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Evolution of a Border: How the Victorio Campaign Affected US -Mexican Border Management,  
1879-1881

by

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To the Graduate Faculty:

The members of the committee appointed to examine the thesis of Dameon Hansen find it satisfactory and recommend that it be accepted.

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Thesis Abstract--Idaho State University (2021)

This thesis will examine the Victorio Campaign of 1879-1881 and the change in US-Mexican border management that resulted from that campaign. This campaign included numerous border crossings from both Apache and American militaries. These crossings showed how fluid a landscape the border region was and how important a controlled border was in the eventual defeat of Victorio. These crossings eventual resulted in Mexican and American armies cooperating to defeat Victorio. This cooperation included an authorized border crossing of the Americans into Mexico in September and October of 1880. The defeat of Victorio also resulted in a change for the Apaches. Victorio was replaced by Nana as the main leader. Apache resistance also dramatically decreased because of the cross-border campaign in September and October 1880. The cross-border campaign in the Victorio campaign changed border management for all the parties involved in the Victorio Campaign.

Keywords: Apache, US-Mexican Border, Native American Wars

## Chapter 1: Introduction

The Mexican-American border was a very fluid border, and this thesis will examine this border in the context of the Victorio campaign between 1879-1881. This fluidity was based on raiding and trading, along with the numerous contacts created in these activities. This fluidity was also based on the Mexicans and Americans complex relationship to the border. The Mexicans and Americans complex relationship to the border was because they both had positive and negative relationships to Victorio's Apache through raiding and trading. Victorio was a Chihenne Apache, who was part of the Chiricahua Apache group. Victorio's Apaches lived in the southern New Mexico, Northern Chihuahua, southern Arizona, northern Sonora, and western Texas near the Rio Grande. This thesis will also feature Americans and Mexicans in New Mexico, Arizona, Texas, Chihuahua, and Sonora. The Apaches' relationship to the Americans and Mexicans was important in the Victorio campaign. The Apaches cultivated positive and negative reactions among those people many of which were based on trading and raiding. This thesis will also discuss the history the Chiricahua Apache had with northern New Spain followed by their history with Mexico. This thesis will focus on how the border interacted with Victorio's Apaches and the previously mentioned people and places will be involved. The term uncontrolled border in this thesis refers to a border not controlled by the US or Mexico, and the term controlled border refers to one where both sides were able to control both sides of this border. The mostly uncontrolled border controls during the Victorio War between 1879-1881 also provided Victorio's Apache with ammunition through trading and raiding. The uncontrolled border also provided the ability to escape pursuit of armies on both sides of the border until the fall of 1880 when a temporary controlled border was enacted. This uncontrolled border gave Victorio's Apaches the ability to survive for longer than they would normally have been able to



under a hard border. The basic of the Apache cultural elements and warfare are covered by Robert N Watt in his books, but he did not focus on the border.<sup>1</sup> The mostly uncontrolled Mexican-American border in the Victorio campaign between 1879-1881 allowed Victorio's Apaches extended success through repeated border crossings to avoid both sides until the controlled border in Fall, 1880 resulted in Victorio's defeat, and changed the borderlands for everybody involved.

Victorio considered the Warm Springs Reservation his home, but that was not going to last very long. Victorio's war with the American and Mexican governments to keep the Warm Springs Reservation between 1879 to 1881 illustrated how an uncontrolled border helped Victorio's Apaches in that war.<sup>2</sup> Victorio was defeated in October 1880, but Nana continued the war into 1881 on his behalf. Victorio was fighting to keep his Warm Springs Reservation at Ojo Caliente in New Mexico territory. This reservation that had been taken away from Victorio in 1877 and he refused to go to the San Carlos Reservation where he was ordered to go. This point is fundamental, because Victorio was not against the reservation system; he was just against going to the San Carlos Reservation. Victorio accepted a reservation, which showed there was a pragmatic side to him.

The US Mexico border and its relationship to the campaign will be the main point of this thesis, because the uncontrolled aspect of this border at this time allowed Victorio's Apaches to cross easily. This border evolved during the time covered in this thesis.<sup>3</sup> The borderlands region initially took up all northern New Spain but changed to Mexico in 1821. The Mexican-American

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<sup>1</sup> Robert N Watt, *I Will Not Surrender the Hair of the Horses Tail: The Victorio Campaign 1879* (Warwick: Helion, 2017), 39-163.

<sup>2</sup> Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, 39-163.

<sup>3</sup> Edwin R Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas: Chief of the Chiricahua Apaches* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1998).

War in 1848-1849 fundamentally changed the border by moving it to the current location. The border changed the final time by 1854 with the Gadsen purchase following the Mexican-American war. This purchase was important to this thesis because it acknowledged Apache raiding as a problem. This thesis will argue that the uncontrolled Mexican-American border allowed Victorio and his Warm Springs Apaches to cross it easily. This allowed Victorio to avoid authorities from both Mexico, and the United States. The logistical aspect of border crossings was just as important as permission to cross it. This logistics were unavailable in Mexico for American armies. Victorio's Apaches were able to cross the border effortlessly until the fall of 1880, but the Americans and Mexicans had to get permission from both respective governments before crossing the Mexican border. Bitter from their defeat, the Mexicans refused to allow cross-border campaigns to defeat Victorio's Apaches before, 1880. The Americans in the campaign underwent unauthorized, but unsuccessful border crossings that did not affect Victorio's Apaches. This policy did not change until the fall of 1880 letting Victorio's Apaches get away on a regular basis. Victorio's Apaches had a thriving long-term illicit trade of guns and ammunition with specific towns that was also supported by uncontrolled border controls. This trade went back long before America took control of the Southwest. The Americans crossed the border without logistical support, while trading and raiding was a fundamental part of the campaign, and Apache culture.

The US-Mexican border was a fluid landscape, and not just a political boundary. It was the location of forty-five border crossings by the Apache during the Victorio Campaign. It was fluid for various reasons. The main reason was that trading and raiding continued on both sides of the border, and neither nation could stop the Apache. The contacts made on both sides of the border with these activities when combined with the related crossings created a fluid landscape.

This fluid landscape also included many Mexicans and Americans who hated the Apache. This landscape also included many people who survived off the Apache. This fluid landscape included Apache contacts who supported them, and people who wanted to defeat them.<sup>4</sup> This fluid border landscape was directly connected to the changing management of the US-Mexican border. This border was initially uncontrolled, but in the fall of 1880 it changed to controlled. This temporary change resulted in Victorio's defeat. This changing management also was the result of Mexico and the US changing their relationship. They started out as hostile neighbors, and eventually worked toward a cooperative partnership designed towards defeating Victorio. This change resulted in permanent changes for Victorio's Apaches. The Apaches had their own relationship to the US-Mexican border. They were aware of the international implications of this border but did not acknowledge these legalities. They were too busy fighting for Apacheria, which was split by the new border in the late 1840s to worry about this. The Apaches crossed this border easily until the fall of 1880. The Americans also had a very liberal interpretation of the US-Mexican border. They accepted the legality of the international border on one hand, but on the other crossed in frequently in their attempts to defeat Victorio. These crossings were usually unauthorized or illegal. It should be stated that unauthorized crossings were not always illegal. These unauthorized or illegal border crossings by the Americans failed to stop Victorio by themselves. The US-Mexican border was a very fluid and complex landscape in this thesis.

This first chapter will start out with discussing Chihenne Apache cultural elements related to this thesis, followed by the Chihenne Apaches relationship to Mexico. It will then discuss borderland issues followed by the Chihenne Apaches relationship to the United States. It

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<sup>4</sup> Edwin R Sweeney, *From Cochise to Geronimo: The Chiricahua Apaches 1874-1886* (Norman: University of Oklahoma,2010)., Robert N Watt, *I Will Not Surrender the Hair of a Horses Tail: The Victorio Campaign 1879* ( Warwick: Helion,2017)., Robert N Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows: The Victorio Campaign 1880* ( Warwick: Helion,2019)., Robert N Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes: Nana's War 1880-1881* ( Warwick: Helion,2019).

will set up how the Victorio campaign began and finish with the breakout from the Mescalero Reservation that started the campaign. This chapter will cover from the 17<sup>th</sup> century to 1879 when Victorio left the Reservation. The second chapter will cover the campaign until the defeat at Tres Castillos in October 1880. The third chapter will discuss the ramifications of that defeat until 1881, and its related effects. The uncontrolled border controls during the Victorio War allowed trading and raiding between 1879-1881 that provided Victorio's Apaches with ammunition, alongside the ability to escape the pursuit of armies on both sides of the border is a common theme in all three chapters. The evolving border is a common theme in all chapters. These chapters discuss the uncontrolled border, which was in place until October 1880 when a temporary controlled border was enforced to defeat Victorio and the difficulties of maintaining border control.

This thesis will use various primary sources to support the main argument. The primary sources will include oral accounts collected by Eve Ball.<sup>5</sup> She documented oral accounts in the 1950s from the surviving Chiricahua Apache and presents the voice of the Apache themselves. She presents a biased view of the Apache. She is the only source of oral sources from the Apaches who fought in the Victorio wars. She provides an invaluable contribution to Chiricahua Apache studies, and is one of the only places to find the Apaches own viewpoints. Robert N. Watt's work will be used as the main secondary source for the Victorio Campaign, and his books opened access to many primary sources.<sup>6</sup> He has a strong bias towards the Apache. He provided

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<sup>5</sup> Eve Ball, *In The Days of Victorio: Recollections of a Warm Springs Apache* ( Tuscon: University of Arizona, 2003)., Eve Ball, Nora Henn, and Lynda A Sanchez, *An Apache Odyssey: Inde*h ( Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1988)., Sherry Robinson, *Apache Voices: Their Stories of Survival as told to Eve Ball* ( Albuquerque : University of New Mexico Press,2003).

<sup>6</sup> Robert N Watt, *I Will Not Surrender the Hair of a Horse's Tail: The Victorio Campaign 1879* (Warwick: Helion & Company, 2017)., Robert N Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows: The Victorio Campaign 1880* (Warwick: Helion & Company, 2019)., Robert N. Watt, *With My Face To My Bitter Foes: Nana's War 1880-1881* (Warwick:Helion & Company, 2019).

detailed analysis of the Victorio campaign, and access to a large collection of primary documents. He provides detailed analysis of the background reasons behind the Victorio campaign, and detailed analysis of the campaign. He provided access to many military documents that support the arguments in this thesis. He also provides access to newspapers, and Mexican documents used in this thesis as well. These primary sources will be the main sources used to support the argument that the Apaches continued control of the border region was the main reason they were successful at evading the Americans and Mexicans.

The secondary sources will provide supporting material on the Apaches in this thesis. These sources also provide numerous detailed information throughout this thesis. The secondary sources that will cover the background information include Edwin R Sweeney, who will cover the Mexican and Chiricahua Apache history up to 1863, along with the background of Nana's Campaign in 1881.<sup>7</sup> Sweeney presents an even-handed approach to Americans with bias towards the Apache. Sweeney provides one of the best accounts of the Chiricahua Apaches' relationship to northern New Spain and Mexico. Works by Kathleen Chamberlain and Dan Thrapp will both be used on Victorio himself to provide background on the war, and his actions.<sup>8</sup> Chamberlain has a strong bias towards Victorio but also presents Apache history from their angle. She focused on Victorio, and the immediate Apache history related to him. She focused on the Apaches' own cultural beliefs, and ideas. Thrapp has a strong bias towards the Apache but is also fair to the American soldiers. Thrapp's work is somewhat outdated but was one of the premiere Apache experts in his day. His works are still considered excellent sources for the Apache wars. John

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<sup>7</sup> Edwin R Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas: Chief of the Chiricahua Apaches* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998).

Edwin R Sweeney, *From Cochise to Geronimo: The Chiricahua Apache 1874-1886* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2010).

<sup>8</sup> Kathleen P. Chamberlain, *Victorio: Apache Warrior and Chief* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007).  
Dan L. Thrapp, *Victorio, and the Mimbres Apaches* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1974).

Upton Terrel will be used to give a basic timeline of the Apaches from the time they encountered Europeans to Nana's campaign.<sup>9</sup> He presented a bias towards the Apache, and an even-handed approach towards Mexicans and Americans. His advantage is that he provides a timeline of a year-by-year history of all the Apache. These secondary sources will focus on the Apache specifically.

This thesis will use secondary sources that relate to other native tribes. Pekka Hamalainen will be used to cover the Comanches influence on the Apache along with examples of how and why raiding was important to Apache.<sup>10</sup> He provided examples of raiding's effectiveness. His effectiveness lies in two ways. He is very good at discussing the relationship between the Apache and the Comanche. He also helped set up how powerful a force raiding could be. Another book used for background research will be Ned Blackhawk, *Violence over the Land* which provided a general background in Native American history in this region.<sup>11</sup>

The secondary sources related to the Victorio's, campaign, and the Mexican border include books by Samuel Truett and Rachel St. John.<sup>12</sup> They discuss the history of the Mexican-American border. They both get into details of the Apaches relationship to the border and have relatively unbiased approaches to all parties. They discuss the evolution of the Mexican-American borderlands up until the early 20<sup>th</sup> century and analyze important details of how the Apache dominated the borderlands in the late-19<sup>th</sup> century. Janne Lahti also discusses the

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<sup>9</sup> John Upton Terrell, *Apache Chronicle: The Story of a People* (New York: World Publishing Company, 1972).

<sup>10</sup> Pekka Hamalainen, *The Comanche Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).

<sup>11</sup> Ned Blackhawk, *Violence over the Land : Indian and Empires in the Early American West* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).

<sup>12</sup> Samuel Truett, *Fugitive Landscapes: The Forgotten History of the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006)., Rachel St. John, *Line in the Sand: A History of the Western U.S.-Mexico Border* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

relationship the Apaches had to the borderlands.<sup>13</sup> Lahti focuses on the Apaches' specific relationship to the border and provides analysis on how they affected border management and the borderlands. Lahti has an even-handed approach towards all parties. These sources will be combined to provide the background to how the border was important to the Apache, Americans, and Mexicans. Lahti takes the borderlands theme of St John and Truett but adds a detailed look at how the Apaches were affected by the border. The borderland's theme is related to the fluidity of the borderlands region on both sides. She focuses on how the border was important to the Apaches as a whole, and not just the Chiricahua Apache whom Watt discusses. Lahti specifically departs from the broad outlines of St John and Truett by only focusing on the Apaches relationship to the borderlands. These sources discuss how the border was directly important to the Victorio Campaign and explain why the events happened the way they did throughout the Victorio War.

This thesis aims to fit in between St John, Lahti, Truett and Watt. The importance of the Victorio campaign on the borderlands is the aim of this thesis. It aims to fit in with St John and Truett in their broad study of the borderlands, but also aims to fit into Lahti's detailed study of the Apaches relationship to the borderlands. The other side of where this study aims to fit in with previous work is in between those works, and Watts' work on the Victorio campaign. Watt provides the most detailed study of the Victorio campaign to date. He focuses on all the various aspects of the Victorio campaign except the direct border relationship to that campaign. This thesis aims in its most ambitious goal to be a borderland study that complements Watt's work on the Victorio campaign. The goal of this thesis is to provide a detailed borderlands study of the

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<sup>13</sup> Janne Lahti, *Wars for Empire: Apaches, The United States, and the Southwest Borderlands* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2017).

Victorio campaign in between Watt's work on the Apache, St John's, Truett's, and Lahti's studies of the Apaches relationship to the borderlands.

The sources used in this thesis are directly connected to the story told here. They are important for two different reasons. The first is the background they provide to the story. These secondary sources provide the details that help frame the story. The borderlands analysis of St John and Truett explain in detail how the border was related to the Apache before the campaign, and during it. These sources also explain how the border evolved, and how it was created. The secondary sources on the Apache like Thrapp, Watt, Terrell, and Sweeney have a similar role. They provide the background details to why the campaign started, and why specific issues helped start the campaign. These sources are essential to our understanding of how the American army's misunderstanding of the Apache culture led to the Victorio campaign and set up the timeline of events that led up to the breakout of the war.

The primary sources have an even more important role in this thesis by directly supporting the argument in this thesis. Ball's oral interviews provide our main understanding of Apache culture and help us understand the Apaches take on some of the most important aspects of this thesis. These are the only sources that provide the Apaches' views on events, and their cultural understanding. Watt's compiled primary sources are the most important ones in this thesis. He provided the access to military documents that support the argument that the uncontrolled border controls allowed Victorio's Apaches to take advantage of that border and become more successful. He also provided access to newspapers that back up the military reports. Watt also provided access to Mexican documents that discuss the evolution of the cross-border campaign that resulted in the defeat of Victorio in 1880. They document the Americans communication with Mexico that eventually resulted in Mexico agreeing to a cross-border



campaign. These Mexican documents also discussed the Mexican campaigns against Victorio. The combination of Mexican and American military documents combined to help explain how the border was an international boundary that became an important meeting ground of the Apache, Mexican, and American cultures.

The borderlands concept needs discussed further as it is related in this thesis. St John explained the concept of the Mexican-American borderlands as a desolate landscape with few population centers on it.<sup>14</sup> She went on to explain that it was also an imaginary line that was created by Mexico and the United States. It drew people including military forces tracking Victorio's Apache, from the Mexican and American militaries. In this sense the border was like a magnet that attracted many people for many reasons. She also cited that the border was a symbol for unconquered territory, which this thesis attests to. The border finally was where cultures like the Apaches, Mexicans, and Americans combined even if unintentionally. Truett added an important element, which was the borders intangible element.<sup>15</sup> He added that the border was hard to define with all the elements that it attracted or was defined by. The border had a layered complicated relationship to the people involved in this campaign.

The complicated relationships in this thesis are important. Victorio's Apache had numerous relationships. The Apaches had layered relationships with Mexicans. They traded with them in Mexico and New Mexico. They also raided them in both areas. This created many Mexicans that had positive relationships and negative relationships with these Apache. These Mexicans benefitted from the trading with the Apache. There were many other Mexicans that hated the Apache, because of the numerous raids that they suffered. An important element of

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<sup>14</sup> St John, *Line in the Sand*, 2-11.

<sup>15</sup> Truett, *Fugitive Landscapes*, 1-9.

these relationships was the element of survival. It would seem logical that many of these Mexicans were only looking out for survival when they traded with the Apache or trying to survive the numerous raids. The positive relationships may have only been based on survival. These trading and raiding relationships were all based in the borderlands region this thesis is examining.<sup>16</sup>

The Americans had a less complex relationship with Victorio's Apaches. There were some Americans that traded with the Apaches, but most of them in the borderlands region of New Mexico saw the Apache as a people that needed to be conquered. The Apaches cultural tradition of raiding was one of the main problems the Americans had with the Apache. Many Americans never accepted the cultural importance of raiding for the Apache. The desire of most Americans to conquer the Apaches resulted in the reservations in Arizona and New Mexico. This desire also fostered misconceptions that inspired the concentration policy that was an important, but damaging factor in the Victorio Campaign. Some Americans in this region also were supportive of the Apache. This thesis has specific examples of military officers who felt that the demands the Apache were making regarding reservation sites was something they should have gotten, but the decision-making in the US governmental process prevented that from happening. The Americans' relationship with the Apache may have been less complex than the Apaches with Mexico, but it still had two sides to it.

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<sup>16</sup> Edwin R Sweeney, *From Cochise to Geronimo: The Chiricahua Apaches 1874-1886* (Norman: University of Oklahoma,2010)., Robert N Watt, *I Will Not Surrender the Hair of a Horses Tail: The Victorio Campaign 1879* ( Warwick: Helion,2017)., Robert N Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows: The Victorio Campaign 1880* ( Warwick: Helion,2019)., Robert N Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes: Nana's War 1880-1881* ( Warwick: Helion,2019). Edwin R Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas : Chief of the Chiricahua Apaches* ( Norman: University of Oklahoma: 1998).

This thesis is not solely about Apache culture, but it will cover the relevant cultural elements that impacted this campaign. These elements include warfare, raiding, trading, and chief succession. Another cultural element that will come into play in this thesis is the Apaches reputation for being guerilla warriors. The border crossings by Victorio's Apaches complicated this reputation. This thesis is not focused on these cultural elements beyond the required elements of their culture needed to understand the campaign.

This thesis will attempt to make the argument that the mostly uncontrolled border enforcement during the Victorio campaign allowed Victorio to succeed longer than he normally would have. In the process of doing that it will attempt to provide the background information behind the campaign, and why those specific factors were important to the campaign. It will also claim that the loose border controls on the Mexican border were the main reason the American army failed to successfully defeat Victorio between 1879 and 1880, and why they failed to stop Nana in 1881. It will also argue that the controlled border, and cross-border campaign in fall of 1880 was responsible for defeating Victorio. It will also argue that the Victorio campaign changed the Mexican-American borderlands region for everybody involved, Apache, Mexican, and American.

## Chapter 2: The Background of the Victorio Campaign

We need to begin with how the Apache got to their geographic location during the Victorio campaign. The Comanche forced the Apache to move from the Plains to what was northern New Spain starting around 1706 according Pekka Hamalainen.<sup>17</sup> The Apache had been removed from the Plains and were living in the Rio Grande region by 1760. Janne Lahti also cited that the Chihenne Apache lived between the Rio Grande, the Mimbres River, and the Black Range at the time of the arrival of the Americans in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>18</sup> This removal of the Apache from the plains to the southwest illustrated the power of the Comanche over the Apache in this time.

Trading and raiding were common culturally important activities to the Apaches beginning in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Raiding was partly motivated by the Apaches view of outsiders in their territory but was also an important cultural and economic activity to the Apache. The Apaches felt that raiding was a perfectly acceptable method of getting resources. The presence of outsiders merely gave them a specific group of people to raid, but those outsiders did not originate Apache raiding. Eve Ball documented that the Apaches felt that the outsiders in their territory were obliged to support them, and this belief was strengthened when the Apaches were hungry along which became a reason for raiding.<sup>19</sup> Ball explains that the Apaches had greater motives for raiding when they were hungry, and the Mexicans had potential food. The Apaches would still have raided without them being there. The Apache raided and traded as early as 1760 when the Apache were moved by the Comanche to what is now the American Southwest, but

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<sup>17</sup> Pekka Hamalainen, *The Comanche Empire* (New Haven: Yale University, 2008), 18-63.

<sup>18</sup> Janne Lahti, *Wars for Empire: Apaches, The United States, and The Southwest Borderlands* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2017), 27.

<sup>19</sup> Eve Ball, Nora Henn, and, Lynda A Sanchez, *Indeh: An Apache Odyssey* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1988), 34.

they still raided before that date.<sup>20</sup> In the 1770's the Apaches were so adept at raiding that northern New Spain was fighting a losing battle trying to defeat them. Authorities of northern New Spain could not prevent a new Apacheria from taking place alongside Spanish settlements due to raiding. This tells us that the arrival of the Spanish increased but did not cause their raiding. This also meant the Comanche were no longer dominating the Apache due to geographic separation. The creation of Apacheria is a good example of how much influence raiding had on European settlements, and an example of successful Apache resistance. It also tells us how much outsiders affected raiding for the benefit of the Apache. Sherry Robinson provided further explanation of trading, and the Apaches relationships to Americans.<sup>21</sup> She confirmed that the Chihenne Apache traded at Monticello, in the territory of New Mexico. Robinson also claimed that the Apache considered whites inferior, which implies Apache superiority in their eyes. She got into details about the Comanche and Apache conflict. Robinson credited their conflict beginning in the mid-17<sup>th</sup> century when Spanish horses were introduced, which made long distance raiding possible. She dated their conflict lasted until 1821, but this did not bring an end to Apache raiding. These dates tell us that the conflict began in the 17<sup>th</sup> century but may not have become aggressive until 1706. These dates also cement the importance of the horse's arrival in Apache raiding. These sources confirmed that trading and raiding were non-European originating Apache cultural activities that affected specific geographic locations in the Southwest while confirming that the arrival of the horse influenced raiding and Apache conflicts.

Primary sources help inform our understanding of the Chiricahua Apache raiding under Victorio including Apache raids in Chihuahua in January 1879. Governor of the Mexican State

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<sup>20</sup> Hamalainen, *The Comanche Empire*, 73-168.

<sup>21</sup> Sherry Robinson, *Apache Voices: Their Stories of Survival as told to Eve Ball* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 2003), 31-134.

of Chihuahua, Angel Trias wrote to Mr Ruelas, the Minister of foreign affairs in February, 1879 describing raids in the previous month that resulted in the taking of twenty five animals.<sup>22</sup> It also documented that the Apache would cross the border with their loot escaping the Mexican authorities. There are many other accounts of Apache raids at this time The Grant County Herald on February 6, 1880 documented a raid in the San Francisco Valley in May 1879.<sup>23</sup>

Raiding and trading was central to the Apache. The Apaches motives for raiding Mexican communities was that the Mexicans had taken over Apacheria. An Apache elder recalled years later “The Mexicans had invaded their country, killed their deer, and driven them from their old homes. Where were they supposed to get food? Did not their enemies have great herds of horses and cattle? Why should they go hungry with abundance of food in their own land?”<sup>24</sup> The Apache needed a trading and raiding balance with their trading partners to survive.<sup>25</sup> Apaches raiding was a combination of need and a belief they had a right to raid people within their region. The Apache saw newcomers in their territory as both possible raiding victims and trading partners. Raiding frequently led to war, which was almost the permanent state of the Chiricahuas’. The Apaches’ ideology around raiding was linked to their survival.

Trade was connected to specific geographic locations for the Chihenne Apache according to Dan Thrapp.<sup>26</sup> He cited that trade existed between the Chihenne Apache and the Mexican population at Canada Alamosa in the territory of New Mexico by 1870. Thrapp also argued that the Mexicans near the Rio Grande border viewed Apache Mexican trade as their natural right.

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<sup>22</sup> Governor Angel Trias to Mr Ruelas, January, 1879, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*: Document 2,345-350.

<sup>23</sup> “ Account of the Apache Raid in the San Francisco Valley , May, 1879,” *Grant County Herald*, February 6, 1880, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*: Document 4, 353.

<sup>24</sup> Ball, *Indeh*, 34.

<sup>25</sup> Lahti, *Wars for Empire*, 6-65.

<sup>26</sup> Dan L Thrapp, *Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches* ( Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1974), 126-158.

Watt also addressed trading and raiding.<sup>27</sup> He cited that Victorio maintained a friendly trading relationship with Mexican settlements on both sides of the Rio Grande, specifically at Canada Alamosa. Victorio even had the Mexicans he traded with wear white handkerchiefs as identification. The trade relationships between Victorio, and various settlements cemented the idea that trading was a cultural and financial activity for everybody involved. This also indicated a deeper understanding between both Victorio, and the people he traded with. This supported the idea previously taken that trade between the Apache, and the Mexicans was commonly accepted by both parties.

The Apaches' relationship to northern New Spain also affected trading and raiding. According to Kathleen Chamberlain the Chihenne Apache had war and trade relationships with Mexico.<sup>28</sup> The Apache also believed that they were superior to the Spanish along with all outsiders. The trade and raiding relationship began in the early-18<sup>th</sup> century and was supported by local Mexicans. The Chihenne Apache practiced the trading and raiding lifestyle. Chamberlain documented that Apache raiders never took everything so there was something to take later. The relationship between trade and peace is important here. In 1795 there was a peace treaty with northern New Spain that supported more trade. This is more evidence that trade with the Apaches was an accepted business for the Spanish in northern New Spain. The inclusion of trade in peace treaties tells us that northern New Spain was encouraging trade on some level. This supports the overall acceptance of trading and raiding. The raids effectiveness is also addressed by Ned Blackhawk.<sup>29</sup> He reported that settlements at Santa Cruz were forced into abandonment due to Apache and Ute raids as early as 1703. The raids also supported trading.

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<sup>27</sup> Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, 27-33.

<sup>28</sup> Kathleen P Chamberlain, *Victorio: Apache Warrior and Chief* ( Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2007), XIV-76.

<sup>29</sup> Ned Blackhawk, *Violence Over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American West* ( Cambridge: Harvard University, 2006), 34-133.

Mexico unlike Spain supported unlicensed trade after its independence in 1821. This indicates that Apaches were raiding and trading with unofficial allies. This explained how the raids in the Victorio wars could be so effective. Raiding and trading fed off each other. The raided goods, and then traded some of them for what they needed. Raiding and trading were intertwined with Apache culture long time before the Victorio war.

Victorio went to Mexico and took plunder when he was resisted, and that he got guns and ammunition from trading and raiding.<sup>30</sup> Apaches went to Mexico in the fall or winter before American reservations took over, and after that they used Mexico for a refuge by 1881. The relationship with Mexico was cyclic. Ball cited that before the US Civil War a bounty was offered on Apache scouts, and the Apache had peaceful relationships with Mexican villages sometimes, which has also been documented.

The distinctions between Apache warfare and raiding are important. There were basic differences between raiding and war for the Chihenne Apache.<sup>31</sup> Raiding was taking property and war directly involved killing. Americans and Mexicans often did not see the distinction. It should be noted that the goal in war was to avoid as many Apache deaths as possible while killing as many of the enemy. The avoidance of killing in raiding and focus on minimal Apache deaths tells us that the Apaches took death very seriously. It should also be noted that the Apache used mirrors, emplacements, and decoys, and avoided night fighting wherever possible. Night fighting was avoided because the Apache were avoiding rattlesnakes, so as not to let nature limit their fighting techniques. These activities tell us that they were not opposed to using tricks to win. The Apache would often flee when surprised to minimize casualties. The Apache would

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<sup>30</sup> Eve Ball, *In the Days of Victorio: Recollections of a Warm Springs Apache* ( Tucson: University of Arizona, 1970),XIV-48

<sup>31</sup> Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, 38-60.



ride horses to exhaustion unlike the army, which accounts for them outrunning the army. Ambush was also a common Apache technique, because when successful it resulted in fewer Apache casualties. The Chihenne Apaches guerilla tactical advantage was due to years of training over familiar terrain, and they were famous as guerilla fighters. The Apaches were known to cut telegraph wires, because they knew the wires were capable of transmitting information. This implied a knowledge of technology, and its role in warfare. It should also be emphasized that the Apache guerilla tactics were capable of paralyzing economic progress across Arizona, New Mexico, Sonora, and Chihuahua during the Apache Wars. The Apaches form of warfare was more about surviving to fight again. Despite exaggerated accusations of cruelty scalping was something the Apache rarely did.<sup>32</sup> Apache warfare was based on survival, which for Apache was a top priority with enemy casualties coming second.

Apache warfare was based on individual actions, and not European style battles.<sup>33</sup> Lahti also cited that Apaches choose small targets to minimize risks, and that due to a limited geographical sphere Apaches could not maintain large long-term campaigns. This explains why they took breaks from fighting frequently. He also claimed that the Apache were not interested in conquest, and that Apaches were in superior shape to American soldiers. This is proven when you compare running abilities between American and Apaches. The Apaches could run 50-70 miles in one day, which was twice what American soldiers could do. Rifle ownership was a symbol of pride to Apaches. Apache warfare was distantly individualistic.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Chamberlain, *Victorio*, XIV-76.

<sup>33</sup> Lahti, *Wars for Empire*, 9-32.

<sup>34</sup> Lahti, *Wars for Empire*, 9-32.

The cultural heritage of the Chiricahua Apache is layered. There were five groups of Apache in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>35</sup> These include Lipan, Jicarilla, Mescalero's, Western, and Chiricahua. Victorio was part of the Chiricahua. Chamberlain listed numerous names for Victorio's people including Chihenne, Warm Springs, and Mimbres Apache.<sup>36</sup> Warm Springs Reservation played an important role, because the Chiricahua Apache believed that all Chiricahua bands began at Warm Springs or Ojo Caliente, in the territory of New Mexico. By defending their right to Warm Springs, Victorio's Apache were literally fighting for their homeland.

The Chiricahua Apache were separated into four cultural bands.<sup>37</sup> Chamberlain claimed that the term Chihenne means red paint people. Along with Victorios' group they include the Central Apache or Chokonens featuring Cochise. They also featured the Bedonkohe, which was led by Geronimo who was not trusted by Victorio. There was also the Nednhis who featured Juh. Victorio was involved with all these individuals during his lifetime. Chamberlain also detailed the importance of marriage and alliances in tribal diversity. She claimed that unless a man's father was a warrior he lived with his wife's people. Opler cited that the Chiricahua Apache had contact with most of the Apache tribes, which explains his contact with the Mescalero Apache later.<sup>38</sup> These Chiricahua groups, and related marriage patterns confirmed the complexity of the Chiricahua Apache as four connected groups with degrees of separation.

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<sup>35</sup> Lahti, *Wars for Empire*, 6.

<sup>36</sup> Chamberlain, *Victorio*, XIV-17.

<sup>37</sup> Chamberlain, *Victorio*, XIV-17.

<sup>38</sup> Morris E Opler, "Apachean Culture and Origins," in *Handbook of North American Indians Vol 10: Southwest*, eds. Alfonso Ortiz, and William C Sturtevant (Washington DC: Smithsonian, 1983), 368-385.

Thrapp, in contrast, separated the Chiricahua Apaches into three groups based on geographic location.<sup>39</sup> The Central Chiricahua with Cochise as an example, the Southern Chiricahua with Juh and Geronimo as leaders, and the Eastern Chiricahua with Mangas Coloradas and Victorio. He also labeled the Eastern Chiricahuas as Warm Springs or Mimbres Apaches. His labeling of the previously stated groups based on location tells us there was a geographical element to the different groups of Chiricahua Apache. He gave Victorio credit for never torturing, and never giving up on his dream of returning to Warm Springs. This implied Victorio had a long-term sense of hope. Thrapp credited the Apaches as not being cruel as a group, but that some individuals were specifically cruel. He cited two dates between 1849 and 1855 that were important to the Chiricahuas and Victorio. The first was the Mexican 5<sup>th</sup> Law passed on May 25, 1849, which authorized payment of scalps in Mexico incentivizing Apache cruelty, and 1855 when Victorio began to start distrusting whites due to repeated untrustworthy dealings. If Thrapp's assessment was correct, then Victorio took a long time to give up completely. Thrapp's initial assessment of Victorio was that he could be forced into war due to his distrust of Americans from the murder of Mangas Coloradas in 1863, and that he was not known to speak a lot and was very distrustful. Overall Victorio seems to have taken a long time to mentally make any change in direction.<sup>40</sup>

Victorio was born in 1825.<sup>41</sup> His Apache name was Bi-Duye, but this name was not used by any non-Apache.<sup>42</sup> Victorio went back and forth between peaceful and violent ways to deal with conflicts, which was a common technique for tribes in that situation. The first time Victorio trusted the Americans officially was in 1855. According to Chamberlain he and other chiefs

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<sup>39</sup> Thrapp, *Victorio*, XV-102.

<sup>40</sup> Thrapp, *Victorio*, XV-102.

<sup>41</sup> Chamberlain, *Victorio*, XIV-76.

<sup>42</sup> Chamberlain, *Victorio*, 81-103.

signed a treaty that gave away 15,000 acres and kept 2,000 for the Chiricahua. It was never ratified, which affected his distrust of Americans explaining Thrapp's 1855 date. Another event during the Civil War, but not related to it was the murder of Mangas Coloradas. This horrified Victorio. Coloradas was killed in January 1863, and this event may have had a lasting effect on Victorio's trust of Americans. These events tell us that Victorio was willing to give Americans a chance initially in 1855, but after 1863 was less likely to trust them. We will see that he still gave them a chance after 1863 until 1879, which meant he took his time giving up. The killing of Mangas Coloradas in 1863 was when leadership of the Warm Springs band moved to Victorio and Nana. Victorio's reign as head chief may be due to the death of another Chihenne Chief Cuchillo Negro who died in 1857, but according to Chamberlain Victorio assumed the mantle of leading Chihenne chief after the death of Mangas Coloradas.<sup>43</sup>

Chiricahua Apache chiefs were elected by warriors based on success in war.<sup>44</sup> This implied that there was choice, and it was not a dictatorship. The implied election of Victorio and Nana tells us that Victorio had the most impressive reputation for success in war followed by Nana. This also explains Nana taking over after Victorio died. Nana clearly had impressive war skills second only to Victorio. A successful Apache chief was one with the least Apache casualties in battle supporting the role of Apaches surviving war being related to a chief's success. This explains why the Apache would retreat when overwhelming odds were presented. They were preventing casualties. This confirms that Apache chiefs' job was to preserve Apache lives while exhibiting superior skills in battle. Apache leadership was not permanent, and leaders

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<sup>43</sup> Chamberlain, Victorio, XIV-103.

<sup>44</sup> Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, 45.

could be replaced anytime they failed to perform.<sup>45</sup> Apache warriors were never under absolute control, and an Apache leader without respect was no leader.

The Spanish and Mexican relationship to the Apache is vital to understanding their behavior towards the Americans. The Apache dealt with northern New Spain as early as the 16<sup>th</sup> century, which dated their relationship 200 years longer than with America. John Terrell cited that as early as 1590 the Spanish massacred Native American tribes, which endangered Apache distrust for the Spanish.<sup>46</sup> The cycle of violence between the Apache and Northern New Spain started long before America took over. As early as the 17<sup>th</sup> century horses came to Apacheria, which changed their lives immensely by amplifying raiding abilities. In 1627 the first Apache massacre by the Spanish happened. It should be known that the Spanish used Apache and Navajo interchangeably. This makes identifying tribes in the early timeframe's problematic.

Apache hatred of the Spanish understandably began in 1630 not long after the first massacre. He cited trade as early as 1639 between Apache, and other tribes supporting early trade. In 1680 the Apache domination of what is now New Mexico began when the Apache supported the Pueblo Revolt. The Apache were attacking roads in Northern New Spain by 1661 and controlling large parts of what is now New Mexico by 1671. The revolt began in October 1680. The Apache warriors supported the Pueblo warriors in their successful takeover of what is now New Mexico. This is the first in a long line of alternating victories between the Apache, northern New Spain, Mexico. The takeover lasted 17 years, and by 1697 the Spanish had taken it back. The end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century resulted in northern New Spain taking back what is now New

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<sup>45</sup> Lahti, *Wars for Empire*, 47-48.

<sup>46</sup> John Upton Terrell, *Apache Chronicle: The Story of the People* (New York: World Publishing, 1972), 3-116.

Mexico from the native tribes, but the Apache had made their threatening position felt to the Spanish.<sup>47</sup>

The Apache in the 17<sup>th</sup> century changed their perspective of the Spanish and became accomplished at raiding in Mexico according to Edwin Sweeney.<sup>48</sup> He cited that the Chiricahua Apache saw the Spanish as friendly, but in the 17<sup>th</sup> century the Apache began to see them as a potential rival. This marked a turn that would never change. Samuel Truett cited evidence that supported Robinson in his claim that Apache raiding became strong in the 17<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>49</sup> Truett cited that in the 17<sup>th</sup> century the Spanish failed to prevent the Apache raids from curbing Spanish control of the borderland region called Apacheria because of raiding in Sonora and Chihuahua. This marked another example of Apache dominance against northern New Spain. The dawn of the 18<sup>th</sup> century was a slow evolution of change for the Apache with most things changing little except the Apache changing their minds about the Spanish.

A bitter war between the Apache and the Spanish happened in the 18<sup>th</sup> century along with the standard cycle of violence. In 1706 some Apache bands were acting peacefully towards the Spanish because of the successful Spanish-Comanche alliance against the Apache.<sup>50</sup> This alliance worked to defeat the Apache. A long and bitter Apache and Spanish war occurred between 1748 and 1795. The year 1786 was an important date for the Apache and Spanish relationship, because in that year the Apache accepted rations for the first time. Rations would become a regular thing. In 1796 a peace treaty between the Spanish and Apache was negotiated

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<sup>47</sup> John Upton Terrell, *Apache Chronicle: The Story of the People* ( New York: World Publishing, 1972), 3-116.

<sup>48</sup> Edwin R Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas: Chief of the Chiricahua Apache* ( Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1998), 11-37.

<sup>49</sup> Samuel Truett, *Fugitive Landscapes: The Forgotten History of the US -Mexican Borderlands* ( New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 35-58.

<sup>50</sup> Terrell, *Apache Chronicle*, 121-144.

which included rations. The raiding of the Chiricahua was so successful that in 1783 the northern New Spain village of Tubac was abandoned showing another example of Apache success.<sup>51</sup> This period was characterized by a long period of violent warfare against northern New Spain with the 19<sup>th</sup> century bringing back cyclic violence to the Apaches lifestyle.

The 19<sup>th</sup> century saw a change in political leadership in northern New Spain, but things did not change much for the Apache. Mexican independence in 1821 created a situation where the Mexican government could not pay rations to the peaceful Apache regularly.<sup>52</sup> This is an important distinction between Mexico and northern New Spain. Mexico often did not have money for rations. The Chiricahua Apache were raiding ranches in Sonora Mexico due to reduced rations after the Mexican War for Independence.<sup>53</sup> This means the emotional effectiveness of raiding lasted far longer than the actual raid. The 1820's were a continuation of the previous decades cycles of violence for the Apache despite the change in political leadership.

The 1820's saw the Apache raiding in Mexico increase extensively, along with the dawn of Mexican Apache massacres. It was in 1826 that the peace established in 1796 began to fall apart.<sup>54</sup> Two years earlier the Apache began raiding again, and that the rations the Chiricahua had been receiving had begun to dry up due to lack of money. Low rations, led to increased Apache raiding. The lower rations influence raiding because the Apaches refused to starve. The 1820's cycle of violence influenced Victorio's distrust of non-Apache, which tells us how long of a social memory the Apache had. In 1822 the Apache saw the Mexicans as the same as the

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<sup>51</sup> Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas*, 11-37.

<sup>52</sup> Truett, *Fugitive Landscapes*, 35-58.

<sup>53</sup> Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas*, 11-37.

<sup>54</sup> Truett, *Fugitive Landscapes*, 35-58.

Spanish, and in 1824 the Apaches saw the first Americans.<sup>55</sup> The political importance of the Mexican War of Independence was largely lost on the Apache, who likely did not care. An important cycle began in 1826, when Mexico began the cycle of inviting the Chiricahua to a peace treaty, and then massacring them.<sup>56</sup> This created a cycle of hate and distrust between the Mexicans and the Chiricahuas influencing Victorio's distrust. Katherine Benton-Cohen cited that between 1810-1831 the Apache controlled most of what is now Southern Arizona cementing the effect of raiding.<sup>57</sup> The 1820s saw a continuation of cyclic violence, but massacres began to become more common starting in the 1830s for the Apache.

The 1830s saw continued massacres, violence and raiding in the Apache Mexican conflict, along with the continued rations. The Apache were trading goods taken during raids to American traders for guns, and ammunition in the 1830s.<sup>58</sup> This was another example of trading. In the 1830s the Apache were back to raiding in Chihuahua.<sup>59</sup> In the 1830s the provinces of Sonora and Chihuahua offered rations to the Chiricahua, but these were occasionally halted or decreased.<sup>60</sup> This again cemented the importance of rations and raiding. This change in rations created the conditions for Apache raiding to increase because they would not starve. Daklugie documented how starvation influenced raiding for the Apache “ Why should my women and children starve with great herds grazing on their land. What are we to do?”<sup>61</sup> This quote provides insight into the Apache mindset when they were starving, and Mexicans had great cattle herds

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<sup>55</sup> Terrell, *Apache Chronicle*, 147-171.

<sup>56</sup> Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas*, 41-107.

<sup>57</sup> Katherine Benton-Cohen, *Borderline Americans: Racial Division and Labor Wars in the Arizona Borderlands* (Cambridge: Harvard, 2009), 22.

<sup>58</sup> Truett, *Fugitive Landscapes*, 5-65.

<sup>59</sup> Kathleen Chamberlain, *Victorio: Apache Warrior and Chief* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2007), 49-50., Truett, *Fugitive Landscapes*, 5-65.

<sup>60</sup> Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas*, 41-107.

<sup>61</sup> Ball, *Indeh*, 35.



that were available for raiding. The Apache simply refused to starve if they could avoid it. In the 1830's the Mexican state of Chihuahua launched numerous campaigns, and temporary truces with the Chiricahuas maintaining the cycle of peace and war. As early as 1835 the Mexicans were offering money for Apache scalps, which shows the desperation of Mexico to deal with the Apaches.<sup>62</sup> Terrell documented the Johnston Massacre, in which 20 Apaches were killed by James Johnston in 1835 under an offer of peace. James Johnston was an American, and the Apaches retaliated against Americans to avenge this massacre. In 1836 Mangas Coloradas rose to power. Mangas was Victorio's mentor and united many Western Apache tribes. This was also the year of more massacres on both sides of the Mexican Apache conflict due to the 5<sup>th</sup> law in Mexico. This law was the law that allowed for payment for Apache scalps. On April 22, 1837 20 Apaches were killed in the John Johnston Massacre. In 1839 another event happened that increased distrust between the Apaches and Sonora.<sup>63</sup> This event happened when James Kirker was sent to hunt for Apache scalps. After the violent conflict in the 1830's between the Mexicans, and Apache the 1840's would bring important changes to the Apache. Most importantly the Americans came into play.

The 1840s was the first time the Americans became important to Apache in treaty talks. The standard cycles of trading, raiding, violence, massacres, and rations continued for the Apache, even after the US conquest of the region from Mexico in 1848. This new border created a division in Apacheria when the US took over northern Mexico. The Apaches traded with the Mexicans in 1840 the same year there was a truce with between the Apache and Chihuahua.<sup>64</sup> In the 1840s there were massacres on both sides of the Apache Mexican conflict. Mangas

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<sup>62</sup> Terrell, *Apache Chronicles*, 147-171.

<sup>63</sup> Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas*, 41-107.

<sup>64</sup> Terrell, *Apache Chronicles*, 147-171.

Coloradas attempted peace with the Americans in 1846, but the talks failed because Mangas refused to stop fighting the Mexicans. This tells us that Mexican hatred was too strong for the Apache to give it up. Mangas knew he would not be able to defeat the Americans, and found the Americans offer unreasonable. This tells us that Mangas was reasonable about his chances but valued raiding Mexico more. The rations sometimes had a reverse effect.<sup>65</sup> In 1843 the Mexican governments increased rations, but this led to too many Apache getting rations. The stress between both groups increased as a result. This tells us that Mexico could hardly get it right with rations.<sup>66</sup>

The cycle of massacres and retaliation also played an important part in the cycle of distrust and hate.<sup>67</sup> On August 22, 1844 65 Apache were massacred in Sonora and the retaliatory raids increased from 10 to 218 in 1844 because of this. This also highlights differences between Mexican states. The citizens threatened to move over the raids over the impossible living conditions again highlighting the effectiveness of raids. Things got worse in 1846 when on July 7th when 130 Chiricahuas were massacred by James Kirker after being invited for a feast. The Apaches were killed after they got drunk at the feast. This resulted in Apache Mexican violence until 1848. Sweeney acknowledged that the Chiricahuas were very skilled at trading with the Mexicans. In 1848 the Chiricahuas took the upper hand.<sup>68</sup> On July 8<sup>th</sup>, 1848 the Chiricahuas took the city of Fronteras under siege because Cochise was taken hostage. This was a successful siege and it resulted in the Chiricahuas dominating Northern Sonora for 18 months after this according to Sweeney. This was another victory for the Apache against Mexico.

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<sup>65</sup> Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas*, 71-150.

<sup>66</sup> Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas*, 71-150.

<sup>67</sup> Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas*, 71-150.

<sup>68</sup> Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas*, 153-212.

The situation between Chihuahua and the Chiricahuas was still rough.<sup>69</sup> On May 25, 1849, Chihuahua's 5<sup>th</sup> law was formally established, but was active since 1835. Its authorized payment for Apache scalps, but in late 1849 Chihuahua decided to change their Apache policy from extermination to accommodation. This was an important change in policy indicated a certain level of acceptance.<sup>70</sup> The Mexicans from Janos were brokers for the Apaches stolen goods from their raids into Sonora between 1840-1851. This happened while the Apaches received rations from Chihuahua. Sonora was still pursuing their violent agenda against the Apache while Chihuahua pursued their peaceful agenda. This also tells us that the Apache could play both Mexican states against each other. This decade involved a continuation of cyclic violence with Apache domination becoming close to complete in Sonora.

The 1840s saw a continuation of trading and raiding in the Apache-Mexican conflict. There was raiding in the 1840s in ranches around Sonoita, Canoa, and Tubac again.<sup>71</sup> There was extensive trade between the Mexicans and the Apache.<sup>72</sup> The retaliation and revenge cycle lasted through the 1840s between Sonora and the Chiricahua Apache.<sup>73</sup> Sweeney also claimed that in the 1840s the Apaches almost conquered and depopulated northern Sonora through raiding and vengeance before the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in the late 1840s, which ended the Mexican-American War. Mexico was never able to conquer the Apache. It was Governor Jose de Aguilar who in 1849 claimed that the Apache left the frontier depopulated, fields destroyed, and towns deserted.<sup>74</sup> Trading and raiding continued for the Apache in the 1840s and beyond.

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<sup>69</sup> Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas*, 216-232.

<sup>70</sup> Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas*, 216-232.

<sup>71</sup> Truett, *Fugitive Landscapes*, 5-65.

<sup>72</sup> Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas*, 41-107.

<sup>73</sup> Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas*, 41-107.

<sup>74</sup> Truett, *Fugitive landscape*, 5-65.

The Mexican states were different in their approach to the Chiricahua Apaches. Sonora up until 1886 favored conquest of Apaches, but Chihuahua usually favored accommodation.<sup>75</sup> This difference was known and used by the Apaches to their benefit. The 5<sup>th</sup> law was an exception to Chihuahua's usual peace policy. The tendency for Chihuahua to usually favor peace was the reason that the Chiricahuas traded with frontier towns in Chihuahua but did not trade with Sonora. There was no level of trust with Sonora according to Sweeney. In 1850 the Chiricahuas were actively raiding and fighting in Sonora. The Apaches made peace with Chihuahua on June 24, 1850, but still refused to make peace with Sonora. The difference in how the Mexican states managed the Apache did not stop Apache Mexican violence although the situation in Sonora had changed.<sup>76</sup>

Sonora was still pursuing its violent agenda against the Apache while Chihuahua pursued its peaceful agenda.<sup>77</sup> On March 5<sup>th</sup>, 1851, the Sonorans massacred 16 Chiricahuas and took 62 as prisoners in Chihuahua. Clearly, the Sonorans had no problem violating Chihuahua territory in their quest to conquer the Chiricahua Apache. This important exception did not stop the cycle of violence between the Chiricahua Apache and Sonora Mexico, but American inspired violence was starting up around this time.<sup>78</sup> In August 1851 the Chiricahuas killed 59 Sonorans, and the Sonorans retaliated back in October 1851 with two massacres. There was the Tato massacre in which 14 Apaches were killed, and 27 were taken prisoner. There was also another in that month where 8 Apaches were killed, and 5 were taken prisoner. There was almost a constant state of war between Sonora Mexico and the Chiricahua Apaches between 1830 and 1852 as demonstrated by the frequent massacres. This was 22 years of raiding, warfare and killing

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<sup>75</sup> Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas*, 41-107.

<sup>76</sup> Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas*, 41-107.

<sup>77</sup> Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas*, 216-232.

<sup>78</sup> Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas*, 45-255

between the Apache and Sonoran's. Opler cited that in 1852 the American and Chiricahua conflicts got more aggressive due to mining and increased agriculture.<sup>79</sup> The violence would continue for years to come with the Americans taking their place in Apache conflicts.

The 1850s saw a continuation of the cycles of raiding, rations and violence. The Chiricahuas in the 1850s continued to raid Sonora. This launched another cycle of retaliation and revenge between the Sonoran's and the Chiricahuas between January and August 1854.<sup>80</sup> In the 1850s the Americans traded guns and ammunition to the Apaches for stolen livestock from Sonora. In 1857 the Chiricahuas took refuge in Janos, Chihuahua, because of the better rations than in the territory of New Mexico. This was an important move, because when you consider their hatred for Mexico to go there for refuge against Americans even partially meant a great fear of Americans. The people of Janos did not apparently appreciate this, because in late 1857 they gave poisoned rations with arsenic to the Chiricahua's. This placed the Chiricahua Apache in between two people that did not want them creating hate on all sides. The evidence shows us that the long-term hatred between Sonora and the Chiricahua Apaches was strong and cyclic. The evidence also tells us that both sides played a big part in the cycles. This cycle of trade, hate and revenge in the 1850s would strongly influence Victorio's tendency to distrust Mexico. The Mexican-American border was influential in that cycle.

The new Mexican-American border resulted from the end of the Mexican-American War and the US taking half of Mexican territory. Rachel St John cited that a border commission was arranged in 1849 to determine the new border.<sup>81</sup> The new border was territory that both countries

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<sup>79</sup> Opler, *Handbook of North American Indian Vol 10: Southwest*, 401-418.

<sup>80</sup> Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas*, 260-361.

<sup>81</sup> Rachel St. John, *Line in the Sand: A History of the Western US Mexico Border* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 5-38.

had yet to control. There was Apache raiding on the commission in September 1851, which highlighted the existing influence of raiding before the border. This supported the previous argument about the border region being out of control of either nation. The Chiricahua Apache easily manipulated the border for their own trading and raiding uses from the beginning. This raiding was in dispute of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in which the American government agreed under article XI to stop all Apache raids. This American raiding promise was resolved with the Gadsden Purchase, which removed the promise to stop Apache raids. This purchase was inspired by the need for land for a potential railroad. The raiding problem was still enough of an issue in 1854 that the US signed a treaty that year with various Apache groups prohibiting raiding in Mexico.<sup>82</sup> This treaty was the Fort Atkison Treaty and it was not signed by the Chiricahua Apaches. It does tell us two important things. The first is that different Apaches were willing to stop raiding Mexico, and the second was that the army was worried about all Apaches raiding Mexico. The Apache raids were one reason they crossed it without legal permission, because they were attempting to defeat the Apaches doing the raids.<sup>83</sup> However symbolic, the new border was a new political boundary for Mexicans and Americans. The new border was not an effective boundary for the Chiricahua Apache and ran right through Apacheria. It did not stop Apache raiding, because the Apache still dominated the borderlands.


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<sup>82</sup> “Treaty with the Comanche, Kiowa, and Apache, July 27, 1853,” The Avalon Project, Last Modified 2008, [https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th\\_century/cokiap53.asp](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/cokiap53.asp).

<sup>83</sup> St John, *Line in the Sand*, 5-38.

*Figure 1*

*New US-Mexican Border*



*Note.* The new US-Mexican border following the Mexican-American War. It ran right through the middle of Apacheria. Image from Library of Congress. " Old Territory and Military Department of New Mexico." Accessed April 10, 2021. <https://www.loc.gov/resource/g4300.np000065/?r=-0.234,-0.016,1.304,0.801,0>.

The Mexican-American border was considered Apache territory by the Apache from the 1860's to 1886.<sup>84</sup> The Apaches had been fighting for control of the territory around Arizona, New Mexico, Sonora, and Chihuahua for hundreds of years. The Americans had to a degree been doing a similar technique in their territory. The 1830s was when the Apache control over that territory peaked, because by this point raids had forced citizens to abandon their lands. The borderlands regions were still essentially Apache territory, which highlights the fact that the new border failed to create an effective barrier for those on either side. The borderlands region instead favored the Apache who did not acknowledge the political border. The borderlands region being considered Apache territory cemented their dominance of the borderland's region. The borderland's region was known as Apache territory but was the home of division on both sides of the conflict influencing borderlands relationships.<sup>85</sup>

The borderlands region was home to divisions and cyclic violence. Americans only agreed that Apache raiding should end, because it was a threat to border security.<sup>86</sup> Americans in the borderlands either wanted to eliminate the Apache or control them. This highlighted a division between Americans. Violent resistance made the border unstable, which fueled the cycle of violence. Lahti also cited that the borderland region was relatively unpopulated, which made it easier for the Apache to dominate the border. The Mexicans and Americans in the borderlands were providing resources captured in raids by the Chiricahua Apaches. The mixed opinions of how to deal with the Apaches, and the limited population gave the Apaches an opening to use the border to support their continued independence from outside powers.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> St John, *Line in the Sand*, 50-51.

<sup>85</sup> St John, *Line in the Sand*, 50-51.

<sup>86</sup> Lahti, *Wars for Empire*, 3-65.

<sup>87</sup> Lahti, *Wars for Empire*, 3-65.



The Chiricahua Apache used the borderlands region to pursue independence. The Apache crossed the border.<sup>88</sup> The Americans crossed it secretly when they felt the need to, but to no degree of success. This tells us that the Apache knew the political significance of it but choose not to acknowledge it. Lahti also claimed that 75 percent of Chiricahua raids before 1870 went into Mexico. This highlighted the uncontrolled aspect of the border before 1870. In the 1880s the Chiricahua used the Sierra Madre as a raiding and trading base for Sonora, Chihuahua, and the territories of New Mexico, Arizona. In between 1850-1860 the Chiricahuas were largely independent in the borderland's region, and their dominance of the border supported their independence.

The Chiricahua Apaches used the border for economic benefits such as raiding. There was a direct connection between Apache raiding, and trading with the borderlands.<sup>89</sup> Northern Sonora was virtually depopulated from western Apache and Chiricahua raids. This highlighted the mental effect raiding had on the residents in northern Sonora. The Chiricahua Apache traded raided goods to Americans at Santa Rita Del Cobre in the 1830s and 1840s. Lahti claimed that some of the raids that acquired these goods were done by Mangas Coloradas in the late 1840s was on ranches near Janos, Chihuahua south of Tucson. This trade was also from Sonora raids, and included food, guns, and ammunition. This trade highlighted the Chiricahua Apaches ability to make the new borderlands residents help them economically through raiding. This supported their political knowledge of the new border, and their support of Apacheria over European dominance by not acknowledging new political boundaries. He cited that the Chiricahua Apache raided in Mexico in the 1850s followed by a retreat to safe American territory. Lahti also

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<sup>88</sup> Lahti, *Wars for Empire*, 74-128.

<sup>89</sup> Lahti, *Wars for Empire*, 99-183.

claimed that the Chiricahua saw the borderlands residents as a breadbasket waiting to be raided, supporting their economic agenda. Apaches continued their dominance of the borderlands well after 1848.

The Apaches raiding effectively weakened the Mexican-American border between 1856 to the 1880s.<sup>90</sup> The Apaches crossed the border knowing that the Mexicans could not follow them. They were unaware of the Americans secret crossings that were largely ineffective in stopping the Apache. This meant that the Apaches knew but ignored the border's significance. Apache raiding was one of the reasons for the depopulation in Sonora around 1861, and that the raids were so effective in the 1850s that some Sonorans wanted to be annexed to America. This depopulation, and desire for annexation illustrated the mental effect of the borderland's raids. The effectiveness of the raids told us how much the Apache could accomplish through raiding. The fact that they almost conquered northern Sonora, depopulated that region, and prevented the border from being adequately controlled tells us that Apache raiding was a highly effective way to enforce control over the territory they claimed as their own. Benton-Cohen cited that extensive Apache raiding in Southern Arizona between 1861-1862 was one of the main causes of the low population again citing raiding's effectiveness.<sup>91</sup> The Apache saw the borderlands region as Apacheria, and the different political situations of European based powers in the 1860s also influenced the Apaches control of the border.<sup>92</sup>

Mexican and American political factors came to play a part in Apache borderlands dominance in the 1860s.<sup>93</sup> The Mexicans and Apache had been fighting for decades. This

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<sup>90</sup> St. John, *Line in the Sand*, 39-45.

<sup>91</sup> Benton-Cohen, *Borderline Americans*, 41.

<sup>92</sup> St. John, *Line in the Sand*, 39-45., Benton-Cohen, *Borderline Americans*, 41.

<sup>93</sup> St. John, *Line in the Sand*, 52-54.

timeframe helped develop a relationship based on hatred and revenge. The Mexican approach to the Apache was to exterminate them, but the Americans approach was confinement. The view of extermination was popular with many Americans despite official policy being different. These Americans view was a more passive viewpoint unlike the Mexicans extermination approach, but was it still about control.<sup>94</sup>

The 1860s saw the Apache dominating the Mexican-American border with help from external political factors outside Apacheria.<sup>95</sup> The American civil war and the French invasion of Mexico City in the 1860s helps explain why both countries failed to control the Apaches in the borderlands in that decade according to St John. Both countries did not have time to focus on the Apaches in that region at that time but had to deal with these conflicts. The Mexican-American border was still considered Apache territory by the Apache between the 1860's-1886.<sup>96</sup> This success by the Apaches highlighted the impossible task of controlling the border for Americans and Mexicans. Apaches' domination in the borderlands was accomplished by external political effects, and by violence on the Mexican side before the 1860s.

Robert Miller added further explanations of how Mexican political factors affected the Apache between 1821-1876.<sup>97</sup> He cited that between 1839-1846 there were six internal revolts in Mexico. This created a weak central government in Mexico. He also argued that the numerous leadership changes between 1821-1876 also supported a weak central government in Mexico. He also argued that the 1860s only added to existing factors that weakened the Mexican governments authority. He cited that in 1861 Mexico was bankrupt, and that between 1862 and

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<sup>94</sup> St. John, *Line in the Sand*, 52-54.

<sup>95</sup> St. John, *Line in the Sand*, 52-54.

<sup>96</sup> St John, *Line in the Sand*, 50-51.

<sup>97</sup> Robert Ryal Miller, *Mexico : A History* ( Norman :University of Oklahoma, 1985),215-247.

1866 France spent time occupying Mexico. These factors all helped give Mexico a weak government making it easier for the Apaches.

Borderland massacres played a big part in Chiricahua Apache borderlands violence. Borderlands massacres were common to the Apaches as both victims and perpetrators in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>98</sup> In 1844 the Chiricahuas left their families at Janos to go raiding. The Sonoran's then went into Janos, Chihuahua and massacred the 80 family members there. The Pino's Altos Mines were also attacked in 1861 by Chihenne and Bedonkohe Apache. Lahti claimed that these attacks were a major show of force and resulted in the mines decline. In 1857-1858 there were multiple massacres in the borderlands of Apaches. These included arsenic laden rations in 1857, and two massacres in 1858. These included one in Frontera's of 40 Chiricahua and one in the Otates Mountains of 18 Chihenne. These massacres were an example of how strong anti-Apache feelings ran in the borderlands and fueled the cyclic violence in the area. These massacres illustrated Mexico's preferred way of dealing with the Apache problem. The massacres had a long-term result in the borderlands population.

The 1870s saw continued Apache dominance of the borderlands region despite different methods of dealing with the Apache on both sides of the border. The 1870s resulted in a dramatic decline of population in the borderlands.<sup>99</sup> In the 1870s in southern Arizona and Sonora the long-term cycles of Apache raiding and Mexican vengeance created an almost depopulated landscape. In the early 1870s Chiricahua raiding in Sonora resulted in them virtually taking over northern Sonora.<sup>100</sup> The Apache dominance over Sonora and southern Arizona territory is a good example of how effective raiding was mentally and physically. This dominance was also a direct

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<sup>98</sup> Lahti, *Wars for Empire*, 98-135.

<sup>99</sup> Truett, *Fugitive Landscapes*, 57.

<sup>100</sup> Truett, *Fugitive Landscapes*, 35-58.

result of their control of the borderlands region. The Mexican methods of dealing with the Apache had resulted in depopulated landscapes, but the Americans focused on reservations as a method of dealing with Apache raids.

The reservation system put into place by the American government failed to stop the raiding across the border.<sup>101</sup> The Chiricahua Reservation was established in 1872. St John cited that the Chiricahua Apache still raided across the border despite the reservation system, and both countries blamed each other for the Apache problem in the 1870s. Sonoran's governor complained in 1873 that reservations supported Apaches raiding in Mexico, by providing them with guns and ammunition, and by harboring Apaches who were raiding Mexico. The Chiricahua reservation was the main target of these accusation from Mexico and was abolished by the US in 1876 due to this issue.<sup>102</sup> The ability of the Apache to dominate the border through reservations showed how strong their control of the border was. This reservation-based raiding was a serious issue for Mexico and highlighted a fundamental flaw with the reservation system in the borderlands.

The first place to begin is the end of the Mexican-American War and the treaty that ended it. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ended the war included a promise from America in article XI that they would stop raiding, which was eventually removed in 1853.<sup>103</sup> This article was unrealistic considering the Apaches control of the border. In 1850 Mangas Coloradas claimed that he had to raid to avoid starvation, because game had been reduced by travelers in his

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<sup>101</sup> St. John, *Line in the Sand*, 55-62.

<sup>102</sup> Lahti, *Wars for Empire*, 99-183., Dan Thrapp, *Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches* ( Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1974),157-171., Dan Thrapp, *The Conquest of Apacheria* ( Norman: University of Apacheria, 1967),144., Edwin R Sweeney, *From Cochise to Geronimo: The Chiricahua Apache 1874-1886* ( Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2010),22-47.

<sup>103</sup> Terrell, *Apache Chronicle*, 181-215.

territory. In this he justified ongoing raiding. By 1853 the Apaches adapted quickly to the new border and used it to their advantage in cross-border raids. They knew how to use political boundaries to support raiding. Terrell claimed that between 1852-1857 Apaches stole 450,000 sheep, 13,000 mules, 7,000 horses and 32,000 cows showed the effect raiding had on the local ranchers. The inability to control Apache raiding, starvation-based raiding, and the new border all influenced Apache control of the border in the 1850's. This raiding relationship extended to New Mexico Territory in the 1850s.

The Apaches had an uneasy relationship with New Mexico in the 1850s.<sup>104</sup> In 1853 the Chiricahua Apache claimed parts of New Mexico territory as part of Apacheria. Sweeney claimed that in the 1850s the Americans there traded guns and ammunition to the Apaches for stolen livestock from Sonora. In 1857 the Chiricahuas took refuge in Janos, Chihuahua because they began to distrust the Americans military campaigns and had better rations in Janos than in New Mexico. This unstable back and forth relationship the Apache had with New Mexico signaled the Apaches tendency to support survival over political ties.

These unstable relationships also applied to treaties with the American government. In 1852 Mangas Coloradas signed a treaty with the Americans to allow American forts and stop raiding of Americans.<sup>105</sup> This treaty had no land demands. Lahti documented two unsigned treaties between the Chihenne Apache and the Americans. These included one in 1853 for land and rations on the Gila River, and one in 1855 that would have paid 72,000 dollars for half their land. He claimed that despite the Apache signing these the Chihenne did not take them seriously and saw them as peace offerings. Lahti documented in 1858-9 Agent Steck negotiated a

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<sup>104</sup> Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas*, 260-361.

<sup>105</sup> Lahti, *Wars for Empire*, 12-170.

successful agreement for Cochise to not raid the Overland Trail in New Mexico and Arizona, which indicated the Apaches decision to not fight Americans in this time. It also showed the Americans success against the Apache was in their own territory.

Cochise and Victorio were under the impression that they were driving off the Americans in 1861 at the beginning of the Civil War, but they knew by July 1862 that the whites were not leaving New Mexico Territory.<sup>106</sup> In 1861 raiding by Cochise's warriors had caused officials in the Superior region of Arizona Territory to abandon those areas.<sup>107</sup> In 1857 Captain Bonneville launched a failed campaign against the Chihenne Apache that only succeeded in the killing of Cuchillo Negro, which set the stage for Victorio's reign as a chief.<sup>108</sup> The Apache military success against American military in these cases was a marker of Apache military dominance.

The death of Mangas Coloradas was a watershed moment in Chiricahua Apache history that decreased their military dominance .<sup>109</sup> Mangas was murdered in January 1863 by Colonel Joseph West. Mangas's death permanently damaged Chiricahua Apache-American relations in the form of distrust. Carleton was relieved of duty in September 1866, but 600 Apaches may have been killed between 1863-1866 due to his actions. Lahti argued that Mangas's death was the peak of Chiricahua Apache power, but Apaches continued to dominate American military affairs for over twenty years. This early peak of Apache power on his death suggested a gradual decline in Apache power.

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<sup>106</sup> Chamberlain, *Victorio*, 81-101.

<sup>107</sup> Truett, *Fugitive Landscapes*, 35-58.

<sup>108</sup> Lahti, *Wars for Empire*, 122-143.

<sup>109</sup> Lahti, *Wars for Empire*, 143-156.

Apache violence in the 1860s formally started the American Apache wars.<sup>110</sup> In 1860 Cochise and Mangas Coloradas were still avoiding raiding the American travelers, but still raided Mexico. In 1861 Second Lieutenant George Bascom ignited the American war with the Chiricahua Apaches after his incident with Cochise over an alleged hostage. This spawned an increase in raiding for American travelers. Terrell claimed that between February and April 1861 150 Americans were killed on the Overland Trail. This trail was previously off limits to raiding in an agreement disregarded after the Bascom affair. Mangas's murder in January 1863 brought violence to the region between March 1863 through 1864. Terrell claimed that in 1864 central Arizona territory was dominated by Apache violence partly inspired by Mangas's murder, and General Carleton's extermination policy. Terrell claimed that by 1869 southeastern Arizona territory was close to being dominated by Cochise's Apaches. The 1860s saw Apache American violence reach new levels. The chaotic nature of the 1860s showed us that Apache American relations were deteriorating into a situation that Americans could not control, but the Apaches were more capable of dominating that situation than Americans.

The 1870s saw the initial establishment of policies that influenced Victorio's campaign changing the situation for the Apaches.<sup>111</sup> These policies were the first step towards attempted control of the Chiricahua Apaches. In 1871 Vincent Colyer went to Canada Alamosa to discuss a peace treaty with Victorio's people based on raiding complaints. Colyer established four reservations in October, 1871. In December 1871, the American government claimed that all Apache must either be on a reservation or be hunted down, which did not result in an immediate change. Opler cited that the Warm Springs Reservation was initially rejected in 1869-1871 due

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<sup>110</sup> Terrell, *Apache Chronicle*, 218-265.

<sup>111</sup> Terrell, *Apache Chronicle*, 284-324.



to American settler conflicts, and too many expensive improvements required by the settlers.<sup>112</sup>

In 1874 the Warm Springs Reservation finally came into being but had many bands there beyond Chihenne Apache.<sup>113</sup> The concentration policy began in 1874 under agent John Clum. General Crook in 1875 felt the concentration policy was doomed to fail, and he was justified in that belief. Crook felt that Apaches did not get along well enough between the various bands for concentration to work. These initial policies were the building blocks to Victorio's breakout.

These policies did not affect trade or change the Americans unstable relationship with the Apaches. Overall, though, the Apaches were leaning toward reservation life. The continued existence of trade showed the limitations of American control. Victorio traded at Monticello in the 1870s in New Mexico Territory, but it was also called Canada Alamosa.<sup>114</sup> Thrapp noted that trade existed between the Apache, and the Mexican population at Canada Alamosa by June 22, 1870.<sup>115</sup> The existence of the Chiricahua Reservation temporarily blocked the Warm Springs Reservation on February 26, 1873, but Thrapp also claimed that Victorio refused to stay the Chiricahua Reservation. The Apache traded at Monticello.<sup>116</sup> Victorio maintained a friendly trading relationship at Canada Alamosa.<sup>117</sup> Most Apaches preferred reservation life to war in the 1870's indicating the increasing control on the part of Americans. General George Crook disagreed with reservations before conquest.<sup>118</sup> These differences highlighted local American divisions about the Chiricahua Apache.

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<sup>112</sup> Opler, *Handbook of the North American Indian*, 401-418.

<sup>113</sup> Terrell, *Apache Chronicle*, 284-324.

<sup>114</sup> Chamberlain, *Victorio*, 138-218., Dan Thrapp, *Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches* ( Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1974),126.

<sup>115</sup> Thrapp, *Victorio*, 126-158.

<sup>116</sup> Robinson, *Apache Voices*, 31-134.

<sup>117</sup> Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, 80-160.

<sup>118</sup> Lahti, *Wars for Empire*, 169-171.

The reservation system put into place by the American government failed to stop the raiding across the border.<sup>119</sup> The Chiricahua Apache still raided across the border despite the reservation system, and both countries blamed each other for the Apache problem in the 1870's. Sonoran's governor complained correctly in 1873 that reservations supported Apaches raiding in Mexico by providing the Apaches with guns and ammunition while harboring Apaches who raided Mexico. The Chiricahua Reservation was the main target of these accusation from Mexico and was abolished in 1876 due to this issue after being in place for four years. The failure of the reservation system to stop raiding suggested an incomplete understanding by Americans about the Apache culture.

The Chiricahua Reservation was particularly important in border relationships.<sup>120</sup> It was created in October 1872 under Cochise's demands. This reservation stopped Apache raiding of Americans but failed to stop them in Mexico. This reservation was right on the border, which allowed Apaches to hide there. Cochise was told to stop raiding in 1873 or else it might endanger that reservation. The raiding did not stop, and Cochise died in October, 1874. These cross-border raids contributed to its closure in 1876, after which the Apaches on it were sent to the San Carlos Reservation as part of the concentration policy. This reservations role in raiding gave weight to Mexico's complaints about reservations as supporting raiding. By 1874 the Apache wars seemed over, but that the army's concentration policy of the early 1870s reignited them.<sup>121</sup> American misunderstanding may have reignited the Apache wars. The reservation period of the early 1870s evolved into the concentration period that led to the Victorio campaign.

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<sup>119</sup> St. John, *Line in the Sand*, 55-62.

<sup>120</sup> Lahti, *Wars for Empire*, 177-184.

<sup>121</sup> Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, 19-27.

The mid 1870s was when Victorio was moved around a lot setting the stage for his disillusionment. Cochise was considered more important by the American government, and that was why Victorio had to wait until July 21, 1874 to get his Warm Springs Reservation.<sup>122</sup> The army had preferential targets in their Apache relations. Victorio preferred the Warm Springs Reservation also called Canada Alamosa or Ojo Caliente. The Warm Springs Reservation did not to last, and in 1877 Victorio and his tribe were ordered to return to San Carlos. This was, because of the concentration policy. Victorio in 1877 tried to get his Warm Springs Reservation back but the concentration policy was still an obstacle for him. Victorio himself explained his attitude towards San Carlos “ I will not go to San Carlos. I will not take my people there. We prefer to die in our own land under the tall cool pine. We will leave our bones with those of our people. It is better to die fighting than to starve. I have spoken,”<sup>123</sup>. He also commented “ The Cavalry had orders to kill any off the reservation. You will be killed. We will not be killed. We will be free. What is life if we are imprisoned like cattle in a corral ? We have been a wild ,free people, free to come and go as we wished, how can we be caged.”<sup>124</sup> He clearly valued freedom over miserable survival.

There were also environmental factors to Victorio’s hating San Carlos. The best way to explain the problems with San Carlos is through the Chiricahuas themselves. Some of Victorio’s people recalled, “ It is a place of death. Few people can endure a summer there... There was nothing but cactus, rattlesnakes, heat, rocks, and insects. No game; no edible plants. Many of our people died of starvation,”<sup>125</sup>. James Kaywaykla a Chiricahua Apache there at the time also describes Victorio’s reasons for hating the physical environment of San Carlos “ That horrible

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<sup>122</sup> Chamberlain, *Victorio*, 130-155.

<sup>123</sup> Ball, *In the days of Victorio*, 53.

<sup>124</sup> Ball, *In the Days of Victorio*, 62.

<sup>125</sup> Ball, *In the Days of Victorio*, 28.

summer! Victorio saw his people die. He saw babies almost devoured by insects. He saw people suffer from malaria,”<sup>126</sup> These comments illustrate Victorio’s stubborn refusal to take a bad reservation no matter the cost. The San Carlos Reservation and Victorio’s refusal to accept the ramifications of the concentration policy there was the basis of Victorio’s breakout from there in 1877.

The Victorio War was instigated by the concentration policy enacted by the American government in 1875.<sup>127</sup> The policy immediately divided the Apache with some Apache going to Mexico instead of going to San Carlos. Thrapp claimed that in April or May of 1876 Victorio first began to think that war was the best option with the American government. If this is true it took three years to get Victorio there. In March or April of 1877, Victorio’s Apache began to settle on the San Carlos Reservation with Victorio himself settling there on July 1877. It did not last long, because after Victorio killed one of the White Mountain Apache chiefs he and his people left San Carlos on September 12, 1877. This is a specific example of the unrest that happened on that reservation and that Apaches did not all get along. The concentration policy inspired unrest among the Apaches and influenced Victorio’s distrust of Americans.

We have discussed the reasons that led to the Victorio campaign, and now we should understand their point of view. Ball documented oral sources of surviving Apaches in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>128</sup> She confirmed that the Chiricahua Apache knew that leaving San Carlos meant fighting. Ball also confirmed that the Chiricahua Apache did not like it, because it had no edible plants. This caused starvation for the Apaches. She also documented that the Apache felt betrayed when reservations were taken away. Her sources stated that in the summer of 1877

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<sup>126</sup> Ball, *In the Days of Victorio*, 52.

<sup>127</sup> Thrapp, *Victorio*, 172-214.

<sup>128</sup> Ball, *In the Days of Victorio*, 21-64.

many Chiricahua Apaches died at San Carlos. Ball also confirmed that the people of Monticello, in New Mexico territory traded goods to Victorio's people, because Victorio maintained peaceful relations with them. Ball confirmed that the San Carlos Reservation was considered a good place only to die in the eyes of some of the Chiricahua Apache because of excessive heat, insects, and snakes. Victorio left San Carlos twice for Warm Springs before he was sent back to San Carlos. The Chiricahua Apaches felt that in the end they were doomed to either slavery, death, or imprisonment. Ball confirmed that the Apache had an incomplete understanding of American culture and prioritized survival of their culture. The Apache had a pessimistic attitude towards their future and were not expecting miracles, and suffered much at San Carlos, and now we need to address the direct reason why the campaign began.

It was the concentration policy that was the source of the San Carlos reservation problem for Victorio. This concentration policy hit Victorio in spring 1877, because that was when the Warm Springs people were ordered to go to the San Carlos Reservation.<sup>129</sup> Victorio was not there long, because in September 1877 Victorio and others broke out of the San Carlos Reservation.<sup>130</sup> He and others surrendered to army officials at Fort Wingate that October. He broke out because he refused to stay at San Carlos, and because Warm Springs was his spiritual home. Victorio's continued demand for Warm Springs, and rejection of San Carlos tells us he would only accept one reservation.<sup>131</sup> American leadership was divided on the Apaches' removal to San Carlos. General Orlando Wilcox and John Pope disapproved of Victorio's removal to San

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<sup>129</sup> Kathleen P Chamberlain, *Victorio: Warrior and Chief* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007), 149., Dan L Thrapp, *The Conquest of Apacheria* (Norman: University of Oklahoma: 1967), 172-5., Edwin R Sweeney, *From Cochise to Geronimo: The Chiricahua Apache 1874-1886* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2010), 82-84., Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, 95-116.

<sup>130</sup> Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, 95-116., Sweeney, *Cochise to Geronimo*, 95.

<sup>131</sup> Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, 95-116.

Carlos in April 1877.<sup>132</sup> General Crook, Col Hatch, and Agent Steck also supported the Warm Springs Reservation being held for Victorio's people.<sup>133</sup> Their disapproval did not change the concentration policy's damaging effects. Victorio's refusal to accept to San Carlos influenced his decision to break out.

The determination to avoid the San Carlos Reservation remained strong for Victorio.<sup>134</sup> The Warm Springs Apache decided they would rather die than exist on the San Carlos Reservation. The Warm Springs were moved from Fort Wingate to Ojo Caliente after their surrender, but the Warm Springs people were moved back to San Carlos in September 1878.<sup>135</sup> Victorio, and many Warm Springs people delayed, and went to raiding in Chihuahua, Mexico.<sup>136</sup> Lieutenant Merritt and Andrew Kelly met with Victorio, and he again refused to go to San Carlos, but wanted Warm Springs. Victorio left the meeting and went back to raiding. Victorio sent a message to Merritt and Kelly on March 23, 1879 that he would not go to San Carlos. The army went in pursuit of Victorio and his Apaches that April to send them to the San Carlos Reservation. Victorio and his followers were raiding during this time in Sonora and Chihuahua. This activity inspired General Ord and his Ord Order in June 1879 to recommend that the US and Mexico to work together to stop the Warm Springs people from raiding. Army leadership knew cross-border campaigns were required to defeat the Chiricahua Apache. This also told us that the army may have been anticipating a campaign. The army knew that Victorio was crossing the border knowing that neither Mexico nor the US could pursue him across the border. It was at

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<sup>132</sup> Terrell, *Apache Chronicle*, 327-337.

<sup>133</sup> Kathleen Chamberlain, *Victorio : Apache Warrior and Chief* ( Norman: University of Oklahoma,2007),219.

<sup>134</sup> Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, 117-150.

<sup>135</sup> Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, 117-150., Chamberlain, *Victorio*, 157.

<sup>136</sup> Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, 117-150.

this time that Victorio was seen at the Mescalero Reservation on June 30, 1879.<sup>137</sup> Victorio's move from the San Carlos to the Mescalero Reservation did not replace his desire for the Warm Spring Reservation.

The beginning of the war started the summer of 1879 after he was indicted in Grant County, New Mexico territory on July 30, 1879 with three indictments against Victorio and three unnamed Apache.<sup>138</sup> Victorio and his people surrendered at the Mescalero Reservation in late June, 1879. Victorio claimed that he wanted peace yet would not settle on the San Carlos Reservation.<sup>139</sup> These indictments were for horse stealing and murder. Thrapp claimed that Victorio was afraid of being found guilty and fled the reservation on August 21, 1879. This told us Victorio had some understanding of American legal procedures even if they were incomplete. Victorio could have understood American prejudices as well. Thrapp also claimed that the whole war could have been avoided if Victorio was given Ojo Caliente permanently, but that never happened.<sup>140</sup>

The breakout was also accompanied by violence against an Apache agent and American military forces.<sup>141</sup> An American trader Dr Joseph C Blazer told Victorio of the arrest warrant from Grant County. Victorio then proceeded to assault Agent Russell. He then decided to flee the Mescalero Reservation sometime between August 19-25. The *Grant County Herald* reported on November 8, 1879 that Agent Russel announced on October 30, 1879 that Victorio left the

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<sup>137</sup> Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, 117-150.

<sup>138</sup> Thrapp, *Victorio*, 216-218., Chamberlain, *Victorio*, 161.

<sup>139</sup> Thrapp, *Victorio*, 216-218.

<sup>140</sup> Thrapp, *Victorio*, 216-218., Chamberlain, *Victorio*, 161.

<sup>141</sup> Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, 155-171.

Mescalero Reservation after finding out the indictments against him.<sup>142</sup> This does not give a date when he broke out. The second one is dated August 20, 1879 and is from the paper *Thirty Four* who stated that on August 20, 1879 Victorio was getting rations on the Mescalero Reservation.<sup>143</sup> Thus he left after August 20, 1879. The Victorio campaign officially began on September 4, 1879 after Victorio stole horses and mules from Ojo Caliente.<sup>144</sup> Capt. Hookers on September 5, 1879 reported the raid by Victorio at Ojo Caliente, claiming that Victorio took horses from the military, and that Victorio killed all but 10 horses, and 2 mules. This is seen as the beginning of the campaign.

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<sup>142</sup> "Cause of the Apache Outbreak," *Grant County Herald*, November 8, 1879, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, document 8.1, 362.

<sup>143</sup> "Victorio," *Thirty Four*, August 20, 1879, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, document 8.2, 363.

<sup>144</sup> Cpt Ambrose Hooker, September 5, 1879, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, document 10,406-7., Dan L Thrapp, *The Conquest of Apacheria* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1967), 181.



### Chapter 3: The Victorio Campaign September,1879 to October,1880

The background to the Victorio Campaign has been discussed previously, and now we will move onward to the campaign itself. This chapter will examine the first part of the campaign in detail from the breakout in August 1879 to the defeat of Victorio in October 1880. This chapter will take place in New Mexico, Texas, and Chihuahua with numerous border crossings on both sides of the Victorio Campaign. The main theme this chapter will be the direct fluidity of the border based on the numerous border crossings that happened between August 1879 and October 1880. One important question that will come up in this chapter is how fluid or controlled was this border until the fall of 1880 when major changes happened to border management. This chapter details the numerous border crossing events that happened in this course of the campaign to support the claim that the uncontrolled border helped support Victorio's success up until his defeat.

The problem of pursuit across the border was an important issue in how the Mexican-American border influenced the Victorio campaign, along with the American armies' treatment of the Mexican-American border. Matt Mathews commented on how the American Army treated the border.<sup>145</sup> He cited that the American army had forts every 100 miles on the Rio Grande, which would make it easier for the Apaches to cross the border. He also claimed that the army crossed the Mexican border twenty-three times between 1873 and 1882. He cited these multiple crossings angered Mexico, which influenced their disapproval of the Americans numerous attempts to authorize cross-border campaigns. The ability of the Apache to avoid authorities on both sides of the border was the main reason Victorio was successful because they could cross

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<sup>145</sup> Matt Mathews, *The US Army on the Mexican American Border: A Historical Perspective* ( Ft Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007),46-51.

the border and avoid both sides. The army had guidelines for pursuit across the border in specific circumstances. These guidelines were used rarely and had minimal effect on the Victorio campaign. According to Lt Smither the US Army could only pursue the Apache into Mexico if they were in hot pursuit.<sup>146</sup> This document was dated August 13, 1878, which was before the campaign began. It was written by Captain Viele in Fort Davis, TX. It did not mention Mexican approval, which implies there was no Mexican approval. One of the most important primary documents regarding pursuit was the Ord Order dated June 1, 1877.<sup>147</sup> The United States Army asserted the right to pursue the Apache across the Rio Grande through Texas based on Mexico's neglect of the Apache. This order also has no mention of Mexican approval. The most important thing about these documents was that America felt they did not need Mexican approval to cross the border. Apache pursuit was important in this campaign.

Eve Ball documented the views of Apache themselves from interviews in the 1950s.<sup>148</sup> She cited Monticello, in the territory of New Mexico was trading with the Chiricahua, which corroborated with other researchers. Her oral interviews reaffirmed that in September 1879 at the beginning of the conflict Victorio was in Mexico with 75 warriors, which was not corroborated with other researchers. Ball also documented that Mexican villages traded ammunition for protection, and that in fall of 1879 Victorio had 450 people including 75 warriors. It was also documented by her that Victorio crossed the Rio Grande into Texas with no fear of Mexican Cavalry, which supported the idea that the uncontrolled border controls helped him survive. Ball

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<sup>146</sup> LT Robert Smither to Cpt Veile, , August 13, 1878, Survey Orders, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, (Warwick, Helion, 2017), Document 1.2, 327-328.

<sup>147</sup> Secretary of War to General of the Army, June 1, 1877, The Ord Order, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," Helion, Document 105, 224.

<sup>148</sup> Eve Ball, *In the Days of Victorio: Recollections of a Warm Springs Apache* (Tucson: University of Arizona, 1970), 57-86.

documented how trade, and Victorio's numbers affected his ability to cross the border easily in the campaign.

The beginning of the campaign began with Victorio raiding Ojo Caliente in September 1879. Victorio, and his band of forty Apaches took 46 horses and 18 mules from the Ojo Caliente post on September 5, 1879.<sup>149</sup> Victorio's band also included some Mescalero Apache from their reservation.<sup>150</sup> Victorio and his band were heading into Mexico at this time. This is evidence not only of raiding, but the army's knowledge of where they are headed. It also indicated the numbers had yet to increase. The first time in the campaign that trading was mentioned was on September 13, 1879 according to Watt.<sup>151</sup> Watt argued on that day Victorio had 150 people with him and was on his way to get Apaches south of the border to join him. Victorio also traded guns and ammunition from the Apache to Mexico. Another source documented a raid at Ojo Caliente on September 28, 1879.<sup>152</sup> This indicated Victorio had not gone to Mexico yet. This raid was near the beginning of the campaign and failed to capture any horses or stock. These documents supported the importance of raiding and trading in the Victorio campaign early on. Another document by Lt Emmett claimed that in September 1879 Victorio had escaped to Mexico but does not give a date.<sup>153</sup> Victorio may or may not have been to Mexico in September 1879, but he did raid and trade in the first month of the campaign.

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<sup>149</sup> Cpt Hooker, September 5, 1879, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, Document 10, 406-407.

<sup>150</sup> Edwin R Sweeney, *From Cochise to Geronimo: The Chiricahua Apaches 1874-1886* ( Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2010),180., Kathleen P Chamberlain, *Victorio: Apache Warrior and Chief* ( Norman : University of Oklahoma, 2007),170.,Dan L Thrapp, *Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches* ( Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1974),272.

<sup>151</sup> Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, 211-256.

<sup>152</sup> Cpt Hooker, September 5, 1879, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, Document 10, 406-407.

<sup>153</sup> Lt Emmett, Some Personal Reflections of the Indian Tribes of New Mexico, and Arizona, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, document 12.4,417.

Victorio headed toward Mexico in October 1879. Watt claimed on October 10, 1879 Victorio went toward Mexico from the San Mateo Mountains.<sup>154</sup> The Apache under Victorio attacked a Mexican Carreta Train around the 13<sup>th</sup> of October that year in the Rio Grande Valley. The Mexican Teamsters guarding it were killed by Victorio's Apaches. Thrapp claimed that Victorio may have been near the Florida Mountains in that encounter.<sup>155</sup> In October of 1879 Victorio was confirmed to be in Mexico, which is another border crossing to avoid American forces.

The border crossing into Mexico in October 1879 by Victorio included an unauthorized border crossing by the American army.<sup>156</sup> In this document Lt Finley cited that the US army entered Mexico on October 17, 1879 south of Hillsboro, in the territory of New Mexico. Lt Finley cited that they went 20-25 miles into Mexico indicating the Americans reluctance to get far from the border in case they were ordered back. This document mentioned Major Morrow leading the campaign, and the Chiricahua Apaches specifically indicating Victorio's involvement. It detailed a fight with Victorio's Apache on the 27<sup>th</sup>. It mentioned that the fight lasted more than three hours, and that Victorio won the day. The document was dated November 4, 1879. Another document discussed this fight.<sup>157</sup> This supported the previous document, but cited that fight happened in the Guzman mountains in Mexico, near the Good sight and Hatchet Mountains. It was written by Lt Gatewood in 1894. This entrance into Mexico by the American army was not sanctioned by Mexican authorities but was most likely based on the Ord Order.

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<sup>154</sup> Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, 241-262.

<sup>155</sup> Dan L Thrapp, *Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches* ( Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1974),246-247.

<sup>156</sup> Lt Walter Finley, November 4, 1879, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, document 21.1, 445-6., Kathleen P Chamberlain, *Victorio: Apache Warrior and Chief* ( Norman: University of Oklahoma,2007),178.,Dan L Thrapp, *The Conquest of Apacheria* ( Norman: Oklahoma,1967),186-189.

<sup>157</sup> Lt Gatewood, 1894, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, document 21.2, 447-8.

The fact that Mexico did not approve this border crossing supports American minimalization of Mexican authority.

Victorio and his Apaches crossed the Mexican border near the Potrillo Mountains between October 23-25, 1879.<sup>158</sup> The question is where was Victorio between October 17, 1879 and October 23-25, 1879. He may have crossed the border again or moved around Mexico. The previous document was written by Major Morrow on November 5, 1879. Lt Gatewood also tracked Victorio into Mexico during the same time.<sup>159</sup> The army under Lt Gatewood tracked Victorio to Polomas lake and saw evidence Victorio crossed the border near the Potrillo Mountains on October 25, 1879. Another document claimed the Apache massacred Mexicans near El Paso Mexico.<sup>160</sup> This document indicated that a group of Mexicans was massacred on the way from El Paso Mexico by Apaches headed for the Florida mountains in the territory of New Mexico. It was by Col Rynerson and was dated October 16, 1879. This was most likely when Victorio was headed toward Mexico. Another document refers to what was most likely the same encounter.<sup>161</sup> This was by the same person but was from the *Thirty-Four* paper and claimed that the Apaches under Victorio massacred Mexicans coming from Mexico. It was dated October 22, 1879. It claimed the massacre happened after the 14<sup>th</sup>. It also cited the Mexican party came from Mexico. The army found 10 people and cattle were killed by the Apaches under Victorio. It went on to claim that Lloyds ranch had all the chickens killed, and 100 cattle and 100 bucks killed by the same Apaches after the massacre. It claimed that Victorio was headed for the Florida

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<sup>158</sup> Major Morrow to Acting Assistant General, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, document 15.2, 424-5.

<sup>159</sup> Lt Charles Gatewood, December 20, 1879, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, document 15.4, 428-429., Thrapp, *Conquest of Apacheria*, 184-5.

<sup>160</sup> Col H.S. Rynerson to Lt Allen, October 16, 1879, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, document 19.5, 440.

<sup>161</sup> Col Rynerson, "Home Again," *Thirty Four*, October 22, 1879, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, document 19.7, 442-3.

Mountains after the massacres. These activities placed him near the Mexican border before Victorio crossed in late October 1879.

Major Morrow followed the Apaches under Victorio into Mexico. He went through the Florida Mountains into the Potrillo Mountains, and from there to the Guzman Mountains around Guzman Lake in late October 1879 according to Watt.<sup>162</sup> The Guzman Mountains were in Mexico. He argued that Victorio took this route because of water in the Potrillo Mountains indicating a practical reason. The Guzman Mountains are in Northern Chihuahua. Morrow and Lieutenant Gatewood fought the Apache under Victorio there on October 27-28, 1879. Morrow had 40 troops, and 18 scouts against 60 or 120 Apaches under Victorio. The US Army was forced to retreat because the Apache had them outnumbered. The American army was also running out of ammunition. It is important to emphasize that Major Morrow had been in Mexico illegally, and had lost to the Apache. This meant Morrow left for America as soon as he began to retreat from the battle. This was part of the previously mentioned illegal entry into Mexico on the part of the American army.

Another document showed Victorio's trail into Mexico in October 1879.<sup>163</sup> This document was written by Major Morrow on November 5, 1879 and was a report of his attempt to trail Victorio. Major Morrows five-week campaign into Mexico to attempt to track down Victorio was also documented by Lt Gatewood.<sup>164</sup> This document supported the interpretation that the five-week campaign in late October 1879 was a failure. It did not mention official approval to enter Mexico and was written December 20, 1879. These engagements during the American army's illegal entry into Mexico showed that America was willing to ignore

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<sup>162</sup> Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, 257-299.

<sup>163</sup> Major Morrow, November 5, 1879, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, Document 15.2, 422-426.

<sup>164</sup> Lt Charles Gatewood, December 20, 1879, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, Document 15.4, 428-429.

international borders to defeat Victorio. The Apache benefitted from the border by crossing it at will to avoid both Americans and Mexicans. The Americans still crossed it illegally though to pursue the Apaches. The Mexicans did not cross it to pursue the Apaches. There were two other documents that document Victorio fighting Mexicans specifically. The first one listed four Mexicans killed by Victorio.<sup>165</sup> The second one listed ten Mexicans killed by Victorio eight miles near Masons Ranch, and a herd of cattle taken by Victorio.<sup>166</sup> These attacks were both in the United states, but still in the border region. These documents were written in October 1879. They indicated these attacks happened while Victorio was going or coming to Mexico. Another document written on October 22, 1879 corroborated that encounter but claimed that the group under Victorio killed 200 cattle telling us he raided when he was in Mexico in October 1879.<sup>167</sup> These attacks tell us that Victorio was actively fighting both sides that October 1879.

Victorio's activity in Mexico in October 1879 went well into November 1879. There were numerous accounts of the fight around the Guzman Mountains against Victorio. The first one was written by Lt Finley on November 4, 1879.<sup>168</sup> This one detailed the trip the US army made into Mexico, and the fact that they lost the encounter. In this account Finly recorded that they were 25 miles south of the border. This indicated the Americans were in Mexico illegally, but close to the border in case they had to leave. A second document of this fight with Victorio was written by Lt Gatewood on November 5, 1879.<sup>169</sup> This one gave better details of the march into the Guzman Mountains, and placed them twenty miles from Janos, Chihuahua. Another important document that informed us about the Mexican side of the situation from the American

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<sup>165</sup> Mesilla to Lt Allen, October 14, 1879, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, Document 19.3,438.

<sup>166</sup> Col Rynerson to Lt Allen, October 17, 1879, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, Document 19.5, 440.

<sup>167</sup> Col Rynerson, "Home Again," Thirty Four, October 22, 1879, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, Document 19.7, 442-3.

<sup>168</sup> Lt Walter Finley, November 4, 1879, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, Document 21.1, 445-6.

<sup>169</sup> Lt Gatewood, 1894, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, Document 21.2, 447-8.

Consulate in Chihuahua on November 14, 1879.<sup>170</sup> This document has a very anti-Apache bias but told us two important things. The first was that it reaffirms the idea in Mexico that the reservations harbored raiders. It also declared the need for both America and Mexico to work together to fight the Apache under Victorio. This was an important reference to both countries potentially working together. It also referred to the 15 and 18 Mexicans that were killed by Victorio. The previous surprise attack by Victorio was labeled the Candelaria Mountains massacre in another document.<sup>171</sup> This account was dated December 3, 1879. It clearly labeled the victims as Mexicans, and the site as the Candelaria Mountains. The victims in the document were listed as being from Carrizal, Mexico. Another document listed this encounter and added that afterward the Apache under Victorio stole 270 horses near the cites of Carrizal, Salada, and Galliana.<sup>172</sup> These documents all supported the idea that the Victorio was active in Mexico in November 1879. These documents cited not only raiding, and border crossing but fights with both sides in November 1879 including massacres.

Victorio's Apaches were reportedly establishing peace with specific villages in Northern Chihuahua in November 1879.<sup>173</sup> Louis Scott of the US Consul in Chihuahua on November 7, 1879 claimed that specific warriors made a peace with local Mexican officials. This peace indicated that the local Chihuahua village had a working relationship with Victorio. This implied that some villages supported the Apaches under Victorio to some degree. Watt claimed that this did not apply to the Chihuahua town of Carrizal, which planned unsuccessfully to launch a trap

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<sup>170</sup> George W McCrary to W.M. Evarts, W Hunter to Louis H Scott, E Martinez to A Jaquez, November 4 to December 4, 1879, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, Document 22.1, 449-452.

<sup>171</sup> Lt Baylor, and Sgt Gillett, December 3, 1879, 1996, 1976, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, Document 22.3, 454-5.

<sup>172</sup> Alexander Ramsey to W.M. Evarts, W Hunter to Louis H Scott, November 28-December 16, 1879, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, Document 23, 456-7.

<sup>173</sup> Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, 282-289.



to give the Apaches alcohol and massacre them in early November 1879. This told us that every village had a different relationship with the Apache under Victorio. Victorio then launched a surprise attack on citizens of Carrizal, Mexico in the Candelaria Mountains on November 9, 1879. Victorio and his group killed 18 Mexicans in the first attack, and 15 in the second attack in the previously mentioned massacre. Watt maintained that the second attack by Victorio was the result of Victorio attacking the rescue party launched from Carrizal. Watt confirmed that there was indeed a trading link between Victorio's raids in Candelaria, Mexico, and the Mescalero Reservation in the territory of New Mexico. Watt confirmed that loot taken on the raids in that region was soon found on the Mescalero Reservation. This link was probably just the tip of the iceberg in the raiding network but verified a link between them. This confirmed that the reservations were being used as a base for raiding into Mexico validating Mexico's complaints. Watt also confirmed that Sonora and Chihuahua oversaw Apache responses. The massacre in Mexico in the Candelaria mountains in Chihuahua, Mexico near Carrizal, Mexico by Victorio happened in November 1879.<sup>174</sup> It listed the date as around November 7<sup>th</sup>, 1879. Citizens from Carrizal, Mexico entered a double ambush massacre. The first was when 15 Carrizal citizens were ambushed by Victorio's Apaches, and the second was when 18 citizens were killed responding to the first one. Victorio's Apaches were involved in peace, raiding, border crossing and massacres in Mexico in November 1879.

Raiding by Victorio in this time caused problems for both sides and inspired both sides to think about working together. Watt noted that the attack in the Candelaria Mountains inspires Louis Scott to recommend Mexico and America working together to fight Victorio. This would

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<sup>174</sup> Lt Baylor, and Sgt Gillett, December 3, 1879, 1996, 1976, Reprinted in Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, Document 22.3, 454-5.

wait a while for it to happen.<sup>175</sup> The Apache raids under Victorio possibly continued in November and December 1879. Watt cited 370 horses stolen in two raids in Galeana and San Lorenzo, Mexico. The raiders then went towards Santa Clara, Mexico, and Scott claimed that the raiding Apaches had killed 150 people in six weeks of raiding. These numbers seemed high. The attacks caused economic problems beyond the actual Apache involved, and the state of Chihuahua decided to offer \$100 per Apache scalp. This was evidence of raiding's effectiveness by their desperate attempt to eradicate Victorio's Apaches. Watt claimed that these raids indicated that the Mescalero Reservation was used as a base of operations for these cross-border raids. This again highlighted reservations involvement of raiding. Watt cited the towns of Canada Alamosa and Las Palomas as places the Apaches could trade their stolen goods. This indicated that some local populations supported the Apache. Historian Rachel St John maintained that between the end of 1879, through 1880 pressure was building on both sides to work together to defeat Victorio's Apaches.<sup>176</sup> Thrapp argued cross-border pursuit was recommended by Scott in November/December 1879.<sup>177</sup> The pressure told us that both sides were beginning to see that a cross-border campaign was required to defeat Victorio.

January 1880 involved border crossings, attempted cooperation between Mexico and the US, and a failed peace attempt by Victorio. Victorio's Apaches reentered the US again on January 2, 1880.<sup>178</sup> This was an example of another border crossing to avoid both sides. Victorio's Apaches entered New Mexico via the Florida Mountains while Governor Terrazas told the American Army that Victorio's Apaches were coming. This highlighted unofficial

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<sup>175</sup> Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, 294-313.

<sup>176</sup> Rachel St. John, *Line in the Sand: A History of the Western US-Mexico Border* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 55-62.

<sup>177</sup> Dan L Thrapp, *Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1974), 239-287.

<sup>178</sup> Robert N Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows: The Victorio Campaign 1880* (Warwick: Helion, 2019), 27-36.

cooperation between both sides. The governor asked for help to prevent them from getting to the Florida Mountains. This told us that in early 1880 the Mexican government thought about working with the US government on their respective sides of the border to defeat Victorio. This level of cooperation indicated that both sides were forming the basis for a cross-border relationship to defeat the Apaches. Watt recorded that on January 16, 1880 Victorio met with American Andrew Kelley, and expressed his desire to live at Ojo Caliente, and live in peace. Victorio did not trust the American army in negotiations. This was an important act for Victorio because it showed both his suspicion, and desire for peace. This was the first of three peace attempts by Victorio.

Cross-border cooperation was on the mind of New Mexico's territorial governor while Victorio was thinking about peace. Victorio was always thinking about peace for Warm Springs, but it was a first for New Mexico territorial Governor Wallace. Gov Wallace was thinking about cross-border cooperation based on the need to defeat the Apaches. There were political problems in allowing Mexican troops into New Mexico territory on New Mexico's governor's orders.<sup>179</sup> Governor Wallace gave permission to Mexican troops to enter New Mexico territory, but the US Secretary of State had to approve it for it to be legal. The actual document included expressed permission from Governor Wallace on January 12, 1880.<sup>180</sup> It also included one sent to Governor Terrazas of Chihuahua. This communication between Terrazas and Wallace reaffirmed the offer was based on pursuit into the United States.<sup>181</sup> Cross-border operations were authorized by Governor Wallace on January 12, 1880. This showed us that the New Mexico supported cross-

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<sup>179</sup> January 12, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex, Original Documents," Helion, 29.1,13.

<sup>180</sup> Governor Wallace to Governor Terrazas, Major Morrow to Col Hatch, January 12, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex, Original Documents," 29.3,13.

<sup>181</sup> Governor Terrazas to Col Edward Hatch, January 17, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex, Original Documents," 29.4,17.

border campaigns to defeat Victorio, but national governments did not.<sup>182</sup> The New Mexico territorial Governor does not appear to have suffered from this disagreement. The third document related to this communication gave permission for Mexican troops to cross into New Mexico to fight the Apaches.<sup>183</sup> The final document in the series was from Chihuahua Governor Terrazas and seemed to imply permission for Mexican troops to cross into New Mexico, but it may not have been official.<sup>184</sup> One implication was that national governments were not willing to do what was needed yet to defeat Victorio. New Mexico's attempted border crossings to defeat Victorio were an important, but unsuccessful step.

There was almost cross-border cooperation between Mexico and the US in January 1880 during which time Victorio crossed the border and was involved in trading.<sup>185</sup> On January 10, 1880 the Mexican troops under General Trevino recorded that Victorio and his Apaches had reached La Mesilla, in New Mexico territory. American Secretary of War Alexander Ramsey told Col Hatch that the Mexican troops could cross the border to pursue the Apaches. Col Hatch contacted the governor of Chihuahua to verify. It was however not to be, because Mexican troops under Col Cisneros refused to cross the American border despite permission. This showed us that the troops were uncomfortable with the idea, which was most likely due to distrust of Americans. This showed us that by this time both American and New Mexico's governments were willing to do what was required to defeat Victorio. Some of the troops were not. This cross-border attempts may not have happened, but the inspiration behind them was not forgotten. This time was also when it was noted by Watt that there were two groups of Apaches active in the

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<sup>182</sup> January 12, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex, Original documents, "29.1,13.

<sup>183</sup> Governor Wallace to Governor Terrazas, Major Morrow to Col Hatch, January 12, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex, Original Documents, "29.3,13.

<sup>184</sup> Governor Terrazas to Col Edward Hatch, January 17, 1880, Reprinted in " Annex, Original Documents," 29.4,17.

<sup>185</sup> Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows*, 38-75.

area. There was a group of thirty Mexican traders in the Florida Mountains attacked by Victorio's group on January 10-12, 1880. This event showed evidence of a large group of Apaches in Chihuahua, and a smaller group in New Mexico under Victorio. The Apache groups combined and mostly joined Victorio by January 22, 1880 according to Colonel Hatch. This was a minor tactical operation by Victorio. Victorio crossed into America from Mexico on January 31, 1880.<sup>186</sup> It was cited by Col Hatch that Victorio entered America from Mexico by crossing the Rio Grande. This document was dated February 2, 1880. In February it was again reported by the US Army that Victorio's Apaches under were trading at Canada Alamosa and Ojo Caliente. The Apaches traded alcohol, ammunition and guns to Mexicans and Anglo-Americans. Watt also claimed that residents at Cuchillo Negro and Las Palomas also traded with Victorio's Apaches. These documents all supported that cross-border travel and trade with the Apaches were related to border crossings. This again cemented the roles of trading and raiding in Apache culture. The uncontrolled border supported the cross-border activities by Victorio, while attempts to work together to defeat Victorio failed.<sup>187</sup>

February 1880 involved multiple border crossing and trading by Victorio. Chihuahua Governor Luis Terrazas attempted to retaliate against Victorio and his Apaches in Mexico in February 1880.<sup>188</sup> Terrazas sent General Trevino with 500 federales, and his subordinate Col Cisneros with his One Hundred men to find Victorio in February 1880. This implied another border crossing into Mexico. Mexican General Trevino asked Major Morrow to scout the border in America to help him out. This told us that they could work together without crossing the

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<sup>186</sup> Col Edward Hatch, February 2, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original documents," 32.2, 21., Dan L Thrapp, *Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1974), 262.

<sup>187</sup> Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows*, 38-75, Col Edward Hatch, February 2, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original documents," 32.2, 21.

<sup>188</sup> Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, 294-313.

borders. These forces failed to find Victorio. There are also documents that confirmed the Apache were heading to Mexico which is yet another border crossing on Victorio's part.<sup>189</sup> Col Hatch sent troops under Major Morrow to follow the Apaches and saw that they were fleeing into Mexico on February 2, 1880. The troops under Hatch were trying to prevent Victorio from going to Mexico.<sup>190</sup> This would also back up the idea that American Troops could not enter Mexico. There are also documents that showed evidence of raiding below the border.<sup>191</sup> The Mescalero Reservation in New Mexico territory had horses with Mexican brands on them on February 15, 1880. This indicated that the horses were taken by raiders in Mexico and sent there to be traded. There was also trading among Apaches.<sup>192</sup> Col Hatch mentioned Mexican money and ammunition in the hands of Victorio's Apaches on February 23, 1880, which was obtained by trading. Reservations and Mexican communities worked with Victorio in trade, which also showed that Victorio had silent supporters in the region. This trade with Victorio was happening while both sides were thinking about working together to defeat him.<sup>193</sup>

Unofficial cooperation between Mexico and American armed forces was common in February 1880, while the Ord Order was on its way out.<sup>194</sup> Watt confirmed that state officials on both sides of the border were willing to cooperate to fight Victorio on their respective sides, but at the federal level Mexico was still unwilling. There were several reasons for why Mexico was unlikely to allow cross-border operations before this. The first was Mexico's understandable distrust of American intent following the Mexican-American War. The second was Mexico's claim that American reservations were supporting Apache raiders. Sweeney documented raiding

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<sup>189</sup> Col Edward Hatch, February 2, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original documents," 32.2, 21.

<sup>190</sup> Col Edward Hatch to General Wilcox, February 5, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex, Original Documents," 32.3, 22.

<sup>191</sup> Cpt Loud to General Hatch, February 15, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex, Original Documents," 34, 26-7.

<sup>192</sup> Col Hatch to AA General, February 23, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 36.1, 30-31.

<sup>193</sup> Watt, *I Will Not Surrender*, 294-313, "Annex Original Documents," 32.2, 21, 32.3, 22, 34, 26-7, 36.1, 30-31.

<sup>194</sup> Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows*, 306-314.

into Sonora from the Chiricahua Reservation supporting the claim that raiding was based from reservations.<sup>195</sup> The Ord Order needs to be mentioned now as well. According to Watt it allowed American troops entry to Mexico if in pursuit of Apache and was put into place June 1, 1877. The order included language that allowed Mexican troops the same right. It also contained language that stated that the pursuit would stop if Mexican troops were available to take over. The most important thing about the Ord Order was that it ignored official Mexican approval. Watt claimed that Mexican President Diaz allowed unofficial cooperation between the US Army and the Mexican Army. Watt also confirmed that the states of Mexico acted separately of the Federal Government in Mexico. These relationships implied behind the scenes approval for cross-border operations. Watt cited that the Ord Order was rescinded in April 1878 due to Mexico's refusal to allow troops to enter its territory, but it was still used until 1880. The term hot pursuit was interpreted in several ways by the Department of Arizona after it was rescinded. This told us that authorities in Arizona territory were creative in coming up with excuses to pursue Apaches. The idea of raiding bases came into play here. America claimed that Mexican Apache were raiding, and the Mexican army was nowhere in sight. The Mexican government claimed that the raiders came from American reservations and cited the fact that they had recently worked with the US Army. This blame showed both sides were unwilling to cite the real solution to victory, which was cross-border operations. Watt documented efforts between Mexico and the US Army that did not include cross-border action. The Ord Order was revoked officially after Major Morrows forced Victorio into Mexico, which forced the Mexican Army in the field. Secretary of War Alex Ramsey revoked the Ord Order was February 24, 1880.<sup>196</sup> This document implied that the

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<sup>195</sup> Edwin R Sweeney, *From Cochise to Geronimo: The Chiricahua Apaches 1874-1886* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2010) , 23.

<sup>196</sup> Alexander Ramsey, February 24, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 40,39.

Mexican military had done such a good job of stopping Apache invasion into America that the Ord Order could be revoked. Another strong motive for its revocation was Mexican opposition to the Ord Order. February 1880 was when cooperation between Mexico and America reached a high not before seen in that campaign although it was not quite officially cross-border cooperation.

Border relationships continued to be important in the Victorio campaign in February 1880 through raiding and military action.<sup>197</sup> Several references point to American troops pushing the Apache into Mexico and Mexican troops pushing the Apache into New Mexico territory around February 14, 1880. These activities supported the idea that neither side could cross the border, so they tried to push the Apache into the hands of the other side. This was an incomplete method that appears ineffective to dealing with Victorio but was still the probably the most realistic option. Victorio was documented raiding Mexicans on February 23, 1880.<sup>198</sup> This document was written by Col Hatch, and documented Victorio having acquired ammunition from Mexicans possibly from trading or raiding. The document listed a raid and mentions he got money from Mexicans. This document implied a strong connection between Mexico and Victorio. Victorio's raiding in America did not stop his peace attempts or his border crossings.<sup>199</sup>

February 1880 included another peace attempt by Victorio, along with more trading. Victorio initiated a failed peace attempt in Late February 1880.<sup>200</sup> The Mescalero Reservation received two warriors from Victorio's Apaches who attempted a peace agreement that would have supported a return to Ojo Caliente. The army understood and agreed with Victorio to a

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<sup>197</sup> Col Edward Hatch to AA General, February 14, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 39.36.

<sup>198</sup> Col Edward Hatch to AA General, February 23, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original documents," 36.1, 30.

<sup>199</sup> "Annex Original Documents," 39, 36, 36.1, 30.

<sup>200</sup> Cpt Loud to General Hatch, March 3, 1880, "Annex Original documents," 35, 28-9.



degree but failed to act on the request.<sup>201</sup> Col Hatch understood that Victorio would rather die than go to San Carlos and believed that he should be sent to Ojo Caliente. Hatch unfortunately was not the one making the decision where Victorio would be sent to. A similar situation happened at the end of the Nez Perce war in 1877.<sup>202</sup> West cited that the location where Chief Joseph ended up was decided by high level army authorities and civilian authorities. The political aspect of decision making in the military was federal, and Victorio's desire for peace failed to materialize. Col Hatch in March 1880 acknowledged that Victorio was trading with citizens on both sides of the border. The main source of ammunition to Victorio was Mexican and Anglo-American's settlements in southern New Mexico territory. This cited trading and raiding as the main way of acquiring ammunition. Watt cited Las Palomas and Canada Alamosa as prime spots to trade with Victorio's Apaches. This trading relationships illustrated Victorio's complex relationship with the local communities. He also cited the fact that Victorio's Apaches were making a serious dent in the economic abilities of the region highlighting raiding's effect. Victorio's failed peace attempts were to join his decreasing fortunes in trade in spring, 1880.

Victorio's relationship with Canada Alamosa was hurt permanently in March 1880, when citizens decided to form a militia to defend themselves from Victorio.<sup>203</sup> Some former traders with Victorio from Canada Alamosa joined the militia. This was the first blow to Victorio's previously peaceful trade relationships to that community. Another blow to Victorio was dealt in April 1880 when the Mescalero Reservation was closed to trading that spring by the army. The reservation was not only involved in raiding, but warriors from it were also supporting Victorio in his campaign.<sup>204</sup> Watt cited that Agent Russell of the reservation thought that thirty-five

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<sup>201</sup> Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows*, 87-110.

<sup>202</sup> Elliot West, *The Last Indian War : The Nez Perce Story*( New York: Oxford University Press,2009), 294-5.

<sup>203</sup> Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows*, 143-172.

<sup>204</sup> Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows*, 143-172.

warriors from the reservation supported Victorio. The long-term result of the closure of trading was the cessation of trade, and future reinforcements from that reservation. That was an important problem for Victorio because he had traded there extensively before. There was also a report according to Watt that forty horses around Canada Alamosa were taken in a raid that May. Victorio was apparently still raided Canada Alamosa, but not trading there as much. These incidents created a change in the relationship between Victorio and Canada Alamosa. It was dangerous for them to trade with Victorio, but even more hazardous for them to stop trading. This marked a negative change in that relationship for Victorio. Victorio's decreased trading with Canada Alamosa was a sign that his luck was running out, and that the army had figured out how to cut off Victorio's trade with the Mescalero Reservation.

Raiding remained a strong source for Victorio. A raid by Victorio's Apache was recorded May 9, 1880.<sup>205</sup> This document was a narrative of an oral account of an Apache raid where the Apache in question took 18,281 or 20,331 sheep. This was just one example of how devastating raiding could be. The total size of his number of sheep was 60,000. The numbers could be artificially high, but this raid tells us that he was still capable of making an effect when it came to raiding. On May 14, 1880 citizens from Janos, Mexico in La Mesilla discovered horses and mules around the Guzman Mountains that Watt cited came from Victorio's Apaches raiding in the United States.<sup>206</sup> This was likely, because Las Palomas and Canada Alamosa were unavailable for trading. This supported that Victorio's status in trading had changed for good. This also tells us that Victorio was still getting many resources from raiding.

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<sup>205</sup> Cpt Pollack, May 8, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 65.1, 116-7.

<sup>206</sup> Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows*, 283-305.

There were peace negotiations in May 1880 while Victorio was raiding and suffering a defeat.<sup>207</sup> Victorio told the army that he would accept peace if he and his family could settle at Ojo Caliente, which meant his position on peace had not changed. This reaffirms that Victorio was still seeking the same goal and had not given up mentally.

Watt cited that on May 24, 1880 the Apache under Victorio suffered an important defeat by Colonel Hatch on the Palomas River in New Mexico territory.<sup>208</sup> This defeat played an important role in his eventual defeat by setting the stage for America to defeat him permanently. This was not near the border or in Mexico, but it was the beginning of the end for Victorio himself. This defeat set the stage for his eventual defeat because it showed that for the first time American troops could defeat Victorio. Victorio moved toward Mexico on May 31, 1880.<sup>209</sup> This document written by Major Morrow cited that Lt Maney followed Victorio's Apaches trail to the Mexican border south of Fort Cummings. Maney turned around at the Mexican border on May 31, 1880, which was in line with the border policy, and revocation of the Ord Order. This defeat forced Victorio to move south toward Mexico. Watt cited that in May-June 1880 both sides of the border worked together without crossing the border to fight Victorio.<sup>210</sup> This defeat left Victorio to retreat to Mexico once again.

Victorio's Apaches were tracked by Major Morrow to Mexico on the 5<sup>th</sup> of June 1880.<sup>211</sup> The army requested to pursue Victorio across the border, but the Mexican Government would not allow it. Victorio got away again across the border due to both countries working separately.

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<sup>207</sup> Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows*, 283-305.

<sup>208</sup> H.K. Parker to General Hatch, May 26, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 72,2, 131.

<sup>209</sup> Major Morrow, June 27, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 80.2, 147.

<sup>210</sup> Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows*, 306-314.

<sup>211</sup> Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows*, 187-218.

Col Hatch asked permission to enter Mexico to catch Victorio on June 12, 1880.<sup>212</sup> Col Hatch asking to pursue Victorio into Mexico showed that he knew it was the only way to defeat Victorio. It was revealed by Watt that by June 13, 1880 Victorio was still in Mexico.<sup>213</sup> Col Hatch documented to General Pope on June 16, 1880 that Victorio had close to 500 Apaches in Mexico on June 16, 1880, which implied help from other Apache tribes.<sup>214</sup> America was still attempting to cross the border to defeat Victorio.

The American army resorted to an illegal border crossing in June 1880 to track Victorio who was stuck in Mexico. Victorio was prevented from entering New Mexico territory from Mexico by the army in mid-June 1880.<sup>215</sup> This showed that the army was guarding the border very well. Col Hatch worked to get around the inability of the US army to go to Mexico.<sup>216</sup> Hatch recruited two Mexicans who lived in New Mexico territory to go to Mexico and attempt to get information on Victorio on June 24, 1880. General Pope cited the presence of Apaches near the Mexican border on July 1, 1880.<sup>217</sup> This implied the Apache had crossed the border since June 1880. General Pope also detailed the mission of two Mexican scouts sent across the Mexican border to find Victorio's position. There was no mention of official permission for the scouts to enter Mexico, though. This illegal use of Mexican scouts showed the army was willing to use illegal methods if legal ones failed to find Victorio.

The American army may not have found Victorio in July 1880, but Mexico did. They also allowed the beginning of cross-border cooperation that month most likely due to pressure

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<sup>212</sup> Col Hatch to AAA General, June 12, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 75, 134.

<sup>213</sup> Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows*, 187-218.

<sup>214</sup> General Pope to AAA General, June 16, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 83, 153-3.

<sup>215</sup> General Sheridan to General Pope, General Pope to Col Whipple, July 1, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 103, 218-221.

<sup>216</sup> Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows*, 283-305.

<sup>217</sup> General Sheridan to General Pope, General Pope to Col Whipple, July 1, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 103, 218-221.

from American Army authorities pressuring Mexico. The Victorio campaign in July and August 1880 was quite active.<sup>218</sup> Victorio's Apaches crossed into Mexico near Eagle Springs, Texas.<sup>219</sup> Col Valle of Mexico fought them around Ojo del Pino, Mexico on July 14, 1880 near Carrizal Mexico.<sup>220</sup> The Apaches were coming from Eagle Springs, Texas fifty miles away. This told us that Mexico started to patrol their border. This document also listed a report of the Mexican soldiers going into New Mexico to track the Apache, and Charles Berger tracking Victorio into Mexico in the Candelaria Mountains. Another document written July 17, 1880 by Hatch claimed that Mexico authorized 400 troops to enter America if pursuing Apaches.<sup>221</sup> This was another step towards cross-border operations that Col Buell was notified of. Lt General Sheridan supported this attempted cross-border operation.<sup>222</sup> It is not known if anything came of this development. Mexican troops crossed the Rio Grande tracking Victorio's Apache in Mexico that month.<sup>223</sup> They crossed the Rio Grande near Fort Quitman, because they got into an engagement with Victorio's Apache. This was evidence that Mexico was active in pursuing the Apache. This cross-border pursuit and tracking showed that both sides were patrolling their border making it harder for Victorio to cross. This document also detailed an understanding between Victorio and certain Mexicans indicating some level of acceptance of Victorio by them. This document finally cited Victorio entering Mexico twice during that time showing the border was still open to him. The Americans were aware of the Mexicans crossing the border on July 17, 1880, which showed

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<sup>218</sup> Col Robert Grierson, September 1, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 87.1, 158-164.

<sup>219</sup> Kathleen P Chamberlain, *Victorio : Apache Warrior and Chief* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2007), 190-192., Col Robert Grierson, September 1, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 87.1, 158-164.

<sup>220</sup> Col Robert Grierson, September 1, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 87.1, 158-164.

<sup>221</sup> Col Edward Hatch to AAA General, July 17, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original documents," 88.1, 191.

<sup>222</sup> General Sheridan, July 20, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original documents," 88.2, 192.

<sup>223</sup> Col Grierson to Col Hatch, July 30, 1880, Tinaja Del Las Palmas, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 91.1, 91.2, 195-6.

an acceptance of Mexicans in the effort to defeat Victorio.<sup>224</sup> Victorio was back in Mexico in July 1880 while cross-border cooperation was beginning.

Victorio was active in Chihuahua in July 1880, while the border was more secure.<sup>225</sup> Victorio's Apaches raided a thirty-mile region around Chihuahua City that month. This showed the Apaches still had raiding strength. It was at this time that cooperation between Mexico and America began to take shape. Mexican Col Valle had 400-500 troops to attack Victorio around the 15<sup>th</sup> of July 1880. Col Valle also had the permission to cross the border into the United States to attack Victorio, which was an important step in cross-border cooperation. This crossing does not appear to have happened, but the permission shows progress was being made. The American Army under Col Grierson out of Fort Stockton and Fort Davis in Texas made sure that Victorio never made it across into the United States during that time frame. Watt reported that on July 21, 1880 Col Valle and Victorio fought in the Sierra de Los Pino's. This was more evidence that Mexico was getting better at fighting Victorio. Col Grierson documented Victorio's activities in Mexico in July 1880.<sup>226</sup> Robert Grierson's diary confirmed that Victorio was in Mexico on July 23, 1880 40 miles south of the border.<sup>227</sup> He also documented on July 23, 1880 there was an engagement between Victorio and the Mexican army near Ojo del Pino, Mexico. This was another example of Mexico making it harder for Victorio to survive there. Grierson also claimed that Col Valle had permission to cross the Mexican-American border to pursue Victorio, but still was not ready to. Col Valle's soldiers fought Victorio again on July 25, 1880 showing their

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<sup>224</sup> "Annex Original Documents, "88.1., 88.2, 191-3.

<sup>225</sup> Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows*, 221-237.

<sup>226</sup> Col Robert Grierson, September 20, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents, "87.1, 158-164.

<sup>227</sup> Col Robert Grierson, September 1, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents, "87.2, 165-186.

determination to defeat him. This stage of the campaign was a new level of Mexico and America working together.

Victorio was in Mexico, while cross-border cooperation was beginning.<sup>228</sup> Col Valle gave Victorio's location in Bosque Bonita on July 29, 1880 and confirmed Mexican cooperation with the American military. Col Valle did not mention border crossing but mentioned sharing information. This was the step before allowing a border crossing. Victorio soon after this crossed the border into America showing the border was still open.

July 1880 was a busy month for Victorio and the military. Another border engagement was to be fought, but this time by Col Grierson just north of the American Mexican border.<sup>229</sup> The engagement was at Tinaja de las Palmas, which was close to Old Fort Quitman. He claimed that Victorio's Apaches were initially spotted opposite Ojo Caliente, TX on the Rio Grande. Victorio's Apaches approached Tinaja de las Palmas which is between Eagle Spring and Fort Quitman. The engagement happened on July 30, 1880. Victorio's Apaches retreated quickly after they saw the casualties as too high. Victorio and his Apaches returned to Mexico. Col Valle was unable to stop the Apaches from entering Mexico due to a lack of provisions, and an internal revolution. This internal revolution may have been Mexican President Dias stepping down, which he did in 1880.<sup>230</sup> This indicated that Mexico's uncontrolled American border may have been the result of too many problems for Mexico to deal with at the time. Victorio was back in Mexico again fighting Mexican authorities in August 1880.

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<sup>228</sup> Col Adolfo Valle to Cpt Brinkerhoff, July 29, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 90, 194.

<sup>229</sup> Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows*, 238-255.

<sup>230</sup> Ryan Ryal Miller, *Mexico: A History* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1985), 258.

Victorio's Apaches were in Mexico on August 1, 1880.<sup>231</sup> Victorio entered Texas near Rattlesnake Springs on August 6, 1880 but went back to Mexico after losing supplies, and realizing Col Grierson was already at Rattlesnake Springs. This confirmed the borders were better guarded. Victorio's Apaches were around El Paso near the border in August 1880.<sup>232</sup> On August 10, 1880 Victorio clashed with Mexican irregulars, which forced him to move north to New Mexico briefly.<sup>233</sup> Victorio was in Mexico again on August 12, 1880 according to General Grierson.<sup>234</sup> General Grierson claimed that a fight on August 11, 1880 forced Victorio into Mexico. This tells us that Victorio started to become less confident about crossing the border, because the border was harder to cross. It was Captain Nolan of the US Army that noticed on August 13, 1880 that Victorio had gone back into Mexico.<sup>235</sup> Grierson documented that on August 13, 1880 he crossed back into Mexico. Grierson claimed that if he were able to cross the border then he would have been able to defeat Victorio. This may be a boast, but it showed the importance of the border was well known to American authorities. He implied that Victorio, and some Mexicans had an understanding that allowed him to survive there, which may have some level of truth. Victorio was forced into Mexico twice by American troops according to a document dated August 14, 1880.<sup>236</sup> Victorio may have been crossing the border frequently, but the American army planned an illegal border crossing to find Victorio in August 1880.

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<sup>231</sup> Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows*, 257-276.

<sup>232</sup> Col Grierson, August, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 94, 201-2.

<sup>233</sup> Thrapp, *Victorio*, 288-314.

<sup>234</sup> Col Grierson, August, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original documents," 95, 97, 203-207.

<sup>235</sup> Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows*, 257-276. Col Robert Grierson, September 20, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 87.1, 158-164.

<sup>236</sup> Col Grierson to AA General, August 14, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 97, 205-6.



The *Grant County Herald* on August 6, 1880 claimed that Victorio crossed the border openly.<sup>237</sup> This is important, because a local newspaper was arguing the same point of this thesis. This shows that the local realized the same idea about border crossings allowed Victorio to get away from both Americans and Mexicans. That showed that local papers saw that the border crossings were helping Victorio. This tells us that not only did major American military figures see this, but local people saw the same thing. The Mexicans still may not have seen this element of how the campaign was playing out.

The US Army sent Captain Jack Crawford to Mexico illegally in August 1880 to find Victorio.<sup>238</sup> Crawford claimed that it was either Col Buell, or Col Hatch that ordered the operation. Crawford went as far as the edge of Victorio's camp in the Candelaria Mountains, but never went into his camp. This illegal expedition happened in the end of August and beginning of September 1880. Crawford still brought back good news for the army, which was the fact that Victorio was short on ammunition. Watt argued that the expedition by Crawford was done to see what Victorio was doing. This document cited the expedition into Mexico by Jack Crawford, and two other men into Mexico after August 1880.<sup>239</sup> Crawford alleged that he went into Mexico to track Victorio in August, 1880. He claimed that he tracked Victorio's trail into the Candelaria, Mountains in Mexico. Crawford claimed that he was told by General Buell to go into Mexico, and that he never tracked down Victorio. He crossed back into America near Fort Quitman, TX before Victorio died. This account has no dates and is far from the timeframe so we must take it with skepticism, but we can believe that he entered Mexico illegally. This one proved the

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<sup>237</sup> General Byrne, "General Byrne's Last Letter," *Grant County Herald*, September 11, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 98.1, 208-9.

<sup>238</sup> Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows*, 330-332., Dan L Thrapp, *Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1974), 291-2.

<sup>239</sup> Cpt Jack Crawford, February 1, 1965, The Pursuit of Victorio, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 110, 239-244.

American government used unauthorized means to cross the border to find Victorio who was still in Mexico. The launching of an illegal expedition to Mexico shows how desperate American authorities were to defeat Victorio.

Victorio was still in Mexico around August 19, 1880, while Americas illegal border crossing gained important reconnaissance information.<sup>240</sup> This document was written by Gen Grierson and claimed that near that day he crossed the Rio Grande close to Ojo Caliente and Ft Quitman, Tx. According to Watt after Victorio left for Mexico Col Grierson requested to follow Victorio to Mexico in late August 1880 but was denied by General Ord.<sup>241</sup> Grierson did however send two scouts with Charles Berger into Mexico. Berger entered Santa Recio, Mexico on August 22, 1880, and discovered that the Apaches had fought with some Mexican scouts under Franciso Mesa a week earlier. The sending of an illegal border crossing expedition shows that America was going to cross the border no matter what to catch Victorio. Victorio was now in the Candelaria Mountains. Col Grierson accused some Mexican citizens of working with Victorio's Apaches. Watt pointed out that many of these citizens felt they must do this to survive, but there may have been other motives. It is also important that up until now there was no official entry of the American Army into Mexico. Victorio's activity in Mexico prompted new attempts at border crossings between both sides.

The initiation of a cross-border expedition into Mexico of American army forces happened in August, 1880.<sup>242</sup> It was documented by a correspondence written between August, 1880 and February 1881 involving John Hay, General Buell, General Kinzie, Col Terrazas and

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<sup>240</sup> Col Grierson, August 19, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents, "99, 210.

<sup>241</sup> Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows*, 276-280.

<sup>242</sup> Thrapp, *Victorio*, 192., John Hay to Alexander Ramsey, Col Buell to AA General, General Buell, Cummings to Brinkerhoff, Lt H Kinzie to Buell, Cummings, Buell, Cummings to Dr Samaniego, Col Terrazas, to Buell, August 16, 1880 to February 12, 1881, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents, " 117, 266-283.

Capt. Brinkerhoff.<sup>243</sup> It began with Secretary of War Ramsey informing Chihuahua authorities that an American force could entered Mexico. It cited that American troops would enter Mexico after August 16, 1880. It cited that on August 31, 1880 that Victorio was in Chihuahua near lake Guzman where they could target him. It also included communication between Buell and Mexican authorities telling them Col Terrazas and col Valle were tracking Victorio to prevent him from entering America. The documents also listed September 15, 1880 as the date when the cross-border operation began. It also cited that there was a planned attack on Victorio's forces by American and Mexican forces around Lake Guzman Mexico. It also listed the American troops under Col Buell around the Candelaria Mountains on September 24, 1880. It also claimed there was another planned attack with General Buell and Col Terrazas against Victorio around September 26, 1880 around the Candelaria, Mountains. On October 7, 1880 they are discussing where to meet and coordinate another attack on Victorio. The situation changed on October 9, 1880 when the American troops were told to go home by the war department. These documents showed us that Mexico was finally willing to do what was needed to defeat Victorio, which was a border crossing. Both sides had been building towards this action slowly for months.

Victorio was headed toward Mexico in early September while the cross-border operations were still being discussed between the U.S. and Mexico.<sup>244</sup> This told us that the border was still uncontrolled despite advancements in previous months. Victorio was tracked heading to Mexico through the West and East Potrillo Mountains. September 1880 was when Col Buell and Governor Terrazas began to negotiate about Col Buell entering Mexico. Their communication

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<sup>243</sup> John Hay to Alexander Ramsey, Col Buell to AA General, General Buell, Cummings to Brinkerhoff, Lt H Kinzie to Buell, Cummings, Buell, Cummings to Dr Samaniego, Col Terrazas, to Buell, August 16, 1880 to February 12, 1881, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents, " 117, 266-283.

<sup>244</sup> Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows*, 338-353.

began after August 16, 1880. The cross-border operation would take time to affect Victorio though.

The plan to allow American troops to cross into Mexico was progressing by September 4, 1880, while Victorio hovered around the border.<sup>245</sup> Col Terrazas of Mexico announced cooperation on September 11, 1880.<sup>246</sup> In that document Terrazas recommended that the forces meet around Ojo Caliente later that month. This was the long sought cross-border campaign the American forces had been pushing for Mexico to accept. Victorio crossed the Mexican border south of the Florida mountains in New Mexico territory around September 10<sup>th</sup>, according to both General Buell<sup>247</sup> and Lt Col Dudley.<sup>248</sup> Another document supported this and claimed that he made it across the border to Lake Guzman near the Potrillo mountains.<sup>249</sup> This was by Brinkerhoff and was written on September 11, 1880. It supported the previous documents. The ability of Victorio to cross the border when they were discussing the border crossing campaign showed the campaign had yet to reach reality. The *Grant County Herald* published a letter from General Byrne on September 11, 1880 that claimed that Victorio was good at crossing the border easily and escaping both Mexican and American troops.<sup>250</sup> This told us that the papers saw the real reason Victorio was successful. The cooperative border campaign to defeat Victorio was not yet effective in September 1880.

America conducted an illegal border campaign while the real one was under way. Col Buell wrote a description of the Mexican campaign on November 20, 1880.<sup>251</sup> Buell confirmed

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<sup>245</sup> Col Buell, September 4, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 118.2, 286.

<sup>246</sup> Col Terrazas, September 11, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 119, 287.

<sup>247</sup> Col Buell to AAA General, September 10, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 112.1, 247-8.

<sup>248</sup> Lt Col Dudley to AAA General, September 9, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 112.3, 252-3.

<sup>249</sup> Cpt Brinkerhoff, September 11, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 116, 265.

<sup>250</sup> General Byrne, "General Byrne's Last Letter," *Grant County Herald*, September 11, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 98.1, 208-9.

<sup>251</sup> Col Buell to AA General, November 20, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 127.2, 302-308.

that he sent “ Citizen scouts” to monitor Victorio’s position in Mexico in August 1880. This showed desperation on the side of America. Buell confirmed that in August the idea of a cross-border campaign took form on both sides of the border, and that by September 15, Col Terrazas and Chihuahua authorities approved a cross-border campaign. He reported that the plan was for General Carr to meet the Mexicans at Boca Grande Pass, but Carr failed to meet them there. Lt Mills was at Palomas Lake in Mexico on September 24, 1880. Col Buell arrived at Lake Guzman, Mexico on September 25, 1880. The events in August to September 1880 are evidence of the pressure on both sides to cooperate on a cross-border campaign.

The cooperative border campaign was active in mid-September 1880. There were close to ten Texas Rangers in Mexico legally helping track down Victorio.<sup>252</sup> General Pope also acknowledged the two countries were working together mentioning Col Buell and Governor Terrazas on September 20, 1880.<sup>253</sup> On September 22, 1880 Pope acknowledged that the Victorio campaign was the result of Victorio being forced onto the San Carlos Reservation in the first place.<sup>254</sup> This highlighted the basic problem, and that army brass knew it. Lt Mills also wrote about the Mexican campaign to stop Victorio.<sup>255</sup> His document is dated October 11, 1880 and mentioned that around September 22, 1880 Mills worked with Gen Buell and Carr. It also mentioned that the locations they were interested in finding Victorio was Lake Guzman and the Candelaria Mountains, which are both in Mexico. This cross-border cooperation showed that both sides had been moved to see the right way to defeat Victorio through every other way failing.

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<sup>252</sup> Cpt Brinkerhoff, September 17, 1880, Reprinted in “ Annex Original Documents, “ 125, 298.

<sup>253</sup> General John Pope to General Ord, September 20, 1880, Reprinted in “Annex Original Documents, “ 120, 288.

<sup>254</sup> General Pope, September 22, 1880, Reprinted in “Annex Original Documents, “ 121, 289-90.

<sup>255</sup> Lt Stephen Mills, October 11, 1880, Reprinted in “Annex Original Documents,” 123, 294-296.

Col Buell entered Mexico on September 18, 1880 to help defeat Victorio.<sup>256</sup> Col Buell entered the West Potrillo Mountains in Mexico on September 23, 1880. Col Buell and other American forces met at Palomas Lake on September 24, 1880. Col Buell then headed towards Laguna de Guzman, and then towards Laguna de Santa Maria, and spent time waiting for Col Carr on September 26, 1880. Victorio was now in the Candelaria mountains. Col Buell then asked Col Grierson to join him in Mexico, but Col Grierson felt he was not legally allowed there. This shows that some Americans were uncomfortable with border crossings, not just Mexicans. Berger finally met Col Terrazas on September 30, 1880 along with 13 Texas Rangers who were also there to help catch Victorio. They met at Los Blancos and Buell had not yet arrived by September 29, 1880. There were four main commanders involved with the cross-border campaign including General Buell, General Carr, Col Terrazas, and the Chihuahua Governor were all involved in the cross-border campaign in Mexico.<sup>257</sup> Victorio's mindset was supported in a document by General Pope written on September 22, 1880.<sup>258</sup> This one cited that Victorio was content to live peacefully at the Warm Spring's Reservation, and not the hated San Carlos. This confirmed that some army officials saw that this campaign was avoidable, and risked violence sending him to San Carlos. Lt Mills documented the Mexican expedition on October 11, 1880.<sup>259</sup> Mills wrote that on September 22, 1880 he left White Water in New Mexico territory to go to Palomas Lake, Mexico. He recounted meeting with Col Buell, and General Buell around Lake Guzman. Mills recounted that on the 24<sup>th</sup> General Carr was at Boca Grande, Mexico. This document indicated that Col Grierson was in America guarding the Rio Grande, while there would be a planned meeting around Lake Palomas of Mexican and American forces.

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<sup>256</sup> Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows*, 362-374.

<sup>257</sup> General John Pope to General Ord, September 20, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 120, 288.

<sup>258</sup> General John Pope, September 22, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 121, 289-90.

<sup>259</sup> Lt Stephen Mills, October 11, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 123, 294-296.

Grierson guarding the Rio Grande showed that America was making sure their border was secured. Col Terrazas planned a failed combined attack on Victorio on September 24, 1880.<sup>260</sup> This document planned on the American force at Boca Grande combining with Mexican forces around Lake Guzman. Col Valle cited that on September 29<sup>th</sup> he met General Buell near the Candelaria Mountains 80 miles from Lake Guzman. The cross-border campaign moved into October 1880.

In October 1880, the Americans and Mexicans worked together in Mexico to defeat Victorio.<sup>261</sup> On October 1, 1880 Col Terrazas told Col Buell that Victorio was going for the Sierra de Los Pinos Mountains. Col Buell and Terrazas met on October 2, 1880 at Cantarrecio, Mexico. Col Buell and Terrazas tried to send Victorio towards Col Grierson. Col Grierson had decided to meet halfway and send a force of men to close to Ojo Caliente, TX around October 7, 1880 to prevent Victorio from going into Texas. It was during this time around the beginning of October 1880 that both Buell and Terrazas headed for the Candelaria Mountains. The cooperation ended between the US and Mexico was the most important step towards defeating Victorio.

Mexico took over the campaign against Victorio in Mexico in October 1880 after sending American forces home in early October 1880. Mexican Col Terrazas and Valle were now tracking Victorio with a plan to attack him.<sup>262</sup> Col Terrazas with Mata Ortiz tracked Victorio to Los Lagunas or Lagunita, Mexico before October 7, 1880. Col Terrazas and Ortiz on October 7 found proof that Victorio had been in Sierra de Los Pinos recently. Col Buell was southeast of Fort Quitman in Mexico going towards the Sierra Borracho and de Los Pinos when he was asked

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<sup>260</sup> Col Terrazas, September 11, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents, "119, 287.

<sup>261</sup> Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows*, 362-374.

<sup>262</sup> Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows*, 374-384., Thrapp, *Victorio*, 293-304.

to leave by Mexican Col Valle on October 9, 1880. The cooperation of Mexico and the US Army was over for 1880. This told us that Chihuahua would allow American help in their territory if they needed them, and that Chihuahua was done with American help with Victorio. It also told us that Chihuahua may have worried about national sovereignty when it came to having Americans in their territory too long. Col Buell left for America the next day. Watt claimed that Col Buell knew he was not in Mexico with official permission from the federal Mexican government, and that Col Terrazas may not have officially asked the American forces to leave, but all-American forces were gone by October 12, 1880. This also told us that the state of Chihuahua acted semi independently of the federal government of Mexico. This implies a division in power between the Mexican federal and state governments. America leaving Mexico was followed by the end of Victorio.

The end of Victorio was the result of the cooperative campaign between Mexico and America.<sup>263</sup> Col Buell also addressed his campaign into Mexico on October 15, 1880.<sup>264</sup> Buell listed the goals of the campaign, and that before they left Mexico, they were 100 miles south of Quitman, TX. This has one letter acknowledging the death of Victorio by Col Terrazas on October 14, 1880. This letter listed 78 Apache dead under Victorio including Victorio. The survivors of the defeat of Victorio were listed as 30 according to Brinkerhoff.<sup>265</sup> Col Buell also addressed his campaign into Mexico on October 15, 1880.<sup>266</sup> Buell reported that him, and Capt. Beyer pursued Victorio from the Candelaria Mountains on the 6<sup>th</sup> of October. Through this period Buell still had citizen scouts in Mexico. Buell cited that Jack Crawford was with him in

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<sup>263</sup> Col Buell to AA General, October 15, 1880, Reprinted in “Annex Original Documents,” 127.1, 301., Thrapp, *Victorio*, 293-304.

<sup>264</sup> Col Buell to AA General, October 15, 1880, Reprinted in “Annex Original Documents,” 127.1, 301.

<sup>265</sup> Cpt, Brinkerhoff, October 28, 1880, Reprinted in “Annex Original Documents,” 130, 311.

<sup>266</sup> Col Buell, November 20, 1880, Reprinted in “Annex Original Document,” 127.2, 302-9.




Mexico in the beginning of October. Buell cited that on October 9<sup>th</sup> Col Terrazas asked him to leave Chihuahua and head back to America. General Pope followed by a similar request on October 10<sup>th</sup>. Buell cited that his force was all on the American side by October 12, 1880. Buell also included a letter from Col Terrazas notifying him of Victorio's defeat on October 14, 1880. In that document Col Terrazas cited that he defeated Victorio who was out of ammunition at Tres Castillos killing 78 Apaches including Victorio taking 68 hostages. Buell claimed that his presence was helpful in defeating Victorio despite his leaving before. It seems that America's role in the campaign was the pivotal role of preventing Victorio from leaving the immediate area in Mexico until Victorio was trapped enough for Mexico to defeat him. Buell also cited that General Grierson was not allowed to cross the border. Grierson was always unsure about crossing it. The survivors of the defeat of Victorio are listed as 30 according to Brinkerhoff.<sup>267</sup> The cross-border campaign resulted in the death of Victorio.

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<sup>267</sup> Cpt, Brinkerhoff, October 28, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents, " 130, 311.

*Figure 2*

*Apache Border Crossings 1879-1880*



*Note.* Map of Victorio's border crossing showing both the uncontrolled aspect of the border and the fluidity of the border.

*Table 1*


*Table of Victorio's Border Crossings 1879-1880*

Crossing number	Date	location	who
2	10/24/1879	Potrillo Mountains, NM	Victorio
3	1/2/1880	Florida Mountains, NM	Victorio
4	1/ 22-30/1880	unknown	Victorio
5	1/31/1880	unknown	Victorio
6	2/2/1880	unknown	Victorio
7	2/23/1880	unknown	Victorio
8	5/31/1880	unknown	Victorio
9	Late June/1880	unknown	Victorio
11	7/14/1880	Eagle Springs, Texas	Victorio
14	7/30/1880	Eagle Springs/ Ft Quitman, TX	Victorio
15	8/1/1880	Eagle Springs/ Ft Quitman, TX	Victorio
16	8/6/1880	Rattlesnake Springs, TX	Victorio
17	8/7-9/1880	Rattlesnake Springs, TX	Victorio
18	8/11/1880	unknown	Victorio
19	8/12/1880	unknown	Victorio
24	9/1-6/1880	unknown	Victorio
25	9/9-10/1880	Florida Mountains, NM	Victorio

*Note.* This table shows the details behind each border crossing for the image above. Table by author.

*Figure 3*

*Military Border Crossings 1879-1880*



*Note.* The map above shows the militaries border crossings in this campaign. It helps illustrate the fluidity of the border, and the many unauthorized and illegal border crossings undertaken in this campaign.

*Table 2*

*Table of Military Border Crossings*

Crossing number	Date	location	Who
1	10/17/1879	South of Hillsboro, NM	Major Morrow
10	6/24/1880	unknown	Unofficial Army scouts
12	7/14/1880	Candelaria Mountains, Chihuahua	Charles Berger US Army
13	7/17/1880	unknown	Mexican troops
20	8/80	unknown	Jack Crawford US Army
21	9/1880	Ft Quitman, TX	Us Army
22	8/22/1880	Canta Recia, CH	Charles Berger and 2 scouts
23	9/15/1880	Lake Guzman	US army
26	Before September 17, 1880	Florida Mountains, NM	13 Texas Rangers
27	9/22/1880	White Water, NM	Lt Mills
29	10/9/1880	Sierra Boracha, De Las Pinos, CH	Us Army
28	10/12/1880	Unknown/ varied ?	US Army
30	10/28/1880	Tres Castillos, CH	Charles Berger US Army

Note. This table by the author gives details about the crossings for the above map. It helps explain in better detail the military border crossings. Crossings starting in the middle of September 1880 were authorized.

The *Grant County Herald* listed the death of Victorio on October 23, 1880.<sup>268</sup> Col Terrazas also announced the initial death of Victorio.<sup>269</sup> It reaffirmed that 78 Apaches died, along with 30 Apaches still unaccounted for. There are many other sources that support the same

<sup>268</sup> “Herald Extra,” *The Herald*, October 23, 1880, Reprinted in “Annex Original Documents,” 132, 314.

<sup>269</sup> Mariano Samaniego to General Buell, Col Buell to AAG, October 19-22, 1880, Reprinted in “Annex Original Documents,” 133, 134.1, 315-318.

story of the death of Victorio at Tres Castillo.<sup>270</sup> Victorio's death was not the end of the campaign.

American troops could enter Mexico officially on October 16, 1880 even though they had already entered.<sup>271</sup> This was from the Federal government in Mexico not the state of Chihuahua. This was a little too late, but still an important development. This shows that even if the state of Chihuahua was faster than the federal Mexican government at realizing this need, they still figured it out in the end. This document was signed by Mexican senate secretaries, Leonidas Torres, and Rivera y Rio. This meant it passed the Mexican Congress. It also stated that the issue was in the works since May 1880. It allowed American troops to enter Mexico to pursue Victorio for the first time on order of the Mexican federal government despite the death of Victorio making it a little outdated. The timing difference in Chihuahua approval of a border crossing campaign and Mexican federal approval was partly explained by Watt.<sup>272</sup> He cited evidence that supported Chihuahua was in a state of anarchy outside of the rest of Mexico. William S Kiser cited a similar situation in Chihuahua.<sup>273</sup> He cited evidence during the American Civil War between 1862-3 that supported an independent Chihuahua before the Victorio Campaign. He claimed that Chihuahua leaders acted independently of national Mexican leaders in this time. He also claimed that between the 1830s and the 1860s the northern Mexican states acted

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<sup>270</sup> "Terrassass Talks," *Daily New Mexican*, October 30, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 134.2, 316-318., Cpt Brinkerhoff, October 28, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 135, 319-320., Kathleen Chamberlain, *Victorio: Apache Warrior and Chief* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2007), 203-207., Dan L Thrapp, *Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1974), 310., Dan L Thrapp, *The Conquest of Apacheria* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1967), 208-209., Edwin R Sweeney, *From Cochise to Geronimo: The Chiricahua Apaches 1874-1886* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010), 165., David Roberts, *Once they Moved like the Wind: Cochise, Geronimo, and the Apache Wars* (New York: Touchstone, 1993), 188-189.

<sup>271</sup> Jose Fernandez to Mt Morgan, October 16, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 107, 227-9.

<sup>272</sup> Watt, *Horses Worn to Mere Shadows*, 316.

<sup>273</sup> William S Kiser, "We Must Have Chihuahua and Sonora," *Journal of the Civil War Era* 9, no. 2 (June, 2019): 196-222.

independently of the central Mexican government. He also cited an existing conflict between the northern Mexican states including Chihuahua and the central Mexican government. His claim is strengthened by the fact that the same Chihuahua Governor Terrazas who was in charge during the Victorio campaign was the same one who was acting independently of central Mexican authority in 1862-3. This conflict between Chihuahua and the rest of Mexico partly explains the timing of approval. This approval was important in symbolism, because American troops had already entered Mexico to help defeat Victorio.

It is now time to evaluate how that Apache themselves felt about the defeat at Tres Castillo. Eve Ball recorded that they believed that Victorio stabbed himself in the heart when he saw he had no way out.<sup>274</sup> Ball also recorded that Victorio, and his people fought until they used all their bullets before they killed themselves with their knives at Tres Castillo.<sup>275</sup> These reflected cultural meanings behind his death and role for the Apaches.

This chapter has featured many unauthorized border crossings on part of the Americans. These crossings brought important reconnaissance information for the Americans. These crossings did not bring about the defeat of Victorio or limit his success. His defeat was brought on by the cross-border campaign authorized by the Mexico in fall, 1880. The reason these unauthorized border crossings never brought about Victorio's defeat was that America lacked the logistical advantage they had when they had campaigned in American territory. The forts, communication lines, and supply lines are what kept them logistically connected in America, and the lack of those resources in Mexico prevented success in Mexico. This logistical side of the border crossings was another side to how important the border was in the Victorio campaign.

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<sup>274</sup> Ball, *In the Days of Victorio*, 11-102.



This chapter covered the beginning of the campaign until the defeat of Victorio in October 1880, and the evolution of the border that followed in that time. The Mexican-American border management evolved from loose management initially to a controlled border in fall, 1880. One of the most common themes in this chapter was the Americas continued attempts to convince Mexico to allow border crossings. A related theme was Americas continued unauthorized border crossings to attempt to defeat Victorio. The gradual cooperation between Mexico and America is a theme that showed itself numerous times in this chapter. This was based on need more than anything else. The defeat of Victorio resulted in Nana taking over from Victorio. Nana's priorities would change from Victorio's and result in a change goals for the Apache.



#### Chapter 4: Nana Takes over and Campaign Analysis.

The previous chapter we discussed how growing pressure on Mexico and America to approve a cross-border campaign to defeat Victorio played out. We also discussed how this eventually resulted in an effective cross-border campaign that resulted in the death and defeat of Victorio. The idea of both American and Mexican armies transitioning from hostile opponents to semi friendly forces on opposing sides of the border was a central theme in Chapter 2. Another theme was the historical importance of Mexico and the US working together to defeat Victorio in fall 1880 thirty years after fighting the Mexican-American War. In this chapter we will discuss the aftermath of Victorio's immediate defeat. This aftermath included the loss of Warm Springs, Apaches' increasing reluctance to fight US forces, and changing border management.

Mexico still viewed America as an invader when the campaign began, and border crossings became an issue. This was seen when you look at all the times US troops attempted to get permission to cross the border to defeat Victorio. This suspicion between two countries was very effective in allowing Victorio to cross the border to avoid both sides, because it initially prevented cross-border cooperation. The first country to see that a change in border policies was needed was the US. This was seen with the Ord Order. This was America's first attempt in this campaign to get around Mexico's refusal to allow troops across the border. This order, which has already been discussed allowed pursuit into Mexico by American troops if they were pursuing Apaches. We have seen that it was not used as much as it could have been, and that it was eventually revoked most likely due to Mexico's disapproval. This need for cross-border cooperation was also seen by the territory of New Mexico. Governor Wallace attempted to allow cross-border cooperation by Chihuahua troops into New Mexico in 1880. This was not approved by the Mexican federal government, and most importantly the American government was not

quite on board yet. These preliminary attempts at cross-border cooperation showed the beginning efforts to develop border policies that would defeat Victorio.

The first factor behind why the Victorio campaign between 1879-81 changed the borderland relationship for the Chiricahua Apache, Americans and Mexicans was the changing border management. This gradual change began with an uncontrolled border, and eventually resulted in a cooperative border. This was the result of the two countries being forced to work together to deal with Victorio and adapted the border to resolve the campaign. The Mexican-American War created an atmosphere of hostility between Americans and Mexicans when it came to the border. This began with Mexico seeing America as invaders who just wanted to take their territory. This attitude was still on Mexico's mind when the Victorio campaign began over three decades later.

The border situation changed in the summer of 1880. This change initially began with America and Mexico working together and exchanging information on their respective sides of their border to attempt to defeat Victorio. Both sides were communicating, which is the first step to any cooperation. They did this very well, but it was only the beginning of what was needed to defeat Victorio. There was still no immediate way to change border management policies, and it must be expected to take time to change.

The border changed in the fall, 1880. Rachel St John argued that pressure from the American military was pivotal to Mexico opening the border.<sup>276</sup> She argued that increasing pressure on Mexico eventually convinced Mexico to open its border in the fall of 1880. This step may have been what was needed for Mexico to finally allow cross-border cooperation to defeat

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<sup>276</sup> Rachel St John, *Line in the Sand: A History of the Western US Mexico Border* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 58-59.

Victorio in October 1880. The real change in border management between America and Mexico happened in August 1880. It was in that month that Mexican and American authorities began communicating about a potential border crossing operation. The approved cross-border operation began in September 1880 between the American army, and the Mexican state of Chihuahua. The Americans entered Mexico in mid-September 1880. The campaign lasted until mid-October 1880. The Americans were asked to leave on October 9, 1880. Their presence was still important, because it supplied the pressure needed on Victorio to defeat him from both sides. This cooperation was not going to last, because as soon as Victorio was killed the border went back to the previous way. His defeat had numerous side effects that changed everything. The limited cross-border campaign in fall, 1880 changed the situation for everybody.

The army dealt with the aftermath of Tres Castillos right away. Charles Berger's expedition into Mexico was sent to follow up on the remains of that expedition.<sup>277</sup> Berger followed the survivors of Tres Castillo around October 28, 1880 after Victorio was killed. Berger did not list if the pursuit into Mexico was officially allowed, but it was after Mexico allowed Americans to cross the Mexican border to fight Victorio. This implied pursuit could have been allowed. The document was dated November 10, 1880. The army now returned to fighting Nana, who was Victorio's replacement after his death at Tres Castillos.

We have discussed the American side of how they were changed by the Victorio Campaign, and now we need to discuss how the Apaches changed from this campaign. The most obvious way was the leadership change. The death of Victorio allowed Nana to take over. Victorio's death was an immediate result of collaborative border between America and Mexico.

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<sup>277</sup> Charles Berger, November 10, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents," 138, 324-326.

Victorio's successful defeat forced changes in border policies between Mexico and America, but it was not the only result of the campaign.

The change in leadership also accompanied a drastic drop in numbers for Victorio's Apaches. The Apaches had Nana as a leader after the death of Victorio. Nana's low numbers was an important result of the change in border management between Mexico and the US having a controlled border in this campaign. The low numbers prevented Nana's Apache from reaching Victorio's numbers, and as a result he was a far lower threat. He only had a total of 40 Apaches in 1881. One reason Nana's numbers were low was that many Apache did not want the trouble Victorio had caused.<sup>278</sup> Sweeney cited that at the time Nana took over for Victorio many Chiricahua were at San Carlos and considered Victorio a troublemaker. The Apache did not want anything to do with Victorio for this reason. The only Apaches that Nana could rally was Victorio's remaining veterans and possibly some Mescalero. This implies Apache revenge as the main motive. These Apache were not trying to avoid starvation and growing tolerant of reservation life. The anti Victorio feeling was so strong that many Chiricahua but not Chihenne enlisted as scouts to fight Nana in the summer of 1881. The Chihenne Apache were one of the subgroups of the Chiricahua Apache. Nana's low numbers were related to Victorio's death from controlled border policies, because if Victorio had succeeded, they may have supported him.

Lahti supported Sweeney in his interpretation about the low numbers.<sup>279</sup> He argued that Victorio had a limited influence on the Chiricahuas in the first place, and that at the time of his death many opposed his actions. He argued that post Victorio the Chiricahua were not a large fighting force anymore, and that Victorio was the last true large fighting force. He also cited that

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<sup>278</sup> Sweeney, *Cochise to Geronimo*, 167-184.

<sup>279</sup> Janne Lahti, *Wars for Empire: Apaches, The United States, and the Southwest Borderlands* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2017), 194-240.

beginning in 1881 the Chiricahua Apaches were increasingly desperate, and many did not want to fight any more. This was another result of Victorio's death. Lahti gave more large-scale reasons why Nana was not able to get the numbers Victorio had.

The low numbers and low fighting spirit also coincided with a change in priorities for Nana. He was Victorio's replacement but had different goals than Victorio as we have discussed. Nana effectively gave up on returning to Warm Springs and attempted to make Mexico his home. This was a sharp change from Victorio who died attempting to get Warm Springs back. Lahti also noticed Nana's change in priorities.<sup>280</sup> He cited that Victorio was fighting for Warm Springs, and that Nana was fighting for freedom from San Carlos. Lahti was careful to cite that Nana was not fighting for Warm Springs anymore. It had been lost. Nana's change in priorities according to Lahti supported the reasons behind the change in direction made by Nana. The giving up of Warm Springs was related to the defeat of Victorio, which was based on controlled border policies of Mexico and America.

The loss of the Warm Springs area was an important moral defeat for Nana and the warriors of Victorio who supported him. Warm Springs was considered the spiritual home to the Chiricahua Apache.<sup>281</sup> According to Chamberlain this was where Ussen the Apache god made the Apache and their world. It was where the Apache became Apache. It was also even more important to Victorio's Chihenne Apache. Originally the Warm Springs Apache or Chihenne were the largest group of Chiricahua, and they lived most of the time at Warm Springs area. This makes Warm Springs even more important for Victorio's Chihenne. Chamberlain's interpretation of why Warm Springs was important helps explain why Victorio fought so hard for

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<sup>280</sup> Lahti, *Wars for Empire*, 199.

<sup>281</sup> Kathleen P Chamberlain, *Victorio: Apache Warrior and Chief* ( Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2007), 4-14., Sweeney, *Cochise to Geronimo*, 35.

Warm Springs, and why Nana's abandonment of it was such a big moral defeat. The Victorio campaign and Victorio's death had forced the Chihenne Apache to give up their spiritual homeland because of the improved border management of Mexico and the US.

Nana crossed the border into Mexico in winter of 1880-1881.<sup>282</sup> He then went to the Mongollon Mountains and Ojo Caliente with around 30 Apaches. This tells us that Nana could still cross the border easily to avoid either side. The controlled border that resulted in Victorio's death was over. Watt cited that Captain Brinkerhoff cited the possibility of Nana ambushing Mexican cavalry near Carrizal, Mexico on November 16, 1880. The reason for this fear was that a sergeant possessing Victorio's saddle was mutilated. This sounded like Apache vengeance for Victorio's death. This supported the idea that there were survivors of Tres Castillo still fighting Victorios' war. Colonel Hatch knew that Victorio's death did not stop the war. General Wilcox also concluded that it was the survivors of Victorio's warriors that continued the war in November 1880. The location of Victorio's remaining warriors was 150 miles below the Mexican border this time, which was out of the immediate borderlands' region. This location came from an engagement between Apache and Mexican troops on December 15, 1880. This tells us that Mexico was still open to the Apache despite any previous efforts to stop the Apache from entering there. Nana crossed back from Mexico to New Mexico in January 1881 showing the border was open. The low numbers possibly limited Nana's ability to fight both the US and Mexico.

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<sup>282</sup> Robert N Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes: Nana's War 1880-1881* (Warwick: Helion, 2019), 17-40; Kathleen P Chamberlain, *Victorio: Apache Warrior and Chief* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2007), 211; Edwin R Sweeney, *From Cochise to Geronimo: The Chiricahua Apaches 1874-1886* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2010), 193.

Nana Apaches attacked in New Mexico in January 1881.<sup>283</sup> There were two attacks around January 14, 1881. The first was when two Mexicans and one Anglo-American were killed and mutilated. This attack was in New Mexico's Goodstight Mountains 12 miles from Fort Cummings, New Mexico.<sup>284</sup> The stagecoach that was attacked on January 14, 1881 was headed for the Rio Grande border, which tells us that the Apache were raiding in the borderlands region.<sup>285</sup> The *Grant County Herald* cited another attack on a stagecoach near Goodstight, New Mexico on January 14, 1881.<sup>286</sup> This was the published attack by Nana after the death of Victorio. It cited 35-40 warriors with Nana. This was a very drastic reduction in numbers for Nana versus Victorio. This reduction was one concrete result of Victorio's death. Reporters suspected this was an Apache attack, because Their fish cargo was in place, which indicated an Apache attack, as the Apache did not eat fish. According to Watt, Lt Col Dudley argued that the Apache may have entered New Mexico Territory through the Potrillo Mountains, east of the Florida Mountains. These attacks certified that Victorio's war was not over despite his death.

Nana's Apaches were hard to find during this time, but they raided again in New Mexico on January 21, 1881. The Apaches attacked in small raiding parties, and the army did not know where the Nana was for most of January 1881.<sup>287</sup> This was most likely due to Nana's small numbers, but also may have been due to Nana's reluctance to fight the US army.

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<sup>283</sup> Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes*, 42-55.

<sup>284</sup> Lt Col Dudley, January 15, 1881, Reprinted in Watt, *With my Face to My Bitter Foes*, Document 144.1, 256-7.

<sup>285</sup> "Letter to the Grant County Herald," *Grant County Herald*, January 14, 1881, Reprinted in Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes*, Document 144.2., 258-9.

<sup>286</sup> "Letter to the Grant County Herald," *Grant County Herald*, January 14, 1881, Reprinted in Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes*, Document 144.2., 258-9.

<sup>287</sup> Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes*, 43-81.

Nana continued to keep his forces on the move, and they returned across the border to Mexico by January 24, 1881.<sup>288</sup> This document dated January 24, 1881 confirmed that some Apache were staying in Chihuahua, and then moved up to New Mexico. This confirmed the border was open for Nana's Apaches. The report mentioned Victorio's band, but not Nana by name. It also referred to the stagecoach attack on January, 19th. Nana returned to Mexico around the end of January 1881 according to Watt.<sup>289</sup> This was another border crossing to avoid American forces. Watt argued that on January 28, 1881 Nana returned to Mexico through the Goodsight Mountains and Florida Mountains. New raids by Nana's Apache including his killing or scaring away 7,000 sheep according to a Mexican named Gonzalez on January 26, 1880. This reaffirmed the raiding power of Nana. There was also another short skirmish between Apaches and men at Cow Springs, New Mexico. Nana's Apaches under were working in small separate groups crossing the border separately, which was most likely a tactical decision. This also supported a different strategy based on smaller numbers. The Apaches were still strengthening from Tres Castillos. Nana's activities in Mexico inspired the US Army to follow Nana into Mexico in February 1881.

There was another pursuit of Nana into Mexico by American troops in February 1881.<sup>290</sup> On February 12, 1881 Lt Maney followed an Apache trail into Mexico to the Candelaria Mountains. It did not state if official permission was given, which implied it probably was not. Lt. Maney tracked Apaches 150 miles into Mexico. This told us that the army knew the only way to defeat Nana was through border crossings. Nana's Apache were still in Mexico around

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<sup>288</sup> Lt Col Price to General Wilcox, January 24, 1881, Reprinted in Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes*, Document 145, 260.

<sup>289</sup> Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes*, 60-77.

<sup>290</sup> Lt Maney to AAAG, February 20, 1881, Reprinted in Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes*, Document 150, 266.



February 19, 1881.<sup>291</sup> The US Army under Lt Maney and Captain Parker tracked them on their way to the Candelaria Mountains. Col Hatch was so worried about the Apache under Nana that he recommended US troops be stationed close to Lake Palomas in Mexico. This did not appear to have been approved. This tells us that Mexico was still weary of Americans in their territory. Watt argued that Col Buell's previous expedition into Mexico had generated enough unwanted controversy that it was enough to prevent the US army from allowing a cross-border expedition on their side. This tells us that that cross-border expedition was controversial to the authorities in Mexico and the US. It was decided that both sides would work separately on their respective sides of the border avoiding any controversy. Lt. Maney's appearance in Mexico tells us that the US did not completely support this idea. There was a small group of American soldiers in Mexico including Lt Maney and Lt Howard. Those two were looking in the Boca Grande Mountains for Nana's Apaches at Lake Palomas and Lake Guzman. It appeared that cross-border cooperation was over for now for the army, while Nana was in Mexico until July 1881. This Mexican expedition showed us that American forces knew crossing the border was the only way to defeat Nana despite Mexico's opposition to US troops on their soil. Nana's long absence from American territory signaled a change in tactics, which was a diminished capacity to attack American forces. This was an important piece of evidence that supports the claim that Nana's campaign after Victorio's death was different. The Apaches in that campaign were less motivated to fight the US army. Nana spent most of spring 1881 in Mexico away from American armies.

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<sup>291</sup> Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes*, 42-81.

Nana's Apaches returned to US soil in July 1881 from Mexico's Candelaria Mountains.<sup>292</sup> This was after a long absence from American territory due to low numbers. At the end of June there were three attacks by Apaches in Northern Chihuahua south of El Paso, Texas. This supported the idea that Nana was raiding based on the location of the attacks. Watt also claimed that Nana had a small group of trained warriors that could easily cross the border undetected at the time. This was a continuation of the previous border situation. This indicated Nana's ability to cross the border was still strong, and that the army knew it. Watt recorded that the initial attack by Nana in America was in Alamo Canyon, NM on July 17, 1881, and that he had between 13-40 warriors with him. July 1881 was the beginning of Nana's famous two-month long raid in America.<sup>293</sup> This raid showcased his strong raiding abilities. Nana recrossed back and forth between Mexico and the US numerous times in July and August 1880. Neither side was about to close the border.

Nana recrossed the Rio Grande into Mexico around July 25-28<sup>th</sup> 1881.<sup>294</sup> He crossed the Rio Grande close to that day six miles from San Jose heading from the Fra Cristobel, Mountains. A report also indicated Nana had between 30 and 40 Apaches with him. Nana's numbers tell us that Apache participation had taken a permanent drop. This could be due to lack of interest from capable Apaches. Inspector General Coppinger documented an example of a typical pursuit on August 15, 1881.<sup>295</sup> It detailed Lt Guilfoyle's pursuit of the Apaches to the Rio Grande, but not

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<sup>292</sup> Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes*, 82-94.

<sup>293</sup> Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes*, 82-94., Dan L Thrapp, *The Conquest of Apacheria* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 211-216., Edwin R Sweeney, *From Cochise to Geronimo: The Chiricahua Apache 1874-1886* (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2010), 174-175., David Roberts, *Once They Moved like the Wind : Cochise, Geronimo, and the Apache Wars* (New York: Touchstone, 1993), 194-195.

<sup>294</sup> General Coppinger to General Pope, August 15, 1881, Reprinted in Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes*, Document 166.2, 291.

<sup>295</sup> Lt Guilfoyle, April 28, 1890, Reprinted in Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes*, Document 152, 268-9.

over it in July 1881. This supported the closed border for the Americans, but not the Apache. Another document supported this claim and added the date of July 28, 1881 for the date of their pursuit of the Apaches.<sup>296</sup> Nana entered New Mexico again in August 1881.

Nana resumed raiding and killing Mexicans in New Mexico Territory in August 1881 near the San Mateo Mountains.<sup>297</sup> His numbers may have been low, but his determination was not diminished. Watt reported that one posse was formed to fight the Apaches. There was a group of Anglo Americans miners and Mexican-American farmers, and together they tried to find the Apaches on August 2, 1881, but they were attacked by the Apache in the San Mateo Mountains. Nana

Nana's Apache were back in Mexico by August 9, 1881. The location of the Nana's Apaches was mainly in Mexico and Texas prior to July when that raid began.<sup>298</sup> They crossed the border many times in July and August 1881. The numerous crossings tell us that the border was only secured for a temporary time in fall, 1880. Col Hatch writing on August 9, 1881 indicated that the army had kept the Apaches out of New Mexico for the most of summer, 1881. Around August, 1881 was when we get information about Nana's motives. This period was nana's most active period after the death of Victorio.

An alleged interview with Nana in August 1881 signaled a change in strategy from Victorio.<sup>299</sup> This document was based on an alleged interview between Nana and Col Stapleton on the 12<sup>th</sup> of August, 1881 and does not mention where it potentially happened. It indicated that Nana felt peace was a lost cause and indicates that war was the only path forward. In the

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<sup>296</sup> Lt Guilfoyle, July 28, 1881, Reprinted in Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes*, Document 155, 272.

<sup>297</sup> Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes*, 104-136.

<sup>298</sup> Col Hatch, August 9, 1881, Reprinted in Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes*, Document 161, 282.

<sup>299</sup> Lt Buck, August 14, 1881, Reprinted in Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes*, Document 157.1, 275.

interview Nana mentions his goal of killing as many whites, and Mexicans as possible. He also was focused on revenge in the interview. He also indicated in the interview he was ready to die fighting. The interview does not mention Warm Springs by name, just removal of existing Chiricahua Apaches from the San Carlos Reservation. This interview is more evidence that Nana was had a change in priorities from Victorio. Victorio died fighting for the future possibility of a peaceful existence at Warm Springs. Nana was drifting toward war as the only option. The document was dated August 14, 1881. This interview changed the goals of the campaign.<sup>300</sup>

Nana continued to raid New Mexico from Mexico despite his low numbers.<sup>301</sup> Col Hatch, stated in August Apache were in Mexico and Texas most of that time before July 1881, and his troops and Apache scouts pursued the Apache between Fort Cummings, New Mexico Territory and the Mexican border. Nana's numbers were listed at 15 in August 1881 and had still not recovered from Victorio's defeat.<sup>302</sup> Col Hatch documented that Nana's Apaches crossed into Mexico around August 13, 1881.<sup>303</sup> Nana recrossed into New Mexico in his continuing raid. The numerous border crossings showed us that the border could not be controlled for very long. Nana did not let his low numbers inhibit his raiding ability.

Nana raided various targets in New Mexico in August 1881 including the Chavez Ranch off the Alamosa River on August 16 in the Cuchillo Negro Mountains.<sup>304</sup> The reports listed six Mexicans dying in that raid. The army pursued the Apache under Nana and tried to engage them. Nanas successfully escaped the army, and their Mexican-American supporting forces. Nana was

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<sup>300</sup> Lt Buck, August 14, 1881, Reprinted in Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes*, Document 157.1, 275.

<sup>301</sup> Col Hatch, August 9, 1881, Reprinted in Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes*, Document 161, 282.

<sup>302</sup> Cpt Loud to General John Pope, August 12, 1881, Reprinted in Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes*, Document 163, 284-5.

<sup>303</sup> Col Hatch to General John Pope, August 13, 1881, Reprinted in Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes*, Document 164, 286.

<sup>304</sup> Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes*, 140-175.

back over the Mexican border by August 24, 1881 according to Watt showing a mastery of the border. Col Hatch thought that most of the Apaches under Nana went south over the Mexican Border. This was most likely the last time Nana was in the US that year. His departure into Mexico indicated the inability and lessening desire to continue an attack on American troops. His low numbers enabled both ideas. Nana was through with dealing with the American army for 1881.

Nana was in Mexico for the rest of 1881, but US troops did not stay on their side. Another report of a border crossing by Col Hatch was dated October 3, 1881.<sup>305</sup> It referred to members of the 9<sup>th</sup> Cavalry following Apache over the Rio Grande River. US forces were still willing to cross the border without permission to catch the Apaches. It identified the Apache as Mescalero's from Mexico, and claimed they were with Nana. These Apaches may have been there to bolster Nana's low numbers. Nana was in Mexico while the army was attempting to organize another cross-border campaign in November 1881.

Nana's raiding in summer, 1881 was so effective that General Pope asked that Mexico be consulted for another cross-border campaign.<sup>306</sup> This was written November 21, 1881, and involved Pope asking if they can get Mexico to approve another cross-border campaign to stop the raiding. Pope specifically asked if they could prevent the Apaches from taking refuge in Mexico. It also stressed the benefits of working together to stop the Apache from raiding. This showed that the army knew border crossings were required to defeat the Apaches, and that Nana was the master of the border crossing to avoid the American army. Watt argued that Juh, and Nana were in Mexico up until 1882, and in November 1881 Juh and Nana had made a treaty with

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<sup>305</sup> Col Edward Hatch, October 3, 1881, Reprinted in Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes*, Document 173, 306-7.

<sup>306</sup> General John Pope to Col Williams, November 21, 1881, Reprinted in Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes*, Document 177, 330.

towns in Northern Mexico.<sup>307</sup> Juh was a Chiricahua chief who spent most of his time in Mexico. This treaty is evidence that Juh and Nana were strong enough in Northern Mexico to influence a treaty with towns there. Watt argued that Juh and Nana were working together, and had up to 200 Apaches with them. This cooperative relationship was most likely the only way that Nana could increase his numbers. Watt reported a fight between Nana's warriors and Mexicans from Casa de Janos in November 1881. In January 1882 it was reported that Juh and Nana were raiding in Sonora 200 miles south of the border. This was most likely from increased troops from Juh. Nana stayed in Mexico indefinitely after November 1881. Nana's absence from the states indicated he did not have the ability or desire to fight the US anymore. Nana teamed up with Juh to bolster his numbers in winter 1881-1882.

Mexico finally agreed to cross-border cooperation in 1883, and Nana was captured and returned to San Carlos courtesy of General George Crook.<sup>308</sup> Sweeney cited that 375 Chiricahua Apaches from San Carlos met Nana in Mexico in September 1881. Nana spent the rest of 1881 until 1883 in Mexico. In spring 1883 General Crook organized a cross-border campaign and brought back all the Apaches destined for San Carlos from Mexico. Crook got approval from Sonora authorities for an international cross-border campaign on April 3, 1883. He entered Mexico on May 1, 1883, and by June 10, 1883 Crook was at the Mexican border with 300 Chiricahuas including Nana. Crook escorted the Apaches including Nana to San Carlos. This was the end to Victorio's war because Nana had returned to the place Victorio died trying to

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
<sup>307</sup> Watt, *With My Face to My Bitter Foes*, 140-175.

<sup>308</sup> Edwin R Sweeney, *From Cochise to Geronimo : The Chiricahua Apaches 1874-1886* ( Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2010),190-312., Kathleen P Chamberlain, *Victorio: Apache Warrior and Chief* ( Norman: University of Oklahoma,2007),209.

avoid. This was separate of Victorio's campaign. Nana accepting San Carlos showed that Nana had finally accepted the fate that Victorio died fighting.

*Figure 4*

*Border Crossings 1881, 1883*



*Note.* This map shows border crossings in 1881 and 1883. An important detail about this map is the fewer military crossings. They may have decreased following controversy related to the fall, 1880 border crossing.



*Table 3*

*Table of Border Crossings 1881, 1883*

Crossing number	Date	location	who
31	Winter 1880-1881	Mongollon, Mountains, NM	Nana
32	Early winter 1881	unknown	Nana
33	1/1-14/1881	Potrillo Mountains, NM	Nana
34	1/22-23/1881	Potrillo Mountains, NM	Nana
35	1/25-27/1881	unknown	Nana
36	2/12/1881	Candelaria Mountains, CH	Cpt Parker, Lt Howard, Lt Maney US Army
37	2/1881	Lake Palomas, Lake Guzman, CH	Cpt Parker, Lt Howard, Lt Maney US Army
38	7/1-16/1881	Candelaria Mountains, CH	Nana
39	7/25-28/1881	San Jose, Fra Cristobel Mountains, CH	Nana
40	8/1/1881	San Mateo Mountains, NM	Nana
41	8/8/1881	unknown	Nana
42	8/13/1881	unknown	Nana
43	8/24/1881	unknown	Nana
44	5/1/1883	Near Colonia Morelos, MX	General Crook
45	6/10/1883	Silver creek	General Crook, Nana +299 Apaches

*Note.* This table corresponds to the border crossings in the above map. Border crossings number 44 and 45 are the legal ones taken by General Crook that brought Nana back from Mexico to the San Carlos Reservation. Table by author.

The border evolution is important here. The Mexican and American governments went from being hostile neighbors to being forced to work together effectively to defeat Victorio's Apaches and later Nana's. This was a very unexpected change for both countries considering their history during the Mexican-American War. They both needed to defeat Victorio and Nana and forced cooperation was the only way they could defeat them. This was also important, because they were forced to look past their differences and political differences to see the bigger picture. They could not defeat him unless they worked together. In essence you could say the

Victorio campaign brought the bordering countries of America and Mexico together by forced need, at least temporarily.

There are some vital connections about borders that can be made here. All borders share common characteristics, along with three features that apply to the Mexican-American border in the Victorio Campaign.<sup>309</sup> The first one was that the Mexican-American border in New Mexico was not labeled on the ground. This factor was important, because in that immediate area it is not obvious there is a border there. This tells us a border was created by humans. This leads us another point by Kevin Marsh in his study of land use boundaries in the twentieth-century West. That point was that humans create borders, but in the case of the Victorio campaign it was European influenced societies, not the Apaches that created the border. The third point was the most important in the Victorio campaign was that borders create situations where neighbors must work together. This was seen in the Victorio campaign, because in the beginning both sides were hostile, but by late 1880 they had gotten good at working together in a friendly manner to defeat Victorio. In the case of the Mexican-American border the Victorio campaign forced both sides to become friendly to defeat a common enemy. These basic ideas about borders inform why both sides in the Victorio campaign behaved the way they did.

It is important to define what the Mexican-American border was in this campaign. In the beginning it was a hostile division between Mexico and America. It then changed to a vaguely defined invisible line that was so poorly guarded that Apaches crossed it so easily that both Mexico and America were powerless to stop the Apaches. It then changed again to an international political boundary with both sides working together on their respective sides to

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<sup>309</sup> Kevin Marsh, *Drawing Lines in the Forest: Creating Wilderness Areas in the Pacific Northwest* (Seattle: University of Washington, 2007), 14-18.

defeat Victorio. In the fall of 1880 before Victorio was killed it changed for the last time in this campaign. In its final form because of Victorio's death the border was an unlikely connection between two formerly hostile countries that made them unlikely friendly partners in their attempt to defeat Victorio.

The border was not absolutely off limits to Americans as this thesis has made clear. They crossed the Mexican border ten times in the time frame discussed in this thesis. They crossed it without Mexican permission seven out of those ten times. There were three times that their crossing was authorized by Mexican authorities, and those crossings were in the fall of 1880 when Victorio was defeated and in 1883. The logistical nature of those crossings was important to the American abilities south of the border. The American military was for the most part not effective south of the border. They crossed it numerous times, but their limited effectiveness south of it reinforced the fact that Mexican political support was needed south of the border.

The American military's lack of success south of the border was documented by General Buell on August 17, 1880.<sup>310</sup> His letter was written in context of an emerging agreement between Chihuahua and the American Army to allow a cross-border campaign to defeat Victorio. It should be known that by this time the American army had previously crossed into Chihuahua. This letter included the comment by General Buell that he would like a good map of Northern Chihuahua and Dr Samaniego of Chihuahua says that he will send one along. This transmission tells us that despite the American military's previous illegal entries into Chihuahua they did not have any real success due to a logistical disadvantage from not knowing the territory, a landscape the Apaches knew very well. This transmission confirmed that the American military lacked the

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<sup>310</sup> General Buell to Dr Samaniego, Dr Samaniego to General Buell, August 17-18, 1880, Reprinted in "Annex Original Documents, " Document 117, 269-270.

logistical advantage to succeed in Mexico, which cemented how important cross-border campaign were to defeat Victorio.

The reason the American military was not successful in Mexico when they were there illegally was, they had no backup in Mexico. The sources are silent on this, but the resources they took for granted in America were not in Mexico. These included supply lines, forts to use as to resupply, horse replacements, and exchanging information with other American forces to help plan out the campaign. These things were easy to access in American territory. It should be noted that the Americans communicated with Mexico numerous times from American territory. This was different because they were on their side of the border. The biggest reason that they lacked resources below the American border was because they could not let the Mexicans know they were there. If they let the Mexicans know they would be escorted out of Mexico in an embarrassing international incident. This secrecy was the price to pay for gambling on an illegal border campaign to defeat Victorio.

The other reason that the Americans lacked logistical support in Mexico was that many missions below the border were meant to be kept secret from Mexico. In those missions the logistics had to be kept contained within the expedition. This type of expedition would not be able to be overwhelming effective in the first place due to this reason. This situation was different when the Americans were invited to Chihuahua in 1880 and 1883. In that expedition America had the full logistical support they were used to, and then they still had to work with Mexico to bring Victorio down. The Americans performance and Mexicans performance against Victorio on their own soil was very solid. They both were able to defeat the Apaches on their own territory, but they could not finish the Apaches off in those defeats until they worked

together. The fact that they needed to work together shows that the logistical issues were better when combined.

The end of the Victorio campaign resulted in numerous changes for the Apaches, Mexico and the US that came from the change from the uncontrolled border to a temporary collaboratively controlled border before reverting to another soft border. This temporary border change was enough to create a significant difference for all affected parties. The management of the Mexican-American border was a very drastic change. The border began as a hostile border between two opposing sides, but through cooperation on part of Mexico and the US they gradually began to work together to defeat Victorio's Apache. In this sense Victorio brought the two rival powers together. The Victorio campaign also exposed the logistical side of border crossings. We have documented that US troops crossed numerous times over into Mexico. Those crossings were usually not successful. This was due to the Americans lack of logistical support in Mexico. This was something that should be expected, but still highlights that south of the border America was not able to achieve success. This supported the idea that cross-border authorization and cooperation was required for America to be successful in Mexico. This was exactly what happened for Victorio to be defeated. The third change that Victorio campaign resulted in was that Victorio himself was defeated. His immediate replacement with Nana was a sign that cross-border cooperation of the previously uncontrolled border was effective in defeating the Apache. The fourth way that the campaign changed the situation was that it resulted in lower numbers and moral for the Apaches involved. We have documented that after Victorio died most Apaches did not support his cause. There were even some Chiricahua that fought against Nana in 1881. This was due to that fact that many Apaches were currently on the San Carlos Reservation when Victorio died and did not want to support him due to hostility towards Victorio. This existing

apathy and hostility signaled a change in Apache priorities and prevented Nana from getting the same support. This also indicated that Nana may not have the same level of respect as Victorio otherwise Victorio may have felt the same numbers drop when he was alive. The low numbers were not the only effect on the Apache. The Chihenne Apache who were Victorio's Apaches gave up on the Warm Springs Reservation after Victorio died. Nana himself gave up on it and went to Mexico in the summer of 1881. He would eventually end up on the San Carlos Reservation in 1883. The Warm Springs Reservation was located at the spiritual heart of the Chiricahua Apache. Their act of giving it up tells us that they had been morally defeated, although their physical defeat was still to come. The Victorio campaign resulted in changing border management, exhibited the logistical challenges of working south of the border, resulted in a leadership change, lowered the numbers of Apaches willing to fight, and forced the Chihenne Apache to give up on their homeland all of which were related to shifts and the United States and Mexico wrestled with managing their shared border.

## Chapter 5: Conclusion

This thesis has shown that the evolving nature of the Mexican-American border during the Victorio Campaign was a pivotal force in the eventual defeat of Victorio and that the Apache resistance led by Victorio and Nana forced the US and Mexico to redefine management of the shared border. The border initially proved to be uncontrolled by the Americans and Mexicans. This situation allowed Victorio's Apaches to cross it easily. This ability was the main reason that he was able to survive successfully for as long as he did in the campaign. Victorio and Nana were able to cross the border whenever they felt the need. The behavior of Victorio's Apaches changed because of his campaign. In the beginning of the campaign his Apaches were able to cross the border whenever they needed to go raiding and trading. The controlled border in the fall of 1880 changed that behavior. It was still possible to go raiding and trading across the border, but they no longer could expect it to be consistently unguarded like it was before. They had to expect that Mexico would be protecting that border periodically from this point on. Mexican border management and their collaboration with US forces fundamentally changed the landscape of the border for everybody involved in the Victorio Campaign.

The Americans were aware of the need for border controls. This thesis has shown that American military officials routinely attempted to convince the Mexicans to allow cross-border campaigns to defeat Victorio, but this was not allowed until the fall of 1880. We have seen that the Americans refused to wait for Mexico to authorize border crossings in their quest to defeat Victorio. This showed us that the Americans were willing to ignore Mexican sovereignty to win this campaign. The Ord Order in 1877 was one of the many ways that the American army refused to honor international boundaries while using pursuit to come up with reasons to excuse

border crossing. We have seen that the Ord Order was eventually removed in 1880. The Americans used the border with varying levels of legality.

The Mexican army was more disciplined about border crossings. We have seen that they undertook only one border crossing in this campaign. That case happened because the Mexican army was in active pursuit of the Apaches. They were offered the ability to cross the border other times, but they constantly refused. This showed us that no matter how much they wanted to defeat Victorio they were not about to violate international boundaries to do it. The Mexicans also had a complex relationship with the Apache that has been documented in this thesis. There were numerous Mexicans that traded with Victorio's Apaches. This meant that many Mexicans accepted the Apaches at least when it came to survival, while many others still opposed the Apache. The Mexicans had a more legal approach to the border crossings.

The border was a fluid landscape as this thesis has showed. It was crossed numerous times by the Apache and Americans. It was also the site of trading and raiding between Apache, Mexicans and Americans. This trading and raiding were an established activity that the Apache had been doing for hundreds of years predating the Mexican-American border in this campaign. The Apaches created long term contacts in their trading and raiding before the new American border in 1848. These contacts also continued after the border management changed. The Mexicans that they traded with had positive feelings about the Apache related to their own survival. This border fluidity also continued throughout the campaign. The same trading and raiding contacts on both sides of the border continued throughout the campaign. The border fluidity can also be seen by the Americans' and Mexican's behavior. They were both forced to work together in their desire to defeat Victorio. It was a rocky journey towards working together, but the border was the center of that journey. The need for border control to defeat Victorio



united the countries, but that cooperation took some time for both to accept the reality that they had to work together.

The Apache themselves were the most affected by the evolution of the Mexican-American border. They were fighting against reservations and American control prior to the Victorio campaign. There were some researchers who think that the Victorio campaign was the last major resistance of the Chiricahua Apache.<sup>311</sup> This was one major change to the Apache behavior resulting from the change in the controlled border. This thesis has documented the motivation of the Chiricahua changed after Victorio died and was replaced by Nana. They appeared to be less motivated to fight anymore. In this way the campaign was a game changer for Apache priorities. They initially began fighting for the Warm Springs Reservation, but by the time Nana took over they had given up on that reservation. The Victorio campaign border evolution played a major part in the Apache admitting a level of moral defeat in the short term.

The evolution of the border is important in this thesis. We have documented that its evolution played an important role for all the effected parties. We will divide the effect of the changing border conditions by the parties affected. The Apache never accepted the international realities of the border when it came to control of territory. They were aware of them, but never acknowledged them in their actions. The Apaches did however use that international boundary to evade both sides very effectively. One thing that is not debated is that early border management was not able to contain the Apaches who crossed the border. The Americans had a different relationship to the border. They understood the legal ramifications of the border, but they were still inclined to ignore the legal issues and make unauthorized crossings whenever it suited them

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<sup>311</sup> Janne Lahti, *Wars for Empire: Apaches, The United States, and The Southwest Borderlands* ( Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2007), 207-8.

until they could cross it legally. The Ord Order was a good example of that. These eventual crossings, allowed by Mexico in 1880, resulted in Victorio's defeat. The Mexican government had the most legitimate way of dealing with the border. They only crossed the border once, which was based on an offer from the Americans because they were pursuing the Apaches. They were also reluctant to allow Americans to cross into Mexico, which was a logical choice. The three different groups of people both treated the Mexican-American border differently but were all attached to it for numerous reasons. This border also connected them in that it attracted all of them to it. They were all attracted to the borderlands for purpose of national survival. This survival was based on cultural practices, and not just physical survival. The Mexican border was like a magnet that attracted three groups of people that otherwise did not get along.

This thesis aimed to use primary sources to argue that the soft Mexican-American border allowed the Apaches to cross it easily to avoid both the American and Mexican forces. This thesis has also aimed to use those same sources to argue that the controlled border in the fall of 1880 was effective in defeating Victorio and cutting off access to border crossings. There was another side to this argument that we need to discuss related to how this claim related to the Apaches' warfare. This argument complicated the Apaches' reputation for being guerilla warriors. Watt cited that the Chiricahua Apache were excellent guerilla warriors.<sup>312</sup> The argument made in this thesis would add the US-Mexican border to this claim by Watt by complicating the Apaches' reputation as expert guerilla warriors. The primary sources were pivotal to the successful argument in this thesis. If the Chiricahua Apaches were as good at guerilla warfare as Watt claimed the border would not be as important.

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<sup>312</sup> Robert N Watt, *I Will Not Surrender the Hair of a Horse's Tail: The Victorio Campaign 1879* (Warwick: Helion, 2017), 38-60.

This thesis has added to the existing knowledge of the Chiricahua Apache, while placing it within the broader context of borderland studies. It has built on the research done by Lahti. Lahti focused on the Apaches in general, but this thesis looked at a specific campaign by the Warm Springs Apache. This thesis opened the door to a new type of research. It added to the existing knowledge by looking at how a specific campaign was related to changing border management. The research undertaken for this thesis found that it was not common for studies of Apache campaigns to combine with border studies. This thesis added this element to Apache research, which was looking at the interrelationship between border management and related campaigns that happened at the same time over those specific borders.

This thesis suggests an exciting new research area. The Chiricahua Apaches campaigns between 1854-1886 can now be researched in a new light. There are specific campaigns that can be looked at within the context of this thesis, including the later campaigns of Mangas Coloradas, campaigns of Cochise, and the final years of the Chiricahua wars between 1882-1886. The Geronimo campaign between 1885 and 1886 is a good example of one of those campaigns and the most known Chiricahua military campaign. In a future study this campaign can be discussed in the context of how Mexican-American border management affected the campaign and how the Apaches in turn contributed to the modernization of this international border.

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