrived from neutral countries around the world.²²⁹ They carry much the same message as those published in 1914. But much of the information the *New York Times* reproduced from German newspapers were dispatches from Ottoman sources. The revolts claimed in these articles were absurdly large. The article “German Tale of India Riots: Berlin Reports Native Troops at Lahore and Madras Have Mutinied” claimed wide scale mutinies in the Punjab and in the city of Madras, accompanied by scenes of disorder not seen since the mutiny.²³⁰ One dispatch from Constantinople reported “battalion after battalion (are) deserting and joining the insurgents. Native troops which were ordered to attack the

²²⁸ “Say Moslems’ Head Is Against Allies; Germans Also Assert the Afghan Ruler Has Sent a Big Army to Attack India. Border Tribes in Revolt Some British Officials Slain, Others Arrested ;– Anti-British Statement by Khedive Reported.,” *New York Times*, November 7, 1914, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9A06EFDE1738E633A25754C0A9679D946596D6CF>.

²²⁹ “Hear of Wide Revolt in Army of India; Germans Told by Turks Whole Battalions Are Deserting to Join the Insurgents.,” *New York Times*, December 24, 1915, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=950CE6DF103FE233A25757C2A9649D946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

²³⁰ “German Tale Of India Riots; Berlin Reports Native Troops At Lahore And Madras Have Mutinied.,” *New York Times*, July 5, 1915, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9A04E4DA1038E633A25756C0A9619C946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

insurgents mutinied and attacked the British.”²³¹ Others claimed that mutineers were destroying railroads and that Afghans were storming cities and on the march.²³² It is clear that there was an emphasis on big, attention grabbing stories, rather than developing realistic and plausible stories.

Articles about German attempts to induce revolts India continued to be a frequent part of the *New York Times*’s coverage of India during the First World War. German agents were accused of spreading dissatisfaction within the British Empire “for some time,” but there seems to be little direct evidence of this.²³³ The *Komagata* incident was beginning to be blamed on the Germans, as the ship used to be German before being sold to Japan, and the leader of the Indians traveling to Canada met with a German agent before they hired a ship. The native press was reported as being quick to condemn the actions and ascribe their activities to German machinations.²³⁴ Further reports of the “sinister character” of German efforts to leverage the Muslim religion in order to spread rebellion among the lands of their enemies followed, including the discovery of calls for

²³¹ “Hear Of Wide Revolt In Army Of India; Germans Told By Turks Whole Battalions Are Deserting To Join The Insurgents.”

²³² “Germans Get Reports Of Indian Revolts; Hear Of Uprising In Madras And The North ;:- Gaekwar Gives \$160,000 For Aeroplanes.,” *New York Times*, September 8, 1915,
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9D04E1D61539E333A2575BC0A96F9C946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

²³³ “India Suspects Germans.; But Fails to Find Direct Influence in Immigration Trouble.,” *New York Times*, January 18, 1915,
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=940CE4DE1538E633A2575BC1A9679C946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

²³⁴ “Blame the Germans for Indian Revolt; Native Press Condemns the Activities of Teutons in Disaffected Quarters. 24 Rioters Executed All Prosecutions Based on Charges of Anarchy, Mutiny, And Insubordination,” *New York Times*, November 19, 1915,
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9403EFD81239E333A2575AC1A9679D946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

holy war transported through Shanghai.²³⁵ The interference of German agents in India offered an easy scapegoat for British propaganda and a convincing message. Germany would spread disorder around the world to win, calling for war against Christians and the murder of European settlers, while the British were defending civilization and good government. Most Indians it was then argued were not disloyal and were willing to give everything for the British Empire, as evidenced by the long lists of gifts from important Indians and calls for greater Indian participation in the war.

Despite this, rumors of revolt in India would continue to plague the British Empire into 1915. The *New York Times* ran several articles about German plots against India, primarily by distributing calls for jihad to Muslims in the Indian Army and the tribes of the frontiers.²³⁶ According to other articles that were also run in the period there were significant difficulties on the frontiers. In one article, India reported a revolt of 10,000 tribesmen in India's northwestern frontier zone.²³⁷ The Indian government reported that Indian troops had engaged and dispersed the band that had intended to attack a local town. The American journalist left the reader with the statement "there have been various reports, some of them evidently from German sources, tending to show

²³⁵ "German Plot Against India; Proclamations Found That Call for a Holy War Against Britain.," *New York Times*, November 25, 1915, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9C03E1D8133FE233A25756C2A9679D946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

²³⁶ Ibid.; "Mutiny in India Urged by Germans; British Government Says Pamphlets Were Addressed to the Troops.," *New York Times*, March 19, 1915, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9C01EFDD123FE233A2575AC1A9659C946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

²³⁷ "Indian Tribesmen Revolt.; British Repulse 10.000 Near Northwestern Frontier.," *New York Times*, April 1, 1915, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9900E7D8133EE733A25752C0A9629C946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

that unrest in India was increasing.”²³⁸ There does seem to be a lot of support for that statement in the paper. Further articles record attacks by the Lashkar tribes on the government. This group comes from northern India, in this case in the area around the Kabul River in northwest India. Like other reports about revolt from that area the British government reports that the Muslim group, eight thousand strong, was attacked by British forces and “the Mohmands [*sic*] had been punished with heavy losses.”²³⁹ There does not seem to be much weight placed on the fighting on the frontier, given the few casualties reported and the remarks about the culture of the boarder tribes. The India office would give out an official denial that “revolt has broken out anywhere in India, or that Brahmins, Buddhists, and Mohammedans have united to make difficulties,” only a month afterward, indicating a British distinction about the nature of the northern border area that might not be seen by the American reader.²⁴⁰

In addition to the difficulties on the frontier there were difficulties within the Indian Army. Two Indian soldiers, described as Muslim fanatics by the article, began to kill their British officers, managing to kill three white officers, and an Indian sergeant and wound a fourth officer before other soldiers killed them.²⁴¹ The article insists that “The

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ “Fight 8,000 Tribesmen on India Frontier; British Force Loses Sixty Men In Defeating Host Of Mohmands.,” *New York Times*, October 12, 1915, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9F01E2DD1239E333A25751C1A9669D946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

²⁴⁰ “India Office Denies Reports of Revolts; Takes Up German Stories Specifically -- Tale of ‘Holy Images’ Causing Mutiny.,” *New York Times*, November 20, 1915, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9404E6D8133FE233A25753C2A9679D946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

²⁴¹ “Two Indian Fanatics Kill Their Officers; Murderers of Four Shot to Death by Their Loyal Comrades.,” *New York Times*, July 3, 1915, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9501E2DB1038E633A25750C0A9619C946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

act was an isolated one in which no one but the murderers were involved.”²⁴² This attempts to hide a real danger that this was not an isolated incident. If it was rather a precursor to larger disruptions among the Indian Army, it would be serious. The 5th Native Light Infantry mutinied in Singapore, murdering their officers and started fighting in the streets between the mutineers and first the local garrison, then landed marines from British and Japanese ships.²⁴³ The article called this mutiny “second only to that of the Sepoy rebellion,” and that knowledge of mutiny in Singapore was being suppressed because of the fear of the effect its knowledge would have in India.²⁴⁴ These articles give a sense that there were a large number of serious problems with the Indian Army.

According to the *New York Times* there were greater problems closer to India. Riots were reported in Ceylon. The situation was reported as serious, with an untold number of casualties among the natives of the island. The majority of the casualties seem to have been caused by the British in their attempt to put down the revolts, but according to the article “it is optimistically predicted that the worst of the trouble is over, and the population is well in hand.”²⁴⁵ Remarks such as this indicate that the American paper favored order in British territory. Further disorders were reported all around India. The situation reported to be so serious by the article “More Sedition in India; Member of

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ “Vivid Story of Singapore Mutiny; Little Has Leaked out about the Uprising of Native Troops There Owing to the Censor, but There Was Brisk Fighting.,” *New York Times*, May 2, 1915, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=980DEFDD153BE233A25751C0A9639C946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ “Serious Rioting Upsets Ceylon; Two Europeans and Many Natives Killed -- 1,500 Jailed in Colombo Alone.,” *New York Times*, July 29, 1915, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9500E3DF133FE233A2575AC2A9619C946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

Council Admits That the Situation Is Serious,” that the Indian government was considering arming the military authorities with more power to act in emergencies in response to greater signs of sedition.²⁴⁶ Articles such as “Visiting Maharaja Says India Is Loyal; Ruler of Kapurthala Asserts Reports of Native Troops Revolting Were Exaggerated, His Son Serving at Front” attempted to counter the perception of serious disorders.²⁴⁷ Reports of serious sedition do not appear in Britain or India, but they do in the United States, which indicates German success and communicating their message to America, despite the British message being more prevalent. Neither can completely force the other out of the American news and shape the one dominant message.

Indians had very little opportunity to describe the situation in India in their own words, given that a majority of news came from either British or German sources and were constrained by wartime needs. However, Indians in the United States did attempt to frame the situation themselves. Two letters to the editor of the *New York Times* appeared in 1915 from Indian newspaper editors. The first one was written by the editor of the *Hindustan Gadar*, Ram Chanda, and appeared in July 1915. The *Hindustan Gadar*, published in San Francisco, had been accused of plotting revolt in India by the British, and was very much an Indian nationalist paper. Ram Chandra insisted in the article “The Unrest in India; The Hindustan Gadar Says It Was Not Manufactured Abroad,” that “The

²⁴⁶ “More Sedition in India.; Member of Council Admits That the Situation Is Serious.,” *New York Times*, March 20, 1915, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9401EFDF153EE033A25753C2A9659C946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

²⁴⁷ “Visiting Maharaja Says India is Loyal; Ruler of Kapurthala Asserts Reports of Native Troops Revolting Were Exaggerated. His Son Serving at Front Prince, Accompanied By His Spanish Wife, Is On His Way To The Exposition.,” *New York Times*, May 3, 1915, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9903E6D91539E333A25750C0A9639C946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

revolt in India is as widespread as it was indigenous. It has not been artificially ‘hatched by the Germans ...’ or even by the handful of Hindus who have come out of their country in search of a meagre living or of education.”²⁴⁸ The editor wrote to the *New York Times* for three reasons: to object to misleading reports, insist that the British government is intended to get the *Hindustan Gadar* shut down by the American authorities, and to persuade the world that unrest in India was “a natural reaction on the part of the people of India as a whole against the unbearable tyranny of the British Government.”²⁴⁹ By doing this he is attempting to change how India was perceived. The question of India was not a question of British order and German schemes, but of British tyranny and Indian desire for liberty.

The other important letter from an Indian editor was from Rustom Rustomjee, formerly the editor of the *Oriental Review* published in Bombay and now living in Boston. In the letter Rustomjee insisted that rumors of revolt were created in Germany, following the British message of a loyal and supportive India.²⁵⁰ The letter attacked the Germans as liars. While it does not directly address the question of Indian liberty and nationalism it stands in contrast to the nationalist Chanda. This contrast between two Indian editors living in America is very clear, reflected the conundrum experienced by Americans trying to understand India. There were two ways to interpret the information

²⁴⁸ Ram Chandra, “The Unrest in India.; The Hindustan Gadar Says It Was Not Manufactured Abroad.,” *New York Times*, July 21, 1915, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9D05E7D71038E633A25752C2A9619C946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Rustom Rustomjee, “Reports, Through Berlin, That Have Proved to Be False.,” *New York Times*, November 23, 1915, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9407E5D71239E333A25750C2A9679D946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

coming out of both British and German sources and the rumors that emerged from the strange Orient. This was shaped by the personal views of those getting these reports. The man looking for signs of the revolt that he had so long hoped for sees what he is looking for. However, the person more closely tied to the regime, as the editor of an Indian newspaper published in India, was less likely to believe the rumors of revolt and disorder. The majority of the information coming to the *New York Times* supported the British reports as more reasonable.

India's part in the fight against Germany and the Ottoman Empire was a recognized part of the British war effort. But India's subservience to the British meant that in the majority of the headlines describing the advance through their most important theater, Mesopotamia, the troops are described mostly as British. The content of the articles sometimes acknowledge the Indian nature of the army in Mesopotamia, such as the article "British at Aden Menaced by Turks; Large Force from Arabia Compels a Retirement to the Fortified Port," that described the campaign as an Anglo-Indian one, however, the emphasis is on the British in a majority of articles.²⁵¹ One examples of this was an article published in April 1915, titled "British Rout 15,000 Turks in Mesopotamia: Troops from India Carry Trenches with the Bayonet- Lose 700."²⁵² While the headline implies that the article would be about Indian troops, the vagueness of the title allows plenty of room for interpretation, especially given the British units mixed

²⁵¹ "British at Aden Menaced by Turks; Large Force from Arabia Compels a Retirement to the Fortified Port.," *New York Times*, July 10, 1915, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9C04E4DB153AE633A25753C1A9619C946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

²⁵² "British Rout 15,000 Turks In Mesopotamia; Troops From India Carry Trenches With The Bayonet -- Lose 700.," *New York Times*, April 17, 1915, 1, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9C0CE7D91E3EE033A25754C1A9629C946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

with Indian units. Further, all of the British troops deployed to that front were deployed from India, under the control of the India Office, so a reference to troops from India referred to Indian and European alike. The reports used in these articles came from the India Office, either released for general information, or announced to the House of Commons by the secretary of state for India.²⁵³ When the article quotes the release directly it only refers to the soldiers on the ground very generally, making no distinction between British and Indian casualties or actions.²⁵⁴ This vagueness allows the reader to apply their own bias to the article to a greater extent, and facilitates the removal of Indians from participation. The Indian Army's contributions at this stage were being subsumed beneath the weight of the British name and the remoteness of the theater of war, in much the same way it was subsumed in British papers.

The Indian Army's presence on the western front brought more attention. The diverse and foreign nature of the Indian Army attracted this attention. According to the article "East Indians Scoff at German Shells; 'Doing Their Bit' Cheerfully with Irish Scots, and Britons in the Trenches," "The picturesqueness of the Indian troops of the

²⁵³ "Turks and Kurds Attack the British.; Force of 23,000 Driven Back With Loss of 300 Men And Two Guns.," *New York Times*, April 15, 1915, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9404E5DA123FE233A25756C1A9629C946496D6CF&legacy=true>; "British Rout 15,000 Turks in Mesopotamia; Troops From India Carry Trenches with the Bayonet -- Lose 700"; "British Fall Back When Near Bagdad; Get Within 18 Miles of City, but Go Back 3 Miles to Get Water. Lose 2,000 Men in Fight But Capture 800 Turks and a Large Quantity of Arms And Equipment at Ctesiphon.," *New York Times*, November 25, 1915, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9E07E1D8133FE233A25756C2A9679D946496D6CF&legacy=true>; "Turkish Losses 2,500.; Force That Attacked British in Mesopotamia Well Organized.," *New York Times*, April 21, 1915, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=940DEEDA153DEF3ABC4951DFB266838E609EDE&legacy=true>.

²⁵⁴ "British Rout 15,000 Turks in Mesopotamia; Troops from India Carry Trenches With The Bayonet -- Lose 700."

British Empire breaks the monotony of the grim, colorless business of modern war,” and “they form a separate world of never-ceasing wonder to the French inhabitants.”²⁵⁵ There was a fascination with the way the soldiers were different from Europeans that highlights how these men do not belong. The Indian soldiers were picturesque and wonderful in a war that had already descended into the mud of the trenches.

There was also a special emphasis on the Indian cavalry, a further part of their separation from the Europeans. The exhibitions that Indian cavalry would give behind the lines brought special attention. These exhibitions were a chance for the Indians to demonstrate their prowess at horsemanship as well as the rifle, sword and lance.²⁵⁶ One of the articles compare these events to a Wild West show, with the riders “looking as wild as any theatrical manager could desire,” and very much impressing the local peasants, British and French officers and in one case the king of Belgium.²⁵⁷ Again the author of these events contrasts the picturesque nature of these men and their exceptional skills with the lance, and the war. The competition to pluck a tent peg from the ground with the lance at full gallop were accompanied by “a fierce screaming yell,” “different from

²⁵⁵ “East Indians Scoff at German Shells; ‘Doing Their Bit’ Cheerfully with Irish, Scots, and Britons in the Trenches. Expect A German Break Cavalry Kept in Condition to Pursue the Invaders When They Begin Their Retreat.” *New York Times*, March 6, 1915, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9801E7D91238E633A25755C0A9659C946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

²⁵⁶ “Indians Astonish by Cavalry Feats; Britain’s Brown Horsemen Give Exhibition Of Their Prowess With The Lance. Eager to Attack Germans Men and Horses in Fine Fettle despite the Rigors of the Winter Spent in France.” *New York Times*, April 17, 1915, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9E00E6D91E3EE033A25754C1A9629C946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

²⁵⁷ Frederick Palmer, “King Albert Sees Indian Gymkhana; Belgian Monarch and the French Country Folk Delighted With Cavalry ‘Stunts.’ Sport behind the Lines Feats of Horsemanship Exhibited within Sound of The Guns Pounding German Trenches.” *New York Times*, June 17, 1915, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9C0DEFDD1038E633A25754C1A9609C946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

anything Occidental ears were accustomed to,” further emphasizing their interesting foreignness.²⁵⁸ It allowed a contrast to be drawn between the pastoral wonders of competition before crowds yelling Bravo and roar of the distant guns battering the German trenches in preparation for a coming attack. The focus is on the Indian cavalymen, a force that was coming to be seen as backwards. The Indians practiced with all the weapons of the modern cavalryman, the sword, the lance, and rifle, but only the most romantic images of brown men charging with the lance were described at length. Articles in the *New York Times* such as “German Derides Victors at Loos” called cavalry charges about 50 years behind the times, and the thought of these men going forward to charge machine guns and succeed, no matter how skilled they were with the lance would be unlikely for readers of the newspaper.²⁵⁹ This focus on the Indian cavalry would contribute to doubts about the Indians’ effectiveness against white men. Doubts that would be confirmed by an article, “Says Indian Corps Left Proud Record; But British Headquarters Dispatch Admits They Did Not Do Well At First,” based on a dispatch from British headquarters “the Indian Corps had proved unequal to withstanding the German onslaughts at Neuve Chapelle and Ypres,” which would confirm in many minds

²⁵⁸ Ibid.; “Indians Astonish by Cavalry Feats; Britain’s Brown Horsemen Give Exhibition Of Their Prowess with the Lance. Eager to Attack Germans Men and Horses in Fine Fettle Despite the Rigors of the Winter Spent in France.”

²⁵⁹ “German Derides Victors at Loos; Kellermann Says They Didn’t Fight According To The Latest Regulations. 50 Years Behind the Times Describes Bravery of The British Carrying Out ‘Their Senile Commanders’ Orders.,” *New York Times*, November 22, 1915, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9A02E6DD1E38E633A25751C2A9679D946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

their doubts about Indian quality.²⁶⁰ In 1916 disasters in Mesopotamia would lead to further questions.

The coverage of the Mesopotamia campaign in the *New York Times* followed much the same pattern as the coverage in the *Times*. The campaign begins with a sting of British successes. Articles such as “British Rout 15,000 Turks in Mesopotamia; Troops from India Carry Trenches with Bayonet – Lose 700.” told of Ottoman forces being routed and driven from trench line after trench line, with the information reproduced from India Office reports.²⁶¹ The only sign of difficulty was a report that the British got to within eighteen miles of Baghdad and captured many Ottoman soldiers and a large quantity of equipment before “want of water necessitated the retirement of ... three or four miles below the captured position.”²⁶²

In January 1916 reports begin to come to America of the siege of Kut, reports of “10,000 British troops, under General Townshend, are holding out against a horde of Turks, while a British relief force ... is advancing along the bank, hoping to rescue the

²⁶⁰ “Says Indian Corps Left Proud Record; But British Headquarters Dispatch Admits They Did Not Do Well at First.,” *New York Times*, December 31, 1915, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9F0DEFDB1E38E633A25752C3A9649D946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

²⁶¹ “British Rout 15,000 Turks in Mesopotamia; Troops from India Carry Trenches with the Bayonet -- Lose 700.”; “British Defeat Turks On Tigris; Driven From Their Trenches, Moslems, Hotly Pursued, Flee Toward Bagdad. Ottoman Losses Heavy Leave Many Dead and Wounded on the Field ; - English Casualties Are Under 500.,” *New York Times*, September 30, 1915, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9D01E7DA133FE233A25753C3A96F9C946496D6CF&legacy=true>.

²⁶² “British Fall Back When Near Bagdad; Get Within 18 Miles Of City, But Go Back 3 Miles To Get Water. Lose 2,000 Men In Fight But Capture 800 Turks And A Large Quantity Of Arms And Equipment At Ctesiphon.”

garrison.”²⁶³ Again the emphasis was on the British and their struggle with the Turkish horde, not on the Indians that made up the majority of the garrison. The siege itself had a sense of suspense and drama that made for exciting news, as the relief came to the aid of the besieged garrison like the cavalry riding to the circled wagons. Early reports tell that the force was only six miles from the garrison, then seven miles, then twenty-three miles, when a misunderstanding at the India Office was discovered, heightening tension.²⁶⁴ As the siege goes on, the story of Kut becomes more about the relief of General Townsend, the commander of the besieged garrison, that the soldiers that were besieged with him.²⁶⁵ When the garrison did surrender in April 1916 the article in the *New York Times* gives the strength of the Indian portion of the garrison at six thousand troops and their followers.²⁶⁶

²⁶³ “Turks at Main Defenses of Kut?,” *New York Times*, January 11, 1916, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9A03E3DD103FE233A25752C1A9679C946796D6CF&legacy=true>.

²⁶⁴ “Turks on the Tigris Again Driven Back; Retreat Before British Relief Forces To within Six Miles of Kut. Lost Waddi Positions General Aylmer Dislodged Them Saturday and Moved His Transports Up-Stream.,” *New York Times*, January 18, 1916, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9501E2DC103FE233A2575BC1A9679C946796D6CF&legacy=true>; “British Relief Force Nears Kut-El-Amara; Aylmer’s Troops Only Seven Miles from Town Where Townshend Is Surrounded.,” *New York Times*, January 21, 1916, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9B07E6DB103FE233A25752C2A9679C946796D6CF&legacy=true>; “British Relief Force 23 Miles From Kut; Parliament Hears That It Has Never Been Nearer -- Repulsed At Menlarie.,” *New York Times*, January 27, 1916, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9E03EFD81531E733A05754C2A9679C946796D6CF&legacy=true>.

²⁶⁵ “Townshend Expects Soon To Be Relieved; Reports He’s Well At Kut-El-Amara -- 3,000 British Killed In Attack, Turks Say.,” *New York Times*, April 13, 1916, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=940CE1DE113FE233A25750C1A9629C946796D6CF&legacy=true>.

²⁶⁶ “8,970 British At Kut Surrender To Turkish Foes; Tigris Force Which Gen. Townshend Led Almost To Bagdad Is Starved Out. Relief Force 20 Miles Off Hordes Of Turks, Strongly Intrenched, Twice Defeated Efforts To Reach Town. Floods Also Halt Advance England Laments Surrender, But Praises Commander for His Brilliant Defense. 8,970 British At Kut Surrender,” *New York Times*, April 30, 1916,

The greater emphasis was on the British, given that they were mentioned first, and their commander more prominently. The article hurts the reputation of the Indian Army further in the description of the relief force, the force that failed to reach the heroic general and rescue him from the Turkish hordes. According to the article “8,970 British At Kut Surrender to Turkish Forces,” “Thirty thousand Indian troops were dispatched and two Anglo-Indian divisions, which had been fighting in France were transported to the head of the Persian Gulf, making... a relief force of 90,000 men.”²⁶⁷ This was one of the few times that the British forces in the theater were described as being for the most part as Indian. Another was from one of the soldiers quoted by the article, who said “The river is the only drinking water, and you can imagine the state of it when Orientals have anything to do with it.”²⁶⁸ The initial reports of the surrender seem to be blaming the Indians. However, this falls off as the repercussions of the campaign bear out. Failure was assigned to the leadership that led to an expedition being advanced so far. According to a military expert attempting to explain the British failure for newspaper readers, “It is difficult to account for the British military conception that led this expedition so far from the Persian Gulf, from which their supplies had to come.”²⁶⁹ This expert continues the trend of under representing the Indian contingent, especially in the conclusion where the expert expounds on how England’s generals have failed England’s soldiers since the

<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9A02E2D9153BE233A25753C3A9629C946796D6CF&legacy=true>.

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ “British Military Failure in Mesopotamia Campaign; Analysis of The Operations Which Ended with the Surrender Of General Townshend’s Forces At Kut-El Amara-Strength and Resources of the Turks Vastly Underestimated.,” *New York Times*, May 7, 1916,
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9806E3DC1439E233A25754C0A9639C946796D6CF&legacy=true>.

Napoleonic War. The fact that most of the soldiers here were Indian is not mentioned. This bears a large resemblance to the way the British treated the Indian participation, understandable given how much the American media had to rely on British sources. The American paper was not devoting resources to the Middle East for information on a campaign that was most interesting in failure.

The situation in India itself was seen differently in 1916 than it had been in 1915. There was less reference to the Germans in reports from India. Reports about German plots come out of Shanghai, where German agents were sentenced to hard labor for selling rifles, revolvers and ammunition to the enemies of Great Britain to be used in a rebellion against the British government.²⁷⁰ Besides this plot the same sort of rumors that had circulated about German backed Indian revolt and Muslim revolution had subsided by this third year of war. There were still difficulties in the northern border areas, the area that the author of one letter to the editor, titled “Native Uprisings No Reflection Upon British Rule,” wrote was “known on the frontier as Yaghistan - ‘the country of revolt.’”²⁷¹ This served as a good rebuttal to claims about the significance of these difficulties on the frontier. The battles on the frontier do not seem to be much cause for worry in any case. The difference between the military ability of the disciplined and equipped Indian and British Armies and the mountain tribesmen was too vast to overcome without dissention within the Indian ranks. In November, a raiding force of six thousand Muslim tribesmen

²⁷⁰ “Planned Revolt in India; Conviction of Munitions Sellers Reveals Widespread Plot.,” *New York Times*, February 16, 1916, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9D0DE6DD1F38E633A25755C1A9649C946796D6CF&legacy=true>.

²⁷¹ “Native Uprisings No Reflection Upon British Rule.,” *New York Times*, August 12, 1916, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9A0DE0D7153AE633A25751C1A96E9C946796D6CF&legacy=true>.

from Afghanistan was driven back with the help of airplanes and loss of only one man.²⁷²

Successes like this demonstrated to American readers that the Indian frontier was not in serious danger.

In 1916 a new aspect of British India was beginning to be addressed. A discussion began in the pages of the *New York Times* about the nature of India's government. Senior government officials gave interviews to American reporters about the government of India and the role of Indians in that government. Lord Islington, undersecretary of state for the colonies and president of a commission that studied proposals to extend further Indian participation in government received a delegation of American reporters to discuss this issue. He denied the accusation that the Indian government was closed to Indians, and called it ridiculous that the British could have governed a fifth of the world's population without their participation. Islington pointed not only to the fact that the princes of India governed a significant part of British India, but also to the reforms that had empowered the ten legislative councils.²⁷³ This new emphasis on India's self-government would continue from other important figures. The *New York Times* published an interview conducted with Lord Hardinge, who had lately returned from the post as the viceroy of India, the highest British office in the colony. In the interview

²⁷² "BRITISH DEFEAT 6,000 AFGHAN TRIBESMEN; Aided by Aeroplanes, They Drive Mohmands from the Field, Killing 100.," *New York Times*, November 19, 1916, 00,
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9C00E2DB1F3FE233A2575AC1A9679D946796D6CF&legacy=true>.

²⁷³ "Self-Rule Growing in British India; Lord Islington Explains to American Correspondents the Empire's Liberal Policy. Natives In High Offices A Government Of Officials, But, He Says, 'The Vast Majority of the Officials Are Themselves Indians,'" *New York Times*, June 4, 1916,
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=980CEFDE1539EF32A25757C0A9609C946796D6CF&legacy=true>.

Hardinge was full of praise for the loyalty of India, and the contributions that they gave to the British war effort, especially in the critical early months of the war. The article “India Truly Loyal, Says Lord Hardinge,” quotes Hardinge as saying “the Indian Empire gave to the British Empire in the critical early stages of the war... the whole of its artillery of the most modern and up-to-date pattern with the exception of a few batteries.... India also supplied the British Government with great quantities of shells rifles and small arms ammunition, and the Government of South Africa with shot and shell.”²⁷⁴ The viceroy also praised the reforms made under his administration of India. According to him great progress had been made in bringing Indians to greater participation in their government as well as advancing their position within the family of nations that was the British Empire. After the publication of that interview the *New York Times* ran an article about the how British newspapers responded to the interview. The discussion highlights the loyalty of India, and the fact that “India has identified herself with the empire in a manner never dreamed of hitherto. She can no more be treated as an appendage to be dragged inertly in the wake of the living body of the empire.”²⁷⁵ These articles reflect the Empire spirit that was such a theme of the coverage of India in the *Times of London*. These articles present a very wonderful image of Britain’s rule in India. The reforms reassure the reader of India’s loyalty by focusing on the benefits of British rule, and assuring them that it was not tyrannical. This method did not rely on the British

²⁷⁴ “India Truly Loyal, Says Lord Hardinge,” *New York Times*, May 20, 1916, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9C01E0DA113FE233A25753C2A9639C946796D6CF&legacy=true>.

²⁷⁵ “British Recognize Claims of India; Lord Hardinge’s Interview in the New York Times Starts Discussion of Vital Issue.,” *New York Times*, May 22, 1916, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9903EEDA113FE233A25751C2A9639C946796D6CF&legacy=true>.

views of India that saw the country as strictly hierarchical. Instead of bringing out Indian royalty to repeat the declarations of loyalty these articles pointed to the promise of liberty. The agreement was not ignorantly different from the argument put forward by the Aga Kahn in 1914, but the perspective is different. The focus is on British actions that made India better.

This perspective was repeatedly attacked by one Indian writer in letters to the editor of the *New York Times*. Lajpat Rai was an early Indian nationalist, who had moved to the United States after his exile from India, and there he continued to criticize the British colonial administration.²⁷⁶ The interviews with British government officials led to a string of letters from this Indian nationalist intending to counter the assertions by British officials and bring to light to facts that had escaped mention. The first letter was a response to Lord Hardinge's assertions that the people who oppose the Empire were desperate and dangerous anarchists. He insisted that instead they should be thought of as people who want Indians to have a voice in their government.²⁷⁷ Instead of being brought into higher positions of government, Rai wrote, in an article titled "What India Wants; Liberty Like That of Canada or South Africa", that "the people of the country have no voice in laying down... policy. India is governed from Whitehall, London and in the interests of England primarily.... The Indian Nationalist wants the Government of India to be free and unfettered except by what is in the interest of India,"²⁷⁸ Lord Islington's

²⁷⁶ J.S. Bains, "Lala Lajpat Rai's Idealism and Indian National Movement," *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 4 (1985): 404.

²⁷⁷ Lajpat Rai, "What India Wants.; Liberty Like That of Canada or South Africa.," *New York Times*, May 31, 1916, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9400E2DE1539EF32A25752C3A9639C946796D6CF&legacy=true>.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

interview was an opportunity for Lajpat Rai to communicate the nationalist message to Americans by the means of letters to the editor. In this case the Islington's assertions that India was governing itself, the princes in particular, was the main point of contention. While the British insisted that the princes governed their lands, Rai countered that these rulers could not take independent action from the British, enact laws fiscally disadvantageous to the British, establish facilities for education or training, and were in great difficulties financially. The participation of Indians in government positions was also less than British officials indicated. According to Rai, out of 1324 Indian civil servants that administered India only 64 were Indian.²⁷⁹ After this further letters continued to dispute claims coming from British and Indian sources about the situation in India. One letter was exclusively about how underrepresented Indians were in the court system.²⁸⁰ Another recounts the growing prison population, and asserts that this is proof that India was not as passive as the British would like it to appear due to the increased number of prisoners being jailed and that the average number of prisoners in hospitals had risen by 30 percent.²⁸¹ However, Lajpat Rai failed to have a decisive effect on the way Americans viewed the British Empire in India. In this case it was the word of an

²⁷⁹ Lajpat Rai, "How India Wears Her British Head.; So That the Native Officials Are but the Legs of Government and Princes Occupy Contemptible Positions.," *New York Times*, June 13, 1916, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9F05E1DD173BE633A25750C1A9609C946796D6CF&legacy=true>.

²⁸⁰ Lajpat Rai, "Who Holds The Reins In India.; The Hopeless Minority Of Natives Who Have Responsible Positions in the Administration.," *New York Times*, July 2, 1916, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9801E6DF1E3FE233A25751C0A9619C946796D6CF&legacy=true>.

²⁸¹ Lajpat Rai, "Uprisings In India.; Their Seriousness As Indicated By Growth Of The Prison Population.," *New York Times*, August 4, 1916, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9F0CE6DB1E3FE233A25757C0A96E9C946796D6CF&legacy=true>.

Indian described by the article “India Approaches Self-Government; Lord Islington Denies That the Native Chiefs Are Mere Puppets” as “an extreme advocate of ‘Home Rule for India’,” and his contentions must be “judged by the question whether the native populations of India are as well fitted for complete autonomy as the inhabitants of Canada. American opinion may see an analogy in the case of the Philippines.”²⁸² This article, from a special correspondent of newspaper in London, put the weight on the British side, drawing on their shared imperialism and racial theories of white supremacy. But Rai put forward a serious effort to get the American reader to consider that there was information the British were not being forthright about, and that the Indians had a part in this discussion of their own.

With the end of 1916 comes the end of the period where American newspapers can be considered neutral. American neutrality had been under stress for much of the war. German submarine attacks on merchant shipping in 1915 had strained the relationship between these two countries, and resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare early in 1917 would make a significant contribution to America declaring war in April 1917. After that the American press was no longer neutral to the British Empire, and no longer presents an avenue to study the perspectives of a neutral power toward India’s position within the British Empire.

Throughout the war British India was the subject of competing propaganda efforts throughout wartime America. At first it appears to be between the British and the

²⁸² “India Approaches Self-Government; Lord Islington Denies That the Native Chiefs Are Mere Puppets. Disputes Lajpat Rai Asserts That Number of Natives Occupying Important Posts is Increasing Steadily.,” *New York Times*, August 6, 1916, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9D0CE4DA1439E233A25755C0A96E9C946796D6CF&legacy=true>.

Germans offering two perspectives on India. The British perspective was that the Indians were loyal and dedicated, contributing plenty to the Empire that they were proud to be a part of. The perspectives coming out of Germany were insistent on India's disloyalty, and the inherent rebelliousness of the population, especially the Muslims. The difficulty here was that there was widespread acknowledgement in the American paper of Germany's desire and need for India to rebel, and for Indian Army units to massacre their white officers and spread chaos in the East. This focus left little in the way of a discussion of India's contributions to the British war effort. The Indian Corps contributions to the western front were included, but more articles were devoted to cavalry demonstration than their actual contributions at the front. Even so the Indians were presented as out of their depth and as not belonging in this new world. When they were withdrawn from fighting on the western front their presence in the paper as fighters dies down considerably. The fighting in Mesopotamia and Africa, where Indians made important contributions, was covered rarely, and that coverage focused mainly on the officers in command of these expeditions. Therefore, in neutral newspapers India's participation was marginalized behind the overall leadership of Britain.

In 1916 there developed a change in the dispute over India. Now India was being disputed between British and Indian perspectives. The British were emphasizing the participation of Indians in the war, as evidence of their loyalty and willingness to be a part of the empire, while Indian nationalists were arguing that they were excluded from participation, and therefore from contributing anything of their own free will to the British war effort. The British perspective continued to dominate the American newspapers.

Conclusion

The First World War brought many changes to how India's relationship with the British Empire was perceived. The impact in India was especially significant, as the educated Indians who made up the Indian National Congress in this period had seen the war as a great opportunity, and they urged Indians to greater and greater participation in the war in the hope that their sacrifice and dedication to the British cause would be rewarded at the end of the war with the reforms that would move India quickly to a place in the Empire equal with the dominions. During the war it seemed that India would receive these rewards, though not at a pace that pleased many Indians. The end of the war brought India honors and the promised reforms. However, the Black Acts and other repressive movements of the British Empire turned many Indian reformers and much of the Indian National Congress against home rule.

The British perception of India at the beginning of the war was one of a willing and loyal servant of the Empire. The arrival of Indian troops on the western front represented the British ideal of the Empire. The war was seen as fostering a spirit of the Empire, one that would bring the Empire together into greater solidarity. The Indian, especially those who had fought in France or traveled to England to recover from wounds, were seen as directly engaging with the heart of the Empire in a reverent and respectable manner. Their loyalty was the natural outcome of the British respect for their traditions and good government. While this would fade as Indian troops were transferred to theaters of war further from Britain, this demonstration of loyalty confirmed British views about their benevolence. The conservative *Times* welcomed reform in 1917, but this reform was to be at a considered pace that fitted British interests, as well as British

perceptions of Indians as not ready to govern themselves. The rejection of these reforms by many Indian leaders was seen in the *Times of London* as ingratitude, and this hardened British attitudes towards Indian liberals.

In the United States the war led to the development of a propaganda conflict in the *New York Times* between the conflicting messages of India as a loyal part of the British Empire and India as a place of revolt and dissatisfaction. Initially this conflict was between British and German perspectives, but by 1916 the Indian nationalists were making their opinions heard in the American newspapers, as German sourced articles appear less and less frequently. The British had still managed to dominate the coverage of India with articles that carried their message, but perceptions of India in America reflected a concern about how the British governed the subcontinent.

This invites a deeper analysis in the ways the First World War impacted the colonial empires of the belligerent powers. The Indian movement for independence from Britain was greatly empowered by the First World War. In this case it was an outgrowth of unfulfilled promises and changing understandings of empire and the world. This began the period of decolonization, as the colonial powers proved unwilling to accept the colonized populations into their government, and unable to persuade the world of the righteousness of empire.

Further research along the same lines should examine the evolving perception of India from within the British Empire. An examination of the *Times of India* would be a very worthy topic of study, if copies of the articles from the period can be obtained. The distinction between the opinions of the British in the metropole, and those on the

periphery of the Empire would give important insight into whether the empire was seen differently in these two areas.

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Appendix A: Additional Graphs and Word Clouds




Figure 6 - Word counts for all headlines about India for counts over 10, with the terms *India* and *Indian* removed



Figure 10 - Word cloud for 1914 headlines about India for counts over 3.



Figure 12 - Word cloud for 1916 headlines about India for counts over 3 with the terms *India* and *Indian* removed.






Figure 14- Word cloud for all headlines about India for counts over 3 with the terms *India* and *Indian* removed.