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The Southern African Development Community's Two Identities and the Islamic Insurgency in
Mozambique's Cabo Delgado Province: The Search for An Alternative African transnational
administration theory.

by

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A dissertation

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Dedication

To my parents, Joseph and Lucia Sibanda Nyaku, words can hardly describe my thanks and appreciation to you for all the years of toiling in the fields to feed and send us to school. Mom, or Gogo VaJoe, as you are affectionately called, through me have you achieved the highest level of education even if you never got a chance to know the walls of the classroom. And to my circle, Nomsa, Philbert, Panashe, and Prince Juandre, thank you all for your patience of living without me for all these years. I owe this one to you all. To my late grannies, Elizabeth and Yohoana, were my source of inspiration, support, and guidance. You taught me to be determined, to believe in myself, and to always persevere. I am truly thankful and honored to have you as part of my extended family.

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List of Abbreviations

| | |
|---------|---|
| AU | African Union |
| ASWJ | Ansar al-Sunna wa al Jamma'ah |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of Congo |
| FFP | Fund for Peace |
| FRELIMO | Mozambique Liberation Front |
| MDP | Mutual Defense Pact |
| OAU | Organization of African Unity |
| SADC | Southern African Development Community |
| IGO | Intergovernmental Organization |
| IO | International Organization |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| SAMIM | SADC Mission in Mozambique |
| OPDSC | Organ for Politics Defense and Security Cooperation |
| RENAMO | Mozambican National Resistance |
| UN | United Nations |
| NEPAD | The New Partnership for Africa's Development |

The Southern African Development Community's Two Identities and the Islamic Insurgency in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado Province: The Search for An Alternative African transnational administration theory.

Dissertation Abstract—Idaho State University (2023)

Although there is a perpetual proliferation of administrative practices and processes in policy making and delivery among intergovernmental organizations, the geographic pattern of policy action can vary significantly. In this study, effort is dedicated to the search and support for an alternative African transnational theory of international organizations where the activities of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in managing the Cabo Delgado Insurgency are scrutinized. In looking at the factors that influence SADC's administrative activities, this article evaluates the SADC's two identities and push an alternative Triadic identity to explain SADC's response mechanism to the Cabo Delgado insurgency in Mozambique. While relying on normative public administration principles and IR theory, the study places its focus on the SADC bureaucratic and political frameworks and how these structures shape decision making. As a part of theory building, the study unpacks the contextual conditions of SADC member states and how the transnationalization of these country-specific factors to SADC shapes the decisions and policies of the international organization. By introducing this triadic identity of SADC, contribution is made towards an alternative African transnational theory of administration that emphasizes state level contextual conditions in the quotidian activities of the regional body. Thus, the research extends the bounds of public administration to the traditional domain of International Relations scholarship to support emerging transnational theories of administration while stimulating regional policymaking and continuously reconfiguring the support for home-grown development initiatives that affect regional policymaking.

KEYWORDS: Security Community, Sovereignty, Two-Identity, Cabo Delgado, SADC, Contextual conditions

CHAPTER 1

Introduction and Background

In October 2017, an attack was launched by an Islamist group known as Ansar al-Sunna at a police station in a Mocímboa da Praia- a town in the northern Mozambican province of Cabo Delgado. According to Muller and Volrath (2019), this attack was widely seen as the beginning of a new wave of violence in Mozambique following decades of civil war between the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) and the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). Ansar al-Sunna wa al Jamma'ah (ASWJ) claims allegiance to the Islamic State of Syria and the Levante (ISIL/ISIS) and another Islamic terror group call Al Shabab operating in East Africa (mainly Kenya, Somalia, and Tanzania) (Institute for Security Studies, 2021). Since 2017, there have been reports of killings, some of which involved beheadings and burning of victims and those who have been displaced are estimated to be over 700 000 and deaths estimated at more than 2500 (Institute for Security Studies, 2021) One of the deadliest events since 2017 took in March 2021 in a town called Palma where dozens were beheaded, burned, and buried in shallow graves. This event resulted in big oil companies such as Total halting operations at their worksite and workers evacuated (BBC, 2021). The incident prompted a meeting of the SADC Troika as well as incoming and outgoing SADC chairs of the Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC). The slow, ineffective response requires serious evaluation and explanation.

This dissertation evaluates Southern African Development Community's (SADC) two identities and their influence on the body's response mechanism to the Islamic Insurgency in Mozambique's northern province of Cabo Delgado. Using the Two-Identity theory developed by

Claude (1996), the study tests the effect of the theory on SADC's response to the insurgency and launches a search for other possible influences on SADC's response mechanism, influences outside the Two-Identity theory. Such influences include the member states' contextual conditions based on the indicators published by the Fund for Peace (FFP) on the Global Fragile States index. While the proliferation of research on the Cabo Delgado insurgency and SADC's efforts to mitigate the conflict is notable (Mlambo and Masuku, 2020; Mabera and Naidu, 2020; Masimbye, 2022; Sithole, 2022; Bussotti and Torres, 2020), Vhumbunu, 2021) lack a thorough study of influences as captured by the Two-Identities theory as a framework to understand SADC's response mechanism to the terrorist insurgency. Through theory testing, the study embarks on a search for an alternative African transnational administration theory to explain SADC's conflict response mechanism linked to the Mozambican insurgency. Such a theory depicts the need for SADC to adapt to the country's context and means as captured by the Global Fragile States Index (Fund for Peace, 2022). These indicators (see Chapter 6) are analyzed and used to demonstrate how country contextual conditions can be transnationalized to the regional organization and influence the same organization's actions and interventionist policies. When the two identities of SADC are coupled with the internal conditions of individual member states, the resultant model, which this study calls the triadic effect on SADC, influences how SADC operates. The study, therefore, argues that while SADC's two identities shape the way the regional organization responds to crises, they alone cannot fully explain the actions, however such actions can be accounted for by a combination of SADC's identity and the internal conditions within the sixteen countries that make up SADC.

Formed as a regional economic community with, currently, sixteen members (**see Fig. 1 in Chapter 3**), the SADC developed its mission around sustainable and equitable socio-economic development using “efficient, productive systems, deeper cooperation and integration, good governance and durable peace and security;” in order to become a keen and functional actor in the international system (SADC, 2022). Against this regional mission is the reality that several countries in Southern Africa have become preoccupied with one or more problems like poverty and hunger (Tagg, 2002; De Wit, 2009; Manyame, 2002), with some like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Cawthra, 2010; Dahlen, 2005), and until recently Mozambique, experiencing violent conflict. These problems have drawn the attention of the SADC transforming such problems from being perceived as marginal security and economic problems bedeviling a single country to regional problems dealt with by major national, international, and humanitarian actors.

1.1.2 Mozambique

Viewed as a successful post-conflict example following years of civil war, Mozambique has remained relatively free from internal conflict notwithstanding sporadic skirmishes between the ruling Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and opposition grouping, the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) (Bekoe, Buchard, and Daly, 2020). The emergence of an extremist group Ahlu al-Sunnah wal-Jamaah (ASWJ) also known as Ansar al-Sunnah has transformed the Mozambican civil conflict prognosis and prompted analysts to rethink the country’s social and conflict trajectory (Bekoe, et al, 2020). However, Mozambique’s situation cannot be understood in isolation. Rather, the actions of the regional international organization play a key role in the pursuit of understanding actions taken to address Mozambique's violence.

1.1.3 The Two-Identity Theory

In this dissertation, Claude's (1996) Two-Identity theory is employed to gauge SADC's actions in response to the Mozambique crisis. The study focuses on SADC's response mechanism as guided by its two identities: first as a body politic controlled by member states which emphasize the sovereignty clause as well as buckling to the forces of national interest, and secondly, as an institution seeking to dispense quotidian bureaucratic functions operating within the political and economic matrix.

The importance of Claude's (1996) Two-Identity theory, as applied to the United Nations (UN), has increased the understanding of how Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) work. However, the theory has not been applied to a regional IGO such as SADC. Applying the theory to SADC, against the organization's response to the Islamic insurgency, produces variable results. It is here that the search for a possible explanation, other than the Two-Identity theory, or as an addition to the Two-Identity theory, becomes valuable. In this endeavor, the research asks the following research questions:

- 1. Does the Two-Identity theory work for SADC, a regional NGO, in its response to the terrorist activities in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province?*
- 2. What other factors, apart from the Two Identity theory, explain SADC's response mechanism as a regional IGO?*
 - 2(a) How do these express themselves in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado Insurgency?*

To understand the role of SADC and how its identities influence conflict response, it is fundamental to unpack the idea of how SADC as an intergovernmental organization (IGO) fits the category of security community- a term coined by Deutsch and colleagues (1957).

1.2 SADC as a Security Community

Deutsch and colleagues define a security community as a phenomenon when states integrate to the point that they have a sense of community that creates the assurance that their differences are settled in the absence of war, hence creating a stable order and a stable peace. Thus, a group of states become so integrated until there is real assurance that the members of that community do not settle disputes physically, but in some other way (Deutsch, et al 1957; Adler and Bennett, 1998). Historically SADC countries have generally been immune to serious terrorist activity, until the Cabo Delgado insurgency that started in October 2017, notwithstanding some armed skirmishes that took place in Angola which are more of a civil war (Hoekstra, 2019) than terrorist insurgency. Scholars suggest two possibilities about security communities to explain this immunity to serious extremist violence. First, as outlined by Raimo Väyrynen (2000), a coalition might possess essential structural fundamentals for stability. Second, the influence of different identities and interests among coalition actors living within an environment with the necessary social and cognitive circumstances for stability to prevail (Risse, 2016; Adler, Barnett, & Smith, 1998).

Focusing on the second suggestion, such coalitions are, as Flockhart (2005) would call them, value-based communities sharing specific ideologies, some of which include “peaceful and cooperative relations” (2005, p. 1). The ideals for cooperation, enunciated in the SADC treaty of 1992 configure strong functionalist thought in different areas which, when implemented, “would bring benefits ... [and] foster an experience of working together and create a sense of regional identity ... which would underpin a [program] of progressive integration (SADC Treaty, 1992, p. i). By emphasizing regional identity, the framers of the SADC Treaty understood, in hindsight, that

although such milestones were necessary, there is an interplay between member self-interest and bureaucracy in determining the course of action for a security community/IGO like SADC. In explaining the function of SADC institutions, due recognition of the context of exercising sovereignty was necessary as a way to prevent the loss of such sovereignty (SADC, 1992). Key to this research is the nexus between sovereignty and member self-interests on one hand, and SADC's bureaucratic framework in the determination of the body's conflict resolution mechanism, including the response to regional instability.

Of course, the study of security communities and international organizations (IOs) has revealed that cooperation and conflict resolution are important cornerstones to the continued existence of political groupings (Williams, 2010; Müller, 2013; Wilkins, 2012; Ngoma, 2003; Pouliot, 2006, Adler, 2009; Nathan, 2016). However, the evolution of the SADC has demonstrated that while cooperation is at the center of the Southern African bloc, problems related to relationships among and within member states are far from resolved. This is evident when considering SADC's objective to stop the Islamic state-linked violence that began in northern Mozambique in October 2017. While research on security communities has approached issues of violence and conflict resolution through an international relations perspective, it has done so at the neglect of the nexus between international relations (sovereignty) and public organizational theory (institutional identities). A double-edged perspective on the operations of SADC, based on the body as a political entity and bureaucratic institution simultaneously, best explains the interactions among security community member states. The issue of national interests as well as the SADC's administrative and bureaucratic organizational structures, where different structures within the organization's framework are assigned specific roles, become central to SADC's choice

of action. The two identities shape the actions of security institutions such as the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) (see Chapter 3) (also known as the SADC Organ on Politics Defense, and Security Cooperation) (Malan and Cilliers, 1997) whose duty is to deal with peace and security in the region.

1.2.1 SADC's Response to the Mozambican Insurgency

SADC's response to the Cabo Delgado conflict in northern Mozambique demonstrates how any conflicting relationship between members' interests and the SADC's administrative/bureaucratic structure creates slow response to the conflict. Thus, this study focuses on a dual lens, based on international relations theory and public organizational theory, to examine the role of SADC in its attempt to find a lasting solution to the conflict. These two frameworks are encapsulated in Claude's Two-Identity theory which is tested for its relevance to conflict management within an international organization or security community whose members place strong emphasis on issues of sovereignty and national interests. As a central theme in international relations, national interest resonates with power politics where the notion "is part of [the] political reality and is integral to [the] discourse on public affairs" (Kratochwil, 1982, p. 2). Since we are, by default, molded to conceptualize national interest through invoking actions shaped by identity, this study alludes to the nature of national interest precipitated by SADC's ability, as a political organization that has the power, to influence action. As is discerned from Claude's Two-Identity theory (see Chapter 4), identity is poly-sided, that is, it is about the conscious nature of self and 'Other.' Identity also "facilitates cooperation and mobilizes agents for change..." (p. 148), and lastly, identity is a source of revisionism and contributes to conflict at different levels (domestic, national, regional, and international) and within the international

organization's institutional framework. These features of identity influence an actor's view of others within the security community or international organization, and how the same actor views themselves. Moreover, the identity of SADC as a political body and as a bureaucratic entity affects the regional body's conflict response mechanisms. In examining the issue of identity, the study analyzes how perceived identities and resultant divergent (national) interests of both Mozambique and SADC, as a collective whose institutional capacity is a product of many factors including economic and political ones, explain why the path to peace in Mozambique has been long and winding.

In one of the earliest papers written about the evolution of the SADC, Jake Cilliers observed that the definition of the SADC as a community dedicated to development integration rests on three key issues namely: peace, stability and an accompanying shift towards democracy (Cilliers, 1996). Peace, stability, and democracy are products of an organization's political and structural framework, among many other things. Thus, this dissertation assesses the political (mainly issues of national interest of SADC member countries and the SADC bloc) and administrative framework of SADC concerning the organization's response to the Islamic insurgency mounted by the group known as Ansar al-Sunna in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado Province. The study lies within the security community or international organization (IO) context and evaluates SADC's response mechanisms when faced with a practical situation affecting one of the member states and potentially threatening the entire region. Suffice to say that such threats are not confined to the region but can also cause damage to foreign policy arrangements of even the major players such as the United States, France, United Kingdom, and other players.

Serious consideration must therefore be given not only to the impact of violence across regions but also to the study of the roles and response mechanisms of specific regional coalitions-security communities. To get a deeper understanding of the nature of such response mechanisms there is a need to explore SADC's historical past, and the theoretical underpinnings of cooperation, human security, sovereignty, and the body's institutional framework which includes how the organization funds its projects. All of this influences the actions of the SADC body Politick and the actions of individual member states.

A general observation about the Cabo Delgado conflict is that SADC, the security community in which the insurgency began, has been impotent in its response to the violence affecting one of its member states- Mozambique. The study, therefore, traces the ferocious events from October 2017 to July 2022 when SADC finally managed to deploy its force (SADC Mission in Mozambique [SAMIM]) (see Chapter 6). This study does not analyze the nature of terrorist activities in Cabo Delgado but evaluates SADC's role and its response to these activities by applying the Two-Identity theory. Secondly, the study seeks to evaluate the political and administrative framework of a security community (SADC) within a conflict situation. The belief is that institutional capacity, broadly defined, precipitates organizational responsiveness, and as a result, the performance of SADC within the prevailing violent conditions provides an opportunity for self-reflection on security community members and, possibly, provides an opportunity for structural and administrative reform.

Having discussed issues of national interest and the administrative framework, both of which form SADC's two identities, the study assesses the possibilities of how SADC's response

mechanisms are also shaped by member states' contextual conditions. These conditions international development linked to terrorist activity.

1.3 Justification for Study

Although there have been several military interventions aimed at restoring peace in SADC, with the Great War of Africa (1998-2003) being a vivid example, SADC has never had to deal with Islamic terrorist threats with the magnitude of what is happening in Mozambique's northern province of Cabo Delgado. Questions, therefore, arise about how SADC is and will deal with a security mutant of a terrorist nature. Probably the first of its kind, Islamic terrorism in Cabo Delgado requires documentation of strategies by SADC members that will ensure better ways of understanding security management in an ever-changing security environment. Even as critical vocabularies and senses in which human security operates seem to vacillate in response to changing social environments, it is critical that community responses to violent threats with a terrorist outlook, and the security threats themselves, should not be taken for granted. This justifies the necessity for learning more about how violence and the responses to such violence mold and convey social meanings.

To date, the role of SADC has been framed in line with the issue of cooperation and response to specific contextual issues: poverty and hunger, conflict, development, and so on (SADC, 1992). For instance, M. C. Lee (1999) observed that SADC was envisaged as a vehicle for regional economic development aimed at market integration in the wake of "the changes occurring in South Africa and within the world economy" (p. 30). These changes meant that SADC would benefit from the anticipated post-apartheid South Africa given the latter's economic status. Secondly, the compelling forces of globalization meant that there was an urgent need for

SADC member countries to make links with new trading blocs since marginalization would create an adverse effect on the regional economy (Lee, 1999). However, this type of integration did not rule out cooperation for security purposes. As Du Pisani (2020) noted, following the dictates of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, SADC represents the first resort in the regional conflict resolution structure. Treating individual contextual issues entirely separately may not provide a clear picture of regional integration because some of these issues are connected in some way. Moreover, regional issues may also be a result of a warped continental approach. This means that the failures experienced by the African Union may trickle down and plague Africa's regional blocs. Sifolo (2010) contended that the older version of the African Union, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), failed in some areas because of its inability to navigate Africa's development through challenges of peace and security that waylaid the organization from the beginning. In the same vein, the performance of SADC, gauged through the response mechanism to pressing security issues, is a product of some political and administrative frameworks within the body's organs mandated to deal with such issues. An assessment of such a framework, therefore, helps in the transformation of the SADC community into an effective security and development bloc.

Another source of justification for such a study is the paucity of literature on intergovernmental or security communities' response to Islamic terrorism in Southern Africa specifically. While critical discourse on such a subject is widespread in other regions, like East Africa's response to Al Shabab (see Anderson and McKnight, 2014; Odhiambo, et al, 2013, and also Cannon and Ruto, 2017), Islamic State terrorism in the Middle East (Lutz and Lutz, 2015; and Levitt, 2002), and also security threats among the NATO states (see Nevers, 2007; Cornish, 2004, and Hellmann and Wolf, 1993), such critical discourse in SADC is still acutely sparse. By adding a

voice to SADC's response to terrorist violence, this study contributes to the security community scholarship, providing additional insights for security experts and analysts. Moreover, there is a need to align security community conflict resolution initiatives with the broader international development trajectory.

An important scenario emanates from the contextual environment in which SADC as a regional body operates. Such context includes both political and structural influences. The principles of non-interference, which is one of the cornerstones of the African Union, extends to other regional bodies like SADC. In the case of the African Union, Field (2004) observed that the continental body was confined by this mandate. The sovereignty motif also plays out in SADC operations. Consequently, this study brings out the complex nature of policy choices within a body that seeks to observe the principle of non-interference while hoping to prevent fundamentalist ideologies from an isolated hotspot from spreading across the region. In brief, the study contributes to a general discursive framework that seeks to explore dilemmas created by organizational mandates faced by metamorphosed security threats. Such a scholarly venture helps unbundle the evolution of conflict management approaches by SADC from the past to the present. The need to understand whether there are alternative response mechanisms to evolving security threats has, thus, become more urgent.

Westphalian tradition and realists contend that one of the states' responsibilities is to protect human rights within their jurisdiction (Mingst, et al, 2014). Because international relations have created space for countries to work together as groups in areas of security, the economy, and other social aspects, the mandate given to states trickles down to regions in which these states find themselves members. By design, the mandates of states extend to become

regional mandates where the protection of these and other rights are key. In articulating the role of regional institutions, the SADC treaty (1992) underscores the importance of integration where some decisions previously taken by states are taken regionally giving due consideration to regional orientations and circumstances (SADC. 1992). Some regional positions include appendages of human rights which include the right to life, the right to security, and freedom from fear, all of which become violated once violent conflict breaks out. One of the objectives of this study is to gauge the perceptions of experts on SADC's ability to protect these rights especially against a background of terrorism in Mozambique with the possibility that the problem could encroach on the country's neighbors (Mabera and Naidoo, 2020).

Because this study seeks to establish the factors surrounding SADC's response mechanism, knowledge about how SADC has responded thus far allows security experts, as well as regional and international stakeholders to design effective mechanisms by taking a leaf from past successes and failures in similar contexts.

Further justification rests on the implications of external interference in responding to internal conflict. Bekoe, et al argued that reliance on external assistance to stem an internal conflict precipitate "an internationalization of the insurgency, which may have consequences that have not yet been fully considered" (2020, p. 2). This study acknowledges that the violence in Mozambique has attracted external attention from actors which include SADC. Hence as part of filling the gap noticed by Bekoe and colleagues, the study analyzes SADC's identity to fully consider the effectiveness and consequences of its action towards the insurgency. Having done this, the study seeks to place mechanisms for intervention in the context of the global foreign policy vortex to promote international development in the region. The pursuit of the foreign

policy dimension is not out of mere vagary. Rather, it is premised on the view that the national interest is used to describe as well as prescribe foreign policy (Nye, 1999). Part of this study is to provide some rudimentary solutions to these questions about foreign policy, albeit in a wider international system, by aligning transnational security mechanisms with development efforts by international players.

1.4 Problem Statement and Research Questions

The importance of Claude's (1996) Two-Identity theory has increased the understanding of how Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) work. However, applying the theory to SADC against the organization's response to the Islamic insurgency may produce variable results. It is here that the search for a possible explanation, other than the Two-Identity theory, becomes necessary. In this endeavor, the research asks the following research Questions:

1. Does the Two-Identity theory work to explain SADC's response to the terrorist activities in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province?

2. What other factors, apart from the Two Identity theory explain SADC's response mechanism as a regional IGO?

2(a) How do these express themselves in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado Insurgency?

1.5 Hypotheses

The study focuses on the Two-Identity theory to better understand the response of SADC to the conflict in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado Province. In addition, the study looks at other factors- also known as a 'third force' - that help to explain SADC's response mechanism. Thus, the study has two sets of hypotheses:

H1: The success of SADC as a security community in defeating the Islamic insurgency in Mozambique depends on the cooperation of member states.

H2: SADC's conflict resolution capacity is aided by a third force created by member states' contextual conditions.

1.6 Research Objectives

The long-term goal of the research is to develop an alternative African transnational administration theory. By testing the applicability of the Two-Identity theory, the study has the following four fundamental research objectives:

Evaluation of the role of SADC's two identities in efforts to address conflict of a violent nature; Assessing how member states' internal conditions influence the actions of the SADC in its fight against extremist violence in one of the member states; Developing an alternative African Transnational administration theory by looking at SADC's institutional framework; Aligning SADC's conflict response efforts to international development pathways in the region.

1.7 Structure of the Dissertation

The preceding section is Chapter One which introduces the study by identifying the problem facing SADC as a result of the terrorist insurgency in one of the member countries- Mozambique. The chapter also introduces the Two-Identity theory which is used to gauge the activities of SADC. The chapter also laid out the research questions and the objectives of the study as well as the justification for undertaking the research.

Chapter Two is a review of literature about community security as international organizations (IOs). It also reviews other concepts such as sovereignty and self-interest and configured them as some theoretical underpinnings of the study.

Chapter Three offers background information on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and outlines the organization's institutional framework. The chapter also

discusses issues of SADC funding source and the roles of other branches such as the Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) and how the Mutual Defense Pact (MDP) was created. The chapter revisits SADC's previous involvement in security issues in the Democratic Republic of Congo as a way to trace SADC's security footprint. The chapter then closes by narrating the events of the Cabo Delgado insurgency.

Chapter Four is the theoretical section which describes the origin and assumptions of the Two-Identity theory. The theory is then applied to SADC and the two identities of SADC are identified. Chapter Four also discusses the nature of Organizational structure, politics, and identity and how this shapes organizational behavior. The chapter concludes by looking at how collective identity plays within an institutional environment.

Chapter Five provides the methods used to collect and analyze the data which are used to make arguments about the role of the Two-Identity theory and that of other factors in the nature of response of SADC to the issues of terrorism taking place in Mozambique.

Chapter Six presents data about SADC's institutional arrangements as well as data about Global Fragile States Index which outline the country-specific conditions using twelve indicators. These indicators are described individually and connected to the influence they have on a regional scale although they emanate at country level. The chapter also describes Mozambique's economic environment by looking at the country's GDP per capita.

Chapter Seven is a discussion of the findings of Chapter Six and uses the Global Fragile States Index data to argue for a third force that is believed to influence SADC's actions besides the two identities observed. Chapter Eight provides a discussion of the research objectives by evaluating the Two-Identity theory, demonstrating the roles played by the First and Second SADC

in general and then linking these roles to the Cabo Delgado insurgency. Next, the chapter discusses the contextual conditions of SADC member states and explains how the conditions create a matrix that influences the operations of SADC. Finally, the chapter forges an argument for a theory that utilizes both the Two-Identities of SADC and member states internal conditions. The chapter concludes by offering recommendations on possible approaches to conflict management by SADC and the broad international community.

CHAPTER 2

Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

Two sets of literature are necessary for this study. First, the literature on security communities is important to understand the nature of intergovernmental organizations (IOs) and security community response to situations. In this study, literature is approached from the general to the particular. That is, a broad discussion on security communities as examples of intergovernmental organizations starts from, borrowing from, mostly, Karl Deutsch (1957), and Adler and Bennett (1998a, 1998b), the discussion of the concept and the evolution of security communities, including factors including their formation. This includes a brief review of two types of security communities: amalgamated and pluralistic communities. From here, particular examples of intergovernmental organizations such as NATO (Adler and Bennett, 2008) and the African Union (Sifolo, 2010), are discussed under such themes as shared interests, norms and shared practices, as well as mutual trust and collective mindsets. This is in order to clearly delineate the security community framework and the nature of their work using regional examples. Such a discussion also includes contentious bodies like ASEAN (Khoo, 2015) and frames the debate about security communities in the views of both protagonists and antagonists. The discussion then moves to the discussion of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as a *de jure* security community.

The second section of the literature review focuses on Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) in Africa. For purposes of this study, the African Union (AU) and SADC are reviewed as examples of IGOs. The focus on African IGOs provides a continent-wide background on matters

of security and cooperation. Hence, this section breaks down the review into the following areas: IGOs and institutionalism, power and functionalist thought, self-interest, identity and cooperation. This general literature on IGOs draws on specific cases where SADC left its regional security footprint.

2.2 Security Communities: Formation, Types, and Organizational Dynamics

Years after Karl Deutsch and his colleagues researched factors through which war can be mitigated, both in space and time, a number of researchers reacted to the concept of security communities. Of these researchers, Adler and Bennett (1998a), Adler (2008), and Nathan (2006) made further enquiries into the spread and causes of security communities across the world. These communities successfully re-appeared in the international relations literature at the end of the Cold War (Tusicsny, 2007; Bueger and Stockbruegger, 2013). For Adler's (2008) study, extending from the initial work in Adler and Barnett (1998a) which developed a framework for the necessary factors needed for the development of security community, the endeavor was to show how common interest increases the chances of the formation of communities of practice using the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as an example.

Deutsch et al., (1957) defined a security community as 'a group of people which has become integrated', while defining integration as 'the attainment, within a territory, of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population' (1957: p.5). According to these scholars, security communities occur at two levels: amalgamated and pluralistic. Amalgamated communities are formed from formerly independent political units which then congregate under a single government like the United States while pluralistic

communities develop from formerly independent states (Deutsch et al., 1957; Tuscisny, 2007). Under pluralistic security communities one can draw examples like the European Union, NATO, African Union- all composed of independent states. Adler and Bennett (1998b) further break down the pluralistic community into three micro categories: nascent, ascendant, and mature. A salient feature of nascent communities is “dependable expectations of peaceful change” (Adler and Bennett, 1998b, p. 30). In fact, Adler argues that agents instinctively “interpret and judge background knowledge,” forming an emotional connection to “particular objects and subjects.” As a result, argued Adler, instinct, judgment, and emotion enrich “the evolution of background knowledge and practices,” which in turn guarantees the “evolution of communities” (Adler, 2008, p. 204). For Adler and Barnett (1998b), mutual trust and collective mindsets create a conducive ambience for the formation of a security community where peaceful interaction forms the standard for such community to exist. According to Adler and Bennett, within a framework of peaceful coexistence, trust levels are so high that ‘neither the expectation of, nor the preparation for organized violence [become options for settling] ...disputes’ (1998b, p. 34). Nathan (2000) concurs that the degree of mutual trust and sense of community is so fervent that actors consider the use and threat of force to be unconceivable. Within this ‘sense of community’ exists a robust process of shared sympathy, trust, loyalty and responsiveness in decision-making (1957: 36). Deutsch et al.’s (1957) seminal work became influential for subsequent studies. For example, the work underpins Adler’s (2008) understanding of the collective-learning process through which “communities of practice establish themselves, [and] how their background knowledge diffuses and becomes institutionalized..., and how social structure spreads (Adler, 2008, p. 202).

The exploration of the development of security communities follows a general path that is linked to cognitive-evolutionary theory (Adler, 2018, Pouliot, 2018 Adler and Drieschova, 2021) where, as Adler explains, like-minded actors are bound by shared interest and the rational and moral expectations and dispositions of self-restraint. In explaining how communities of practice develop, Adler emphasized how cognitive evolution “helps reveal why certain ideas become practices and why and how practices evolve.” (2008, p. 202). Chapter 3 revisits the issue of self-restraint and self-interest by framing the concept of cooperation and identity within SADC. The contributions of security community scholars help reconfigure SADC’s identity and its response mechanisms to security threats.

Security communities are products of conscious arrangement. According to Adler and Greve (2009), security communities have a certain level of symbiotic arrangement, often sharing a distinct practice of handling issues together. Supporting this view, Bueger and Stockbruegger (2013) observe that the symbiotic nature of security communities underscores the importance of investigating representations of threats that occur within the security community environment and the shared practices with which actors seek to cope. Bueger and Stockbruegger, thus, identify norms such as partnerships and policy coordination as essential for coping with threats. Norms and shared practices within the security community perspective result from the perceptions of threats and, as Bueger and Stockbruegger (2013) argued, to develop shared practices is to cope with the stresses of such threats. From these shared practices, then, emerge norms that cultivate collective identity which in turn intensify an existing security community. While Bueger and Stockbruegger focused their case on “on practices of directing common enterprises, projects and partnerships and policy coordination to cope with piracy” (2013, p.

107), this dissertation focuses on the practices that direct partnerships and policy coordination to respond to terrorism.

Practices are a particular kind of action immersed in specific organized contexts (Adler and Pouliot, 2010; Corradi, Gherardi, and Verzelloni 2010). As patterned performances (see Butler, 1990; De Certeau, 1990), practices require social recognition through which an audience is able to appraise the practice (Adler and Pouliot, 2011). Practices, including shared ones, transcend the barrier that confines them to text and meaning only. Adler and Pouliot (2011) aver that this transcendental quality of practices “forces us to engage with the relationship between agency and the social and natural environments, with both material and discursive factors, and with the simultaneous processes of stability and change” (2011, p. 2). The emancipation of the concept becomes a legitimate goal especially when the stakes compel us to explain and understand the way world politics work in practice (Adler and Pouliot, 2011).

In analyzing issues of conflict and cooperation, Hopf (2010) emphasized the influence of ‘habit’ as examples of practices arguing that change that comes either through conflict or cooperation has to first conquer “the power of habitual perceptions, emotions, and practices” (2010, p. 540). In dwelling on habits, Hopf perceived a domain of world politics, one in which long-term relationships of conflict and cooperation abound, where habits are more influential compared to normative or instrumental rationality. Therefore, the discussion about habit is congruent with the need to understand how international practices, as they play out in world politics, account for different actions which form part of ‘doing’ in the world (Adler and Pouliot, 2011). This study draws upon an array of shared practices within SADC and how actors within this

security community coordinate and cooperate towards common security goals in order to cope with Islamic insurgency in Mozambique.

Interestingly, while some scholars analyzed factors like common interest among constellations of interstate agents (Adler, 2008), mutual trust and collective identity within groups (Adler and Barnett, 1998a), the adoption of peace and security agendas among regional groupings (Sifolo, 2010), and the role of preventive diplomacy (Ancas, 2011) to support how security communities come to being and their sustainability, Nathan (2006) took a dissident position and argued that domestic stability, not instability, is a necessary requisite for the formation of security communities. Understanding how security communities work requires finding its place within the human security framework. For Laurie Nathan (2006), the human security framework is underscored by domestic and regional stability. Thus, using this framework, Nathan (2006, p. 276) sought to make forays into “the potential of other, less stable regions to become security communities.” The endeavor seemed to emanate from the need to explore other environments different from contemporary communities which include Western Europe, the United States (US) and Canada, and the Nordic group (Nathan, 2006).

As noted earlier, security communities thrive through shared practices. Such practices, argued Pouliot (2008), manifest themselves as social actions imbued with intersubjective meanings common to a particular community. It is from these intersubjective meanings that collective identity (Greve, 2018; Pouliot, 2008; Adler and Bennett, 1998a; Bueger and Stockbruegger, 2013; and also, Deutsch, 1957) motivates response. Communities in question share threats and referent objects leading to the creation of security dependence (Bueger and

Stockbruegger, 2013). These dynamics glue practitioners together within the community (Pouliot, 2008).

Bueger and Stockbruegger (2013) identify these dynamics evident in Adler and Greve (2009) and Pouliot (2007) manifesting themselves as practices of self-restraint, common enterprises, partnerships, cooperative security, socialization mechanisms, and diplomacy. Bueger and Stockbruegger (2013), hence, conclude that the overall security community standpoint emphasizes that a known security threat can stimulate the adoption of any one of these practices as a way to cope with the said threat. The threat becomes a credible source for the development of collective identity (Bueger and Stockbruegger, 2013).

2.3 Constructivism, Identity, and Interests

Since the end of the Cold War, constructivism has been fought on two fronts. On one axis, it confronted rationalist thinking, while on the other axis, it battled the assumptions developed by critical theorists. The emergence of a new constructivist submission to international theory disputed the rationalism and positivism of neo-realism and neoliberalism while instantaneously parrying critical theorists away from metatheoretical critique, for its lack of direct application to practice, while emphasizing the empirical analysis of world politics (Reus-Smit, 2013). The central tenet of constructivism is empirical analysis (Reus-Smit, 2013). However, argued Reus-Smit, the influence of critical international theory is indelibly noticeable “as many of its [the latter’s] pioneers explicitly sought to employ the insights of that theory to illuminate diverse aspects of world politics (Reus-Smit, 2013, p. 195). The convergence of like-minded groups or individuals for purposes of cooperation can thus be explained through social constructivism.

Social constructivism's (Vygotsky, 1978; Risse, 2004) point of departure in relation to state cooperation is the belief that, like state identity and state interests, the environment in which states act is a social construct. Human knowledge of phenomena depends on the interaction of interpretations and reinterpretations which produce a social reality. For social constructivists, states are a social mold bound by norms, rules and institutions of their own making (Hwang, 2006; Kolodziej, 2005). Russett et al (2006) assert that constructivists command the need to recognize that established diplomatic practice, international law, and organization, even those things and entities that appear to be obvious national interests like political independence and secure borders, all are socially constructed. Thus, the institutionalization of cooperation may involve processes such as developing a shared sense of belonging or regional identity (Hwang, 2006). Waltz (1998) weighs in arguing that the social constructivist approach goes beyond the liberal institutionalism theory which claims that institutions facilitate cooperation when it is in each state's interest to do so. According to Sifolo (2010), the contextual conditions in which self-centered states learn to cooperate are similar to environments where they seek to reconstruct their interests in terms of a shared commitment to specified norms or practices. The material world, with its coterie of other exogenous influences, molds and changes human interaction based on its prior and evolving epistemic and normative interpretation (Adler and Bennett, 1998). This is one of the premises of this study's conclusions of the triadic effect on SADC's response to the Cabo Delgado insurgency.

2.4 Constructivism and the 'Self'

Constructivism is characterized by an emphasis on the importance of normative as well as material structures on the role of identity in shaping political action and on the mutually

constitutive relationship between agents and structures. The 'constructedness' of identity influences how identities, and hence interests, are defined (Zehfuss, 2001). Such a nexus between identity and interests shapes actions. Thus, in order to understand the actions of SADC, one ought to understand, first, the bloc's interests. However, limiting one's scope to SADC's interests can create self-inflicted conceptual inadequacies. A true understanding of SADC's actions should be juxtaposed to the interests of its member states. Ultimately, it makes sense to conceptualize both SADC's and Mozambique's actions within the vortex of their own interests. Such interests are, like Zehfuss's (2001) argument, a product of an actor's identity. Given that interests are a product of identity (Hopf, 1998, p. 176), the interests of Mozambique as a sovereign state on one hand, and those of SADC and other international players, on the other, may be different. For example, the identity of SADC during the Great War of Africa (1998-2001) was different to the current identity of SADC as it contemplates the course of action in the situation in Mozambique. This validates Hopf's (1998) take that constructivism believes identities are amorphous. That is, it assumes that the selves, or identities, of states are a variable; their malleability depends on historical, cultural, political, and social context (Hopf, 1998). Identities can be individual and collective. For Pouliot (2008), whichever type of identity exists at any given time, constructivists have theorized that norms and identities automatically inform action, and such action manifests itself within intersubjective representations of reality, morality, or individuality. These social facts determine socially embedded cognition and behavior (Pouliot, 2008). For example, there is certain behavior that takes place within a collective, and such behavior can differ when applied to an individual country. Thus, Greve's (2018) argument that identity is never a piece of knowledge that defies context is important. Who, and probably what

a member state is varies with circumstances (Greve, 2018). Applying Greve's line of argument to SADC leads us to be cognizant of the fact that Mozambique outside of the regional body is different from Mozambique that is a part of SADC. Consequently, there is a possibility that a member state acts differently and at different times than it would in circumstances that it perceives it ought to follow its own national interest separated from the interests of a security community to which it belongs. These circumstantial conditions are the same as the country specific conditions that form a third force that influence SADC's response to the Cabo Delgado insurgency.

2.5 IGO's Institutional Environment and Collective Identity

Because the collective action problem commands world politics, the state strives to solve within the "domestic society by forcing or socializing people to identify with the common good, but the problem seems endemic to the anarchic world of international relations, where each state reserves the right and the force to do as it pleases" (Wendt, 1994, p. 384). From Wendt's assertion, there is strong evidence of the coalescence between cooperation and identity in which the former becomes the dependent variable. The understanding of collective identity differs from one paradigm to the other. Within the realist checklist, collective identity is hampered by a materialist thought process which assumes that power and natural human disposition preclude consequential cooperation (Wendt, 1994). Yet, in the institutional environment, collective identity is premised on the argument that "...knowledge and institutions make it possible" (Wendt, 1994, p. 384). Operating within this institutional environment, IGOs "matter in shaping the behavior of important actors in world politics" (Martin and Simmons, 1998, p. 729). How these institutions matter depends on the who and what questions. Thus, the institutional

environment has to conform to the identities of the disparate elements within it and eventually the collective product that obtains from the interaction of these disparate elements. The argument here is that collective identity emerges out of the ability of the institutional environment to tame the egos of the disparate elements within it. Such an understanding is based on Martin and Simmons's perception about international institutions which they see "as both the object of strategic choice and a constraint on actors' behavior..." (1998, p. 729).

While alliances exist among states, Wendt makes a distinction between these and collective security arrangements. According to Wendt (1994), the former is temporary as it aims to ephemerally deal with a specific threat after which it should disband. The purpose is instrumental. On the other hand, collective security involves the commitment of states towards multilateral action against general threats. These threats are multifarious, unpredictable, and range from low to high key. Collective identity, then, provides the fundamental ingredients that buttress generic principles of conduct which also make reciprocity an essential outcome (Ruggie, 1993a; Wendt, 1994).

In framing the collective identity case, Wendt (1994) is cognizant of the perpetual importance of non-state actors such as IGOs in world politics- a phenomenon that collides with states' preoccupation with their sovereignty. The latter, argued Wendt (1994), results in states resisting collective identification than other actors. Both state and non-state actors perceive collective action problems whenever they emerge. However, the ability to conquer collective action problems resides in part on how actors' social identities engender self-interests or collective interests (Wendt, 1994). The interest-identity nexus becomes very important in

understanding collective behavior. Where behavior is molded not for collective gain, the type of interdependence between self and other (Keohane, 1984) is situational rather than empathetic.

Empathetic interdependence creates identities that perceive threats collectively. According to Wendt (1992a), a state that positively identifies with other states results in its perception of security threats not as a private matter for each state but as a responsibility for all. The need to ward off the threat becomes collective effort. If the collective self is well developed, argued Wendt (1992a), then security practices will be to a relative degree altruistic or prosocial. The driving force for such manifestations is the identity each state accords itself, or the identity the concerned state gets from others. For Greve (2018), identity and the process of identification are domiciled in what Giddens calls practical consciousness: it “consists of all the things which actors know tacitly about how to “go on” in the contexts of social life without being able to give them direct discursive expression” (Giddens 1984: xxiii). This means that actors seldom constantly reflect when identifying. What Greve demonstrates here is that identities are mostly sedimented and effortlessly habitual so that there is no need to think much about the process of identifying both friends and enemies. The process is spontaneous in order for energy to be deployed elsewhere (Greve, 2018). When identities within a security community such as SADC are established in this manner, it is easy also to forge cooperative arrangements for purposes of collective gain. Where such identities are blurred, however, cooperation among actors can either become limited, or become entirely absent. All these scenarios exist within SADC’s endeavors on the situation in Mozambique.

The security community perspective stresses that threats may lead to shared practices of coping with those threats and as such become the source of a collective identity and enable the

formation of new or the intensification of existing security arrangements. This perspective highlights the importance of not only investigating representations of threats, but also the shared practices by which actors aim at coping with them. For the case within this dissertation, this requires focus on practices of directing common enterprises, projects and partnerships, and policy coordination by an intergovernmental organization to cope with terrorism.

2.6 Sovereignty and Power Within IO's

The concept of sovereignty is remarkably multifaceted, and part of the challenge to conceptualize it emanates from the fact that the discourse about sovereignty is shared among diverse literature (Nagan and Haddad, 2011). For example, one notion of sovereignty places potent political power at its center, and another distinction emphasizes jurisprudence (Nagan and Hammer, 2005). Sometimes the concept is viewed in terms of a combination of political and legal culture, and not as stand-alone categories.

Despite the complexity of sovereignty (Elden, 2006, Nagan & Haddad, 2011, Nagan & Hammer, 2005) in its entirety, the concept is operationalized to mean the result of the appropriated meanings of both national and popular sovereignty whose elements, following Bhadauria's (2012, p. 42) classification, are aligned to independence and the "freedom of the collective entity to act" as well as the ability to have vested legitimacy and authority. Bhadauria's (2012) analysis of sovereignty dealt with the monistic theory, a product of Austin's thought which maintains that every state has an authority to whom the citizenry acquiescently accounts, and that this authority is "absolute, unlimited, and indivisible." According to Bhadauria, and others (Nagan and Haddad, 2011), this means the sovereign authority has a way to coerce people into habitual obedience, with punishment being the result of disobedience, and that any attempt to

divide the sovereign power is to constrain it. In this research, the analysis of its effects to cooperation within the SADC region is based on the models of sovereignty whose basic assumption encapsulates the 'State' exercising nuanced control over the body politic within what Nagan and Haddad (2011) intuit as a milieu where control must dependably be chaperoned by a module of authority in the administration of the hegemonizing facilities.

Sovereignty forms part of the criteria through which nation states gain identity. However, the era of diplomacy, amid persistent global competition and subsequent conflict, means a qualitative view of sovereignty should defy certain fixed criteria in order to suit selected situations. In a review of the conceptual basis of sovereignty in terms of theory and international legal practice, Nagan and Hammer (2005) sought to comprehend sovereignty as it adapts to the metamorphosing forces of international relations, globalization and the events in international law that constantly align themselves to the UN Charter and practice. If nation states conform to such criteria, then it means sovereignty, while observing the monistic precedent, can assume hybrid forms to allow certain processes like diplomacy and arbitration to take place. It is to this geopolitical requirement, perhaps, that Nagan and Haddad (2012) regard sovereignty as having internal and external configurations. Citing Abraham Kaplan, the authors point out the way external sovereignty ought to lodge a world of surrogate sovereigns through diplomatic contrivances and an assortment of methods of various communication blueprints. While external sovereignty works notably well in situations involving nation-state disputes, the numerous conflicts across the world means this type of sovereignty probably has its limits which could be narrower than those of internal sovereignty. This view is not immune to contestation especially where certain imperatives of international law as the guiding principle in diplomatic engagements

come into play. Yet still, Lebow (2008) concurs, arguing that the concept of sovereignty is permeated by diverse and even murky origins which emphasize its domestic rather than its international implications. Thus, nineteenth- and twentieth-century crusaders, influenced by Kant and Hegel, crafted a narrative that associated sovereignty with the accumulation of power among central governments and depicted the state as the sole focus of a people's economic, political and social concerns (Lebow, 2008). Hence, for Lebow, even as sovereignty formed a legal framework for states and their leaders to have unbridled rights within their jurisdiction, it divided states and actors from one another such that these cleavages seemed natural. In this study, the concept and its characteristics carry a consistent meaning that emphasize the Westphalian system where territorial monopoly is paramount, albeit applied to present-day political phenomena taking place in the southern African regional organization- SADC.

Closely related to sovereignty is Foucault's notion of power and the work of institutions. With the sovereign as the epitome of supreme authority, how the citizenry responds to the authority depends on the institutional capacity of nation states to monitor and control its citizens and the activities of those from outside. The repressive and constitutive nature of power (Foucault, 1977), through its deployment in surveillance and molding behavior (which is some form of punishment) is part of the ingredients of the concept of sovereignty which has, in most cases, precluded the process of integration in Africa. The evolution of a punitive society- a result of Foucault's perception of how power works over human bodies (Zureik & Salter, 2005)- forms part of the pith of this research in an endeavor to examine how nation states impose themselves on the processes involving their cooperation with other members of the regional intergovernmental organization. All the accompanying processes, like the determination to

either cooperate or not, are part of the mechanisms with which, in order to survive, the State ought to exercise as part of its sovereign mandate. Thus, as Foucault (1977, p. 188) succinctly averred, “specific relations of domination which have their own configuration and relative autonomy” aid the State’s ability to impose itself, and subsequently function.

2.7 Intergovernmental Organizations in Africa

Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004) argued that as third-party actors, IGOs can most effectively encourage peace by mediating between competitors in ways that deescalate tensions. Thus, for Boehmer and colleagues, IGOs activity assumes a middle path in which their effectiveness becomes “a variable rather than a parameter” (2004, p. 2). The functions of IGOs within the peace context do not limit IGOs to this function alone. Rather, they demonstrate the many ways in which IGOs are fundamental actors within the international system. Many IGOs in Africa (Volgy, Fausett, Grant, and Rodgers, 2006) have different functions and focus. For example, there are IGOs whose focus is the environment and the sustainable conservation and management of heritage resources for the protection of the interests of future generations such as Nexus Heritage and Statistical Research, Inc. (Wait and Altschul, 2014). Other IGOs, like the African Development Bank (ADB), have their mission molded around the fight against poverty with the aim to improve living conditions among the inhabitants of the continent (The African Development Bank, 1994a; Mingst, 1990; Park and Strand, 2016). The African Ministers’ Council on Water (African Water Facility (AWF), 2010) is a subsidiary of the African Union which oversees water and sanitation activities on the continent. Consisting of all African countries, the regional network also aims to achieve socioeconomic development and the eradication of poverty through proper management of water supplies and provision of clean water to the continent’s

population (African Water Facility (AWF), 2010). For purposes of this study, the focus is on the IGOs who concentrate on peace and security in Africa, and the review is restricted to the activities of the African Union's Peace and Security Commission (PSC) and the Southern African Development Community with a focus on the Organ on Politics Defense and Security (OPDS). These IGOs are relevant insofar as they provide a basis for understanding institutional dynamics of IGOs in general and how SADC as a regional IGO approach the terrorist activities in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado.

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed literature on security communities by looking at the factors that influence their formation. The review also included the types of security communities following Deutsch, et al.'s (1957) classification, and key components of security communities like mutual trust, collective mindset, shared interests and practices. The main objective under which security communities were discussed by Deutsch and colleagues is linked to the need to mitigate war. The chapter also examined the connection between constructivism and identity in the pursuit of collective and individual interests. The discussion then paved the way for a review of the nature of collective identity within IGO's institutional environment as a way to understand the behavior of important actors in world politics. The chapter then discussed the influence of sovereignty and power as these have a bearing on cooperation in the security community, and reviewed the aspect of human security, bringing to focus the role of the state in individual and collective security then concluded by a brief appraisal of intergovernmental organizations in Africa. The next chapter provides a background of SADC, examining the IGO's institutional framework against a backdrop of regional instability.

CHAPTER 3

SADC's Institutional Framework

3.1 Introduction

The formation of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), (see **Fig. 1.1** below), has its roots in the regional body's predecessor- the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) which was formed in 1980. According to Hwang (2007), the SADCC was a strategic formation influenced by the Frontline States (FLS) which fiercely opposed the destabilizing effects of apartheid.

Figure 1.1: SADC member states



Source: SADC 2022 (<https://www.sadc.int/themes/theme/images/states.png>)

Table 1 below shows the sixteen SADC member states with their respective geographical and population sizes. In some cases, there are notes to explain the status of member states.

Table 1: SADC member states, area size, and population

| Country | Area in km ² | Population | Notes on Membership |
|--------------|-------------------------|------------|---|
| Angola | 1,246,700 | 25,646,166 | |
| Botswana | 582,000 | 2,393,767 | |
| Comoros | 2,235 | 886,035 | Since 20 August 2017 |
| DRC | 2344,858 | 91,969,351 | Since 8 September 1997 |
| Eswatini | 17,363 | 1,170,860 | |
| Lesotho | 30,355 | 2,157,381 | |
| Madagascar | 587,295 | 28,321,604 | Membership reinstated on 30 January 2014 after an imposed suspension in 2009 |
| Malawi | 118,484 | 19,567,808 | |
| Mauritius | 1,969 | 1,273,660 | Since 28 August 1995 |
| Mozambique | 801,590 | 32,077,842 | |
| Namibia | 824,268 | 2,583,364 | Since 21 March 1990 |
| Seychelles | 456 | 98,897 | Previously a member of SADC from 8 September 1997 until July 2004 then joined again in 2008 |
| South Africa | 1,221,037 | 56,000,000 | Since 30 August 1994 |
| Tanzania | 947,303 | 61,333,527 | |
| Zambia | 752,612 | 18,867,491 | |
| Zimbabwe | 390,757 | 15,061,323 | |

Source: Member States (SADC, 2017)

The SADCC aimed to reduce its economic dependence on South Africa, which at the time was under apartheid rule. SADCC was also to promote and coordinate foreign aid and investment (Hwang, 2007). In 1992, SADC was established against the need to promote economic integration, poverty alleviation, peace, security and the evolution of common political values and

institutions' (Nathan, 2006, p. 605). The expectation was that the end of apartheid would create stability and development among regional countries.

According to Solomon (2004), while the development of SADC in 1992 was, just like many other security communities across the globe, spurred by the existence of transnational security threats or by the need to cooperate in areas of security, there is a recurring fact that after the new millennium, Africa needed to perpetually rely on its own resources to resolve its problems as a result of two interconnected factors. First, the African continent became geo-strategically marginalized further after the events of “9/11” when the world’s attention turned to focus on both southeast Asia and the Middle East. Secondly, the UN became increasingly reluctant to get involved in peacemaking and peacekeeping activities in Africa (although this matter is open for debate owing to the different activities being undertaken by the UN peacekeeping force, even controversial ones like in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo). Hence, within this evolving international order, it became fundamental for SADC to establish its own security framework to achieve political stability and ensure collective security (Matlosa, 2001; Hwang, 2007).

This chapter provides an outline of SADC’s institutional framework, including its formation, actors, and security activities. This involves a discussion of the SADC’s defense and security body, the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) and how it works to achieve peace and security in the region. The OPDSC is important for the study because its activities provide an understanding of the SADC’s security capacity in the endeavor to bring peace in the region. The chapter also provides an account of the Great War of Africa as a way to understand cases of security crises that have taken place in the region. This discussion

leads to a brief analysis of the SADC Mutual Defense Pact (MDP) in order to understand issues of collective security within an Intergovernmental Organization (IGO) or security community. Finally, an outline of the Cabo Delgado insurgency and the drivers of violence provides a brief background to the case study.

3.2 SADC's Institutional Framework

As laid down in the SADC Declaration and Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the body's structure is made of the Summit of Heads of State or Government (simply known as the Summit), the Council of Ministers and the Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM), the Standing Committee of Officials, the SADC Secretariat, and the Tribunal (SADC, 1992). These are explained below.

3.2.1 The Summit

The SADC Summit is the decision-making body of the regional organization. It is made up of the Heads of States of all the sixteen member countries. The SADC Summit is responsible for all policy directions and control of the functions of the regional community (SADC, 1992). The SADC Summit is managed on a Troika system (see section 3.2 below) that comprises the current Chairperson, the incoming Chairperson (the Deputy Chairperson), and the outgoing Chairperson (SADC, 1999). The position of the Summit is seen in Figure 3.2 below. Beneath the SADC Summit is the Standing Committee of Senior Officials, the Council of Ministers, and the Sectoral & Cluster Ministerial Committees (see **Figure 1.2 below**). These report directly to the Summit, yet they ensure that decisions made at the lower levels are ratified by them first before the final node by the Summit.

The diagram illustrates the organizational structure of the SADC Secretariat. At the top is the **SUMMIT** (green box). Below it is the **Council of Ministers** (yellow box), which is connected to the Summit by a double-headed dotted line. The Council of Ministers is connected to the **Standing Committee of Officials** (yellow box) by a double-headed dotted line. The Standing Committee of Officials is connected to the **SADC Secretariat** (yellow box) by a double-headed dotted line. The SADC Secretariat is connected to the **SADC National Committees** (yellow box) by a dashed line. The SADC National Committees are connected to the **Sub-Committees** (yellow box) by a solid line. The Summit is also connected to the **Organ on Politics Defence & Security** (yellow box) by a solid line. The Organ on Politics Defence & Security is connected to the **SADC Troika** (blue oval) by a dotted line. The SADC Troika is connected to the Summit, Council of Ministers, and Standing Committee of Officials by dashed lines. The SADC Secretariat is also connected to the SADC Troika by a dashed line. The Integrated Committee of Ministers (yellow box) is connected to the Council of Ministers by a solid line. The SADC Tribunal (yellow box) is connected to the Summit by a dashed line.

```

graph TD
    Summit[SUMMIT] <-.-> Council[Council of Ministers]
    Council <-.-> Standing[Standing Committee of Officials]
    Standing <-.-> Secretariat[SADC Secretariat]
    Secretariat -.-> National[SADC National Committees]
    National --> Sub[Sub-Committees]
    Summit --> Organ[Organ on Politics Defence & Security]
    Organ -.-> Troika((SADC Troika))
    Troika -.-> Summit
    Troika -.-> Council
    Troika -.-> Standing
    Secretariat -.-> Troika
    Tribunal[SADC Tribunal] -.-> Summit
    ICIM[Integrated Committee of Ministers] --> Council
  
```

3.2.2 The SADC Troika

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3.2.3 The SADC Tribunal

The SADC Tribunal was established under the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, but was only inaugurated in November 2005 (International Justice Resources Center, 2023). The tribunal was suspended in 2010 and the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government agreed in August 2012 to create a new court whose mandate is limited strictly to the adjudication of inter-State disputes, instead of international human rights norms. In 2011 the Summit announced that it would continue with the moratorium on the regional court- the SADC Tribunal on any extant, pending, or new case until the Tribunal Protocol had been reviewed and the revisions approved by the heads of state (SADC Communiqué, 2011). According to Nathan (2013), this move rendered the court inquorate and dysfunctional. An example of a case that the Tribunal adjudicated on involved *Mike Campbell (Pvt) LTD and Others v. Zimbabwe*, Case No. SADC (T) 2/2007, Main Decision of 28 November 2008 (Case no. 2 of 2007). Mike Campbell, a Zimbabwe national, claimed that his basic rights had been violated as a result of the expropriation without compensation of his private property. Despite the findings of the court that the government of Zimbabwe violated the SADC Treaty principles on nondiscrimination and the rule of law, the government rebuffed the court, continued the violent harassment of white farmers. This amounted to a campaign by Zimbabwe to emasculate the Tribunal and nullify its rulings (Nathan, 2013). This is a case in which SADC member states render SADC activities futile.

3.2.4 The Secretariat

The SADC Secretariat- the principal executive institution of SADC- “is responsible for strategic planning, coordination and management of SADC programs” (SADC, 2021). The Secretariat works alongside Sector Coordinating Commissions and reports to the Council (SADC, 1992). It is also responsible for the implementation of the decisions made by the SADC policy and its institutions such as the Summit, the Troikas and Council of Ministers (SADC, 2020). Within the jurisdiction of the Secretariat are the different “Organs.” For the purposes of this research, which deals with security and cooperation within a security community, the focus is on the Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation. The institutional framework for this organ is shown in Figure 1.3 which has been adapted through merging the SADC organizational structure and one aspect of the Secretariat- The Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security (OPDSC). For a region with numerous objectives, one of which is cooperation on issues on defense and security, SADC has always worked to adapt its institutions to the political pressures of each period. Hence, Bilal (2017) has opined that institutions should not be designed in a vacuum but should transcend both technical and capacity issues to respond to political processes. Such processes, averred Bilal (2017), require political leadership for making correct choices.

3.2.5 The Organ on Politics Defense, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC)

SADC security matters are guided by the Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) which aim to promote peace and security in SADC, protect the region’s people from instability due to the breakdown of law and order, develop a common foreign policy for the region, and cooperate on matters related to security and defense. The view behind the establishment of the OPDSC was to allow more flexibility and swift response to sensitive and

potentially explosive situations (SADC Communiqué, 1996). Important to note is that while the idea of the OPDSC was mooted in 1996, the decision to form the Organ was only implemented in 2001- five years after the decision appeared in the Gaborone Communiqué of 28th June 1996.

The OPDSC, as a branch under the SADC Secretariat, was designed to complement economic growth and development which, according to Cilliers (1996, p. 1), “cannot be achieved without peace, stability and a concomitant move towards democracy.” Article 5 of the SADC Treaty (1992) has one of its objectives aiming to “... promote and defend peace and security,” hence the political and institutional need to establish the OPDSC in order to realize these intentions.

Figure 1.3: OPDSC Structure



Figure 3.3 above shows the link between the Organ’s structure and the main SADC body. Here, the Organ falls under the control of the SADC secretariat which directs all activities which the Summit mandates.

Article 2(2a-l) of the Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (1996) laid down the following objectives:

1. To protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, inter-state conflict and external aggression.
2. To promote political cooperation among member states and the evolution of common political values and institutions.
3. To promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within member states and encourage the observance of universal human rights.
4. To promote the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of security.
5. To engage in regional security and defense cooperation through conflict prevention, management and resolution.
6. To mediate in inter-state disputes, use preventive diplomacy to pre-empt conflict in the region and seek to end conflict as quickly as possible through diplomatic means.
7. To develop a collective security capacity, conclude a Mutual defense Pact for responding to external threats and establish a regional peacekeeping force; and
8. To encourage and monitor the ratification of UN and OAU treaties on disarmament and arms control, human rights and peaceful relations between states (SADC, 1996, p 3-4).

The SADC Road to integration and cooperation is a function of the SADC Treaty, the bloc's institutions, and various legal instruments (Saurombe, 2012). These instruments are, as stated in the treaty of 1992, premised on the realization that virtuous and strengthened political relations, as well as peace and mutual security are important benchmarks for regional cooperation (SADC, 1992). However, these institutions are constantly put to the test by the desire of SADC member states (see Table 1 above) to exercise their sovereign mandates. Thus, there is a need to navigate SADC's institutional terrain in a way that aligns, or at least attempts to align various administrative instruments to the contextual conditions existing among different member states.

This strategy reduces instances of conflict of interest between SADC expectations and member states' sovereign interests. Where a balancing act has happened between these interests, certain sovereign interests have, in some cases, been sacrificed to allow certain

regional agreements and the process of integration to take place. Thus, according to Erasmus (2011), the strength of the integration process and comprehensive nature of trade agreements within SADC calls for the need for strong and appropriate institutions with supranational powers. The same can be said about regional security where the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) becomes the central branch that deals with security matters.

This section analyzes the SADC institutional framework from a public organization perspective. The aim is to develop an appraisal of the various institutions that make up the SADC and how these institutions' contextual dimension influence the way SADC deals with issues of defense, security, and cooperation. Further, it is imperative to examine whether SADC has the institutional framework which is in line with its capacity to deliver on its objectives and ambitions. The institutional context also allows us to identify factors that play a role in the organization, either through constraining mechanisms or enabling the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) from executing its mandate. Such factors include the power wielded by member states and the Summit- composed of heads of states.

3.3: Explaining SADC's Institutional Framework

The desire for a beneficial institutional framework in organizations such as SADC should be balanced with Bilal's argument that "there is no 'one-size-fits-all', best practice model of institutional configuration for regional integration, or one predetermined trajectory that needs to be followed" (2017, p. 3). As an organization that has a vision and ambition, the SADC's objectives are clearly enunciated in the region's broad objective that seeks "to foster peace, sustainable development, freedom and social justice, and the eradication of poverty for the

people of Southern Africa, by creating the enabling environment for deep regional integration and cooperation” (Bilal, 2017).

SADC carried with it institutional residues from its predecessor, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), an act viewed by Saurombe (2012) as being oblivious, on the part of SADC, of the past failures of the SADCC. Like its predecessor, the SADC has continued with the centralized structure whose power resides within the Heads of State Summit and Council of Ministers (Hwang, 2007). Such an anti-bureaucratic organizational structure, contends Hwang, was designed to resolutely constrain the actions of potential bureaucracy. Despite this cut-and-paste approach to the SADC restructuring, the regional body has experienced “complex and challenging institutional restructuring efforts” since the body was created (Hwang, 2007).

The overall institutional framework of SADC followed lessons in other parts of Africa where the power of supranational institutions was toned down in favor of the role played by member states “in the formation and implementation of policy decisions (Saurombe, 2012). However, as Saurombe (2012) observed, meaningful integration in the SADC should emerge from an effective supranational mechanism among member states which allows them to hold each other accountable at the highest political level. In the SADC Treaty (1992), Article 19 provides that all decisions are to be taken by consensus of member states. It is, therefore, possible that a Catch 22 scenario develops where the supranational institution binds its actors in a way that the individual member states may not be willing to concede. Thus, the absence of unanimity among SADC member states is a legal clause articulated in Article 19 which stresses the need for consensus because the traditional respect for sovereignty allows member states to choose a

course of action that promotes its interests. The nexus between sovereignty and the dictates of the Mutual Defense Pact (MDP) is discussed in a latter section.

With the Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security (OPDSC) operating at Summit, ministerial and technical levels, and functioning independently of other SADC structures (Nathan, 2009), there arose a number of sticking points among member states. For example, the rotating criteria for the Chair of the OPDSC which came with the clause that the country whose president is the current chair “would be responsible for administrative, logistical and financial matters” (Nathan, 2009, p. 65), exposed the OPDSC to manipulation by reigning Chairs. An example of such manipulation is captured by Nathan in the passage below:

In terms of the SADC Treaty, moreover, the formation of the Organ required a protocol approved by the Summit and ratified by two-thirds of the member states, a process that was not completed until 2004. Prior to this, the Organ did not exist *de jure*. Nor did it exist properly *de facto*: Mugabe did not set up any of its envisaged structures, the Chair did not rotate annually and the ISDSC continued to operate independently of SADC. Over the next five years Mugabe made pronouncements and decisions as the Chair of the Organ without consulting all member states. The most controversial decision related to the deployment of troops from Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola to support President Kabila during the 1998 rebellion in the DRC (2009, p. 66).

What we see is that the lack of wider agreements on security and political matters reveals that SADC has, in large measure, failed to realize fully the goal of peace and security in the region (Nathan, 2006). In all this, part of the blame is leveled against the Organ as well as against competition among member states such as South Africa and Zimbabwe (Nathan, 2006). While Nathan (2006) analyzed these problems from the perspective of a lack of common values and the reluctance by states to cede part of their sovereignty, this study factors in these variables, albeit against a background of the two identities of an intergovernmental organization (IGO).

3.4 SADC Funding

According to Article 26 of the SADC Treaty (1992), SADC's funds come from member states, income from SADC enterprises, and injections from regional and non-regional sources. The need for social and economic development has resulted in the idea to create a SADC Regional Development Fund (RDF). According to Wentworth, Markowitz, Ngidi, Makwati and Grobbelaar (2018) funding SADC's industrialization and infrastructure strategies has conceivably accentuated the decision to launch the SADC RDF. The aim of the SADC is to "mobilize resources from member states, development partners and the private sector to support regional development and deepen regional integration, as outlined in Article 26A of the SADC Treaty" (Wentwitz, et al., 2018, p. 16). The search for funding through the adoption of the SADC RDF has been necessitated by the region's economic status. Because the SADC region is poor (Tanyanyiwa and Hakuna, 2014), the resultant intra-SADC trade is significantly subdued compared to other regions in north and west Africa (SADC, 2021/22). Table 2 below shows the state of the region's economy using the region's fiscal position measured against the 3 percent regional target. Limited domestic and international investment flows are both a cause and consequence of very low fiscal performance in the region. What can be gleaned from this information is that the need to fund SADC initiatives, including those related to peace and conflict management, faces problems because several member states have negative balance sheets and are debt-ridden.

3.4 Conflict management and the Great War of Africa (1998-2004)

The Second Congo War took place between 1998 and 2002 after a fierce war (the First Congo War) which resulted in the ouster of the then Zairean dictator Mobutu Sese Seko by Laurent Kabila. Laurent Kabila got support from Uganda and Rwanda under Yoweri Museveni and

Paul Kagame, respectively. Ironically, in the Second Congo War, these leaders- whose countries are not members of SADC- fought alongside militias that sought to remove Laurent Kabila in a case of shifting alliances (Reyntjens, 1999).

Table 2: SADC Member states’ Fiscal Position in 2017

| Countries | FISCAL POSITION IN 2017 MEASURED AGAINST 3% REGIONAL TARGET | TARGET MET OR MISSED |
|--------------|---|----------------------|
| Angola | -6.7 | Missed |
| Botswana | -0.05 | Met |
| DRC | -0.27 | Met |
| Lesotho | -4.46 | Missed |
| Madagascar | -5.12 | Missed |
| Malawi | -5.25 | Missed |
| Mauritius | -3.41 | Missed |
| Mozambique | -7.35 | Missed |
| Seychelles | -4.84 | Missed |
| Namibia | 0.66 | Met |
| South Africa | -4.45 | Missed |
| Eswatini | -8.19 | Missed |
| Tanzania | -3.41 | Missed |
| Zambia | -7.97 | Missed |
| Zimbabwe | -5.15 | Missed |

By looking at the Great War of Africa in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), also called the Second Congo war, it is possible to assess SADC's involvement in conflict management activities. The conflict can be used to explain the mechanisms of politico-security regionalism in the milieu of a multi-level approach to regional security and regionalism (Hwang,2007). The Second Congo war involved many players, including those outside the SADC region. The participation of non-SADC members is partial justification for the Zimbabwe-Namibia-Angola (ZNA) alliance which sought to defend one of their own- the DRC's Laurent Kabila- from aggressors. Hence, it was a conflict that triggered many groups in a complex web of informal alliances and rivalries (Konig, Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti, 2014).

The activation of a network of alliances that spanned central and eastern Africa created powerful centripetal forces that hauled nine African states into a brutal conflict (Williams, 2013). For scholars like Reyntjens, the DRC conflict, also known as the Second Congo War or the Great War of Africa, deserved the title of the "first African world war" (2001:311). The war resulted in an effective division of SADC countries into two. The conflict initially revealed a rift between the politico-security paradigms of Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola on the one hand, and South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique, and Tanzania on the other. Specifically, the divisions among the SADC countries underscores the reality of incongruous national interests as well as the clout wielded by individual countries when their interests are at stake. For example, Zimbabwe's participation among pro-Kabila allies was based on economic grounds. As Reyntjens (1999) explained, in penetrating the Congolese market, Zimbabwean business interests would only succeed in a friendly, Kabila-led government and that Zimbabwe's economic ventures would be in jeopardy if Kabila were defeated. The countries that supported the government of Laurent Kabila included

Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, and Angola. According to Hwang (2007), these countries decided to invoke the DRC's membership as the premise for their actions in defending Kabila's government. The DRC had become a member of SADC at the Blantyre summit in 1997 and according to the ZNA alliance, a SADC military intervention would be appropriate to defend the Kabila regime from external aggression (Caraynnis and Weiss, 2003).

The collective self-defense stance taken by the pro-Kabila countries led by Zimbabwe, which precipitated at the request of Laurent Kabila, was a direct response to what the alliance believed to be an invasion by rebel forces armed and supported by Rwanda and Uganda (Neethling, 2004). Hwang (2007) observed that the Zimbabwe-led Operation Sovereign Legitimacy was neither authorized by the SADC's Organ Summit nor recognized by any other international security body creating a crisis within SADC itself. Hence, according to De Coning (2004), the actions of the pro-Kabila forces led by Zimbabwe only served as 'neo-interventionism', whereby the actors are not peacemakers but allies of a single side of the conflict (Hwang, 2007). In fact, as Hwang (2007) argued, the pro-Kabila interventionists led by Zimbabwe were duty-bound in their defense of Laurent Kabila's government because the DRC was recognized both within SADC and the UN as the legitimate replacement of Zaire. Yet, since the intervention did not include all members of the regional body, according to De Coning (2000), it could be an incomplete act of collective self-defense even though the invitation to assist the DRC was made by the legitimate leader-Laurent Kabila. In fact, as Williams (2013) observed, there was a legal justification for certain members of the SADC- Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola- to fight along Laurent Kabila because his DRC formally asked the organization's Inter-State Defense and Security Committee to protect it from the invasion of Ugandan and Rwandan forces. Uganda and

Rwanda are not SADC member countries but had assisted the DRC's Laurent Kabila in a lightning campaign against the government of Mobutu Sese Seko, the then Zaire's dictator. Be that as it may, the illegitimacy of the Zimbabwe-led intervention could have rested on two premises. First, the authoritarian approach of the Kabila government could have led to the reluctance of other SADC members, particularly South Africa and Botswana. While the SADC Treaty emphasized under the section of "Institutions," that regional decision-making allows changes in the locus and context of how member states exercise sovereignty, such a provision is overridden by the clause that these actions do not imply the "loss of sovereignty" (SADC, 1992, p. 9). Hence, even if other members do not approve of a neighbor's actions, the need to respect each other's sovereignty overrides potential actions against such actions like authoritarianism. Secondly, the rationale for intervention by the pro-Kabila group was motivated by economic and strategic interests, not SADC principles. The result of these dynamics was an exposed SADC whose members seemed to disagree on security matters, yet the pursuit of common interests resulted in member states becoming reluctant to act together. For a complete discussion of these interests see Soderbaum (2003), Williams (2013), and Taylor and Williams (2001). For non-SADC actors such as Rwanda and Uganda, the reasons for their participation in the war was Laurent Kabila's ineptitude in preventing Hutu extremists and the Ugandan guerillas of the Allied Democratic Front (supported by Sudan) from launching their attacks on Rwanda and Uganda from Congo (Williams, 2013).

In light of events of Africa's Great War, SADC's conflict management credentials were rendered ineffective not because of the magnitude of the war itself, but by the constellation of forces, some of which are of a neo-realist nature, creating an insecure economic and ideological milieu among states. The war once demonstrated that security communities are mere bodies

made up of individual states whose geopolitical and strategic interests often militate against common organizational ideals. The collective defense approach used in the conflict, where different states formed groupings and arrangements to protect each other from aggression, and were not concerned with internal practices (Van Nieuwkerk, 2003), created a weakness within the SADC security body. To counter this in future potential conflicts, the mutual defense pact was envisaged to regulate relations between states in the area of collective self-defense. This next section describes the SADC mutual defense pact to contextualize SADC's security reform mechanisms.

3.5 The SADC Mutual Defense Pact of 2003

Since states within a common regional organization share similar security concerns of a multi-faceted nature, they tend to congregate rather than act alone or as antagonists in addressing these security concerns (Cawthra, 2003). Within SADC, we see this type of cooperation in the formation of the Mutual Defense Pact (MDP). The SADC Mutual Defense Pact (MDP) was instituted on Tuesday 26 August 2003, at the closing ceremony of the 2003 Summit of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) held in Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania. The assembled Heads of State and Government signed an agreement establishing a mutual defense pact chaired by Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa. The pact was designed to permit a synchronized response to external military threats (van Nieuwkerk, 2003). In analyzing the mutual defense pact, van Nieuwkerk (2003) sought to distinguish between collective security and collective defense by observing that under the latter, "states make arrangements to protect each other from external aggression, and are not concerned with internal practices," while collective security "allows both for the peaceful resolution of conflicts (Chapter 6 of the UN

Charter) and the use of military force by states or groups of states (Chapter 7)” (2003, p. 1). The essence of the MDP is its potential to create a regional watchdog as part of the proposed African standby force (van Nieuwkerk, 2003). Yet, a closer look at the instruments contained in the pact reveals that the pact is both an extension of and subordinate to the SADC Organ on Politics Defense and Security (OPDS). This can be gleaned in Article 2 which enunciates the “objective of this Pact [as] to operationalize the mechanisms of the *Organ* for mutual cooperation in defense and security matters” SADC Communiqué, 2003, p. 2), and Articles V (1 and 2), VI (2), VII (1 and 2), XI (2), XIV, XVI, XVIII, and XIX (1).

SADC has drawn some lessons and conceded that some challenges in the region typify certain global trends and practices, and therefore needs similar approaches on issues of security cooperation (Cawthra, 2008). For example, while in general mutual defense pacts are designed to regulate interstate relations in the area of collective self-defense as envisaged in Article 51 of the United Charter of 1945, it is incumbent upon the victim state to invoke self-defense (van Nieuwkerk, 2003). There is a plethora of reasons why states aid each other in situations of perceived attack. For example, according to Williams (2013), the triple alliance that participated in defense of Laurent Kabila’s DRC in the Great War of Africa, i.e., Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola, did so for different reasons yet all the reasons were linked to individual countries’ national interests. Generally, countries can come to the aid of the victim country out of fear of spillover effects which can be foiled by acting together (van Nieuwkerk, 2003).

While the provisions of the pact sought to insulate member states from security threats, it does not mean that the pact itself did not have challenges in its implementation as duly noted by van Nieuwkerk (2003). Hence, van Nieuwkerk argued that “Mutual assistance treaties are

instruments whereby contracting parties proclaim that an armed attack against one of them will be regarded as an armed attack against all, pledging to help out each other in such circumstances" (2003, p. 2). In fulfilling security obligations, the SADC states tend to employ force as they seek to defend their vested interests and such actions are often antagonistic with the peaceful resolution of disputes- a principle that holds key in the Organ on Politics, Defense, and Politics (OPDS). Because vested interests often motivate states to act on their own, at the expense of the regional body such as SADC offering authoritative decisions (Van Nieuwkerk, 2003), the regional body becomes undermined. As de Albuquerque and Wiklund (2015) observed, some of the challenges facing the SADC peace and security initiatives result from the inability of the body to appropriate states' sovereign powers. Consequently, because individual states shun any regional imperial tendencies, those influential states often keep a low profile so as not to be seen as regional hegemonies (de Albuquerque and Wiklund, 2015). Even as the mutual defense came into effect nearly two decades ago, contradictions in the Pact's objectives subject the document to manipulation by SADC member states. For instance, a rider to Article 6 outlines the sections on collective self-defense and collective action as follows:

1. *An armed attack against a State Party shall be considered a threat to regional peace and security and such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action.*
2. *Collective action shall be mandated by Summit on the recommendation of the Organ.*
3. *Each State Party shall participate in such collective action in any manner it deems appropriate.*

4. *Any such armed attack, and measures taken in response thereto, shall immediately be reported to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the Security Council of the United Nations (SADC MDP, 2003, p. 3).*

While Article 6(1) calls for “immediate collective action,” and Article 6(2) underscores the need for “Collective action [to be] mandated by the Summit...,” the fact that in 6(3) “Each State Party shall participate in such collective action in any manner it deems appropriate” means individual states that act on self-interest can legally launch, without recourse, an armed attack in defense of the victim state. These loopholes expose the pact to abuse even though van Nieuwkerk (2003) submits that freedom of choice can also provide an essential escape route for countries seeking reasons to avoid military engagements.

3.6 The Cabo Delgado Insurgency: A Litmus Test for SADC’s Institutions

In October 2017, an attack was launched by an Islamist group known as Ansar al- Sunna at a police station in Mocímboa da Praia- a town in the northern Mozambican province of Cabo Delgado. This attack set off a new wave of violence in Mozambique following decades of civil war between the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) and the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). Ansar al- Sunna Wa al Jamma’ah (ASWJ) claimed allegiance to the Islamic State of Syria and the Levante (ISIL/ISIS) and another Islamic terror group, Al Shabab, operating in East Africa (mainly Kenya, Somalia). The Cabo Delgado conflict is a convergence of religious, economic, and political factors. The conflict continues until today. Since it started, there have been reports of killings, some of which involved beheadings and burning of victims, and those who have been displaced are estimated to be over 700,000, with deaths estimated at more than 2500 (Institute for Security Studies, 2021). One of the deadliest events since 2017 took place in

March 2021 in a town called Palma where dozens were beheaded and burned or burned in shallow graves. This event resulted in big oil companies, such as Total, halting operations at their work site and evacuating workers. The incident prompted a meeting of SADC Troika as well as incoming and outgoing SADC chairs. However, there was no sign of urgency on the part of SADC leaving the question, why did SADC adopt a slow, and ineffective position to end the crisis?

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has provided SADC's institutional framework and outlined the roles of different branches and how they interact with each other. The chapter has described the body's formation and the actors and activities involved. By discussing the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC), provided a background of how the Organ works in matters of defense and security in the region. The description of the Great War of Africa also provides an account of a selected case of security crises that have taken place in the region while the background to the SADC Mutual Defense Pact (MDP) sheds light on issues of collective security within an Intergovernmental Organization (IGO) or security community. Finally, an outline of the Cabo Delgado insurgency and the drivers of violence provided a glimpse into what SADC as a regional body faces. The insurgency is significant to this study because it provided a focusing event for SADC and part of the contextual conditions for Mozambique and other SADC countries help to understand the diversity of influencing factors in the pursuit of conflict intervention strategies within the region. The next chapter is a theoretical framework which serves as a conceptual grounding of the research.

CHAPTER 4

Theoretical Framework: The Two-Identity Theory, Organizational Culture and Behavior in IGO's

4.1 Introduction

The purpose of this theoretical framework is to introduce the Two-Identity theory as a critical working framework for understanding the nature of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and how they shape their identities in response to security threats. The starting point is the focus on 'identity.'

Identity became a culmination of the search for a new conceptual framework by scholars of International Relations (IR) as a way to highlight what Berenskoetter described as a "socially constructed nature of the state and its interests, and to explain the causes of war and the conditions for peace" (2010, p. 1). For those seeking an alternative to realist-rationalist paradigm, identity has become one of the dominant subjects in IR since the 1990s (Berenskoetter, 2010) and its utility has allowed IR scholars to establish the questions about *who*, *what*, *why*, and *how* in international politics. Bruce Cronin's assertion helps explain the relevance of these questions, "identities provide a frame of reference from which political leaders can initiate, maintain, and structure their relationships with other states" (Cronin 1999, p.18). The concept has become indispensable, making it unimaginable to think about world politics devoid of identity, people, states, and the international system (Burke, 2006). By default, identity forms part of all socio-political strata (Campbell. 1992), while making sure that the world revolves around identities to deal with chaos, uncertainty, and anarchy (Hopf, 1998).

In unpacking the Two-Identity theory, it is imperative to understand the angle that this framework takes, that is, the key function of “identity” in IR scholarship. The key function is one that Berenskoetter (2010) called an “eye opener” because it provides an analytical aspect to international politics which allows us to understand actors and their actions, the rationale for the actions, and the methods used in international engagements. To do this, the next section introduces the Two-Identity theory and explains the nexus between organizational politics and structure and how these interact with organizational identity.

4.2 The Two-Identity Theory

Claude’s (1996) research put forward the idea that the United Nations has two identities. He classified these two identities into First and Second UN, respectively. While making these distinctions, Claude reiterated the indispensability and mutual dependence of the IGO’s two ‘wings’. As Claude explained, this dependence is partly a result of what each “wing” can and cannot do in terms of the roles and responsibilities of the United Nations. Following Claude’s theory, IGO’s two identities can, thus, be conceptualized as bureaucracy and diplomacy where the latter deals with the interaction of member countries which, for the most part, are controlled by the imperatives of their sovereign interests.

Understanding international organizations (IOs) involves a tedious process of applying theory to how we view organizational dynamics. Researchers have approached organizational practice through different ways (for example, Hofstede, 1983; Goldman, Scott, and Folman, 2015), and Claude’s (1996) Two-Identity theory is an important framework used to study intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Although Claude’s original application referred to the United Nations, the Two-Identity theory generally frames organizational practice in ways that

helps us unpack how IGOs approach issues of peacekeeping and conflict resolution in different regions of the world.

Peacekeeping and conflict resolution form part of security community response mechanisms to threats on states or a collection of states. In unpacking Claude's theory of organizations, it is important to emphasize Claude's observation that since the Cold War, the international community has realized that peace and security, among many other pressing issues in the international system, are lacking across the globe. Thus, Claude observed that while the global community would welcome the covenantal benefits of a collective security community or system, it is seldom prepared to make sacrifices through which such security is realized. According to Claude, only in situations where national leaders perceive an existential threat will action become the best alternative. Otherwise, the default duty of national leaders is to preclude military engagements. In trying to understand the ways that global organizations can be useful bodies for creating and/or promoting world order, Claude (1996) "famously introduced a distinction between the two 'identities' or 'institutions'" (Warnecke, 2020, p. 639) to explain why the UN fluctuates between action and inaction, between intervention and lame-duck tendencies with respect to the international organization's roles and responsibilities. According to Warnecke, Claude emphasized the distinct types of resources that the two identities "draw on in the area of international peace and security" (2020, p. 639).

In setting the stage for understanding the organizational practices of other security communities, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Claude's Two-Identity theory is deemed useful. The Two-Identity theory is used to provide an organizational theoretical framework for analyzing the institutional capacity of the Southern African bloc in

peacemaking endeavors in one of the member states-Mozambique- grappling with violent conflict fomented by the terrorist group Ansar al-Sunna operating in the Cabo Delgado province. In addition, this research suggests that it is pertinent to add an element of International Relations methods by incorporating country-context from Mozambique to this discussion. The pursuit for contextual conditions provides an explanation that expands upon the fact that every supranational entity has characteristics aided by a set of legislative instrumentation, as well as interests united by common feelings (Bussotti and Coimbra, 2023) that, if distinctively individual national interests are overcome, will lead to a swift, decisive response to regional security threats.

Thus, the chapter assesses the Two-Identity theory of SADC as a way to establish the bureaucratic and diplomatic (relating to IR) practices of SADC. More specifically, this research applies the Two-Identity theory to the security community's response mechanism surrounding the terrorist attacks in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province. Justification for applying Claude's theory of two identities to IGOs different from the UN is provided by Swarnecke who argues that while "Claude's argument is only concerned with the UN proper, his insights, particularly with regard to the incompatibility of different types of IGO authority and legitimacy in peace support, can be harnessed for studying a broader set of IGOs" (2020, p. 638). A brief overview of each of the two identities is key to understanding the interaction of an IGO's institutional and political framework.

4.3.1 Bureaucracy as the First Identity of an IGO

Works on bureaucracy (for example Weber, 1980; Gulick, 1937a;1937b; and also, Taylor, 1911) buttressed some classical principles of public administration. Weber's discussion of

bureaucracy is generally taken as a descriptive account of organized social structure within a rational-legal system. If we link these elements of bureaucracy to an IGO's first identity we observe a "hierarchically structured, professional, rule-bound, impersonal, meritocratic, appointed, and disciplined body of public servants with a specific set of competencies" (Sager and Rosser, 2009, p. 1137). Within this bureaucratic framework, the institution and its administrative personnel are able to deal with internal relations. However, such administrative functions do not rule out the existence of substantial administrative problems. Paradoxically, some of the problems the bureaucratic wing addresses are oftentimes the result of the control and influence of the second wing-the diplomatic identity consisting of member states, and international relations processes that take place in the organization. The interaction between the two identities often takes place at the discretion of the member states that make up the institution. Constituted of its staff, an international secretariat or bureaucracy located in IGO's headquarters, an entity only has a limit as to the scope of functions under its jurisdiction. The limitations of the powers of the first identity in its interactions with the member states, hence, demonstrates the level of power wielded by the second identity of the IGO. States possess the power to create and kill the organization. The checks and balances over the first identity of an IGO are provided by the states which provide considerable amounts of influence on quotidian activities of the institution. However, such "control and direction is limited and variable" (Claude, 1996, p. 291). Such control is made possible through states' bargaining power as the first identity's "sponsors, suppliers, supporters, and directors, its clients and customers, the beneficiaries of most of its activities." (1996, p. 291). Claude cautions that notwithstanding the

influence these states have on the First Identity, they cannot be the corporate entity which is the bureaucratic entity that exists alongside these member states.

4.3.2 The Second Identity of an IGO

While the first identity presents a bureaucratic profile of an IGO, the second identity, as presented by Claude (1996) assumes what, in this research, is called a diplomatic, interactive community made of the different member states that form the IGO. However, even as the leadership of the IGO in specific policy areas is rotational, there are some member states that wield substantial influence. This variation in influence, in part, determines the extent to which member states protect their interests. These member states employ an international secretariat that supports the body's collective reflections and activities.

In this regard, the two-faced identity of an IGO implies that there are certain activities which the first identity cannot perform without the approval of the constellation of forces created by member states. Taking the Rwandan example provided by Claude in analyzing the UN identities, the Rwandan genocide where the bureaucratic wing voiced the need to intervene, the absence of a direct nod from member states or the interactive community meant that the concerns of the bureaucratic wing remained an idea which never developed into action (Claude, 1996).

In evaluating the Two-Identity distinction, Warnecke (2020) judged that the theory is a "simplification of the complex webs of agency, accountability, and influence between the First and Second United Nations, [but] provides a useful heuristic and conceptual device for unpacking the relationship between the different dimensions or 'faces' of the UN system" (2020, p. 639). What becomes evident, then, is that when an organization experiences a clash between state

power or sovereignty and bureaucratic preferences, it is the former that gets its way. The intersectionality of these conditions created by separate identities has fundamental theoretical implications on how IGOs execute their roles in conflict situations like what is transpiring in the Southern African Development Community.

4.4 Organizational Structure, Politics, and Identity

An organization's identity is in part a manifestation of the parts that form it. One of these elements is the organizational structure whose effects on the organizational dynamics cannot be ignored. Understood from the structural perspective of organizational theory, an organization's structure emphasizes goals, roles, formal relationships, and the rational side of the organization. Bolman and Deal referred to the works of Fredrick Taylor (1911) and Weber, the latter of whom is well-known for his description of monocratic bureaucracy as an ideal form that maximized norms of rationality (2013, p. 46). Weber's ideas were rejuvenated by Perrow (1986) and others in the context of a general analysis of the relation of structure to performance. Perrow (1961) argued that some goals most relevant to organizational behavior are seldom official goals, but those that are immersed in major operating policies and the daily decisions of the personnel. Perrow's argument touches on three frames: the structural, human resource, and political, albeit more subtly for the political frame. As for the structural frame, according to Perrow (1961), the goals of the organization mirrored in operating policies depend on many things which include the power structure and the type of synergy between both human elements and organizational branches. In SADC, such powers are revealed by the interaction between the two identities. For Perrow (1961), operative goals also depend on other factors like skills, legitimation, and capital. Bolman and Deal (2013) show the utility of the multi-frame approach to organizational theory

and practice. This multi-frame approach uses concepts like coordination, vertical integration, and vertical as well as lateral coordination in their analysis of famous organizations such as Harvard University and McDonald's Corporation (Bolman and Deal, 2013).

Seminal works on organizational structure (Scott, 1975; Udy, 1959; Meyer and Rowan, 1977) linked structural features of organizations with their implications for the behavior of the organization and its subunits. According to Scott (1975), organizational structure provides a setting in which the interactions of subunits occur. The structural features of an organization can be traced to Weberian type of bureaucracy (Weber, 1930; 1946; 1947) which, for Udy (1962) and Meyer and Rowan (1977), identifies a set of structural variables whose interdependencies are subject to empirical exploration. Based on 'bounded rationality,' the organizational structure influences behavior of actors and allows leaders to play key roles in the decision-making process (Christensen, 2019; Christensen, et al, 2007). This means hierarchy is fundamental in organizational decision making. The two identities of SADC relate very well to the need for organizational decision making.


There is a relationship that exists between organizational size and its structure or hierarchies. For instance, Williamson (1971) and Evans (1975) observed that as organizations grow, several levels of hierarchy emerge, and as noted by Ouchi (1977), problems of loss of control become evident. Yet, the application of such wisdom seems to evade certain Intergovernmental organizations like SADC whose size is near static as the likelihood of growth is restricted by the number of countries that exist within the region. Such kinds of organizations are preoccupied not by size but by other internal and external dynamics such as cooperation among members, external threats, and resource availability. Recent studies (Bolman and Deal, 2013;

Ahmady, et al, 2016; Janićijević, 2013) have underscored the importance of structure on the relations between organizational elements. For example, Bolman and Deal (2013) understand how organizational structure can make or break the organization. Following the renditions of late 20th Century scholars (Blau and Scott (1962); Perrow, 1986); Thompson, 1967; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Hall, 1963) who rediscovered Weber's ideas, Bolman and Deal (2013) acknowledged how these works inspired a significant body of theory and research that augment Weber's bureaucratic model. For Bolman and Deal, these trendsetters included the elements of structure that affect such outcomes like morale, productivity, and effectiveness. Though dated, Meyer and Rowan (1977) provide a succinct evaluation of the implications of the Weberian bureaucracy on the organizational structure. For Meyer and Rowan, the "essence of a modern bureaucratic organization lies in the rationalized and impersonal character of these structural elements and of the goals that link them" (1977, p. 342).

While the effect of a rationalized character of structural elements may not be questioned, it may not be the same with the impersonal character of structure especially within organizations that comprise of states which themselves pursue their own interests. This is a caveat when looking at how IGOs and actors within these bodies behave. That said, the role of bureaucratic control has proven to be one of the effective ways to control and standardize subunits in centralized states which are themselves a manifestation of their influence on the formation of formal organizations. An important aspect of the interaction between relational networks of social organization and exchange and rationalized institutional elements obtains from the conditions set by societal modernization (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). This interaction has been modified from Meyer and Rowan's (1977) original ideas to show the kind of interaction in Figure

4.2 below. Emphasis has been given to certain extenuating needs such as cooperation, external threats/benefits/interests, common culture, all in pursuit of a common goal. In our discussion of IGOs later in this chapter, the common goal is the attainment of peace and security.

Figure 1.4.: Networks of social organization and exchange



Adapted from Meyer and Rowan (1977, p. 346)

The political frame is based on the assumptions that organizations are coalitions made up of different individuals and interest groups and that coalition members have enduring differences in values and beliefs as well as in the perception of reality. Hence, an organization's identity is the culmination of these dynamics. Moreover, decisions are based on the allocation of scarce resources. The decisions made by SADC as an IGO depend on what the second identity sanctions. Scarce resources and differences create conflict and make power an important asset. Coalitions use bargaining and negotiation in the pursuit of interests (Bolman and Deal, 2017). Based on these assumptions outlined by Bolman and Deal (2017), the other three approaches to the study of organizational theory are linked to the political frame because each of the frames has actors with interests, the same individuals who seek power to get what they want. The exercise of such power is evident in the way SADC member states decide what the bureaucratic wing (the First

SADC) does. Where there are human elements, politics is an endemic phenomenon. Perrow (1973) traced the evolution of public organization as it passed, even swinging back and forth between approaches, from one theory to another. An important aspect of organizational politics noted by Perrow (1993, p. 7) is that “in the world of political parties, pressure groups, and legislative bodies, conflict [is] not only rampant but to be expected — [and is] even functional.” According to Bolman and Deal (2017), most events illustrate political dynamics that are everyday features of organizational life. Hence, in understanding organizational identity, we note that politics seldom focus on individual foibles. Rather, they investigate the interdependence, diverging interests, and power relations within some organizational actors and activities. It, thus, shapes how an IGO determines organizational goals and outcomes.

Jones and Jones (2013) define the function of organizations by how they affect and are affected by the environment in which they operate. While Jones discusses organizational theory from the perspective of management and business in the 1970s (Lounsbury and Ventresca, 2003), the perspective of organizational theory utilized for this study is one that considers organizational action as fundamentally molded by wider political, social and cultural processes (e.g., Scott, 1995; Lounsbury and Ventresca, 2003; Stern and Barley, 1996). Hence, the theory of identity, immersed in the matrix of institutional dynamics, both public and private, unlocks key organizational issues while keeping at the center the ability to demonstrate how organizations work. On this, Davis and Marquis (2005) argue that organizational theory possesses a distinctive toolkit that unlocks the puzzle of how organizations work and an effective set of theoretical mechanisms that can elucidate macro level institutional changes that impact organizational life. The impact of SADC’s two identities cannot, therefore, afford to be ignored as the activities of

the Southern African IGO are very much controlled by what SADC, as both a bureaucratic and political institution, perceives itself to be. The extenuating circumstances and needs, all part of an organization's identity, form part of the means through which an organization adapts. The gradual adaptation to these conditions and goals creates idiosyncratic cultural (and indeed political) identities (Christensen, 2019). What follows is a discussion of the other components of organizational theory -culture and behavior- and how these affect change within organizations.

4.5 Organizational Culture and Behavior

Like organizational structure, organizational culture shapes and controls behavior within the organization. It influences how people respond to a situation and how they interpret the environment surrounding the organization (Jones and Jones, 2013, p. 31) and affects the decision-making process (Bolman and Deal, 2017; Marchisotti, Almeida, and Domingos, 2018; Janićijević, 2013; Taylor, 2007). While structure is an instrumental element in organizational theory, culture appeals more to institutionalist theory of organizations and has a direct impact on organizational structure and subsequent organizational behavior (Bolman and Deal, 2017; Jones & Jones, 2013; Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2008). Lauded by Aksom, Zhylynska, and Gaidai (2019) as the founders of institutional theory, Meyer and Rowan (1977) kneaded the culture-behavior combination that explains how institutional developments within an organization help in adapting to internal and external pressures. These pressures create distinct cultural identities (Christensen, 2019). The shared basic assumptions, beliefs, and values became a template for organizational behavior which is also shaped by the myths and stories people tell about the organization's evolution as it overcomes challenges triggered by external adaptation and internal integration (Schein 2010, Trice & Beyer 1993, Zohar & Hofmann 2012; Aksom, Zhylynska, and

Shevchenko, 2019)). Thus, for Hofstede and Hofstede, “culture works as the mental software for humans, which plays a significant role in forming our ways of feeling, thinking, and acting” (2005, p. 1).

Organizational culture and politics have a strong impact on the variety of organizational processes, actors and organizational performance. As a result, there are different dimensions to organizational culture. For example, research (Jones, 2013; Shahzad, Luqman, Khan, and & Shabbir, 2012; Alvesson, 1993) shows that there is congruence between employee commitment, organizational norms and value and performance aimed at achieving organizational goals.

According to Jones,

Organizational structure and culture are the means the organization uses to achieve its goals; organizational design is about how and why various means are chosen. An organization’s behavior is the result of its design and the principles behind its operation. It is a task that requires managers to strike a balance between external pressures from the organization’s environment and internal pressures from, for example, its choice of technology. Looking outward, the design can cause organizational members to view and respond to the environment in different ways. Looking inward, an organization’s design puts pressure on work groups and individuals to behave in certain ways (2013, p. 31).

The urgency for adaptation and change in organizational life is succinctly captured by Alvesson and Sveningsson (2019). For the authors, “Understanding and managing change have developed into a virtual industry, encompassing consultancy firms, management and leadership gurus, mass media, the business press, high-profile corporate executives, politicians and business schools, as well as management writings and management rhetoric and practice” (2019, p. 3). Going through the motions of change, an organization transforms from present to some desired future state to find better ways to utilize resources and capabilities in order to retain its value (Jones and Jones, 2013). While literature about conventional organizations (Jones and Jones, 2013; Bolman and Deal, 2017) conceptualizes an organization operating under a specific

manager, notably an individual, it begs the question about organizations that require the inputs of several managers that work together to achieve solicited objectives collectively. Such organizations, like most IGOs, are headed by a group of managers whose actions are constrained by the identities they carry from their respective states—states that are characterized by different factors, some of which are country specific. Such factors may include a country's institutional capacity and autonomy. The latter has strong links with the aspect of sovereignty. O'Neill, Fields, and Share (2017) provide a distinction between autonomy and capacity and argued that autonomy has connections with sovereignty and self-interest. This research relies on their arguments to provide a conceptual framework that seeks to extend the boundaries that may be created by the Two-Identity theory.

4.6 Identity and Decision Making within IGOs

Although the fluidity of the concept of identity has allowed many uses to be attached to it, two of the five uses by Brubaker and Cooper (2000) provide strong grounding for establishing the relationship between identity and decision making in IGOs. The first use is that identity is a product of social or political action and the second is that identity is a product of multiple and competing discourses. The notion of identity assumes that it cannot be created without the simultaneous creation and negative stereotype of the other (Lebow, 2008). Hence, in determining the two identities of an IGO, it is established that the first identity of an IGO, in this case SADC, is often controlled and dictated to by the second identity that created it. It then goes on to imply that when it comes to decision making, the second identity of an IGO decides what ought to be done and passes it on to the first identity for implementation. The dilemma of this organizational setup is that even if the bureaucracy- the first wing in the Two-Identity theory- has

independent policy alternatives, it can only implement them when the second identity of the organization approves. The decision-making exercise is how behavior is legitimated within an organization (Pettigrew, 2014). The issue of who decides what is part of identity construction creates a dichotomy between the insider and outsider group. The group with power to decide becomes the insider group while the other group often follows the commands of the former. The conception of identity used in this research borrows from both the one discussed in the works of such philosophers like Immanuel Kant and others which emphasized the interaction of states, and the one which situates identity in organizational dynamics where different elements of the organization operate differently from each other. However, the same dichotomy of Us versus Them applies with the same effect. While member states, as the attributes of the second identity of an IGO, can influence decisions individually, they sometimes influence decisions collectively. The next section establishes the effect of collective identity on decision making within an IGO.

4.7 Collective Identity within IGO's Institutional Environment

The understanding of collective identity differs from one paradigm to another. Within the realist checklist, collective identity is hampered by a materialist thought process which assumes that power and natural human disposition preclude consequential cooperation (Wendt, 1994). Yet, in the institutional environment, collective identity is premised on the argument that "knowledge and institutions make it possible" (1994, p. 384). Operating within this institutional environment, IGOs "matter in shaping the behavior of important actors in world politics" (Martin and Simmons, 1998, p. 729). How these institutions matter depends on the who and what questions. Thus, the institutional environment has to conform to the identities of the disparate elements within it and eventually the collective product that obtains from the interaction of these

disparate elements. The argument here is that collective identity emerges from the ability of the institutional environment to tame the egos of the disparate elements within it. Oftentimes, egos are diluted states' recognition that IGOs also work to solve common security and political problems. Such an understanding is based on Martin and Simmons's perception about international institutions which they see "as both the object of strategic choice and a constraint on actors' behavior..." (1998, p. 729).

While alliances exist among states, Wendt makes a distinction between these and collective security arrangements. According to Wendt (1994), the former is temporary as it aims to ephemerally deal with a specific threat after which it should disband. The purpose is instrumental. On the other hand, collective security involves the commitment of states towards multilateral action against general threats. These threats are multifarious, unpredictable, and range from low to high key. In identifying themselves as common targets of a security threat, member states assume a collective identity which should also make decisions collectively. Collective identity, then, provides the fundamental ingredients that buttress generic principles of conduct and make reciprocity an essential outcome (Ruggie, 1993a; Wendt, 1994). In framing the collective identity case, Wendt (1994) is cognizant of the perpetual importance of IGOs whose actions are often restricted by member state interests. Thus, within the IGO, the collective identity consciousness is still affected by the ideology of sovereignty which circumscribes the legal basis for states and their unrestricted rights to act as they wish within its borders (Lebow, 2008).

Both state and non-state actors perceive collective action problems whenever they emerge. However, the ability to conquer collective action problems resides in part on how actors'

social identities engender self-interests or collective interests (Wendt, 1994). The interest-identity nexus becomes important in understanding collective behavior. Where behavior is molded for reasons other than collective gain, this research conceptualizes that the type of interdependence between self and other (Keohane, 1984) is situational rather than empathetic. The same interdependence plays out when the two identities of an IGO intersect. Empathetic interdependence creates identities that perceive threats collectively. According to Wendt (1992a), a state that positively identifies with other states results in its perception of security threats not as a private matter for each state but as a responsibility of all.

The need to ward off threats becomes a collective effort. If the collective self is well developed, argues Wendt (1992a), then security practices will be, to a relative degree, altruistic or prosocial. The driving force for such manifestations is the identity each state accords itself, or the identity the concerned state gets from others. For Greve (2018), identity and the process of identification are domiciled in what Giddens calls practical consciousness: it “consists of all the things which actors know tacitly about how to “go on” in the contexts of social life without being able to give them direct discursive expression” (Giddens 1984: xxiii). This means that actors seldom constantly reflect when identifying. What Greve demonstrates here is that identities are mostly sedimented and effortlessly habitual, so that there is no need to think much about the process of identifying either friends or enemies. A collection of member states knows beforehand that other institutions of the IGO, in which the member states are part, are accountable to these member states. It is a spontaneous process that creates an environment in which the energy is deployed elsewhere (Greve, 2018). When identities within an IGO are established in this manner, it is also easy to forge cooperative arrangements for purposes of collective gain. Where such

identities are blurred, however, cooperation among actors can either become limited, or become entirely absent.

The IGO perspective stresses that threats may lead to shared practices of coping with those threats and as such become the source of a collective identity and enable the formation of new or the intensification of existing security communities. This perspective highlights the importance of not only investigating representations of threats, but also the shared practices by which actors aim at coping with them. For this research, this requires a focus on practices of directing common enterprises, projects and partnerships and policy coordination to cope with Islamist insurgency in the Cabo Delgado province in Mozambique. Having established the theoretical framework about IGO identity using the Two-Identity theory, the following chapter discusses the different methods of data collection and analysis that help to answer the research questions raised in earlier sections of this research.

4.8 Conclusion

The chapter provided a theoretical framework that combines IR and PA theories. Identity in IGOs is believed to influence an entity's behavior and culture. The Two-Identity theory provides a theoretical and methodological foundation for the study of SADC in its response efforts and mechanics in light of the Cabo Delgado insurgency. It also highlights the roles played by SADC's bureaucratic and political branches in decision making and prepares the reader for the evaluation of these roles in Chapter Seven and Eight. The next chapter outlines the research methods used in data collection and analysis for the research.

CHAPTER 5:

Methodology

5.1 Introduction

This dissertation research adopts a mixed method approach. The choice of the research methods used for this study is influenced by the type of research the study seeks to pursue. First, the organizational response of a security community, SADC, requires an understanding of how such an organization operates when confronted with a security situation such as the one that hit Mozambique's Cabo Delgado in 2017. The statistical data used was accessed from the Fund for Peace (2020) which used a range of indicators to measure countries' fragility. The multi-method dimension which involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the subject matter allows for the interpretation of phenomena in terms of the meanings which are assigned to these phenomena (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). The various interpretations and meanings which different people and researchers assign to SADC processes and actions contribute to an in-depth understanding of how SADC's two identities influence the way the organization has responded not only to the Cabo Delgado crisis, but to other problems that it has faced since its inception. The research problem and preference of this study, which determines the reliance on qualitative approach (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), seek to understand organizational behavior- a process that does not require vast numerical interpretation.

5.2 The Mixed Methods Approach

Mixed methods research has been practiced since the 1950s but formally began in the late 1980s and is increasingly used by a growing number of researchers (Clark, Creswell, Green, & Shope, 2008; Dunning, Williams, Abonyi, & Crooks, 2008). The increase in mixed methods

research justifies the question of determining the perceived value of mixed methods research compared with a purely quantitative or purely qualitative study. It is important to understand the perceived value of combining two distinct methodologies, especially given the added resources, time, and expertise required to conduct a mixed methods study. Mixed methods research requires additional time due to the need to collect and analyze two different types of data (Creswell, Klassen, Plano Clark, & Smith, 2011). This study uses qualitative methods in the form of case study and document analysis. In addition, descriptive statistics are used to analyze data from the Global Fragile States Index. The next section briefly discusses each of these aspects of the mixed method approach.

Case Study

Given the overarching aims, the qualitative approach adopted here involves the use of case studies. The choice of the types of the qualitative methods is inspired by De Vos et al's (2005) five strategies of inquiry, of which the case study method is one. According to Crasnow in Cartwright and Montuschi (2014), the epistemological role of case study research is of great interest. This is because the epistemological function allows researchers to understand how individual case studies give evidence for the causal claims that political scientists hope to ascertain, and the sort of evidence they provide. Perspectives drawn from case-specific examples help in giving the study an objective, non-aligned outlook. Hence, SADC is used as a security community case or intergovernmental organization, whereas Mozambique is the point of reference for the case's activities. To understand the essence of case studies and their relevance to research of this nature, a critical appraisal of case studies as a methodological technique is necessary.

According to De Vos et al (2005: 272), a study may be called a case study whenever a case is used as a reference. The use of a case study, therefore, allows for in-depth exploration and analysis of a given system (Creswell, 2003; 2007). For Yin (2011, p. 4), a case study is defined as: an empirical inquiry about a contemporary phenomenon (e.g., a “case”) set within its real-world context especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 2011, p. 4). In the same vein, Bromley (1990) understands a case study is a strategy and an empirical inquiry that is strategically used to investigate an event or a set of related phenomena in a real-life setting. Hence, in using the SADC case, the study pursues a deep understanding of the interactive nature and relations of actors within the region. Such factors include the regional body itself, as well as member states. The SADC case study therefore allows setting a precedent that can be used to analyze other regional examples. The intensive study of SADC a single unit, that is a spatially bounded phenomenon observed over a demarcated period of time (Gerring, 2004), allows the testing of theoretical postulations which in turn provide substantial consciousness of social and political phenomena through the case’s contextual lens (Onapajo 2014). Since the strength of the case study is its flexibility (Hyett, Kenny, and Dickson-Swift, 2014), such flexibility can be gleaned from Meyer’s (2001) observation that case studies permit orienting the design and data collection techniques to the research questions. The tailoring can include choosing how many issues to address within a case study. Thus, in this case, apart from the pursuit to analyze SADC’s role and response mechanism, the study also includes the perceptions of sub-units within an entity, that is, the different groups of people and their perception of SADC’s response. Expert perception is an example of an embedded design (Yin, 2011) that allows paying attention to subunits within the bigger case-SADC. An interesting

relationship between the two levels of analysis, that is, SADC (looking at its role and response mechanism) and experts' perception is that the latter is shaped by the outcomes within the former, and not vice versa. Meyer (2001) argues that the ability to study many different aspects within a single, larger case is an advantage exuded by the case study approach as we can view interacting processes within a case's total environment. According to Meyer (2001), such a study offers "a detailed investigation of one or more organizations or groups within organizations," (p. 329) to provide an analysis of the situation and processes of the phenomenon under study. In our case, the situation under study involves an organization- SADC- and its role and response mechanism to terrorist activities in one of the organization's member states. The focus on the organization obtains from the fact that such an entity is in itself a social construct whose development owes to the conscious invention of human endeavors seeking to fulfill a social function. The case study approach, therefore, draws attention to specific units of analysis, for instance, the regional body and its people. This is not all. Such focus also invites researchers to appreciate how case studies function to understand other processes that characterize entities (Noor, 2008). According to Yin (2003), when using several sources of evidence, case study approach shuns single data methods. The approach validates the use of unique tactics of both research design and data analysis. Such processes include the way people think about how the organization is faring in security matters. Thus, a tedious and precise study of the aggregate of internal dynamics within a case study stimulates conversation about the role of security communities, as well as their members, in certain social, political, and economic situations. This aspect fulfills one of the assumptions of case studies that they are particularly useful for responding to *how* and *why* questions about a current set of events. Through the case study

approach, this research helps to explain how and why SADC responded to the conflict in the manner it did. In other words, the objective of such a technique is to make connections between actors and institutions.

The larger problem of the processes within the SADC region (both the organization and its people) is answered owing not only to the dictates of a single methodological approach but also out of the investigation of the miscellaneous conditions surrounding the case itself.

Document analysis

According to Bowen (2009), organizational and institutional documents are a common target in qualitative research and the number of research reports that rely on document analysis is in perpetuity. Following these ideas, this research utilized various types of document materials, both primary and secondary, in which SADC is mentioned, discussed or reviewed. The first type of research materials comprised journal articles and books on SADC, including its institutions and activities, as well as those that focused on Cabo Delgado. Finally, information was also collected from official SADC documents that describe SADC treaties, publications, protocols, statements, decisions, recommendations, charters, official reports and communiques. Used in conjunction with other qualitative research methods as a means of triangulation (Bowen, 2009), the use of different documents in this research sought to allow the convergence and corroboration of sources (Yin, 2003; 2011). Triangulation also added to credibility (Eisner, 1991) and as Patton (1990) argued, the accusation of relying on a single method or investigator bias is neutralized by this approach.

Process-Tracing

In order to understand the activities of SADC in the response efforts, this study used the process-tracing method (Beach & Pedersen, 2019; Weiss, 1998). According to Beach and Pedersen, 2019), this type of inquiry centers on public sector responses and how they shape and the resultant outcomes (Beach & Pedersen, 2019; Weiss, 1998). According to Ryu and Nyaku (2022), who used the process-tracing method to capture the COVID-19 pandemic response within given contextual conditions, the rationale behind the process-tracing method is that it best captures the public sector responses to phenomena in specific settings. The method exposes the types of responses as they adapt to evolving situations (Ryu and Nyaku, 2021). By using this method, the study constructs a narrative of events in Chapter Six from the data about SADC and its member states and allows for the development of what happened from 2017 when the insurgency broke out in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado Province. Thus, the process-tracing method relies on ontological determinism that provides explanations for the outcomes of certain actions among a select group of actors (Beach & Pedersen, 2019). Using this method, the study is able to make links between the events in Mozambique and results of SADC's actions in response to these events.

5.3 Descriptive Statistics

Displaying data is useful for uncovering patterns within the data and for effectively presenting the results of a project. Descriptive statistics is one way of doing this. Descriptive statistics comprise numerical and graphical techniques in organizing, presenting and analyzing data (Fisher and Marshall, 2009). The forms of descriptive statistics used to describe a variable in a sample depend on the level of measurement used. Of the three levels of measurements

(nominal, ordinal, and continuous), this study uses the nominal and ordinal levels to rank and classify the sixteen countries. The descriptive characteristics for selected indicators for the sixteen SADC countries are shown in Figure 6, Chapter Six. As Nick (2007) observed, the display of data can uncover patterns within the data. From this, the selected indicators for the countries were highlighted.

These indicators, understood as country-specific conditions, can be viewed as external factors that influence the quotidian activities of the regional body. In their interaction with SADC's identity markers, these country-specific factors, this study argues, may create a unique understanding which SADC's institutional identity may not explain. To summarize country-specific conditions that in turn influence the regional profile, the study makes use of Fund for Peace's (FFP) Global Fragile Index Data for 2017 and 2022. The classification of fragile states ranked between 2017 and 2022 was selected purposively because the Cabo Delgado insurgency began in 2017 and SADC managed to deploy its standby force in 2022. Thus, these two years are key to the study's objectives. The period is significant because the last two years of the classification period fall within the timeline of the eruption of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. The twelve indicators used in the classification, also used by O'Neil, Fields, and Share (2021) in their analysis of strong and weak states, provide an in-depth understanding of individual member states' contextual conditions which are a crucial factor of SADC's activities. These indicators, therefore, provide some answers to one of the study's research questions- RQ 2 and the follow up question 2a.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter provided the methods used to collect and analyze the data used to make arguments about the role of the Two-Identity theory and that of other external factors in the nature of response of SADC to the issues of terrorism taking place in Mozambique. The next chapter presents the data that were collected from SADC documents, illustrating the Two-Identity theory and how it shapes an organization's response mechanism. Further, the chapter applies the data from FFP's Global Fragile States Index (2020) and then uses it to explain how country contextual conditions influence the activities of a regional organization like SADC.

CHAPTER 6

Data Collection and Analysis

6.1 Introduction

This chapter analyzes the response of the South African Development Community (SADC) to Mozambique's Cabo Delgado insurgency through the lenses of the Two Identity theory as well as the contextual conditions of SADC member states. While Mozambique is used for an in-depth contextual analysis, general reference to the fragile situation of the sixteen SADC member countries is important in reinforcing discourse about country-specific conditions in the organizational response framework.

The Cabo Delgado insurgency broke out in October 2017. Shortly thereafter, Mozambique took some individual steps in response to the violence in the Cabo Delgado Province. Figure 6c below traces some key actions by the government of Mozambique. While President Nyusi's first acknowledgement in 2018 of the need for international support and having formally reported the concern to SADC in May 2019, the country went on to secure the services of private security companies- the Wagner Group from Russia and the Dyck Advisory Group (The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2021). In choosing private military groups, Mozambique sent out a message to other governments that although they saw the need for additional help, the issue was an internal one which did not warrant fully fledged regional military intervention.

However, overtime, and with numerous reports of brazen attacks in Cabo Delgado, President Nyusi expressed his willingness to get assistance from regional member states at an extraordinary SADC Troika Summit held in Harare, Zimbabwe, in May 2020.

The Cabo Delgado attack marked a turning point in the socio-political climate of the provincial region as well as across the country. According to Bussotti and Coimbra (2023), the position of Cabo Delgado, with its prospective economic gains for the country, triggered great concern for Mozambique. This is despite the fact that the government of Mozambique tried to downplay the crisis, using a range of nomenclatures that framed the situation as nothing more than a localized disturbance.

Figure 1.5: Timeline of events in Mozambique



While SADC aspires to have strong inter-state regional integration (SADC Treaty, 1992), similar to sub-Saharan Africa, it has been intricately convoluted with the broad political objectives of Pan-Africanism and third world solidarity (Pallotti, 2004). This characteristic of integration has been acknowledged in discussions concerning sovereignty which is emphasized within the Second SADC. However, the political objectives behind the idea of integration have their origins in the nature of individual country dynamics whose background political and economic conditions shape SADC's actions. For example, the subdued economic conditions (Le Roux & Moyo, 2015) for the majority of the SADC member countries, (see Tables 6a and b in Chapter 6), explain the absence of economic inequality, a general lack of public services, and the amplified group

grievances and demographic pressures, among other indicators. Yet more significant is the effect of a subdued economic performance on individual countries' ability to fulfill their financial obligations to the SADC (see description of SADC funding sources in Chapter Three).

As noted by Pallotti (2004) and Mapuva and Muyengwa-Mapuva (2014), there are political implications behind the nature of regional economic interactions within SADC (Pallotti, 2004). However, especially for Mapuva and Muyengwa-Mapuva (2014), the implications of challenges are region-based. For example, the low and decreasing levels of per capita Gross National Product (GNP) and low growth rate are a manifestation of the imbalances among states in the economic clout of dominant states like South Africa. While this is true, the observation overlooks the role of the individual states and their economic and political policies. In relying on the Fragile States Index, this study uses the state and its contextual conditions as the default unit of analysis to further understand regional problems. Hence, the negative outlook in the countries' political and economic environments creates the sort of problems that the SADC has to address.


SADC aspires to have a say in the nature of regional peace and security (SADC, 1992). Looking at most member states' generally low negative scores on the Fragile States Index (see chapter Six Tables 6a and 6b) in the security apparatus and legitimacy, the member countries which respect the principle of sovereignty seem to be comfortable with the approach that precludes a peer review mechanism. Such a review mechanism can be traced to the African Union (AU) monitoring and assessment policy which calls African countries to comply with the edicts of human rights and good governance (Manby, 2004). It seeks to foster democratic cultures and practices for the realization of good governance advocated for in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) framework (Agbu, 2003). The logic behind the third force to SADC

operations, hence, is that a country whose security apparatus and legitimacy score is negative (for example Zimbabwe and Eswatini, see Chapter 7) may not be in a position to advocate for strong evaluation of a fellow member in the same situation. Just as countries are unable to fund SADC initiatives because of a subdued economic standing, member states lack the credibility to change the circumstances of SADC when their own internal conditions are similar.

6.2 SADC's Two Identities

The SADC institutional framework is designed in such a way that it has two wings. Chapter three outlined the different branches that undertake the administrative and political functions. These two functions are called the First and Second Identity respectively. Figure 6.2 below shows the interaction of the two identities of SADC and in the way they influence SADC's response mechanism. In the framework, SADC's second identity, made up of the Heads of state and also known as the Summit, controls all decisions made for the organization. This is an illustration by the one direction arrow in Figure 6.1 and this one direction shows that the Second Identity can act unilaterally and in making the decisions regarding any kind of response. Only when the Second identity of SADC gives a greenlight on projects and policy does the First identity act through implementation of the decisions.

Figure 1.6: SADC's Two Identities



The functions and influence of these two identities above are discussed below.

6.2.1 The Bureaucratic Wing: The First SADC)

SADC's institutional framework (see Chapter 3) reveals that SADC's bureaucratic institutions cannot make independent decisions outside the scope of the Summit. Apart from participating in the conventions in response to the news of the growing insurgency in the Cabo Delgado province, the different institutions such as the Organ of Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) could not oversee the deployment of military personnel to Mozambique until 2021. According to Bussotti and Coimbra (2023), the absence of institutions such as SADC parliament and the SADC Tribunal which was dissolved in 2012 means a weak bureaucratic system that does not meet the urgency with which the crisis ought to be treated.

This research shows that the operations of the First SADC are determined by the rules made by the Second SADC. The administrative wing, the First SADC, is subordinate to the Second SADC. Because the Second SADC did not ratify any decision, there was nothing that the bureaucracy could do to find a solution to the problem. As Adebajo (2010) observed, there is a

general sentiment that SADC member states have kept the SADC secretariat incapacitated as a strategy that precludes an interventionist bureaucracy with the potential to meddle in some sensitive security issues. This could be the reason why the few communiques that SADC meetings broadcast had little detail other than acknowledging that the Summit or Troika met and discussed the issue of Mozambique. If one concludes that the First SADC did nothing in the search for solutions to the Cabo Delgado province, one is inadvertently acknowledging that the Second SADC has the power to weaken one of its departments. Thus, in answering the question about the Two-Identity theory, this research shows that while there are other factors outside this framework that can influence response mechanisms, the Two-Identity, through its Second SADC made up by the heads of states, has remarkable influence in the outcomes of SADC's organizational actions.

Looking at the governing structure of SADC (Figure 3.2), decision-making and the implementation of programs starts at from the Summit level to the Secretariat while the Integrated Council of Ministers (ICM) also sometimes makes decisions on behalf of the Summit, while providing policy guidance to the Secretariat. Yet, because the ICM also has the power to oversee the implementation of core areas of integration, something which the Secretariat also does, there is a possible duplication of duties. Another problem which emanates from this is the continued weakening of the Secretariat. This has been the case, the Secretariat is noted to lack authority and power (Isaksen & Tjønneland, 2001). Although some structural changes took place with the inception of SADC in 1992 to deal with problems of implementation and give impetus to the Secretariat, new structures continue to be unable to adapt to evolving circumstances and

challenges especially those that require instant action like the security situation in the Cabo Delgado Province in Mozambique.

6.2.2 The diplomatic Wing: The Second SADC

As noted in chapter three, this diplomatic wing of SADC, also called the Summit, is composed of the heads of government of the member countries. It is the supreme policy-making institution of SADC under Article 10(1) (SADC, 1992). The Summit and its subsidiary units, such as the Troika and the Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) are the ultimate decision-making body as enshrined in the SADC Treaty (1992). This second SADC, as Claude (1996) identified the political element of the United Nations, designs rules and regulations which guide operations. Because the second SADC makes decisions guided by the rule of consensus as contained in Article 19 of Chapter Six of the SADC Treaty (1992), the influence of this organizational unit on the entire operations of SADC is far reaching. Consensus means that if any one head of state from the sixteen countries that form the SADC does not ratify a decision, then any resolution may not be implemented. For instance, as noted in chapter six, the reluctance to acknowledge the crisis by Mozambique and the subsequent turn towards private security companies and countries for bilateral engagements temporarily presented some unannounced veto to the preferences of the SADC. Even as the SADC Summit is the ultimate decision-making body, it cannot override the position of the member countries' principals. Thus, while SADC has the power to make things happen, it can only do so if each of the sixteen heads of states are on board. The ultimate consequence of this arrangement is that SADC is powerless and only acts effectively if the interests of its members are upheld, hence the member states seem to prioritize self-interests over group benefits. It becomes credible, hence, as noted by Mearsheimer (1994-

95) that the space for cooperation among states has its limits and is mostly contorted by the dominating logic of security competition. In the case of SADC, such competition has often manifested itself in several ways, including the protection of self-interest. Although such reasoning belongs to the realist paradigm and often rejected by constructivists (Tavares, 2011) on account of the role political institutions play in molding values and norms, the failure by SADC to mount a timely and definitive intervention seems to validate the argument that when national, and indeed interests are at stake, values and norms, like those pronounced in SADC's founding document (SADC Treaty, 1992), are seldom adhered to. This begs the question about whether there is a need for SADC to move from diplomatic superficiality to practical engagement with member states- a position that prioritizes the organization over individual country preferences. Admittedly, the stakes towards achieving such a position are tediously high.

The prioritization of self-interest does not completely rule out the functions of SADC when it noted the sticking points that the organization faced in trying to find a solution to the insurgency. In fact, the slow response to the Cabo Delgado insurgency is a manifestation of the operations of the second SADC whose processes are influenced by the positions taken by the different members of the Summit.

While Ancas (2011) and Nathan (2010b) strongly believe that there should be a simple external consensus that peace in the SADC region is worth pursuing, the authors, particularly Ancas (2011), thought that such a normative consensus is generally lacking among SADC member countries. The lack of consensus which exudes a general absence of common values and unity culminates in what Ancas (2011) sees as less effectiveness of regional conflict resolution efforts. The absence of visible intervention by SADC from 2017 to 2021 has produced mixed messages

about the regional body. First, the rather effeminate approach to the insurgency resulted in numerous attacks in Mozambique and the deaths of both civilian and military populations. The liberal institutionalism thought that projects institutions as a forum for monitoring compliance and detecting defections became a parody given the time it took SADC to actually deploy SAMIM. Secondly, it can be argued that this non-confrontational approach allowed Mozambique to be at the center of decision making. Consequently, common norms which should bind members within a security community appeared to have become under threat. For example, as the general lack of trust and common values among member states forestalls consensus, the delay in rapid response to regional crises becomes a feature of the region's peacekeeping and conflict resolution process. The matter at hand here, thus, is about the degree of influence of the Second SADC. That is, does SADC's identity play a role in the organization's response mechanisms. According to Hammerstad (2005), one of the pillars that SADC continues to operate on is absolute sovereignty. Using data from the literature in chapter two and background section in chapter three, the following section discusses how sovereignty among SADC states precludes the adoption of key decisions. Caveat that such a discussion associates sovereignty with features of the Second SADC made up the Summit.

In answering the first research question, SADC's two identities help us to understand the extent to which the organization is able to deal with security matters affecting its member states. However, any capabilities shown by the two identities reveal that there is a missing link that precludes the achievement of best outcomes given the time it took SADC to deploy the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM).

6.2.3 Activities of the SADC Troika and the Deployment of SAMIM

The SADC Troika is a three-member team made up of the current SADC chairperson, the outgoing Chairperson, and the incoming Chairperson. This system was introduced at the 1999 SADC Summit held in Maputo, Mozambique. According to SADC (2023), the system accords the Troika the authority to take quick decisions on behalf of the Summit as well as directing policy decisions for SADC institutions when the SADC Summit is in recess. The idea of the Troika is rotational leadership. Another branch which is managed on a rotational (Troika) basis is the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation which is responsible for promoting peace and security in the region (SADC, 2023). However, these two entities are mutually exclusive, and the Chairperson of the Organ does not assume the leadership of the Summit. If the SADC Troika and the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation meet together then the convention is called the Double Troika.

After Mozambique's President expressed his willingness for support from regional members, SADC Troika on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation, on the 19th of May 2020, convened an Extra-Ordinary Summit which acknowledged that, "SADC remains seized with the political and security situation prevailing in the region and stands ready to support any of its Member States to find lasting solutions to challenges threatening peace and stability in the region" (SADC Troika on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation, 2020). Immediately after the Extraordinary Organ Troika Summit and Mozambique convention SADC, "strongly condemned the armed attacks and acts of sabotage perpetrated by the terrorists and armed groups in some districts of Cabo Delgado Province" (SADC Communique, 2020).

Figure 1.7 below shows some key events by SADC after the request by the Mozambican President for support. The synchronized actions by the SADC Troika and SADC Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) rested on the provisions of Article 6(1) and 6(2) of the Mutual Defense Pact (2004) which mandates member states to act in the event of an “armed attack against a State Party [which is] considered a threat to regional peace and security and such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action,” [and that such] “Collective action shall be mandated by Summit on the recommendation of the Organ” (SADC Mutual Defense Pact, 2004, p. 3).

Figure 1.7: Timeline of Events for SADC



On 29 April 2021, the SADC extraordinary summit of the OPDSC met in Gaborone, Botswana to receive a report prepared by the Technical Assessment Team that was deployed in line with the decisions upheld at the SADC Extraordinary Double Troika Summit which was held on the 8th of April 2021. Immediately following the April 29th Summit, SADC held another meeting- the SADC Double Troika involving the Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation. The Summit noted with concern the acts of terrorism in Mozambique’s Delgado and reaffirmed SADC’s continued commitment to bringing lasting peace and security to the province. It was not until the

extraordinary summit held in June 2021 where a resolution to deploy the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) was made. After nearly five years since the outbreak of violent conflict in Cabo Delgado, SADC resolved to deploy a standby force that would help to quell the violence caused by the terrorist group in Mozambique's Northern province. In a letter addressed to the United Nations Secretary, Antonio Guterres, justifying the deployment of the SADC Standby Force, the SADC Executive Secretary- Stergomena L. Tax said:

The SADC Mission to Mozambique aims to, among other things, support the Republic of Mozambique to combat acts of terrorism and extremism, and to support the republic of Mozambique to restore law and order in affected areas in Cabo Delgado Province (SADC, 2021).

SAMIM was then deployed on 15 July 2021. These processes and events serve to shed light on the public sector responses to a situation and how such a response triggers consequential outcome. Examining the overview and response to the Cabo Delgado insurgency allows for a response to this thesis' first research question:

1. Does the Two-Identity theory work to explain SADC's response to the terrorist activities in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province?

To answer the second question, the following sections offer some economic, social, and political insights on Mozambique and SADC in general.

6.3 Mozambique and the Cabo Delgado Insurgency- Some Insights


The second research question asks, *What other factors, apart from the Two Identity theory, explain SADC's response mechanism as a regional IGO?* This research suggests that it is necessary to look at some factors internal to Mozambique and other SADC member countries in general because the SADC's two identities alone cannot fully explain the slow, ineffective approach to the security situation in Mozambique. More specifically, the Cabo Delgado

insurgency can be understood by looking into Mozambique's and the region's internal social, economic, and political conditions. These conditions, much as they have a bearing on the SADC's regional operations, are created by the actions of Mozambican leaders and the country's citizens. Furthermore, the right to exercise sovereignty is enunciated in Article 4(a) of the SADC Treaty (1992) which emphasizes the sovereign equality of member states. This principle is explained in the SADC Mutual Defense Pact (2004) in Article 7(1) which underscores the need for states to "... respect one another's territorial integrity and sovereignty and, in particular, observe the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of one another. Thus, although SADC's response to the situation is important, so are the internal workings of the individual sovereign states that make up SADC. In this section, the research briefly described the socio-economic, and political conditions within Mozambique which have a bearing on the Cabo Delgado insurgency yet having an effect on SADC because of the principles outlined above.

Ethnic inequality is one of the features of negative social conditions in Mozambique. Such inequality has contributed to Mozambique having unfavorable scores on demographic pressures and group grievances in both 2017 and 2022. Yet, looking at these inequalities, they have a bearing on the current causes of the insurgency. For instance, Mabera and Naidoo (2020) noticed that stakeholders have viewed the insurgency as rooted in historically unequal distribution of political and economic privileges existing among the dominant ethnic groups in Cabo Delgado. These groups are identified as the Mwani and the Makonde ethnic groups. These ethnic cleavages further manifest themselves into religious divisions. The Mwani are mostly Muslim, and the Makonde are Christian (Mabera and Naidoo, 2020).

Generally low level of growth (see Figure 6b below), the failure of the government to deliver services, a deteriorating public service outlook as seen in the FFP (2017; 2022) global Fragile States Index Table 6a and Table 6b above, have influenced the gradual restlessness in the population. The demographic pressure indicator for both 2017 and 2020 are conspicuously high with scores of 9.9 and 8.1, respectively.

Figure 1.8: Mozambique's GDP per capita in \$USD 2016 to 2022



<https://www.statista.com/statistics/507328/gross-domestic-product-gdp-per-capita-in-mozambique/>

Source: Statista.com 2023

According to Mabera and Naidoo (2020), these pressures are more intense among the youth in marginalized regions of Mozambique and districts which are outside the capital, Maputo. Uneven economic growth has seen areas in the North lagging behind, to the point of neglect, just in the same way political representation in the ruling party, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), is skewed in favor of southerners and Christians at the expense of northerners and Muslim. A subdued economic outlook, marked by a low GDP per capita for the years 2016 to

2022, is evident of an environment which qualifies for a spot among the most fragile states in the world. Yet, these conditions do not carry any justification for SADC to intervene without violating the principle of non-interference espoused in the SADC Treaty (1992).

6.4 Religion, Politics, and the Economy as Drivers of Violence in Cabo Delgado

While the insurgency is under-explored thus far, a number of studies that have looked into the conflict (Bonate, 2018; Bussotti, 2021; Makonye, 2020; Heyen-Dubé and Rands, 2022; Mlambo and Masuku, 2021; Bekoe, Burchard, and Daly, 2020; Meyer, 2019) have suggested that the violence occurring in Northern Mozambique is being carried out by radicalized Muslim youth connected to the Harakat al-Shabaab of Somalia and its offshoots in Kenya, Tanzania, and as far as DRC. According to the 2017 National Population Census, of the nearly 28 million people in Mozambique, Muslims account for about 18% of the total population of the country while accounting for 58% of the Cabo Delgado inhabitants (Bonate, 2018). Connected to the wider Islamic network, the Cabo Delgado insurgents use the same historical religious views that have been used in all attacks that extremists have claimed responsibility for. Yet, the Cabo Delgado conflict has some political and economic explanations. The economic factor in the Cabo Delgado province is more explained by the resource curse phenomenon. The Cabo Delgado Province is gas and mineral rich and the recent boom in these extractive minerals has been associated with the “New Scramble for Africa” (Bonate, 2018). The seizure of these mineral-rich lands by mega-projects ignored the laws of customary tenure and statutory land Code which underscore the privilege of such natural resources to local communities (Bonate, 2018). Besides these grievances against multinational corporations, Bussotti (2021) observed that the prohibition of some ethnic groups such as the Kimwani (or Mwani) and Makhuwa to exploit gold and diamond mines,

favoring a narrow political and military elite belonging to the Mozambican revolutionary party FRELIMO and influential people of Makonde origins. These political and economic factors are believed to have added to the religious grievances cited above. The social, political, and economic conditions become part of a wide array of indicators used to rank countries by the Fund for Peace (2020) and these indicators tend to influence each other. These factors, once fully considered, become the foundation for the triadic effect that supplements the shortcomings of the Two-Identity theory. These indicators are discussed in chapter 7.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter outlined SADC's two identities and discussed the activities of the SADC Troika by means of a timeline of events from 2017. Further the chapter provided some insights into Mozambique's battle with the insurgency and how socio-economic factors shape the security situation in the country. For example, a discussion of Mozambique's GDP per capita builds into the discussion of the general economic situation of SADC member countries and how the situation affects SADC funding activities. The discussion of the social and political factors in Cabo Delgado plays into the discourse about demographic grievances which are believed to contribute to the rise in terrorist activities in the subregion. Through process tracing, the chapter laid a foundation for evaluating the two-identity hypothesis and to demonstrate how contextual conditions also play a role in shaping the actions of SADC. The evaluation and analysis of the findings in this chapter follows in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 7

Southern Africa's Contextual Outlook

7.1 Introduction

As mentioned in the last chapter, to fully understand SADC's response it is imperative to consider member countries' context using the Fragile States Index data. Consideration of country-specific conditions helps to explain some of the problems and actions that SADC experienced in its response to the Cabo Delgado insurgency. This research suggests that it is important to not only recognize the country-specific conditions for the country experiencing the conflict, but also for the other countries involved in the regional organization—in this case SADC. These are both important because the contextual conditions and national interests of individual member states influences behavior at the regional level, the analysis of these contextual conditions provides a glimpse of the different motivations and actions in creating security decisions. If we understand the dynamics within member states in terms of the different indicators analyzed, we are also able to make sense of a generalized regional experience that in turn drives both individual and common decision-making alternatives. Thus, a better picture of country-specific conditions can be seen by referring to the Fund for Peace's (2017; 2022) Global Fragile States Index which uses a wide range of indicators. Tables 3 and 4 below have been adapted from the global ranking to put the Southern African region in context. All the sixteen SADC member countries have been ranked globally.

ranges from 1 to 10 where 1 shows the best condition where a country is not regarded as fragile. A score of 10 shows the extreme position where a country is considered extremely fragile.

On the global scale, seven of the countries in SADC are in the top fifty most fragile states in 2017 while twelve countries fall in the top hundred most fragile states. For the year 2022, eight SADC countries fall into the top fifty most fragile states. Only Mauritius, The Seychelles, Botswana, and Namibia are outside the top hundred countries for both years. These figures can influence regional politics especially in situations where indicators like security apparatus are brought to the fore.

In 2017, *Economic volatility* scores range from 5.8 to 9.5 in all countries except for Mauritius with 4.0. As seen in the general economic outlook of the region, the patterns of economic decline measured against per capita income and other indicators like unemployment, inflation, debt, etc., correspond to other outcomes such as economic hardships mainly induced by austerity programs (Fragile States Index Annual Report, 2022). In 2022, *economic inequality* is also high in most countries. Only Mauritius has scores below 5.0 for both 2017 and 2022 with scores of 3.5 and 2.8 respectively. One of the problems that cripple SADC operations is created by the challenges caused by a lack of economic growth and poverty reduction because SADC member states are poor (Tanyanyiwa and Hakuna, 2014). The volatile economic outlook has a direct impact on the ability of member states to fund regional projects. Chapter three reported how member states failed to meet their annual subscriptions to SADC. The challenges that the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) encountered (Louw-Vaudran, 2022), though not explicitly outlined in terms of financial capacity, may also include the lack of funds to sponsor a huge peacekeeping mission in Mozambique. However, the history of SADC financial problems and the subsequent challenge to fund peacekeeping activities is well documented (Cilliers, 2008; Solomon, 2015). According to Ndaguba, Nzewi, and Shai (2018), SADC experiences challenges to

fund its activities and its small budget does not clearly state the total share for security. This has a direct impact on the functionality of the SADC standby force from which SAMIM was deployed.

In 2017, only Botswana and Mauritius have scores below 5.0 for the *security Apparatus* while the other fourteen countries score above 5.0. According to Fund for Peace's (FFP) (2022), data for Southern Africa, there are more security threats that range from bombings, rebel movements, mutinies, coups, or terrorism. Such threats also include serious acts of criminality and organized crime. The security apparatus indicator factors in the use of force on citizens and the figures seem to show that such acts are rampant in a number of SADC countries, with some countries' militaries evading the civilian control benchmark. In some cases, the police forces do not meet professional standards, resorting to use of force on the citizens (FFP, 2022). However, a much-improved outlook for the year 2022 has seven countries with scores below 5.0. The DRC, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique score above 7.0 meaning their security forces use force on citizens and possibly evade the civilian control standard. A high score in group grievance can be attributed to a range of factors, including a member state's style of governance.

On *Group Grievance*, the period from 2017 has ten countries with scores above 5.0 while 2022 shows a slight drop recording seven countries with scores above 5.0. For example, the 2017 index shows South Africa in the Elevated Warning Category with an uptick in protests, strikes, and political instability (Global Data, 2017). Zambia, another SADC member state, also made the list of the worst countries with respect to group grievances for both years (Global Data, 2017; 2022). Generally, these contextual conditions create resentment by citizens and for fellow governments to condemn the crackdown on dissent by Mozambique on the citizens in the northern provinces would be tantamount to condemnation of their own governments. Hence,

the slow response by SADC was also influenced by these dynamics which need a deep analytical ability to make connections.

State Legitimacy has a very low scale in twelve of the sixteen countries which have a score above 5.0 in 2017 and twelve countries in 2022. Only Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Lesotho, and The Seychelles had scores below 5.0. in 2022. An average of 6.54 for the region in 2017 and 6.36 for 2022 means that the majority of ruling governments in the SADC are considered somewhat illegitimate. In terms of *Public Services*, which consider the provision of, and access to public services such as education, infrastructure, health, and shelter, only The Seychelles and Mauritius have a score that is less than 5.0 in both 2017 and 2022. The rest of the countries have scores between 7.0 and 9.7. The *Human Rights* indicator shows that South Africa, Mauritius, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and The Seychelles have scores lower than 5.0. in 2022 yet in 2017 the same countries except Botswana and Lesotho had scores below 5.0. The other countries have scores that are above 5.0 meaning that citizens from these countries have a constricted human rights space. The poor scores for most indicators in the majority of the countries in the region seem to reverberate on the *demographic pressures* indicator. Of the sixteen countries, only Mauritius and The Seychelles have scores below 5.0 in 2017 and only Mauritius scores better in 2022 with a score of 3.0. The other fourteen countries have scores above 8.0.

According to the Fragile States Index Annual Report (2022), generally, three SADC countries- South Africa, Madagascar, and Mozambique- have declined in their 2022 scores. The decline of South Africa on the Fragile States Index has possible ramifications for a region under threat of terrorist incursion. The reason is two-pronged. First, the decline of South Africa means the waning of influence as the dominant regional member. Secondly, South Africa becomes more

worried with pressing issues at home such that priority is given to the need to address domestic problems before helping neighbors although Mozambique's security situation has potential spillover effects.

Table 3. Global Data's (2022) classification of fragile states ranked for 2017.

| Country | Global Rank | Security Apparatus | Group Grievance | Economy | Factionalized Elites | Human Flight and Brain Drain | Refugees and IDP | External Intervention | Economic Inequality | State Legitimacy | Public Services | Human Rights | Demographic Pressures |
|--------------|-------------|--------------------|-----------------|---------|----------------------|------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|------------------|-----------------|--------------|-----------------------|
| DRC | 6th | 9.0 | 10.0 | 8.4 | 9.8 | 6.6 | 10.0 | 9.5 | 8.4 | 9.6 | 9.5 | 9.1 | 9.4 |
| Zimbabwe | 13th | 8.1 | 7.3 | 8.6 | 9.8 | 7.9 | 8.5 | 7.5 | 8.5 | 9.2 | 8.9 | 8.2 | 9.1 |
| Mozambique | 40th | 6.7 | 5.4 | 8.0 | 6.6 | 8.0 | 5.8 | 8.0 | 8.8 | 6.5 | 9.7 | 5.6 | 9.9 |
| Angola | 32nd | 6.6 | 7.5 | 6.4 | 7.2 | 6.6 | 7.1 | 5.4 | 9.9 | 8.6 | 9.1 | 7.3 | 9.5 |
| Zambia | 46st | 4.6 | 6.2 | 7.9 | 5.9 | 7.9 | 6.4 | 7.2 | 9.2 | 7.7 | 7.9 | 7.4 | 9.5 |
| Malawi | 44rd | 4.8 | 5.6 | 8.4 | 8.1 | 7.9 | 5.8 | 8.2 | 8.3 | 6.4 | 8.6 | 6.2 | 9.7 |
| Eswatini | 42nd | 6.3 | 3.4 | 9.7 | 6.8 | 7.2 | 4.7 | 7.1 | 8.2 | 8.8 | 8.1 | 9.1 | 9.4 |
| Comoros | 53rd | 6.7 | 5.4 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 7.4 | 4.7 | 8.0 | 7.5 | 7.3 | 8.2 | 6.3 | 7.3 |
| Madagascar | 55th | 7.1 | 4.1 | 7.6 | 7.8 | 6.7 | 3.9 | 6.8 | 9.1 | 7.1 | 9.1 | 5.6 | 9.1 |
| Lesotho | 60th | 6.2 | 3.9 | 8.1 | 7.3 | 8.0 | 4.8 | 7.8 | 8.1 | 5.9 | 8.1 | 5.0 | 8.5 |
| Tanzania | 65st | 5.5 | 5.2 | 6.2 | 5.7 | 7.6 | 6.7 | 7.2 | 7.1 | 5.9 | 8.6 | 5.9 | 8.7 |
| South Africa | 96th | 6.1 | 6.7 | 7.1 | 6.1 | 5.5 | 5.4 | 3.0 | 7.5 | 6.5 | 7.0 | 4.2 | 7.2 |
| Namibia | 103rd | 5.5 | 5.8 | 6.8 | 3.5 | 7.1 | 5.0 | 6.4 | 8.1 | 3.3 | 7.4 | 3.8 | 7.6 |
| Botswana | 121st | 4.1 | 4.9 | 5.8 | 3.3 | 5.5 | 4.5 | 4.1 | 7.8 | 3.3 | 7.3 | 5.0 | 8.2 |
| Seychelles | 126th | 6.1 | 4.5 | 4.1 | 6.0 | 5.9 | 3.2 | 7.0 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 2.7 | 3.8 | 5.1 |
| Mauritius | 153th | 2.3 | 3.2 | 4.0 | 3.2 | 4.4 | 2.7 | 4.7 | 3.5 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.6 |

Source: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/data/>

Table 4. *Global Data's (2020) classification of fragile states ranked for 2022.*

| Country | Global Rank | Group Grievance | Human Rights | State Legitimacy | Factionalized Elites | Security Apparatus | Economic Inequality | External Intervention | Demographic Pressure | Economy | Public Services | Human Flight and Brain Drain | Refugees and IDP |
|--------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------|------------------|----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|---------|-----------------|------------------------------|------------------|
| DRC | 6th | 9.3 | 9.3 | 9.3 | 9.6 | 8.7 | 8.4 | 8.8 | 9.7 | 8.3 | 9.5 | 6.7 | 9.7 |
| Zimbabwe | 15th | 5.8 | 8.1 | 8.9 | 9.9 | 8.7 | 7.7 | 7.0 | 9.0 | 9.1 | 8.7 | 7.0 | 7.9 |
| Mozambique | 21st | 6.9 | 7.5 | 6.8 | 6.3 | 7.3 | 9.1 | 8.1 | 9.3 | 8.0 | 9.6 | 7.4 | 7.9 |
| Angola | 35th | 8.4 | 6.1 | 8.3 | 7.2 | 6.9 | 8.8 | 4.3 | 9.2 | 8.3 | 9.1 | 5.9 | 5.6 |
| Zambia | 42st | 5.6 | 7.2 | 7.2 | 5.9 | 4.2 | 9.2 | 6.5 | 9.3 | 8.7 | 7.8 | 6.8 | 5.2 |
| Malawi | 45th | 4.4 | 5.0 | 7.4 | 8.7 | 4.5 | 7.9 | 7.1 | 9.5 | 7.8 | 8.5 | 6.7 | 5.5 |
| Eswatini | 52nd | 1.9 | 7.9 | 8.7 | 6.8 | 4.8 | 7.9 | 6.4 | 9.0 | 9.3 | 7.4 | 6.3 | 4.0 |
| Comoros | 47th | 4.5 | 5.5 | 7.9 | 8.0 | 5.9 | 7.4 | 6.5 | 8.3 | 7.3 | 8.1 | 7.1 | 5.8 |
| Madagascar | 52nd | 3.6 | 5.9 | 7.0 | 7.8 | 6.0 | 9.1 | 5.3 | 9.5 | 7.6 | 8.8 | 5.8 | 4.0 |
| Lesotho | 65th | 3.0 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 7.3 | 6.1 | 8.1 | 7.1 | 8.9 | 8.3 | 7.2 | 7.6 | 4.2 |
| Tanzania | 61st | 5.1 | 5.9 | 7.4 | 6.5 | 4.9 | 7.0 | 6.3 | 8.9 | 5.9 | 8.4 | 6.7 | 5.2 |
| South Africa | 79th | 5.9 | 4.5 | 6.4 | 6.8 | 6.9 | 7.0 | 3.0 | 7.9 | 8.0 | 6.9 | 4.8 | 3.9 |
| Namibia | 109th | 4.3 | 2.3 | 3.1 | 3.5 | 4.5 | 7.3 | 4.9 | 8.4 | 7.1 | 7.5 | 6.1 | 3.9 |
| Botswana | 123rd | 4.0 | 4.9 | 2.5 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 6.9 | 2.6 | 7.9 | 6.1 | 6.6 | 4.8 | 1.9 |
| Seychelles | 127th | 4.0 | 4.3 | 4.0 | 6.0 | 5.1 | 5.6 | 6.8 | 4.5 | 4.1 | 2.6 | 5.0 | 2.2 |
| Mauritius | 154th | 4.7 | 3.5 | 2.1 | 3.1 | 1.1 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 5.3 | 3.1 | 4.1 | 1.9 |

7.3: Descriptive Statistics for Selected Indicators for the Sixteen SADC Countries

The selected indicators in Table 5 below show how the sixteen SADC countries performed in terms of fragility. The five indicators have been selected because they capture the full picture of the interaction between the causes and effects of internal country dynamics. For example, there is a strong link between economic performance and the ability of states to fund SADC initiatives, while the way in which a government responds to economic problems and public service problems can amplify demographic pressures and subsequent group grievance.


Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for selected indicators

| Economy | | Group Grievance | | Economic Inequality | | Public Services | | Demographic Pressures | |
|--------------------|----------|--------------------|----------|---------------------|----------|--------------------|----------|-----------------------|----------|
| Mean | 7.19375 | Mean | 5.56875 | Mean | 7.84375 | Mean | 7.71875 | Mean | 8.2375 |
| Standard Error | 0.395018 | Standard Error | 0.433659 | Standard Error | 0.381441 | Standard Error | 0.499685 | Standard Error | 0.439116 |
| Median | 7.75 | Median | 5.4 | Median | 8.15 | Median | 8.15 | Median | 8.9 |
| Mode | 8.4 | Mode | 5.4 | Mode | 7.5 | Mode | 9.1 | Mode | 9.4 |
| Standard Deviation | 1.580071 | Standard Deviation | 1.734635 | Standard Deviation | 1.525765 | Standard Deviation | 1.998739 | Standard Deviation | 1.756464 |
| Sample Variance | 2.496625 | Sample Variance | 3.008958 | Sample Variance | 2.327958 | Sample Variance | 3.994958 | Sample Variance | 3.085167 |
| Kurtosis | 0.290781 | Kurtosis | 1.549247 | Kurtosis | 3.855641 | Kurtosis | 2.858548 | Kurtosis | 2.400434 |
| Skewness | -0.81491 | Skewness | 0.995966 | Skewness | -1.73002 | Skewness | -1.82461 | Skewness | -1.63842 |
| Range | 5.7 | Range | 6.8 | Range | 6.4 | Range | 7 | Range | 6.3 |
| Minimum | 4 | Minimum | 3.2 | Minimum | 3.5 | Minimum | 2.7 | Minimum | 3.6 |
| Maximum | 9.7 | Maximum | 10 | Maximum | 9.9 | Maximum | 9.7 | Maximum | 9.9 |
| Sum | 115.1 | Sum | 89.1 | Sum | 125.5 | Sum | 123.5 | Sum | 131.8 |
| Count | 16 | Count | 16 | Count | 16 | Count | 16 | Count | 16 |

7.4 A Broader Picture: Country and SADC Averages

Looking at the twelve indicators used to construct Tables 3 and 4 above, country averages for fourteen countries are greater than 5.0 and only Mauritius and The Seychelles have average scores of 3.4 and 5.0 respectively (see Figure 6 below). A score that is less than 5.0 or less shows that a country is less fragile while a score above 5.0 means a country is fragile with score 10.0 the most fragile. These favorable scores for Mauritius and the Seychelles indicate a consistent performance by the two countries in the majority of the indicators as seen in Table 6a and 6b above.

Figure 1.9: Country and SADC Fragile States Index Averages



The data in this chapter demonstrate that the external factors to SADC, which are understood as country-specific dynamics, produce a boomerang effect on the region's actions particularly those

that are linked to conflict resolution and peacekeeping. The data specifically questions whether it is SADC's unique identity that determines how the organization acts towards security threats. In questioning SADC's identity, the data help in designing appropriate strategies which can be applied at the state level, yet the solutions help in the entire regional spectrum.

7.5 Conclusion

Chapter 7 used data from the Fragile States Index (FFP, 2020) to explain how a country's contextual conditions are important in determining SADC's response mechanism. The data also show the relationships among some indicators and the importance of considering these indicators when looking for regional peacekeeping solutions. The next chapter evaluates the Two Identity theory and advocates for country contextual conditions to create the triadic approach to the understanding of SADC's response to the Cabo Delgado insurgency. Such a discussion evaluates the assumption of the two identities and demonstrates the indispensability of local conditions from regional pursuits.

CHAPTER 8

Interpretation Of Findings, Discussion, And Conclusions

8.1 Introduction

This study has four fundamental research objectives:

- To evaluate the role of SADC's two identities in efforts to address conflict of a violent nature.
- To assess how member states' internal conditions influence the actions of the SADC in its fight against extremist violence in one of the member states.
- To develop an alternative African Transnational administration theory by looking at SADC's institutional framework.
- To align SADC's conflict response efforts to international development pathways in the region.

This chapter provides a discussion of these research objectives through an evaluation of the Two-Identity theory by demonstrating the roles played by the First and Second SADC in general and then linking these roles to the Cabo Delgado Insurgency. This chapter then discusses how the principle of sovereignty took effect in the organization's management of the Mozambican conflict. Next it discusses the contextual conditions of SADC member states and demonstrates how the conditions create a matrix that influences how SADC works. Finally, the chapter uses these discussions to form an argument for a theory that utilizes both the two-identities of SADC and member states internal conditions. This is called the triadic effect on SADC operations.

8.2 Evaluating the Two Identity Theory

The first objective of the study is hinged to the institutional framework of SADC where the two wings of the organization are put under the spotlight. Evaluating the SADC's two identities required an understanding of how the regional organization operates at the administrative and political levels. The background information, outlined in chapter three, sheds light on the functions of the first and second SADC. In addition, the assessment presented in chapter six gives a full view of SADC's two identities and how they played a role with the Cabo Delgado crisis.

Overall, the Two-Identity theory shows that there is a need for greater coordination within SADC. Yet, some principles in the SADC Treaty (1992) prevent any external intervention in a member state's internal affairs. At the same time, the unidirectional flow of policy recommendations (see Figure 8.1 below) means that SADC'S First identity acts upon the recommendations designed by SADC's Second identity. As noted previously, the activities of the First SADC are limited by a tight SADC budget, resulting in delayed, and in some cases failed program implementation (Ndaguba, Nzewi, and Shai, 2018). Another challenge is that decision making by members of the SADC's Second identity is guided by national interest and concerns raised by sovereignty. While all these have, in part, contributed to the slow pace in the response to the Mozambican insurgency, they do not fill all the gaps to fully capture the causes of the security status quo. Consequently, there needs to be more than the Two Identity theory to explain SADC's actions.

8.3 The Principle of Sovereignty and Effects on Organizational Decision Making

Whether understood as placing potent political power at its center or emphasizing jurisprudence (Nagan and Hammer, 2005), sovereignty has a direct role in the decision-making process among international organizations. In this discussion, the concept is viewed in terms of a combination of political and legal culture, and not as stand-alone categories. Precisely, as noted in the literature section, the concept is operationalized as entities with independence and the freedom to act, as well as holding vested legitimacy and authority. Article 4(a) of Chapter III outlined the principle of sovereign equality of all SADC's member states. By extension, this principle emphasizes the notion of non-interference. Thus, as has been the tradition, Mozambique's sovereignty is viewed as precluding any form of external intervention, including by fellow regional members in SADC. By framing the crises as internal, Mozambique's President Nyusi sent a message, and SADC complied, that Mozambique's sovereign interest be respected. As is expected when it comes to this principle, SADC leaders, who retain political power in the organization's decision-making process, often close ranks to maintain a coherent position even as problems are visible.

Closely related to the notion of sovereignty is the idea of self-interest. The study found that there were numerous conventions by the SADC Summit, and sometimes by its subsidiary units such as the SADC Troika and the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC), that discussed the Mozambican situation from 2018. As noted earlier, the 'constructedness' of identity influences how identities, and hence interests, are defined (Zehfuss, 2001). Mozambique's identity is, in part, understood by tracing its sovereign mandates, just like any other nation. And since, as argued earlier, the nexus between identity and interests shapes

actions, it can be argued that the actions of Mozambique were a means to preserve its interests first, before trying to appease fellow member states. It could be that, by seeking the help of Rwanda and private security organizations, Mozambique did not want to make its security problems, mostly fueled by its demographic profile (see Chapter Six), part of a regional problem. The pursuit of bilateral arrangements by Mozambique is not a new phenomenon. Such arrangements played out in the DRC war between 1998 and 2002 where leaders entered into intervention agreements without the involvement of SADC. This is a situation which was based on the “personalization of politics and on relationships between heads of state - based either in empathy or animosity” (Tavares, 2011, p. 167).

Yet the nature of conflict in the Cabo Delgado Province cannot be reduced and confined to a particular area for a long time. However, the amorphous nature of interests, hence Grieve’s (2018) argument that identity varies with context, made it difficult for Mozambique to maintain a hardline stance. As time progressed, Mozambique changed its tune and sought SADC’s assistance with the insurgency (see the timelines in chapter 6). The change in mindset created a convergence of interests between SADC and Mozambique such that cooperation became possible and allowed the deployment of SAMIM. In the next section, a discussion of the other factors and how they play a key role in the operations of the organization follows.


8.4 The Triadic effect to SADC politics: An Alternative African Transnational Administration Approach

Although there is a perpetual proliferation of administrative practices and processes in policy making and delivery among intergovernmental organizations, the geographic pattern of policy action can vary significantly. In this section, effort is dedicated to the support of alternative

African transnational administration theory where the activities of SADC in relation to the Cabo Delgado insurgency are analyzed by examining context-specific factors in SADC member countries and how these factors are transnationalized to the regional administrative activities. An important aspect to consider is that these conditions are not confined to the country where the conflict is taking place.

Because SADC's response mechanisms, and the general processes surrounding its approach, are seldom confined to its identity molded by the two wings discussed above, this section discusses the implications of the data contained in the FFP's (2017; 2022) Global Fragile States Index. As noted in chapters six and seven, the Fragile States Index provides contextual conditions of individual SADC member countries which, as argued in this study, have a ripple effect on the way SADC operates. The influence of country contextual conditions is shown by the two-directional yellow arrow in Figure 1.10 below. In this setup, the role played by country contextual conditions towards how the regional response to crises is also determined by the way in which that same regional body operates. In other words, the interaction between SADC's response mechanisms and country contextual conditions is corresponsive. A change in the conditions within one vortex influences the conditions in the other vortex. The bidirectional arrow in Figure 1.10 below captures this phenomenon.

Figure 1.10: The Triadic Effect to SADC's Response



SADC member countries' contextual conditions should be examined in terms of the countries' economic performance and in/equality, governance, including issues of legitimacy, and service provision, among other indicators. All of these reverberate on the citizens' sentiments and grievances that the population groups express, as well as the direct impact on the population. These indicators, with the first group classified under causative factors, show some kind of connection.

These arguments do not mean that the role of the two SADC wings (illustrated in Figure 1.6) in the decision-making process of the organization should be downplayed. As already mentioned, the Second SADC is responsible for formulating the decisions which the First SADC can then implement, mostly through the Secretariat. However, the formulation and implementation of decisions by these two wings, that is, SADC's two identities, does not provide sufficient explanation for some of the outcomes within the regional organization especially those that are directly linked to the member states. The reason for the delay in the regional response to the Cabo Delgado insurgency may have been partly due to both the political (Second SADC) and the administrative (First SADC) structures failing to adapt to the fast-evolving circumstances of the insurgency in Mozambique. Such an evolution includes the way Mozambique initially interpreted the conflict. This is a case of internal conditions of a country influencing the activities of a regional organization. Yet such conditions may not be limited to Mozambique alone but are spread across different members. Looking at these dynamics, then, the transnationalization of country specific conditions to the operations of SADC creates a third force that influences SADC processes and outcomes. In a scenario where the tail wags the dog, the conditions of different SADC member countries shape how SADC molds its own programs. For example, the huge budget that SADC structures rely on is partly funded by individual member countries whose own budgets are thin, and at times lead to occasional defaults in member subscriptions. According to Isaksen and Tjønneland (2001), prior to the 2001 budget, several SADC member countries were behind in their payments- a feature that can be explained not by the countries' unwillingness to contribute, but by lack of capacity. Table 2 in Chapter Three shows only three out of sixteen SADC member states meeting the payments to SADC in 2017. Hence, with regards to funding, no matter what

the Summit/Second SADC aspires to do, only through the ability of the member countries to pay their subscriptions can these aspirations translate into action. The domestic problems of a country's economic standing are transferred, mostly inadvertently, and become the problems of the regional organization.

Governance and State Apparatus

On matters of governance, the lack of ability to enforce standards and accountability (Isaksen and Tjønneland, 2001) is not surprising. It is a consequence of the intersectionality of SADC principles of noninterference and the countries' exercise of sovereign authority. While member states enjoy the brotherhood created by being members of SADC, they each have their own internal sociopolitical dynamics which dictate their methods of governance. For example, the tribunal set up by the Summit to preside over Zimbabwe's land issue and government interaction with opposition parties (see Chapter Three) did not yield the desired results because Zimbabwe considers issues of land reform a correction of historical imbalances that disenfranchised the indigenous black people. These are internal country dynamics which may not be uniform to other SADC members yet influence Zimbabwe's stand on issues of principles in Summit meetings. Similar contextual conditions, though different in theme, can occur among other countries. For example, the terrorist activity in Mozambique which is, by Southern Africa standards, endemic to Mozambique is an internal security situation which may configure the government of Mozambique to act in a certain way that is incongruent to the expectations of SADC. Indeed, there are certain organizational parameters that form part of the SADC Treaty when regional conflict is discussed. However, the expectations of the Summit as one wing are mostly negotiated rather than prescribed. Article 7(1) of the SADC Mutual Defense Pact (2003)

entrenches the need to negotiate issues rather than prescribe due to the non-interference clause. It is natural, then, that member countries design their internal policies with the knowledge that SADC may not impose itself to get a member state to recalibrate its policies. As argued, the actions of SADC are directed by external forces. Such a force forms part of the triadic effect which is absent in a two-identity setup.

As one of the major actors in the Cabo Delgado Insurgency, the government of Mozambique has sought to deploy its state apparatus (the military and police) to conflict-hit province. In doing so, the government has sometimes applied a heavy-handed approach to quell the conflict (Sithole, 2022). Such a forceful approach was not only targeted at the Islamic militants but was also meted out to citizens believed to be supporting the insurgent group (Sithole, 2022; Vhumbunu, 2021). Although this approach is generally deplorable, impunity is allowed to happen because of the status of the Mozambican ruling party, FRELIMO, considered a liberation movement which enjoys the support of fellow liberation movements within the region. The state apparatus therefore enjoys an absence of scrutiny because of the nature of the party in power. This scenario is complex in the sense that the support of the ruling FRELIMO by other revolutionary movements in the region insulates Mozambican authorities against criticism. Notwithstanding the stipulations of the Mutual Defense Pact (MDP) that “an armed attack against a state party shall be considered a threat to regional peace and security and such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action” (SADC 2003, 3), the conformation of the state apparatus to the protection offered by revolutionary links dampens the political will by Mozambican authorities to prioritize highest levels of SADC involvement to halt the conflict. Like

other conditions already discussed, the strongest influence lies not in SADC institutional capacity, but in the internal dynamics of a member state.

Issues of state legitimacy, Economic Inequality, and Public Service Provision

As a distinct form of political support involving evaluations of the state from a public perspective (Easton, 1965), state legitimacy has country-level origins and influences a country's profile. According to Gilley (2006), the ability of a state to be considered as rightfully holding and exercising political power entails legitimacy. Hence with scores of 6.5 and 6.8 for 2017 and 2022, respectively, the Mozambican government has little representativeness and openness to its citizens and the level of confidence in state institutions among the citizens is almost absent. Because the indicator factors in issues of accountability (FFP, 2022), this could partly explain the reluctance by the government of Mozambique to allow SADC intervention (Vhumbunu, 2021) as the involvement of SADC would entail the exposure of demographic discrimination on the population of Mozambique's northern province of Cabo Delgado- a factor that has created structural inequalities in Mozambique and subsequent grievances among the population of the north.

As discussed in Chapter six, some of the drivers of violence and unrest in Mozambique are rooted in the socio-political environment of Mozambique. For example, the historically unequal distribution of political power favors the southern groups at the expense of the north which also belongs to a religious Mwani minority (Mabera & Naidoo, 2020). The majority of the leaders of FRELIMO identify as the Makonde- a predominantly Christian grouping. These ethnic cleavages have not only affected political power distribution but have also shaped the way resources are distributed among geographical locations with the south getting the lion's share.

Hence, for Mozambique, some aspects of the conditions created by the indicators originate from Mozambique's historical motifs.

To further illustrate the external influence brought by country-specific conditions, this study argues that the influence of these factors sometimes fall outside the institutional capacity created by SADC's identity. For example, it is notable that while the social-economic systems and conditions in the SADC countries are diverse and their income and population distribution vary (Nkomo, 2007), a common feature that underlines several of these countries is that they score lower in many of the indicators used by the Fund for Peace (2020) for the assessment of state fragility. When these dynamics operate at country level each indicator then influences one or more other indicators. As analyzed in the Fragile States Index, there is a link among many of these indicators. If we take Mozambique's economic inequality for example, there is evidence of structural inequality based on group identity. For example, the ethnic and religious cleavages that divide Northern Mozambique and the southern Mozambique create perceptions of neglect by inhabitants of the north, particularly those in the Cabo Delgado province where the conflict began. Such perceptions have fueled group grievance hence reinforcing social tensions and nationalistic rhetoric. The fundamental problem is how these dynamics influence SADC operations. As already mentioned, the activities of SADC are influenced both by SADC's own institutional arrangements and by the effect of different indicators at the national level. For example, considering the effect of economic inequality in Mozambique, the widespread lack of employment opportunities and the confined space or virtually absent participation by locals in the extractive industry in the oil and gas-rich Cabo Delgado Province (Meek & Nene, 2021; Sithole, 2022) are all drivers of conflict of an intrastate nature.

The provision of services has been a problem for the majority of SADC countries and Mozambique scores the lowest of the sixteen countries with an average score of 9.65 for 2017 and 2022. The Fund for Peace (2022) describes public service as the provision of essential services like health, education, water and sanitation, transport infrastructure, internet connectivity, and electricity and energy. The inability of member states to provide public services have ripple effects on the ability of SADC to meet its peacekeeping obligations owing not only to the fact that countries fail to meet their financial obligations to SADC, but also to many other abstractions such as poor infrastructure for easy navigation by peacekeeping forces that would have been deployed. Also, other aspects of public service such as energy provision, water and sanitation, as described by the Fund for Peace (2022), prevent the smooth execution of mandates both by the government and intervening groups. Hence, even if SADC expressed intent to intervene, the effect of these outside factors is traced to a host country such as Mozambique. This explains why contextual conditions matter in regional peacekeeping efforts.

8.5: Conclusion: Aligning SADC's conflict response efforts to international development pathways

The need to align SADC's conflict response mechanism to international development pathways is guided by the importance of the creation of a regional security complex which, according to Buzan and Weaver (2003), creates closely-knit concerns about the national securities which are not isolated from one another. As already mentioned, the security challenges facing Mozambique have the potential for spillover effects in the region, and naturally, an elevated, mutually intuited insecurity runs among SADC member countries, especially those that share borders with Mozambique. Part of the argument raised in this study is that although the

SADC member states desire to see the benefits of an integrative cooperation, they still experience the overwhelming obstacles created at both the regional and state levels. Hence, any conflict response mechanism that SADC adopts has to consider both the local and regional factors in order to achieve an encyclopedic outcome. A brief discussion of some recommendations at both state and regional levels follows below.

8.5.1 Recommendations

The situation in Cabo Delgado has taken a protracted length of time and has resulted in the deaths of thousands of Mozambican citizens with several hundreds of thousands of others displaced (Vhumbunu, 2021; Sithole, 2022). In light of this, the study proposes recommendations at two levels: the regional level where SADC plays a role in managing conflict and provides military assistance to Mozambique. Secondly, at the state level where Mozambique addresses a range of issues that affect citizens from resource distribution, legitimacy, rule of law, service provision, and accountability.

State-Level Recommendations

One of the abstractions SADC faced and continues to face in peacekeeping interventions is created by the principle of sovereignty. In Southern Africa, specifically, the principle of sovereignty is conflated with revolutionary party politics where the assumption is that it is the latter that secured independence from colonial powers. As such, for many revolutionary movements such as FRELIMO and many in the SADC region, the role of these revolutionary movements is to secure against the proliferation of puppet governments installed by the West (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011). However, there is a need for adaptation within these movements so

that revolutionary ideologies are aligned with present day realities that citizens need security and a better way of life- the requirements which governments are obliged to provide.

Notwithstanding the principles of Westphalian type of sovereignty that underscores territorial integrity monopoly, Mozambique can adapt its internal political dynamics by forging a balance between observation of such sovereignty and steps seeking to create a better life for citizens. This means being receptive to regional monitoring systems whose mandate is to identify the security needs of the country in a manner that is impartial.

As discussed in the study, some of the problems that originate within Mozambique create spillover effects to the region. Some of these problems include inequitable distribution of resources, a subdued rule of law manifested through brutality of state apparatus, poor public service, among others. These problems have been linked with prevailing demographic pressures and the general negative sentiment that has contributed to the eruption of violence in the Cabo Delgado province (Meek & Nene, 2020; Vhumbunu, 2021). It can be argued that while Meek and Nene (2020) prescribe state-level solutions to the crisis, Vhumbunu's (2021) regional level prescription works better if local conditions are regulated. Of course, it would have been prudent for the Mozambican president- Felipe Nyusi- to use his position as the SADC chairperson in 2021 to push for a robust response to the crisis in Cabo Delgado (Vhumbunu, 2021). While such a move aligns with the expectations within a Two-Identity framework, it only addresses one of the two-step process which can only be achievable through the recognition of country-specific conditions. For example, a move towards equitable resource allocation (Meek and Nene, 2020), promotion of the rule of law in Mozambique, mending social cleavages- including those on religion- are some of the steps that the Mozambican government can embrace. Specifically, long term political

solutions need to be entrenched in Mozambique's government. For example, Louw-Vaudran (2023), reinforced Vhumbunu's (2018) observation that favors "the equitable distribution of revenues from resources, job creation and other measures to eradicate poverty and [marginalization] (2023, p. 8).

Regional Level Recommendations

In a bid to foster effective and inclusive steps in conflict resolution within the region and in Mozambique in particular, the Southern Africa bloc has to reframe issues of sovereignty by encouraging member states to institute pragmatic steps towards the development of a body of ethics that align sovereign claims to accountable, responsible governance. Additionally, there is a need to create strong peer review mechanisms that are not hamstrung by revolutionary movement affiliations. Because revolutionary movements have often supported each other even in the face of malpractice (Sithole, 2021; Marovah, 2020), SADC has to convince member states of the need to uphold the rule of law without using revolutionary history as a default setting in laying claim to legitimacy.

Article 11 of the SADC Mutual Defense Pact (2003) provides a legal framework for assistance and support towards fellow members in the event of a security threat. In order to increase the weight to this clause SADC needs to create an independent fact-finding body working with incumbent governments of affected countries to establish a credible evaluation of conditions on the ground. Such a mission then recommends, as the authoritative body, for swift, guided intervention.

There is a strong need for synergy between institutional capacity at the national level and the various decision-making branches at the regional level so that the two constantly develop

and evaluate strategies to build common purpose. Because, as this study has demonstrated, a decision-making process that is limited to SADC's two identities potentially misses the effect of state level political dynamics. Such a synergy allows the policies at the regional level to metamorphose in response to the evolving internal trends in the member states.

While the deployment of SAMIM by the SADC Summit is commendable, it should be understood that the move is not an end in itself but a means to an end. For example, SAMIM's deployment has filled a gap that the Mozambican government created through information blackout (African Press-Malawi, 2023).

Overall, the existing localized grievances and other factors captured in the discussion about contextual conditions should form part of a broad campaign towards achieving total peace not only in Mozambique but across the region. According to Africa Press-Malawi (2023), it is thus imperative for other SADC member states to reassess their own local conditions to address grievances that can lead to armed insurgencies. In fact, the reassessment of local conditions has to apply to all the factors discussed in this study because this creates ideal conditions in which SADC programs can succeed.

8.5.2 Research Limitations

The first limitation to this study is that it relied mostly on published data such as that from the Fragile States Index. While this data is key in understanding internal country conditions, it does not provide a full picture about the actions of individuals who are part of the actors in the conflict. Hence, while these contextual conditions provide a credible starting point, they hardly answer the question of when and where the next activity will occur. They are a starting point but as you even recognized there are limitations to completely relying on them to determine where

the next SADC intervention will likely occur. There is a need to conduct interviews among security and political personnel to gauge the extent of other factors that influence the interaction among the three aspects of the triadic model discussed in this research.

8.5.3 Conclusion

The triadic effect discourse demonstrated that the approach to the Cabo Delgado conflict requires something more than the traditional peacekeeping strategies that have been deployed to different countries in the past. Such strategies have to consider a range of issues including, as noted by Sithole (2022), the Mozambican political economy of under-development. Considering such internal dynamics, including the origin of this third force, allows the SADC to understand problems at the source. These problems often evade the spotlight of issue-diagnostics that begin at the regional level where the interaction of institutions is sometimes limited to the two SADC wings.

While, as noted by Vhumbunu (2021), SADC member states possess a legal and moral obligation to help other member states in the face of security threats and challenges, this only becomes effective when there is buy-in from the affected member states. Moreover, if SADC were to intervene at the onset of the Cabo Delgado conflict, it would have done so to cure the symptoms of a situation that is fundamentally endemic to Mozambique while neglecting the foundational causes. Because the causes of group grievances are based on factors like economic inequality, lack of public service provision, issues of state legitimacy, factionalized politics, and other indicators, it is difficult to conclusively apply remedies at the regional level like that of SADC. These factors are considered the responsibility of the individual member states, thus, in the example of Cabo Delgado, it is the responsibility of Mozambique to satisfy the population of

Mozambique. In sum, the effectiveness of SADC actions takes place within a triadic set up within a system where its own identity, made up of the bureaucratic and diplomatic appendages, is backed by the state matrix. To answer the research questions, the lack of a full consideration for contextual conditions by SADC has yielded unsatisfactory results in the institution's response to the Cabo Delgado insurgency. At the same time, the study has shown that the influence of external conditions that emanate from member countries' contextual conditions should not be underestimated as these conditions are transnationalized to the regional organization.

To this end, although there is a perpetual proliferation of administrative practices and processes in policy making and delivery among intergovernmental organizations, the geographic pattern of policy action can vary significantly. Hence, as this study underscores, effort has to be dedicated to the search and support for an alternative African transnational theory of international organizations where the activities of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in managing the Cabo Delgado Insurgency.

The quotidian operations of SADC are designed in such a way that the body's identity is not as independent as it ought to be. Hence, while the emergence of bureaucratic policy innovation has not reached maturity mostly because of the power wielded by the Second SADC and the individual interests of the heads of governments which translate to become the interests of the countries, the dynamics that took place from 2017 pose key challenges to the pursuit of bureaucratic autonomy (see Carpenter, 2002) where the First SADC has to operate with little interference from the political wing- the Second SADC. If the SADC bureaucracy received the greenlight to forge ahead with the unique goal to achieve autonomy, then the bloc's regional response mechanism would transcend the dictates of political control. What remains in this state

of open resistance by the Second SADC to grant the bureaucracy space to maneuver is the contorted space through which SADC as an IGO is recognized even by its member states. Future research can therefore benefit from the pursuit of the conditions in which country identities epitomized within the Second SADC are supplanted by the bureaucracy whose mandate would make it politically costly for members to resist. Further, the question of how such institutional barriers become dismantled is key in the search for conditions that would promote bureaucratic independence in the IGO not only in matters of security, but also in other development-related issues. Finally, it would be interesting to see the results of the pursuit of a theory of security intervention in an organization whose members equally wield veto power.

While relying on normative public administration principles and IR theory, the study places its focus on the SADC bureaucratic and political frameworks and how these structures shape decision making. As a part of theory building, the study unpacks the contextual conditions of SADC member states and how the transnationalization of these country-specific factors to SADC shapes the decisions and policies of the international organization. By introducing this triadic identity of SADC, the research extends the bounds of public administration to the traditional domain of International Relations scholarship to support emerging transnational theories of administration while stimulating regional policymaking and continuously reconfiguring the support for home-grown development initiatives that affect regional policymaking.

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