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Language Conflict in Ukraine: Can Legislative Policies

Revive Ukrainian in the Eastern Region?

by

Olena Contor

A thesis

submitted in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts in the Department of Anthropology

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Committee Approval

To the Graduate Faculty:

The members of the committee appointed to examine the thesis of Lena Contor find it satisfactory and recommend that it be accepted.

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December 6, 2019

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This letter is your approval, please, keep this document in a safe place.

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Sincerely,

Ralph Baergen, PhD, MPH, CIP
Human Subjects Chair

Acknowledgements

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Thesis Abstract – Idaho State University (2021)

Since Ukraine proclaimed its independence from Russia in 1991, the status of Ukrainian has risen significantly. However, the major part of Ukraine, specifically the Central and Eastern regions, consists of the Russophone population who continue to use Russian daily. Legislative efforts are aimed toward government entities, including the education system that supports only Ukrainian-medium education. Children of the Russophone population have been exposed to the Ukrainian language during secondary education (which is equivalent to K through 12 in the U.S.) and, if they chose to do so, in college, amounting to 16 years of instruction in all subjects in Ukrainian. There are controversial attitudes toward language policies among the population of the Eastern Ukraine, which effect the process of reviving of Ukrainian in that area. The negative evaluation of the Ukrainian language leads to resistance by the Russophone population toward language shift. The purpose of this study is to determine whether the language shift from Russian to Ukrainian is happening among the younger generation, specifically among college students of the Zaporizhzhia National University, the major university of Zaporizhzhia, a city in the Eastern region of Ukraine.

Chapter 1: Introduction: Background to the Study

The year 2019 marked thirty years since Ukraine declared Ukrainian as its sole state language. Since then, the government applied different language policies to promote Ukrainian and raise its prestige. Language and language policies in Ukraine have been a matter of debate over a long period of time. Due to its unique history, the people of Ukraine have controversial opinions on the language policies which affect the process of their implementation and consequently the language shift. There are several languages spoken in Ukraine. The most widely used are Russian and Ukrainian. Since 1989, the official policy on the sole titular language in Ukraine gave Russian the status of a minority language. Due to the historical and cultural differences in Western and Eastern parts of Ukraine, the enthusiasm with which the legislative measures were implemented was quite different. Russian continues to dominate in the everyday life of Ukrainians in the Central and Eastern parts of Ukraine and in Crimea. There are several factors that contribute to this effect: there is still negative stigma associated with the use of Ukrainian and its low prestige, the legislative policies are not strictly implemented, there are flaws and ambiguities in the language policies, and general disregard for government policies in Eastern Ukraine. On the other hand, there is a tendency among the younger generation to support Ukrainianization.

The purpose of this study is to determine if the language policies have produced the desired by the authorities outcome, whether or not there has been the language shift from

Russian to Ukrainian among college students in Zaporizhzhia, and what influence the attitudes and ideologies have on the language shift in the predominantly Russian-speaking region of Ukraine.

The Ukrainian and Russian Languages in Ukraine: Historical Context

Ukraine is a country with a population of approximately 42.5 million. It became independent from the USSR in 1991 (State Statistics Service of Ukraine 2018). Two years prior to its independence, in 1989, the Ukrainian government gave Ukrainian the status of official state language. Since then, the status of the Ukrainian language has risen significantly due to the change in political and language ideologies favoring nationalism and Ukrainian identity. However, today, almost thirty years later, Ukrainian is spoken predominantly in the Western part of Ukraine. Russian continues to be the language of preference among the majority in the Eastern and Southern parts of Ukraine and among many in the Central part. For simplicity, from now on, I will refer to the Russian-speaking region of Ukraine as Eastern Ukraine and to the Ukrainian-speaking region as Western Ukraine.

The history of Ukraine can explain the uneven distribution of Ukrainian and Russian speaking populations. The territory of Ukraine as we know it today was divided and belonged to different empires. From the ninth to the mid-thirteenth centuries, there existed a principality known as Kyivan-Rus' with Kyiv as its center. Its territory included some parts of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (Wilson 2004; Reid 1997). After the fall of Kyivan-Rus' and until the independence of Ukraine in 1991, the territories that now

comprise modern Ukraine were divided among other non-Ukrainian ethnolinguistic

neighboring empires. There was a significantly different development of Ukrainian in

Western and Eastern areas of Ukraine, the results of which are now seen in contemporary

language practices (Bilanuk and Melnyk 2008).

Linguistic and Political History of Ukraine Before the USSR

It is worth mentioning that the history of Ukraine after the fall of Kyivan-Rus' and before

World War II is very unclear. First of all, Kyivan-Rus' was a political unit that stretched

from the Black Sea to the Scandinavian Peninsula and encompassed Finnic people of

Europe and East Slavs. This means that today several existing nations have the right to

claim Kyivan-Rus' as their cultural homeland. Second, it is a subjective decision to look

at the history of Ukraine as one whole continuum. When occupied by other political

entities, this principality's boundaries changed continually and it was known under

different names, such as: Galicia-Volhynia, a name the Western part of Ukraine was

referred to for a century after the fall of Kyivan-Rus'; the Cossack, a name used to refer to

Central and Eastern Ukraine from the late fifteenth through eighteenth centuries; the

Ukrainian National Republic was used in reference to Central Ukraine at the end of the

nineteenth century, of which the Western region had not yet been a part of the Ukrainian

State until December 1918; and the Ukrainian territory, now including the Western parts

as well (Kuchabsky 2009, 25; Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine 2001). This contributed

to the weak development of a Ukrainian ethnic identity along with the lack of common

myths and history, which will be discussed more in detail in the sub-chapter *Weak

National Identity*.

For over a century, from the middle of the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, the Western part of Ukraine was under Polish administration, which was known as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Later, for another century, from the end of the eighteenth century until 1867 it belonged to the Austrian Empire, and from 1867 through the early twentieth century to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. After World War I and until World War II, some of the Western parts of Ukraine belonged to Poland once again, and some parts were under Romania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (Chemberlin 1944). Even though the languages of the occupiers had more prestige than Ukrainian, the Polish and Austrian governments were supportive toward the development of national minorities that lived on the territory of the empires (Bilniuk & Melnyk 2008). "The Austrian government in particular supported the development of the nationalities populating its empire and their languages" (Bilaniuk & Melnyk 2008, 348). The Ukrainian language was able to continue developing even under a foreign regime.

At the same time, from the middle of the seventeenth century, when the Ukrainian Cossacks accepted the Russian Tsar as their ruler, the Eastern part of Ukraine belonged to the Russian Empire. The Russian Tsar, Alexander II, intended to unify the empire through the spread of Russian (Hrushevsky 1970). He did not recognize the languages of the minorities living on the territory of the Russian Empire as independent languages and prohibited their use through new language policies. "Alexander II forbade the publication of all works in the Ukrainian language, with the exception of historical documents ... His decree also banned the importation of Ukrainian publications from abroad, and prohibited Ukrainian theatrical and musical performances" (Liber 1982, 674). Russian became a

required subject in all schools. Students were prohibited to use their native languages even during recess (Pavlenko 2009). Ukrainian was given the status of a regional dialect. Consequently, Ukrainian was not developing as successfully in the East of Ukraine as in the West (Bilaniuk & Melnyk; Hrycak 2006).

In 1917, the Russian revolution overthrew the tsarist regime, and the central and eastern parts of Ukraine that used to belong to the Russian Empire became independent and established a government that lasted from 1918 to 1920. At the end of World War I, they joined the newly-established Soviet Union under the name of Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, one of the fifteen future republics that comprised the USSR. A similar situation was happening in Western Ukraine; it achieved its independence for a short time between 1918 and 1919, but once again became a part of Poland until the end of World War II when it was attached to the Soviet Ukraine within the USSR (Reid 1997; Hrushevsky 1970).

Soviet Language Policies

During the leadership of Vladimir Lenin, the first head of government of the Soviet Union, from 1922 until 1924, the Soviet government approved the development of the nationalities within the USSR. According to Bilaniuk and Milnyk (2008), "early Soviet policies supported Ukrainian language and culture to some extent as part of a policy of 'indigenization' (meant to mobilize local support by counteracting oppressive tsarist policies)" (348). Stalin's rule began in 1924, and by 1930 strict language polices were implemented to insure Russification of Ukraine, which impeded significantly the development of the Ukrainian language. During the Soviet period, Russian was an

obligatory subject while Ukrainian was an elective. The number of hours dedicated to Russian increased and publications of textbooks and teacher training became a priority (Pavlenko 2009).

Many words were removed from Ukrainian dictionaries leaving cognate synonyms in order to bring Ukrainian closer to Russian. Orthographic changes were made as well. "Both political preferability and social prestige of Russian fostered the spread of Russian phonological, lexical, and syntactic influences in everyday Ukrainian usage" (Bilanuk 2004, 413). "Ukrainian language was gradually forced out from scientific fields, … a large number of Ukrainian books were eliminated from libraries" (Bilanuk & Melnyk 2008, 348). This strategy impeded the development of the Ukrainian language.

We can see a stark contrast between linguistic contexts of Western and Eastern Ukraine during the pre-Soviet era. The Ukrainian language continued developing while the Western part still belonged to the Polish and Austro-Hungarian governments, and due to not very strict language policies, the Ukrainian population developed a sense of Ukrainian identity. After incorporation into the Soviet Union at the end of World War II, the Russification policies affected this region only for forty years. With the fall of the USSR, it was easier for this part of Ukraine to implement the legislative changes in support of Ukrainian, where Russian was a relatively new language without any historical or cultural significance for that region. In contrast, the Eastern region of Ukraine had Russian influence for almost four hundred years (Bilanuk and Melnyk 2008).

Chapter 2: Linguistic Landscape as an Indicator of Language Preference

Historical context explains the contemporary language practices and the uneven distribution of Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking populations with Ukrainian being concentrated in the West and Russian in the East of Ukraine. One of the ways to examine regional preference of a language is by looking at the linguistic landscape of that region. This approach can give an insight to the understanding of language change and language conflict, especially within a bilingual context.

The Theory of Linguistic Landscape

There is a growing interest in the study of linguistic landscape in sociolinguistics and various other fields (Shohamy and Gorter 2009). Most often, a language of interest is analyzed in its spoken or written form. It is less common to study a language as it is used and displayed by government entities, organizations, and individuals, or the reasons behind the use of a particular language whether functional or symbolic (Shohamy and Gorter 2009). The ideas about symbolic power as developed by Bourdieu (1991) in *Language and Symbolic Power* can be applied to understand the power relations between different groups of a society. This study is especially insightful in a multilingual context, because "...each instance of language choice and presentation in the public signage transmits symbolic messages regarding legitimacy, centrality, and relevance of particular language and the people they represent" (Pavlenko 2009, 247).

There are several definitions provided by various scholars of the meaning of linguistic landscape. According to Landry and Bourhis (1997), linguistic landscape is "the language of public road signs, advertising billboards, street names, place names, commercial shop signs, and public signs on government buildings" (25). Gorter (2006) defined linguistic landscape as "the use of language in its written form in public sphere" (2). Ban-Rafael *et al*. (2006) offer this definition - "any sign announcement located outside or inside a public institution or a private business in a given geographical location" (14). Linguistic landscape as an area of sociolinguistics is particularly relevant to this study, because it examines linguistic and social changes that are happening (if they are happening) in a newly established post-Soviet country, such as Ukraine. There are different categories within the study of linguistic landscape. One area is the typology of the sign authorship.

Pavlenko (2009) defines two basic categories of sign authorship: *top-down* which represents official signs placed by government and the government organizations, and *bottom-up* which represents non-official signs placed by individuals and private organizations (250). Private signs are not bound by law to adhere to the official language of Ukraine, in contrast with official signs. The former ones are of special interest in this study, because they can indicate the language of preference in the region, specifically, the language of preference of the initiator and/or of the intended audience of the sign and show the level of prestige of the chosen language. While government organizations are bound by law to use the official language in the signage, private organizations are a good indicator of a language choice free from legal influence.

There are two basic types of commercial enterprises: those that resemble government organizations, such as banks, credit unions, attorney offices, etc. and private businesses. Such a division correlates with the use of a particular language. In this case, the former type uses mostly Ukrainian for their signs, because they work under "highly restricted national regulations" (Bever 2010, 12). The latter type uses mainly Russian to convey prestige and attract potential customers. Grin's (2006) ideas about the economic reasons for language choices explain the use of a particular language in private commercial businesses, and support the theory of language prestige.

Linguistic Landscape of Zaporizhzhia

Upon arriving in Zaporizhzhia, a non-native speaker of Russian or Ukrainian can easily be misled by the pervasive visibility of Ukrainian language through public road signs, billboards, street names, and other official signs placed by the government, which can give an impression of a monolingual city. As explained in the previous sub-chapter *Theory of linguistic landscape,* while the government entities need to comply with the legislative policies about language use, private businesses and individuals may choose a language of their preference, which usually points to the prestige of the chosen language and indicates the language of competence of the initiator and the intended audience of the sign (Pavlenko 2009).

In June of 2018, two years prior to conducting my research, I applied the study of Pavlenko (2009) to an analysis of the linguistic landscape of Zaporizhzhia. As the object

of my analysis, I chose billboards at 35 bus stops (five for each seven main administrative regions in the city). Two factors contributed to my choice. Firstly, due to less than universal access to the Internet in Ukraine, the main way to advertise, buy, or sell goods and services is through attaching paper bulletins to billboards at bus stops. Secondly, the main mode of transportation in Ukraine is public transportation. In this industrial city with almost one million people, this brings masses of people to bus stops where they read posted bulletins while waiting for the necessary transportation.

The results of my examination showed that even though Ukrainian is very visible through official signs, it is used very rarely in private signs. The bulletins placed by individuals using Ukrainian constituted from 0 to about two percent of all the bulletins; the other 98% were in Russian. Sturdier signs and advertising posters placed by small businesses using Ukrainian constituted about five percent; 95% were in Russian (see Appendix F). Of course, there are limitations to this analysis. Firstly, it cannot be generalized and the findings do not represent all citizens of the city, because perhaps those who did not use the poster boards would choose to use Ukrainian if they ever needed to advertise, buy, or sell. Secondly, there are many more bus stops that were not examined that might contain a higher percentage of bulletins that used Ukrainian as a medium. According to Pavlenko (2009), such questions as to how many and which streets, bus stops, and areas of a city can be selected to be "sufficient for generalizations about the city as a whole" need to be taken into account to determine the representativeness and scope of a sample (249).

Despite the limitations of such examination, analyzing quantitatively the frequency of use of a specific language can give us a general idea of the prestige and centrality of a particular language (Pavlenko 2009). Shohamy and Waksman (2009) argue that in addition to public signage, linguistic landscape should also include "what is heard [and] what is spoken" (313). It is not hard to observe what is spoken by simply taking a bus, going to a store or a community event. By these parameters, coupled with the results of my examination of the poster boards, it is easy to evaluate Zaporizhzhia as a city with a predominantly Russian speaking population. This is one of the measurable factors of why Zaporizhzhia can represent the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine and was chosen as a place of this study.

Chapter 3: Education as a Means of Promoting Ukrainian

Hornberger and De Kome (2018) maintain that "mandatory, nation-state-controlled schooling" is a powerful tool in language revitalization (94). "The prestige of schools as social institutions remains high, making education an important social domain within which to push back against the inequalities experienced by endangered language speakers and learners..." (Hornberger and De Kome 2018, 95). Even though Ukrainian is not an endangered language, the government does not underestimate the power of "mandatory, nation-state-controlled schooling" as a means to enforce monolingual legislation policy.

Education and government are the spheres where language policies concerning the use of Ukrainian were implemented first. Education is seen as decisive in the future of the Ukrainian language (Besters-Dilger 2007, 258). According to the language education policies, all school-going children in Ukraine complete their secondary and higher education with Ukrainian as the language of instruction. While this can be the case in Western Ukraine, in the Eastern part of the country, this remains a wishful hope. Due to the unstable economy, the government is unable to provide and finance extensive training of the educators of all levels in each of their scientific fields. They are left on their own to translate and adjust their curriculum to abide with the language policy. A'Beckett (2013) states that "some universities in eastern Ukraine have forced their lecturers to sign a pledge to teach exclusively in Ukrainian... solely for relieving authorities of their responsibilities" (33).

According to my own sources, some educators have turned for help to dictionaries and Google to translate their lectures. While their limited knowledge of Ukrainian might be sufficient for translation and writing, they feel inadequate to conduct their lectures in Ukrainian, because it requires a higher level of knowledge, competence, and fluency of the language. Often, all they can do is to translate a lecture and deliver it in Ukrainian. This is where it ends. In a conversation with one of the professors of the university where I conducted my research, she reflected that after she delivers her translated lecture the lesson transitions to a more interactive mode where the students could ask questions. This is where she has to start using Russian due to her lack of specialized vocabulary and fluency in Ukrainian. According to A'Beckett (2013), "academic authorities in the East and South face a dilemma as to whether to employ a lecturer who is fluent in Ukrainian but ignorant in their field of sciences or to keep a professional with limited skills in the state language (33).

Chapter 4: Mass Media as a Means of Promoting Ukrainian

Mass media is seen as possibly having a great impact on language maintenance and language status, and for this reason, minority language activists all over the world have put their efforts into promoting their languages through the mass media. We can see this pattern in the examples of Catalan, Welsh, Basque and many other languages that are striving to survive and/or raise their prestige. The Ukrainian language is no exception in this matter. On April 14, 2004, "the Ukrainian National Council for Television and Radio adopted the unexpected resolution that obliged all national and international broadcasters to broadcast only in Ukrainian" (A'Beckett 2013, 38). However, as with the legislation concerning education, in the East, there was a delay in the implementation of the language policies concerning the use of Ukrainian in the mass media. The local eastern channels and even the state channels continued to run some shows in Russian and invite Russian-speaking actors and artists.

In the following years, there were more attempts to increase measures to control the language use in the mass media. On March 26, 2008, the Ukrainian National Council for Television and Radio required that "the total volume of information presented in the Ukrainian language on non-public radio and television channels must make up at least 70 percent of the overall volume of broadcasting time" (A'Backett 2013, 38). A'Backett (2013) points out that it would be hard to measure the volume of the use of each language due to the common practice of non-accommodating bilingualism where each speaker adheres to the language of their competence. Most often, TV show hosts conduct their

shows in Ukrainian, while the guests and other participants can use either Russian or Ukrainian. This unclear policy about language use on TV was one of the loopholes to avoid its implementation. Russian continued to be prevalent in many TV shows. In 2012, the policy that required at least 70 percent of overall volume of broadcasting was canceled due to the cost of dubbing and subtitling (A'Backett 2013). The idea of translating Russian-speakers on TV into the Ukrainian language for the Russian-speaking audience seemed pointless and absurd to many involved in the television business as well as to the audience in the East.

The slow pace of implementation of the language laws in the East and pervasive use of Russian in the mass media instigated more changes in the laws. On October 13, 2017, new changes were adopted into the law to ensure that 75 percent of the overall volume of broadcasting would be in the Ukrainian language, with financial penalties attached for its violation in the amount of 400,000 gryvnas (the local currency), which is equivalent to about $16,000. The law allowed TV and radio shows to be broadcast without dubbing if the guests of the shows spoke Russian. On March 15, 2019, more legal changes were adopted that increased quotas for the Ukrainian language on radio and television to 90 percent instead of the previously adopted 75 per cent, with the requirement of 60 per cent to be broadcast between 7am and 10 pm (Zakon 2020). The addition of a specific time was a counter-strategy to the practice in the East of broadcasting the previously required 75 per cent in Ukrainian after midnight. The amendment to the law that allowed the Russian language to be present in TV shows and on the radio in cases when guests and speakers were speaking was deleted.

Being a part of the mass media, the movie-making industry could have been influential in affecting the attitudes toward the state language. Ukrainian movie-making has always been less favored than Russian. During the Soviet Union era, there existed two Ukrainian film studios (Dovzhenko Film Studio and the Odessa Film Studio). In the early 1980s, they produced approximately 30 to 45 films, 20 animation films and a few hundred documentary and educational films yearly (Labunka 2005). With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the economic crises that followed, coupled with the growth of TV audiences, the Ukrainian film industry began to decline. The number of movie-goers declined from 552 million a year in 1990 to five million in 1999. But even before this decline, out of 136 films produced in Ukraine, only 54 were filmed in Ukrainian. By the early 1990s, film production had decreased by almost half. By the end of the last century, Ukrainian film studios produced less than four films a year. To sustain themselves they had to rely on foreign productions. The period of independence was characterized by the decline of the Ukrainian film industry and attempts to restore it in the 2000-2010s.

In addition to the failing attempts to revive Ukrainian movie-making, dubbing in Ukrainian turned out to be unprofitable as well. This financial factor and the fact that Russian is the language of competence in the East were detrimental to the speed of implementation of legislation concerning the language of mass media in Eastern Ukraine. In 2007, Ukrainian language activists organized a boycott against Russian-dubbed films in movie theaters and in rental shops (Bilanuk and Melnyk 2008). They created a website where participants could sign a pledge that they would not attend films in movie theaters

with Russian dubbing. The goal of the organizers of the website was to collect one thousand signatures. As a result, 5,302 individuals signed the pledge (Pledgebank). Film distributors eventually agreed to the protesters' demands. This is an example of weak implementation of the legislative policies and the need for external efforts on the part of Ukrainian language activists in order to bring Ukrainian into the movie theaters.

It should be mentioned that movie distribution in Ukraine is a private business. While on the one hand, those in the movie business are forced to comply with language legislation policies, on the other hand, they need to insure the popularity of their products by appealing to the preferences of their customers, specifically to their language of competence. The fact that all movie theaters are restricted to showing only Ukrainian-dubbed movies helps to eliminate competition with Russian-dubbed movies. However, according to Riabchuk (2007), poorly dubbed films, due to limited financing, can impede the reviving of the Ukrainian language. In addition to the poor quality of dubbing some films into Ukrainian, easy, and often free, access to movies online with Russian dubbing is the reason many prefer watching movies with Russian dubbing at home to watching Ukrainian-dubbed movies in a movie theater.

While there is a general belief that the mass media can have a great impact on the use of a particular language, Cormack (2007) argues that the effect of mass media in this respect is not very clear. In agreement with that, but applying it to indigenous languages, Browne (1996) states: "There is virtually no 'hard' (scientific) evidence to indicate that the initiation of an indigenous language media service helps to restore or revive its usage, but

all stations broadcasting substantial amounts of such languages certainly have that hope and expectation" (169). Nevertheless, there are other positive effects that the mass media can produce. Cormack (1998) argues that a community (in our case, the Ukrainian-speaking community) would not be able to successfully develop politically without being able to participate in the public sphere using its language. The centrality of a language is recognized through its presence in the public sphere (Cormack 1998, 43). Another benefit of the mass media is the ability to "...meld people into a sense of a larger community" (Cormack 2007, 54). While a direct effect of the mass media on language revival is uncertain, these outcomes might eventually lead to the desired language shift if the language laws concerning the mass media are implemented. Nevertheless, the fact is that they are not, or at least not completely.

A specific example of a violation of the language laws concerning the use of the state language in the mass media is described by Labunka (2005): "... the Russian-owned distribution companies engage in deceptive advertising and marketing by plastering the movie theaters with Ukrainian-language film posters promoting the latest release, while simultaneously projecting the same now Russian-dubbed film inside the theaters" (1). From my yearly visits to Zaporizhzhia, I can add that even after the adoption of the new amendments to the language law on March 15, 2019 many popular TV shows are broadcast in Russian while being advertised in Ukrainian, giving an impression of a show with Ukrainian dubbing. The sub-chapter *Disregard for Government Policies among the Population of Eastern Ukraine* explains why the language laws (and laws in general) are not implemented in a timely and proper manner. The Eastern population of Ukraine,

including officials, is still guided by their Russian-speaking habits and let "the law of supply and demand often prevail over decisions of administrative bodies" (A'Backett 2013, 39).

Chapter 5: Linguistic Obstacles

In addition to the historical context and the negative stigma associated with Ukrainian, there are also linguistic obstacles to the desired language shift from Russian to Ukrainian in the East. They have both a mechanical and ideological character. In a bilingual country such as this, it is expected that almost every citizen has a level of competence in both languages. Such linguistic competence can range from fluency in each language to barely understanding one while having full competence in the other (the latter case is more prevalent in the East).

Lack of Comprehension of Ukrainian

One of the linguistic obstacles is the lack of comprehension of Ukrainian in the East. Both Russian and Ukrainian belong to the East Slavic branch of the Slavic family and therefore have many grammatical and lexical features in common. For this reason, there has developed a false assumption that Russian and Ukrainian are "almost the same" (Bilanuk and Melnyk 2008, 345). This, in turn, has led to inappropriate language teaching strategies and language policies. According to Bilanuk and Melnyk (2008), "there are insufficient numbers of well-trained bilingual teachers to provide good instruction in the subject of Ukrainian as a second language. Teachers often use inappropriate methodological frameworks, teaching Ukrainian as a native language and not as a second language to students who do not speak Ukrainian at home" (356).

The idea that Russian and Ukrainian are 'almost the same,' coupled with the subjective

loyalty to the official language of one's motherland and the ensuing political and

ideological tendencies and preferences, creates a trend of idealized self-reported data

about the level of comprehension of Ukrainian language (Bilanuk and Melnyk 2008,

346). Analysis of census results before and after the independence of Ukraine can support

the idea that self-reported language competence is subjective and fluid. There was in

increase in the percentage of people who designated Ukrainian as their native language,

even if they did not know the language or were less competent in it than in Russian,

believing that this is how it should be, because Ukrainian corresponds with their ethnic

heritage and their civil identity (Bilanuk and Melnyk 2008, 346). Such self-identification

of native language does not match the actual usage and, being skewed by current

ideologies, cannot be representative.

Linguistic Differences Between Russian and Ukrainian

Even though Ukrainian and Russian are sister-languages and share many linguistic

features, their lexicon differs by 38 percent. The other 62 percent represent the lexicon

they have in common, which, in turn, consists of 44 percent morphemically identical and

eighteen percent morphemically similar words (Bilanuk and Melnyk 2008, 344). To give

a better idea of what it means, Spanish and Portuguese, which are also considered as

'almost the same' differ by 25 percent, Spanish and Italian by 33 percent, and German and

Dutch by 25 percent. As we can see, there is a more significant difference between

Russian and Ukrainian than between the mentioned languages (Bilanuk and Melnyk

2008, 344).

There are differences in phonetics and phonology of the two languages. Some differences are a result of linguistic sound change over time. As the two languages became diversified, the Cyrillic letter 'ѣ' (jat') changed to letter 'и' with the sound /i/ in Ukrainian and to 'e' with the sound /e/ in Russian (Bilanuk and Melnyk 2008, 344). This phenomenon produced cognates that are very similar in writing with a slight difference in pronunciation. Some examples are:

(summer) Russian: *лето* /'lʲeto/ vs. Ukrainian: *літо* /'lʲito/

(forest) Russian: *лес* /lʲes/ vs. Ukrainian: *ліс* /lʲis/

(snow) Russian: *снег* /snʲeg/ vs. Ukrainian: *сніг* /snʲiɣ/

(place) Russian: *место* /'mʲesto/ vs. Ukrainian: *місце* /'mistse/

(dough) Russian: *тесто* /'tʲesto/ vs. Ukrainian: *місто* /'tʲisto/

(measure) Russian: *мерка* /'mʲerka/ vs. Urainian *мірка* /'mirka/

(song) Russian: *песня* /'pʲesnʲa/ vs. Ukrainian: *пісня* /'pisnʲa/

Such phonological features of Russian as vowel reduction did not develop in Ukrainian. Vowel reduction in Russian is a tendency of an unstressed tense vowel to merge into the schwa sound /ə/ reducing the number of allophones. Whereas in Ukrainian the unstressed vowels in the same words are pronounced without reduction. The unstressed /o/ is always pronounced in Ukrainian. Some examples are:

 (crown) Russian: *корона* /kə'rona/ vs. Ukrainian: *crown* 'корона' /ko'rona/

(milk) Russian: *молоко* /məla'ko/ vs. Ukrainian: *молоко* /molo'ko/

(head) Russian: *голова* /glə'va/ vs. Ukrainian: *голова* /ɣolo'va/

(powder) Russian: *порошок* /prə'ʃok/ vs. Ukrainian: *порошок* /poro'ʃok/

(telephone) Russian: *телефон* /tʲlə'fon/ vs. Ukrainian: *телефон* /tele'fon/

(rhinoceros) Russian: *носорог* /nsə'rog/ vs. Ukrainian: *носоріг* /noso'riɣ/

Another linguistic feature of Russian which is absent in Ukrainian is final consonant devoicing, a process by which voiced obstruents at the end of a word or in the syllable coda become voiceless. The voiced consonants at the end of a word always remain voiced in Ukrainian. Some examples are:

(track) Russian: *след* /slʲet/ vs. Ukrainian: *слід* /slʲid/

(blood) Russian: *кровь* /krofʲ/ vs. Ukrainian: *кров* /krov/

(bread) Russian: *хлеб* /xlʲep/ vs. Ukrainian: хліб /xlʲib/

(snow) Russian: *снег* /snʲeg/ vs. Ukrainian: *снг* /snʲiɣ/

(frost) Russian: *мороз* /mo'ros/ vs. Ukrainian: *мороз* /mo'roz/

(frost) Russian: *приз* /prʲis/ vs. Ukrainian: *приз* /prɨz/

(ancestors) Russian: *предки* /'prʲetki/ vs. Ukrainian: *предки* /predkɨ/

(slavery) Russian: *рабство* /'rapstvə/ vs. Ukrainian: *рабство* /'rabstvo/

There are also other differences. Ukrainian palatalizes more consonants than Russian. There are differences in morphology and syntax in the case system, gender system, and the forms of numbers. Ukrainian has two future tense forms, while Russian has one. The Ukrainian vocative case is formed differently morphologically. Other cases that are shared between the two languages are used differently syntactically.

Some phonological differences are a result of contemporary sound change processes related to development of *surzhik* (a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian). The statistical data from the lexicons of Russian and Ukrainian, as well other phonological and syntactical differences disprove the common myth that Russian and Ukrainian are 'almost the same' (Bilanuk and Melnyk 2008, 345). The fact is that even small differences do not "...diminish the potential for political and ideological contention. In cases where languages are related, the features that make them different become more salient in representing social and political differences" (Bilanuk and Melnyk 2008, 343).

Passive Bilingualism and Non-accommodating Bilingualism

In Russian and Ukrainian, there exists the complex term of *родной язык* /rodnoi jazik/ (native language). It translates as "first language," but can signify various other meanings, such as: mother tongue, the first one learned in childhood even if not used much in adulthood; the language used most of the time even if not the same as one's mother tongue; a language to which there is a strong emotional connection; the language of the country/culture, and/or the language of ethnic self-identification. Such a variety of meanings of this term can be misleading when a statistical approach is used in identifying a language of competence or a language of preference when trying to understand the linguistic practices of Ukrainians.

The analysis of census data before and after Ukrainian independence supports the idea that national and ethnic identities are fluid categories and are easily affected by the political and cultural ideologies of the time. The same can be said about the self-

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identification of one's 'native' language, which used to be a common practice in the USSR and is still practiced in today's Ukraine. According to Bilanuk and Melnyk (2008), people often will identify the one that corresponds with their ethnic heritage as their native language, even if they do not know the language or are less competent in it than in their language of preference, believing that this is how it should be (346). Such self-identification of native language does not match actual usage and, being skewed by the current ideologies, cannot be representative.

The lack of competence and fluency in Ukrainian is also known as passive bilingualism, a phenomenon when Russian speakers understand Ukrainian speakers but do not reply in Ukrainian. This phenomenon had led to non-accommodating bilingualism. It is based on "the expectation that everyone must have at least bilingual comprehension" (Bilanuk 2004, 414). Such non-accommodating bilingual interactions are common in the public sphere and in the media. Speakers adhere to a language they know best and avoid mixing the two. Bilingualism in Ukraine can be defined as 50 percent bilingual (meaning that they are fluent in both languages), and 50 percent speak only Russian or only Ukrainian. The group that speaks only Russian is larger than its counterpart (Korostelina 2013, 298). The bilingual 50 percent are concentrated in the Western part of Ukraine. This leads us to the conclusion that those whose first language is Russian are more likely to be monolingual than those who speak Ukrainian as the first language.

The phenomenon of non-accomodating bilingualism "reinforces the stigmatization of surzhyk in that each person should speak their best language and not mix if trying to use

a language in which they are not fluent" (Bilanuk 2004, 414). This new language

ideology has produced linguistic insecurity - a fear of speaking the impure form of

Ukrainian by those who are not fluent in it, which is the case for many in the Eastern part

of Ukraine. This strengthens the tendency to choose Russian in social interactions. This

picture describes the language situation in the East.

Surzhyk and Language Purism

Bilingualism in Ukraine is also complicated due to the existence of *surzhyk* – a mixture

of Ukrainian and Russian. It is a negative term that means "impurity." In an older usage

the word described a mixture of wheat and rye flour (Podvesko 1962, 897). *Surzhik*

represents "many varieties and mixtures of [standard forms of Ukrainian and Russian]"

(Bilanuk and Melnyk 2008, 344).

These varieties of *surzhyk* can be viewed from the perspective of a dialect continuum

where standard Ukrainian is spoken in the most Western part of Ukraine and standard

Russian in the Eastern part. It is also arguable whether standard Russian is spoken in the

east of Ukraine, because even if a speaker uses Russian vocabulary with Ukrainian

phonology, their speech falls under the category of *surzhyk*. To be precise, standard

Russian is spoken in Russia closer to Moscow and St. Petersburg, even though

pronunciation with Ukrainian phonology is still present in Russia where it borders

Ukraine. All the varieties of *surzhyk* in between the two represent a gradual change from

standard Ukrainian to standard Russian. The political Ukrainian-Russian border does not

stop this dialect chain. From the western border the dialect continuum continues to the

Polish language. The boundaries of the varieties of *surzhyk* are not clear and overlap, but the main characteristic of the dialect chain is mutual intelligibility of the neighboring varieties and reduced mutual intelligibility of the more remote varieties. For this reason, for those who learn standard Russian or Ukrainian as a second language outside of Ukraine, it is hard to understand the other one. Even though *surzhyk* is not homogeneous, all its varieties fall under the term *surzhyk*, meaning they all are impure.

In addition to the different degrees of mixture of *surzhyk*, Bilanuk (2004) defines five types of *surzhyk* (410). Each emerged due to different social conditions. The first kind, *urbanized peasant surzhyk*, emerged from urbanizing Ukrainian-speaking peasants who tried to speak Russian in order to raise their social status. The second type, *village dialect*, is used predominantly by peasants living in rural areas, and is caused by contact with Russian speakers mostly through the obligatory two-year army service. The third type, *Sovietized-Ukrainian surzhyk*, is the institutionally-created Ukrainian during Stalin's rule with added Russian vocabulary, missing Ukrainian vocabulary and a changed orthography. The fourth, *urban bilinguals' surzhyk*, is spoken by those living in urban areas who mix both languages habitually by codeswitching. The fifth type, *post-independence surzhyk*, is a result of the attempt of those who never spoke Ukrainian during the Soviet era but speak it now because of the increase in prestige of the language since Ukrainian independence (Bilanuk 2004, 415-21).

Today *surzhyk*, as a general term, refers to the variety of 'impure' Ukrainian spoken by Russian-speaking Ukrainians who live mostly in the Central and Eastern areas. The

negative attitudes toward Ukrainian during the Soviet era have been transferred unto

surzhyk. This tendency helped "to elevate pure Ukrainian as a prestigious language and

separate from its connotation as a peasant language" (Bilanuk 2004, 414). During Soviet

times diglossia consisted of Russian as the High language and Ukrainian as the Low

language; today pure Ukrainian and Russian share the position of High language, and

surzhyk takes the position of Low language (Bilanuk 2004).

Russian as Lingua Franca

Even in the pre-Soviet era, the Russian Empire was a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual state

with populations of Belorussians, Moldovans, Poles, Swedes, Germans, Lithuanians, and

Hungarians. Until the eighteenth century, the Russian Empire did not have a unified

language policy. The minority populations had their own native languages which were the

official languages of the respective territories they occupied, while the Russian

administration used interpreters to communicate with them (Pavlenko 2009, 12). In the

middle of the nineteenth century the situation changed dramatically. Alexander II applied

strict language policies and limited education to Russian. This was the beginning of

Russian as a *lingua franca* in the territories of the Russian Empire. It continued on this

course with even more success after the Russian Revolution in 1917, when the tsarist

regime was overthrown.

Due to the successful spread of socialist ideology, the USSR covered a large geographical

territory and incorporated many ethnicities and nationalities. Fifteen of them gained the

status of a republic within the USSR, while there were many others that due to a small

population and the lack of political power added to the number of the mainstream ethnic populations of other republics. Such are: Abaza, Adyghe, Aleut, Altai, Bashkir, Buryt, Chechen, Chuvash, Crimean Tatar, Erzya, Ingush, Kabardian, Kalmyk, Karachay-Balkar, Khakas, Komi, Hill Mari, Moksha, Nogai, Ossetian, Tatar, Tuvan, Udmurt, Yakut, and many others. All of these nationalities spoke their own language. Just as with Alexander II during pre-Soviet era, Stalin's regime was known for its strict language policies and its Russification strategies. Inevitably, Russian became the *lingua franca* of the USSR.

With the disintegration of the USSR, it has been one of the main components of language policy and planning among the former republics of the USSR to reverse the process of Russification and revive their titular languages. Depending on the historical circumstances and the length of time a republic was subjected to Russification policies, the rate of success differs. Baltic countries are considered among the most successful in this process, while Belorussians are the least or are not even concerned much with the issue of their national language. Nevertheless, Russian continues to be taught in schools among the ex-soviet republics and most of the older generation who lived during the Soviet era still speak Russian as their first language or, at least, are fluent in it. Russian continues to fulfill the role of *lingua franca*.

The fact that many still speak Russian as their first language "created major challenges for the nation-building efforts of local authorities" and represents an important issue in reviving Ukrainian in the East (Pavlenko 2009, 12). Many of those living in the territory of Ukraine, who do not consider themselves to be of Ukrainian ethnicity, feel less

inclined to learn Ukrainian. The fact that everyone speaks Russian within all the republics of the former USSR gives it a symbolic power and appeal to learning it rather than a language in which less than half of Ukraine is fluent. Having a language with so much symbolic and economic power is an obstacle in reviving Ukrainian.

Chapter 6: Political and Ideological Obstacles

Language ideologies go hand-in-hand with political ideologies. Language is often used as a source of political power. Fairclough (1993) described the relationship that exists between language and political power through the phenomenon of 'common sense'. He claims that common sense does not exist interdependently but is a product of an ideological order. Language has the power to 'impose assumptions' upon those who share the language by constructing discourses and constantly maintain them, usually without them being aware of it (Fairclough 1993, 83). He claimed that "... the most effective form of ideological common sense will be 'common' in the sense of being shared by most if not virtually all of the members of a society or institution" (Fairclough 1993, 88). Consequently, the greater linguistic diversity leads to greater ideological diversity and reduces the ability to impose the 'common sense' on all members of a society. No wonder, language is often a battlefield between communities and societies.

Weak National Identity

Historical context plays an important role in the national identity formation of Ukrainians. For centuries, the Ukrainian culture and language were a target of oppressive assimilation policies forcing them to become either Poles or Russians; "Ukrainians were denied not only the right of self-rule, but also the use of their native tongue"; several of its rulers officially declared that "there never had been nor would there ever be a Ukrainian language or nationality" (Fishman 1966, 318).

Wilson (2004) argues that Ukraine represents "an amorphous society with a weak sense of national identity … due to [its] late nation-creation" (31). He insists that there is a substantial gap between the two 'ideal' national identities (Ukrainians and Russians) that encompasses several 'middle ground' categories of national identities which cannot be ignored or lumped into one category (Ukrainians) or even two (Ukrainians and Russians). He identified this 'middle ground' group as 'other Ukraine'. Their common characteristics are a resistance to assimilation to western Ukrainian culture, a strong dislike of the radical nationalists of the West, some level of regret for the fall of the USSR, and a national identity as Soviet Ukrainians. According to Wilson (2004), this 'middle ground' category represents a larger part of Ukrainians than either 'pure' Ukrainians or 'pure' Russians (37).

Lieven (1999) identified two major groups in today's Ukraine: Ukrainians and Ukrainian-Russians (79). Both groups have strong feelings about belonging to Ukraine but express it very differently. These two groups are culturally different, have different interests, and even their "politicians have completely different priorities" (Lieven 1999, 79). Due to different historical backgrounds where the two areas have been separated for centuries and under different dominating regimes, they lack "a common history, common development of state, common culture, common customs, religion, and a will of cohesion" (Besters-Dilger 2007, 283). On the one hand, the absence of a common language adds to the gap between the identities of the two major ethnicities, and on the other, it "increases the significance of the language even further" (Besters-Dilger 2007, 283).

Another contributing determinant to the weak national identity is the fact that during the USSR there existed a single cohesive group with Soviet or Russian identity. Just as the Russian language had more prestige than the languages of the nationalities within the USSR, Russian identity was a desired one. During the Soviet era and up to the present time there existed an institutionalized practice of self-identification with a limited number of identity categories. People were asked to choose one ethnic affiliation and one native language. There was an increase in percentage of people who identified themselves as Ukrainians during the census in 2001 in comparison with the one in 1989. This shift is most likely due to changing ideologies favoring Ukrainian identity. According to Cohen (1969), ethnicity is a symbolic form that performs a function of emphasizing 'distinctiveness' and 'exclusiveness' of one society from another (218). At the same time, it is used instrumentally according to circumstances and situations, whether the distinctiveness from another society is more favorable or the association with it.

The already arbitrary boundaries between ethnic and national identities were erased even more through the common practice of forced industrial migration. Migration often leads to assimilation of national minorities into the mainstream culture and contributes to the erasure of ethnic identity boundaries. The Soviet government enforced an extensive industrial migration within the borders of the USSR. This forced industrial migration was another tool used to accomplish Russification of the country during the Soviet era. Despite long distances, diverse geographical conditions, and big cultural and linguistic differences between the republics, migration within the USSR was not perceived as immigration. The inner borders were only symbolic.

As a consequence, there are many ethnicities living within the borders of today's

Ukraine, who might identify themselves as belonging to the ethnicity of their ancestors or

as Ukrainians due to being several generations away from their first ancestors who

moved to Ukraine, especially if they belong to an ethnicity that is phenotypically similar

to Ukrainians, such as Russians and Belarusians. According to Wilson (2004), "subjective

loyalty to the language of one's ancestors is an important identity factor" (35). Many

choose to identify themselves based not on ethnic or linguistic identity but based on their

civic identity and citizenship. National and ethnic identities are fluid categories.

Various studies have been done on the correlation of language choice and national

identity.   According to Korostelina (2013), the absence of the concept of a Ukrainian

nation and national identity, which have led to a controversial process of identity

formation, resulted in the weak connection between national identity and language

choice. Results of her research show that only 46 percent of her respondents feel the

Ukrainian language is a necessary part of Ukrainian identity. This percentage would be

significantly smaller if evaluated specifically in Eastern Ukraine.

The Differences in Political Views

The Russian and Ukrainian languages in today's Ukraine are not only a matter of

linguistic preference but also are symbols of two opposing political views: loyalty to

Russia or to Western Europe. Such division in political views is not only a post-Soviet

phenomenon. Political preferences of Ukrainians in the West toward developing

economic ties with Europe and seemingly contradictory preferences of the Eastern

Ukrainians toward maintaining the existing ties with Russia correlate with their historical backgrounds. Most of Ukraine's history has been influenced and shaped by its two closest major neighbors: Russia or the Russian Empire on one side and western Europe on the other. These influences persisted from the pre-Soviet era through today. Pro-Ukrainian language legislation is a counteraction against centuries of Russification policies. It has an objective of stopping the domination of Russian that has deep historical roots and to create a new ethnic identity that can unite the two culturally and linguistically different communities.

The presence of a Russian element in the cultural and ethnic identity of eastern Ukrainians is seen by western Ukrainians as a lack of loyalty to Ukraine, its interests, and culture, and Russophone Ukrainians are considered not to be true Ukrainians. In contrast, Riabchuk (1999) points out that from a political perspective, the Russian-speaking Ukrainians are "quite Ukrainian", because they are "supportive of state independence, territorial integrity and many historical myths and symbols" shared with Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (3). From a cultural and linguistic perspective, the Russian-speaking Ukrainians are seen as being more Russian than Ukrainian, "unsympathetic to Ukrainophones... and ... thoroughly biased against the Ukrainian language and culture" (Riabchuk 1999, 2). Hryck (2006) maintains a similar view that the language choice of Russian-speaking Ukrainians is only a side-effect of Soviet languages policies and does not mirror pro- or anti-Ukrainian feelings, cultural and/or political allegiances.

According to Anderson (1991), self-consciously held political ideologies of individuals represent the sense of nationalism of the society and align "with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which...it came into being" (12). This statement agrees with the idea that individual political preferences are only an expression and a consequence of contemporary ideologies.

Flaws and Ambiguities in the Language Policies

Passing new language laws which emphasized monolingual legislation was a common practice among the republics of the former USSR after its dissolution. This desired monolingual policy contradicts the historically grounded bilingualism of Eastern Ukraine. The conflicting interests of the government and the population of Eastern Ukraine are being expressed through the resistance by the latter to the former. One of the ways to avoid the implementation of undesirable language laws is to look for loopholes in the legislative policies.

While Article 10 of the Ukrainian Constitution states that Ukrainian is the only official state language, it also guarantees protection and development of Russian and other minority languages. According to the Law on Languages of 1989, the primary language of instruction is Ukrainian, but articles 25-29 insured an individual's right to receive instruction in their native language provided there is a sufficient concentration of the minority speakers in a region. According to articles 25-29, parents were allowed to choose the language of instruction for their children. The study of both Russian and Ukrainian were required during school. Ukrainian lessons were obligatory in institutions

of higher education. Russian was allowed as a language of instruction in higher education. According to Besters-Dilger (2007), "the Law on Languages provided only a vague commitment to the Ukrainian language; indeed, Russian [could] always replace Ukrainian" (259).

The Strategic Plan of Teaching Ukrainian Language and Literature in 2019/2020 in the Secondary Education Institutions with the Language of Instruction of the National Minorities states that in places with a high concentration of national minorities, the instruction in secondary educational institutions will be conducted through the languages of the national minorities and that the education must include the Ukrainian language and literature classes (Khoroshkovska 2019). Such a statement does not represent the true picture in today's Eastern Ukraine. There is undoubtedly a high concentration of the Russian-speaking population in eastern Ukraine. Nevertheless, the educators are forced to provide instruction in the state language.

Such legal provisions with unclear conditions under which a minority language can replace the state language and no mention of the penalties for violation of the language laws were reasons good enough to continue linguistic practice that existed in Eastern Ukraine before the fall of the USSR. In addition, the poor financial situation of Ukraine in general, made the implementation of the language laws concerning the use of Ukrainian "in all spheres of social life" a very costly endeavor, especially in the region where Russian had been used in all spheres of life for a very long time (Constitution of Ukraine). Such adjustments would include the translation and replacement of all

textbooks, the training of the educators, official representatives, public service workers, and those involved in mass media, in order to achieve sufficient fluency of Ukrainian in their fields, as well as the translation of all official and technical documents, retooling equipment for printing presses and many other technical issues involved into promoting the use of Ukrainian in all social and public domains. The strong preference for Russian in daily life in eastern Ukraine, coupled with the absence of penalties for violation of the language laws, resulted in a weak incentive to comply with them.

Disregard for Government Policies Among the Population of Eastern Ukraine

Pavlenko (2009) views policies enforcing Ukrainian use among the Russophone population as "a violation of human rights" (38). In contrast, the language policy makers see accommodation of Russian speakers' rights as a threat to the titular language (Pavlenko 2009, 38). In reality, Ukrainian has been the first language of Western Ukrainians for many generations, spoken at home and in the community even during the Soviet era. Since the fall of the USSR it has been used in all domains. Today Ukrainian is not in danger of dying out. Those who speak Russian as their first language represent the majority of the population in the East, and almost half total population of Ukraine. The policy makers represent a quantitative minority. Because language is a social phenomenon, the difference between the Ukrainian and Russian language speakers cannot be considered a legitimate source of conflict. The idea of a conflict between the rights of a language and the rights of speakers of a language is a veiled struggle between classes, in which the Ukrainian language represents the interests of those in power, and the Russian speakers representing a threat to that power.

Eastern Ukrainians see language as a tool of the ruling class to solidify their power by uniting the two major ethnic populations. Of particular importance to those in power is the economically profitable territory of the Eestern Ukraine. Although Marx's ideas have generally been abandoned and even ridiculed, the sense of class-consciousness internalized during the Soviet era remains. This mindset still governs attitudes and behaviors of ex-Soviet Ukrainians in the East. Subverting or simply ignoring policies that come 'from above' is a way to resist those who produce the policies. This mindset is easily seen by comparing the way language policies have been implemented and accepted in the East and in the West.

Even though it has been over thirty years since Ukraine declared the Ukrainian language its sole state language, strict implementation of these policies in the East did not start until after the conflict with Russia over the Crimean Peninsula. Russian continues to be the main language of instruction in schools and universities due to the personal preferences of the educators and/or their inability to use the language fluently (Bilanuk 2005, 97). A'Beckett (2013) points out that during her personal interactions with Ukrainians she learned that some of them "did not even know that the Ukrainian Constitution stipulates Ukrainian as the sole state language" (26). The language laws became stricter and less ambiguous during the years of the conflict over the Donbass region, which is still ongoing. This pattern indicates that the enthusiasm with which language policies began to be implemented in the East has less to do with loyalty to the Ukrainian language than to do with its symbolic power to emphasize distinctiveness of one community from the other, in this case, Ukrainians from Russians. The strong class-

consciousness among Ukrainians in the East, coupled with weak national identity, encourages people to interpret language policies as a tool of the government to accomplish its own ends rather than benefit the people. The lack of social cohesion between the two major ethnicities of Ukraine creates controversial attitudes toward the language policies.

Linguistic landscape in eastern Ukraine represents another example of a weak implementation of language laws. Public signs, both official and private, in Russian constituted the majority of all the signs for many years after the monolingual legislative policy. Specifically, in Zaporizhzhia, official signs started being replaced for the ones in Ukrainian within a year after the conflict with Russia over the Crimean Peninsula. According to Bever (2010), "the official language policy is only partially effective in the predominantly Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine" (12). The sub-chapter *Linguistic landscape of Zaporizhzhia* explains in more detail the current use of Ukrainian in signage, and supports Bever's statement.

In contrast with the East, in Western Ukraine the new language policies were implemented promptly. Bilanuk (2005), who was in Ukraine from 1991 through 1992 conducting ethnographic fieldwork, points out that, in Western Ukraine, Ukrainian became widespread very quickly (97). Proficiency in Ukrainian was one of the main requirements for many positions, especially in education (Bilanuk 2005). Ukrainian was, and still is, the only language of instruction in schools and universities in the west. An example of the promptness with which language policies were implemented can be seen

in signage (Pavlenko 2009, 255). According to Bilanuk (2005), the replacement of street signs from Russian to Ukrainian happened "practically overnight" in L'viv (the oldest and largest city in the western Ukraine), while in Kiev (the capital of Ukraine) the government pursued a cheaper method by merely replacing or modifying individual letters on signs (95). Pavlenko (2009) argues that replacement of signs is one of the most effective ways of 'language erasure', because "it leaves no physical trace of the other language" (255). Such visible manifestation of language preference represents the actual usage of, and attitudes toward, Ukrainian language in the West.

Resistance against Ukrainianization

During the last two decades, the monolingual government policy had been challenged more than once by the officials of Eastern and Southern Ukraine. In 2006, "the regional councils of Donetsk and Luhansk, and the city councils of Kharkiv, Sevastopol, Mykolaiv, and Dnepropetrovsk [the areas of Ukraine known for their higher percentage of ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians] voted to give Russian official regional status" (Bilanuk and Melnyk 2008, 351). Their request was denied as being in contradiction with the Constitution. Bilanuk and Melnyk predicted that the language policies will most likely continue to be contested and "the struggle over the regional legal status of languages" as well (2008, 351).

Six years later, the Crimean status referendum was conducted in that region which resulted in a 97 percent vote for integration of the region into the Russian Federation. Most countries do not recognize the referendum as being legitimate due to the

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involvement of Russia and the presence of the Russian military during the process.

Nevertheless, such a high percentage gives reason to believe that the majority of the

population of Crimea welcomed its annexation to Russia. These political tensions and

patterns represent a strong sense of resistance among the Ukrainian population, who

consider themselves ethnically Russian and where Russian has been a historically and

traditionally dominant language, against the monolingual language policy and the

consequent coercion to assimilate to the Ukrainian language and culture.

On March 3 of 2015, Mr. Churkin, the representative of the Russian Federation and a

member of the UN Security Council, declared that the reasons for the involvement of the

Russian Federation were "threats of violence by ultranationalists against the security,

lives and legitimate interests of Russians and Russian-speaking peoples" and the

violation of human rights (UN Security Council). According to the article on Language

Rights of Linguistic Minorities of the UN's Office of the High Commissioner of Human

Rights, language rights are integral to human rights and thus, legislation and policies that

address linguistic human rights must be in place to "promote tolerance, cultural and

linguistic diversity and mutual respect" (UN Human Rights). In 2012, President

Yanukovych signed into law the State Language Policy which gave minority languages

"the status of an official language when a minority group making up to ten percent of the

residents of a particular region would have this language as their native language" (Van

de Driest 2015, 332; Zakon 2015). The newly-established government after the Ukrainian

Revolution of 2014 approved a Draft Bill "that would revoke the 2012 State Language

Policy, thereby banning Russian as an official language within Ukraine" (Van den Driest

2015, 332). In the view of the population of Crimea and the Russian government, this was a violation of linguistic human rights.

 Bebler (2015) suggests that "the annexation of Crimea encouraged the Russian-speaking [population] in Eastern and Southern Ukraine who apparently hoped that Moscow will repeat the same scenario" (211). In April 2014, protests against the newly formed government, also known as Anti-Maidan and Pro-Russian protests, took place in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, often collectively called "the Donbass", and led to an armed conflict between the government and the protesters, which is still ongoing. Again, the Russian government has also been involved, claiming that they are sending only humanitarian aid to the suffering Russian-speaking population of the area. Russia denies its military involvement.

We can find similarities between the conflicts in Crimea and Donbass. Both areas have strong historical connections to Russia, both areas' populations, in their majority, are Russian-speaking Ukrainians or ethnic Russians and are strongly supportive of the pro-Russian policies. There are also some differences. Crimea became a part of the Ukrainian Republic in 1954, while Donbass has been a part of Ukraine since 1919. While the majority of both areas' population is Russian speakers, Crimea has a higher percentage of ethnic Russians, and Donbass has more ethnic Russian-speaking Ukrainians.

Whether or not the two areas can be representative of the Russian-speaking population of Eastern and Southern Ukraine to predict future political conflicts is unclear. Bilanuk and

Melnyk (2008) stated that "involvement of the Russian government in Ukrainian language issues serves as a reminder of the symbolic and practical power of language in the construction of political independence or dependence" (351). Indeed, language is an instrument for building political community.

Chapter 7: Attempts toward Ukrainianization

Along with what Fairclough (1993) described as an imposed by means of ideology 'common sense', Bilanuk and Melnyk (2008) stated that "arguments over language legislation are often expressed in terms of what is 'right' or 'natural', and these concepts constitute part of people's language ideologies" (342). The ideological and imposed 'common sense' that Ukrainians should speak Ukrainian can potentially develop a sense of national identity and nationalism and be a means of Ukrainianization in Eastern Ukraine.

The institutionalized practice of self-identification with an ethnicity and native language is a good example of the influence of current ideologies on individual's choices in this respect. It can be assumed that the same individuals (or the majority of them) who participated in the census of Ukraine in 1989 participated in the census in 2001. More individuals identified themselves as Ukrainians and designated Ukrainian as their native language in 2001 (after the independence of Ukraine) than in 1989. Because both concepts (ethnicity and native language) can exist as social constructs, they are changeable and can reveal the influence of current political ideologies. Educational institutions are one of the government's sources to mass-produce and reproduce new ideologies.

While the manifest function of educational institutions is to distribute knowledge to the next generation, their latent function is to distribute ideologies and ensure common

consensus about what is 'right' and 'natural'. Janmaat (2002) argues that "education is one of the main vehicles by which the state can purposely seek to alter citizens' notions of national identity" (171). The lack of common ancestry, history, and experiences is one of the problems in building the country's group cohesion. There is a scarcity of "the heroic moments or periods in history from which Ukrainians can derive a feeling of pride" (Janmaat 2002, 171). For this reason, the state places emphasis on propagating new versions of history through education that are enhanced by heroic examples of the recent political events. A small number of such events is one of the reasons why their significance is so exaggerated "to such an extent that these assume mythical proportions" (Janmaat 2002, 1710).

As part of its attempt to revive Ukrainian language in the East, the government is using educational institutions to boost nationalism and a sense of national identity. President Poroshenko's decree in March 2019 approved this strategy of national and patriotic education as part of school curriculum (Zakon 2019; Khoroshkovs'ka 2019). The strategy is very focused and specific in relation to what examples from the history of Ukraine can be used and promoted as noble and worthy of admiration and imitation. The strategy specifically emphasizes the examples of those who participated in the recent Ukrainian revolution of 2014.

Wars and Revolutions as Catalysts of Nationalism

Often, the terms "patriotism" and "nationalism" are used interchangeably, because they both emphasize an individual's positive association with one's country. For the purpose of

this thesis, I will differentiate between the terms, as did Li and Brewer (2004) in *What Does It Mean to Be an American?* They proposed that the term "patriotism" refers to "national attachment, pride, and loyalty..., creates bonds of solidarity among all members, aligns individual interests with national welfare, and provides the motivation for being a good group member at the individual level" (727). "Nationalism", on the other hand has a negative connotation and is associated with "authoritarianism, intolerance, and warmongering" (Li and Brewer 2004, 728). Van Evera (1994) defines such side effects of national identification as "hypernationalism".

The lack of unified experiences between East and West resulted in the lack of having a common history, culture, and myths, which in turn caused an uneven development of patriotism and national identities. According to Wilson (2004), this is the reason that the Ukrainian nation is "unable to rest on any stable cultural core or develop any powerful transcendent idea. Nor has it performed well in the areas that might underpin a civic identity, such as liberty, prosperity and welfare..." (31). In other words, the Ukrainian nation lacks the prerequisites for the development of a "healthy" national identification that would result in patriotism rather than nationalism.

While "healthy" national identification requires steady improvements over a long period in multiple spheres of nation-building, the promotion of a sense of nationalism is a quicker way to compensate for the absence of the first in order to provide social solidarity (Voegelin 1901). However, the resulting social solidarity might not be as lasting and might have negative side effects, such as intolerance for diversity. However, some believe

that the "unhealthy" social solidarity is better than no solidarity. Such an attitude mirrors the famous quote of Anton Chekhov, a famous Russian writer: "Love, friendship and respect do not unite people as much as a common hatred for something" (Anton Chekhov quotes). According to Hankens (1922), the sense of nationalism does not require the members of a community to have neither a common [ethnicity], nor religion, nor language but a reason for social solidarity. These characteristics, or lack of, describe perfectly the population of Ukraine and emphasize the need for another source of social solidarity, political conflicts.

The effects of wars, revolutions, and other political turbulence on a sense of nationalism can be observed worldwide throughout history. There is no need to go too far in time or space to find examples of this phenomenon. According to Li and Brewer (2004), "the 9/11 attacks resulted in immediate, visibly evident increases in expressions of national identification and unity throughout the United States" (728). According to Shekhovtsov (2013), the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine in 2004 played the role of such a political turbulence that became detrimental in building a sense of national identity and nationalism. The "Orange revolution" was caused by "the electoral fraud that allowed the corrupt regime of President Leonid Kuchma to declare the regime's protégé Victor Yanukovych as the winner of the 2004 presidential election (Shekhovtsov 2013, 730). Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians were drawn from different parts of the country (including eastern and southern Ukraine) to the Kiev's *Maidan Nezalezhnosti* (Independence Square) to protest against the arranged election results. "Sleeping in tents in freezing temperatures and ringed by heavily armed security forces, they refused to

leave Kiev's central square, the Maidan, until the results of the stolen presidential election were nullified and a second, honest election could be held", and this is how a "courageous public act spawned a modern nation" (Gillingham and Tupy 2005).

Such a political upheaval as the "Orange Revolution" was essential in Ukraine where the population does not represent a nation but a "mechanical assembly" (Shekhovtsov 2013, 731). Wilson (1997) identified three main ethno-linguistic categories: Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, Russian-speaking Ukrainians, and Russians, but "none of [them] can be considered a real social 'group', with a clear identity and fixed boundaries" (23). In addition to that, the circumstances of Ukraine becoming an independent state are void of conflict and struggle that normally boost or initiate the sense of patriotism. "The emergence of sovereign Ukraine on the global map occurred largely by default and apparently without any particular national effort as the Soviet Union met its peaceful demise..." (Shekhovtsov 2013, 731). The "Orange Revolution", being the very first national political conflict in independent Ukraine, compensated to some degree for the lack of nationalistic sentiments that usually arise and/or are intensified during the process of a state becoming independent.

The "Orange Revolution" was not the last source of nationalistic sentiments. Several more political conflicts occurred within the next decade. In November of 2013, Euromaidan, a protest sparked by the decision of the government to postpone signing the association agreement with the European Union and choosing to strengthen ties with Russia instead, had led to the 2014 Ukrainian revolution. In March 2014, the Russian

Federation annexed the Crimean Peninsula. In April 2014, protests against the newly

formed government, also known as Anti-Maidan and Pro-Russian protests, took place in

Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and led to an armed conflict between the government and

the protesters, which has not been resolved yet.

Awareness of the power of political conflicts in heightening the sense of nationalism is

relevant to this study, especially since the population of this study is young adults who

lived through every political conflict that happened in independent Ukraine. On one side,

they are a product of being raised in Russian-speaking homes in a community with a

weak national identity, but on the other side, they are the primary target of the

government and its monolingual legislation policy and are involuntary witnesses and

recipients of the side effects of the political conflicts that often heighten the sense of

nationalism.

The causes of the sense of nationalism of this age group of eastern Ukrainians can be

contrasted with ones in the older generation. While the former source comes from Russia

and effects only the population of Ukraine, the latter was caused by World War II

effecting all republics of the Soviet Union and uniting them under one national identity as

Soviets. Such differences are yet another explanation of still unsuccessful efforts of

Ukrainianization toward the older generation.

Creation of Carnivalesque Space for the Youth

In correlation with the effects of wars and revolutions on the sense of nationalism of young people, Shekhovtsov (2013) also found some evidence of positive evaluation of Ukrainianization by the younger generation of Ukraine. He attributes this fact to the notion of "secular religion" (732). Durkheim (1912) maintains that "secular religion" can serve as a substitute for a traditional religion which often is a source of social solidarity in the era of modernization and secularization. The notion of nationalism with its attributes falls under the umbrella of the term "secular religion".

According to Gentile (2006), myths, rituals, and symbols "create an aura of sacredness around an entity … and turn it into a cult and an object of worship and devotion" (1). Shekhovtsov (2013) argues that a nation, as a political entity can be sanctified and worshiped as well (732). Just as metanarratives provide individuals with the belief in immortality, Griffin (2007) suggests that similar metanarratives can have the same effect on individuals' belief in the immortality and sacred nature of a nation. Shekhovtsov (2013) examines two major concepts that contributed to creation of the "sacred" dimension of the very first political conflict in independent Ukraine that involved populations from the West and the East, the "Orange Revolution", suggesting that this event was of utmost importance in the creation of the dimension of sacredness of the Ukrainian nation.

The two concepts are *carnival* and *communitas*. In this context, *carnival* is "the utopian realm of community, freedom, equality, and abundance" (Bakhtin 1984, 9). *Communitas*

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is "an unstructured communion of equal individuals juxtaposed against society as structured … and often hierarchical system of politico-legal-economic positions" (Turner 1969, 129). Common characteristics of both *carnival* and *communitas* are a "temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and from the established order" (Bakhtin 1968, 10). Both are powerful tools used in "orchestrating the carnivalesque (*liminoid*) space" by the interested party in order to artificially create the sentiment of nationalism to accomplish political goals (Shekhovtsov 2013, 734). The government uses its resources to provide carnivalesque spaces that are appealing to youth, because the younger generation is more prone to be affected by such manipulative strategies.

Turner (1974) defined *liminoid* phenomena as "social critiques or even revolutionary manifestos … exposing the injustices, inefficiencies, and immoralities of the mainstream economic and political structures and organizations" (86). Carefully planned activities that provide l*iminoid* spaces in order to accomplish social and/or political goals contradict the common belief and sentiment of their spontaneous nature and their purpose of liberation from the existing structures. In fact, according to Martin (2001), unconventional behavior and the breaking of social rules, while functioning as *carnivals*, actually serve to reinforce the social norms and "demonstrate the necessity of a social order" (15). The fact that *carnivals* "are not meant to last" requires conscious thought processing (Shekhovtsov 2013, 733). Turner (1974) maintains that individuals usually are not capable of thinking clearly while in the midst of *liminoid* space and tend to act "according to an internal logic which seems to need no conscious intervention" (87).

Positive evaluation of Ukrainianization by youth as a result of wars and revolutions and the creation of carnivalesque space coupled with the legislative language provisions might be able to stand against the current linguistic practice of Eastern Ukrainians and their lack of national identity and might be able to affect the desired language shift. In addition to that and in spite of all the drawbacks in the attempts of promoting Ukrainian in the East, Bilanuk and Melnyk (2008) point out that "many young people [who grew up speaking Russian] take up Ukrainian not so much because of official policies, but as a form of grass-roots resistance to perceived historical injustices" (363).

Chapter 8: Language Ideologies

According to Bilanuk and Melnyk (2008), "language ideology is the set of beliefs and attitudes that link social differences, and establishes the social import of speaking in different ways. When people react to or express opinions about a particular use of language, they are enacting a language ideology; concurrently, the reactions and opinions of others (in both official and informal contexts) continually work to shape people's language ideologies" (343). Language ideology is often expressed through favoring one language and discriminating against the other. Such attitudes are usually entrenched in the history of the language and its nation. The separate cultural, political, and linguistic development of the East and the West resulted in the difference of language ideologies in the two regions and the unequal status of Ukrainian and Russian.

Before the incorporation of Western Ukraine into the Soviet Union, Ukrainian was developing relatively freely in the West even under the domination of non-Ukrainian ethnolinguistic empires and functioned as the language in home and in the community. At the same time, the development of Ukrainian was obstructed in the East under the rule of the Russian Empire through strict language policies and later under the rule of the Soviet Union through the Russification strategies. After the incorporation of Western Ukraine into the USSR at the end of WWII, the Russification strategies affected it for only forty years and did not have such a profound effect as they did in the East. The stereotype of Ukrainian as a "...backward peasant language, in contrast with Russian as the 'civilized' and 'highly cultured' language" persisted from the centuries of domination by the pre-Soviet Russian Empire through the Soviet era and even after Ukrainian independence

(Bilanuk and Melnyk 2008, 341). The newly established monolingual legislation contradicts the centuries of bilingual language practices and domination by the Russian language in the East and South of Ukraine. Even though the status of Ukrainian has risen significantly in these areas in the last decade, Russian continues to be the language of preference among almost half of the population of Ukraine. Thus, we can see that language ideology plays an essential role in the shaping of language practice and in the success of the reviving of a language.

Ideology of Correctness and Purism

Due to the presence of the standard Ukrainian language in the mass media and/or in its *surzhyk* form in the everyday life of eastern Ukrainians, even young children develop at least passive bilingualism, which is accompanied by a strong belief that Ukrainian and Russian are 'almost the same' and that for this reason are mutually intelligible (Bilanuk and Melnyk 2008). Even though the statistical data of the differences between Russian and Ukrainian lexicon and other linguistic features refute such misconception, it is hard for people not to feel embarrassed for not being able to speak standard Ukrainian. For this reason, many who have a lower level of competence in Ukrainian avoid speaking it from the fear of being subject to criticism concerning their correctness.

Bilanuk (2005) underlined that "the legitimacy of a language as a discrete entity is often linked to linguistic correctness, which is ideologized as an immutable essence" (26). This agrees with Bourdieu's (1991) perspective,

The legitimate language is a semi-artificial language which has to be sustained by a permanent effort to correction, a task which falls both to institutions specially designed for this purpose and to individual speakers. Through its grammarians, who fix and codify legitimate usage, and its teachers who impose and inculcate it through innumerable acts of correction, the educational system tends, in this area as elsewhere, to produce the need for its own services and its own products, i.e. the labour and instrument of correction" (60).

The efforts to promote Ukrainian to a higher level correlates with "an ideology of linguistic purism" (Bilanuk 2004, 414). With the new sense of nationalism, "there is more attention paid to correctness [and] literary standards" (Bilanuk and Melnyk 2008, 345). This, in addition to the efforts of the Ukrainian government and linguists to increase the difference between the two languages by substituting cognates for non-cognate Ukrainian words and restoring the original orthography, increases the fear of those who are not perfectly fluent in Ukrainian to make mistakes or speak *surzhyk*. Such lack of confidence in one's ability to speak a language is known as linguistic insecurity. The widespread bilingual context in the East where the use of both languages is acceptable provides even less incentive to speak a language in which one is not completely fluent. Bilanuk (2005) argues that the ideology of purism is acting against the revival of Ukrainian in the East (145).

The Social Conditions in the East and the Language Shift

Often language is an expression of national identity, but not always. As mentioned in the

sub-chapter *Weak National Identity*, various studies have been done on the correlation of

language choice and national identity. The absence of an internalized concept of a

Ukrainian nation and national identity have led to a controversial process of identity

formation and resulted in the weak connection between national identity and language

choice. Results from the research conducted by Korostelina (2013) show that only 46

percent of her respondents feel that the Ukrainian language is a necessary part of

Ukrainian identity. This percentage would be significantly smaller if evaluated

specifically in Eastern Ukraine.

Similar to the sense of national identity (as well as nationalism and ethnicity), language

ideologies go hand in hand with political ideologies and are social constructs, and, thus,

are fluid and changeable. The status of a language and the attitudes toward its use are

affected not only by the history of the language and its region, but also by legislation, and

the current social conditions (Bilanuk and Melnyk 2008, 343). For example, speaking

Ukrainian today is a sign of patriotism and is viewed positively, while during the Soviet

era, Ukrainian patriotism used to symbolize separatism and had a connotation of negative

nationalism (Bilanuk and Melnyk 2008, 343). The changes in political ideologies must

precede the changes in linguistic ideologies.

The framework proposed by Weinreich (1966), can explain the current changes in

linguistic practice, or their lack, in modern Ukraine and predict the possibilities of future

changes. Weinreich emphasized the utmost importance of social conditions in which the given change is happening or is hoped for, whose main characteristic is the symbolic value of the given linguistic change and the emotions it evokes. The "attitudes toward each language, whether idiosyncratic of stereotyped" is one of the non-structural factors (factors that are not related to the linguistic organization of the given languages) that can explain and determine the change in linguistic practice (Weinreich 1966, 3).

Such non-structural factors pointed out by Weinreich are the language ideologies that are prevalent in the East, which caused a strong resistance to Ukrainianization and the delay in implementation of language policies. This fact has magnified the difference in the degree of the sense of national identity between the West and the East developed during the pre-independence time. Today, almost three decades after the independence of Ukraine, social conditions in the East are changing in favor of the development a sense of national identity (most likely, due to continuous internal and external political conflicts). Consequently, the status of the state language is beginning to rise in the East as well.

To predict a linguistic change, or in our case, a shift in linguistic practice from Russian to Ukrainian in the East, Campbell (2004) proposes to ask the following questions based on Weinreich's framework:

– How is a given language change embedded in the surrounding system of linguistic and social relations?

– How does the greater environment in which the change takes place influence the change?

- How do speakers of the language (members of a speech community) evaluate a given change, and what is the effect of their evaluation on the change?

- Why does a given linguistic change occur at the particular time and place that it does?

- What starts a change and what carries it along? (Campbell 2004, 219).

Some of the above questions can be answered with the current political and ideological changes favoring nationalism and Ukrainian national identity coupled with the positive evaluation of Ukrainianization by the young. It is logical to expect the linguistic shift from Russian to Ukrainian in Eastern Ukraine. However, it remains to be seen how soon this language shift will happen. This study attempts to answer some of the above questions and evaluate whether the language change is happening among the younger generation of Eastern Ukraine.

Chapter 9: Design of the Study

Introduction

From the previous chapters, we can see that there are multiple factors that contribute to the continuation of the Russian-speaking practice in the East including 400 years of Russian influence, low level of competence in Ukrainian, weak national identity, disregard for government policies, and a negative stigma associated with the use of Ukrainian. On the other hand, there are several factors that contribute to the shift from Russian- to Ukrainian-speaking practice, especially among the younger generation, such as the government's efforts of Ukrainianization through language legislative policies (including Ukrainian-medium education in all levels of education), nationalism-hoisting side-effects of political conflicts, and the creation of carnivalesque space which also contributes to the boosting of the sense of national identity among the youth. The purpose of this study is to describe a pattern of the linguistic practice among the youth in the example of the student population of Zaporizhzhia National University.

According to the language legislation policy, it is assumed that all school-going children in Ukraine study Ukrainian as their first language as well as use it as a medium throughout pre-school, secondary school, and in the institutions of higher education. The legislation regarding the use of the Ukrainian language in the educational institutions continues to be the main way in which the government propels its objective to promote Ukrainianization and the use of the state language. While the language policy was

adopted in 1989, the promptness of its implementation varies among the regions of Ukraine. From my annual visits to Ukraine and personal interactions with the Russian-speaking people (students as well as parents of school-going children), I have reasons to believe that the legislation about the use of the state language as a medium in educational institutions has been enforced, at least to some degree, within the last fifteen years in Eastern Ukraine and became more rigid after the conflict with Russia over the Crimean Peninsula in 2014.

Selection Procedures and Samples

Research Questions

Main question: Has there been a language shift from Russian to Ukrainian among college students of Zaporizhzhia National University since the establishment and expansion of Ukrainian-medium education in the East?

Secondary question: What influence do the attitudes and ideologies have on the language shift among Russian-speaking youth of Ukraine?

Language shift in this context is defined as a change of the Ukrainian language from being the language of government entities (due to legislative policies) to becoming a functional language in families and community.

Place of the Study: Zaporizhzhia City

Zaporizhzhia is a city in the southeast of Ukraine. Its population was about 750,000 people in 2019. It is the fourth largest industrial center of Ukraine with developed engineering, aircraft industry, military, metallurgy, chemical and construction industries.

Zaporizhzhia became one of the most important centers for the production of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, heavy industry and electric power. The symbol of the industrialization of not only Ukraine, but also the entire USSR was the construction of the hydroelectric station, one of the largest in the USSR (see Appendix G). The factories and the construction of the dam required a lot of labor power. As I mentioned earlier, with the forced industrial migration, the city provided many jobs which created an influx of people from different republics of the USSR (see Table 1) This fact contributes to the explanation of the controversial process of national identity formation and makes Russian language not only a language of preference but also a lingua franca in the multi-ethnic context of the city.

Table 9.1 Census data of 2001from State Statistics Service of Ukraine

Nationality	Number of people	Percentage
Ukrainians	573000	70.28%
Russians	207000	25.39
Belarusians	5500	0.67
Bulgarians	3600	0.44
Jews	3400	0.42
Georgians	3110	0.38
Armenians	3080	0.38
Tatar	2200	0.27
Azeris	1200	0.15
Roma	9200	0.11
Poles	7800	0.1
Germans	7600	0.09
Moldovans	7200	0.09
Total number	**815300**	**100.00%**

According to Turchenko (2018), the historical context of Zaporizhzhia, specifically the building of the hydroelectric station and consequent influx of national minorities due to institutionalized industrial migration, plays an important role in the current political and linguistic preferences of the population of the city. Zaporizhzhia differs from other Ukrainian cities in respect to the ratio of other ethnic groups to the ethnic Ukrainians. While the cities of the Crimean Peninsula and the Donbass region have more ethnic Russians than ethnic Ukrainians and the cities of Western Ukraine have the majority of ethnic Ukrainians, Zaporizhzhia has a very considerable number of both ethnic Ukrainians and Russians. In general, all other ethnic minorities add to the pro-Russian political and linguistic preferences of the ethnic Russians amounting nearly to a half of the population of the city. Due to such ethnic composition, the city represents a golden middle between the two extremes (the Western nationalists and the Donbass region's pro-Russians) where the relative size of the key groups determines success of Ukrainianization and of the language practice. In contrast, Zaporizhzhia becomes a peculiar place to investigate how the educational language policies and the current ideologies affected the change in the attitudes and the linguistic change of the generation who grew up in the independent Ukraine and was exposed to eleven to seventeen years of Ukrainian-medium education.

Place of the Study: Zaporizhzhia National University

Zaporizhzhia National University (ZNU), one of the oldest higher education institutions in the city, is owned by the state and is almost 90 years old. It has the highest level of state accreditation. The structure of the university includes eighteen departments and has branches in other cities in the Eastern Ukraine. ZNU provides 110 educational programs

for Bachelor Degrees. The University comprises four colleges: College of Economics and Law, Trade College, Hydropower College, and Metallurgical College. ZNU includes a scientific library, Confucius School for the Study of Chinese, John III Sobieski Polish Language and Culture Center, Shakespeare International Center, Center for Continuing Education, Foreign Languages Intensive Study Center, Goethe-Institute and other language educational centers. Today, more than 17,000 students attend ZNU.

Selection of Participants

The population of this study are students of Zaporizhzhia National University ages 18 through 25 who grew up in Russophone families but were exposed to Ukrainian-medium education. Given that the approximate length of study in secondary schools in Ukraine is eleven years, and in the universities four years for the bachelor's degree with two additional years for Master's degree, the total number of years of exposure to Ukrainian-medium education is from eleven to seventeen years. In general, children start attending school at the age of seven. Taking into consideration the fact that the language policies concerning education began to be implemented within the last fifteen years, anyone who is older than 25 would have less years of exposure to Ukrainian-medium education. For this reason, the age from 18 through 25 represents my population.

My sample was all students who met the criteria to represent the population. My population has two major characteristics: age (18 through 25) and being raised in a Russian-speaking family with Russian as the first language. Due to the way by which the link to the survey was distributed among the students of the university, it is impossible to know to how many students received the invitation to participate in the survey. The total

number of participants was 158. It is a sample of convenience out of which I chose those who represented my population. Out of 158 participants, five did not qualify due to age, 38 due to being raised with Ukrainian as their first language and nine with the first language other than Russian or Ukrainian. After eliminating those who did not represent my population, I had a sample of 108 participants.

Data Collection Instrument

The participants of the study took part in an online confidential survey which consisted of 43 questions (38 closed-ended and five open-ended). The participants were given a choice of completing the survey in either Ukrainian or Russian (see Appendix B, C, and D). The survey was created using Qualtrix platform and included:

- seven demographic questions (1, 4 – 9)

- eight questions about their language background (5 – 7, 10, 11, 14, 17.7, 17.9)

- nineteen questions about their current language preferences (1, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17.1 – 17.6, 17.7, 17.8, 18, 20 – 25)

- four questions in which they evaluate proficiency in Ukrainian of their professors (27.1 – 27.4); this set of questions also helps to determine if the professors comply with the legislative policies

- ten questions to evaluate attitudes toward Ukrainian (17.10 – 17.12, 19, 26, 28 – 32)

- two questions to evaluate their attitude toward Russian (24, 26)

Due to the limited access to internet and technological difficulties, the university

practices an old-fashioned way of distributing information to students: either via in-class

announcements or through head-boy/girls who have email addresses of each other and of

all class presidents. Those in turn have email addresses of those in their classes. One of

the head-girls of the university was asked to distribute the link to this survey via the latter

way of distribution (the first way required my personal presence at the university). The

participants were sent an invitation to take part in the survey (Appendix E) with the

survey link attached. Within three days of the day the head-girl received the link to the

survey, the survey closed resulting in 158 participants.

<p align="center">*Significance of the Study*</p>

This study offers a focus which is different from previous studies. My research is focused

on a smaller sample which represents a specific population. Rather than looking for the

signs of the language shift among all the Russian-speaking Ukrainians, I was interested in

the language shift specifically among the youth ages 18 through 25, who were exposed to

Ukrainian language for at least eleven years during secondary education and additional

years of college. My sample, potentially, can represent the entire population of young

people of the same ages within the Russian-speaking part of Ukraine, though there are

limitations of my sample which I explain below in the sub-chapter *Limitations of the*

Study.

The results of this study can answer questions such as whether there is a direct

connection between the increased visibility of Ukrainian and its actual functioning as a

living language in families and the community. It can advance our knowledge about the efficiency of secondary education as a means of revitalization efforts and the influence of the attitudes and ideologies on the language shift. It can indicate the efficiency of the revitalization provisions provided through legislation. The outcomes of the study can give an idea about how strongly the Russian-speaking youth of Eastern Ukraine oppose or support Ukrainianization and the language shift from Russian to Ukrainian. It can indicate whether or not there are signs of their assimilation into the Ukrainian culture or a trend toward preserving the Russian culture and language. Finally, it might give us a hint as to whether we should expect the unification of the two major ethnic populations or similar to the Donbass region political conflict.

Limitations of the Study

First of all, my population sample is a sample of convenience. In contrast with probability sampling methods that strive toward representing the same variations that exist in the population or ensure that all members of the population have an equal chance of being selected in the sample, this sample was selected by means of a non-probability sampling method. It might not represent all Russian-speaking youth of Eastern Ukraine. Due to the lack of an automated way to distribute the link of the survey to every student of the university, there is also a reason to believe that not every student had an opportunity to participate. This factor contributes to non-generalizability of this sample as well.

Also, the place of the research (the city and the university) might not represent all Russian-speaking youth of Eastern Ukraine. This city is more industrial than other cities,

and has a higher ratio of ethnic groups to ethnic Ukrainians. Due to industrial character of the city, the university offers more technical degrees. This leads to a larger concentration of lower-class strata, which might result in more chances of having a higher concentration of *syrzhyk* speakers who came from rural areas than speakers of standard Ukrainian. There are fewer chances that children of Ukrainian *intelligencia* are studying at this university.

Finally, the changes in political ideologies favoring nationalism coupled with the absence of clear criteria by which bilingualism and competency in Ukrainian can be measured leads to an increased number of those who claim to have competence in Ukrainian. According to Bilanuk and Melnyk (2008), "the self-reported language knowledge is subject to people's ideological inclinations" (346).

Chapter: 10 Data Analysis and Discussion

After the data was collected, it was analyzed, and statistical analysis was applied to the quantitative data in order to determine whether the selected sample represented the population, whether the number of speech events in the Ukrainian language has increased, and if there is a positive or negative evaluation of Ukrainian among college students. Coding was applied to qualitative data gathered from the open-ended questions in order to find patterns, trends and common themes (Strauss and Corbin 1990).

The survey questions, though not in order, can be organized to answer three broader questions:

1.   How many of the participants represent the population?

2.   What are the current language preferences of the chosen sample?

3.   What are the attitudes of the Russian-speaking youth toward Ukrainian?

How many of the participants represent the population?

The population of this study is characterized by two factors: being raised with Russian as their first language and being exposed to Ukrainian-medium education. Because the purpose of the study was to evaluate whether there is a language shift from Russian to Ukrainian among the youth in a predominantly Russian-speaking area, the responses of all participants who grew up in Ukrainian-speaking families had to be taken out of the sample. The seven demographic questions (1, 4 – 9) and the eight questions about

language background (5 – 7, 10, 11, 14, 17.7, 17.9) helped to determine if the participants grew up speaking Russian and if they were more likely to be exposed to Ukrainian-medium education which was determined by their age. The students who were 18 through 25 had more chances to receive their secondary education by means of Ukrainian due to the late implementation in the East of the language policies concerning education. Out of 158 participants, twelve did not qualify due to age, 38 due to being raised with Ukrainian as their first language and nine with the first language other than Russian or Ukrainian. After eliminating those who did not represent my population, I had a sample of 108 participants.

Table 10.1 Selection of the sample

Total number of participants	158
Participants older than 25 (not included)	12
Participants who were raised in Ukrainian-speaking families (not included)	38
Final sample for this study	108

What are the current language preferences of the chosen sample?

Nineteen questions (1, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17.1 – 17.6, 17.7, 17.8, 18, 20 – 25) were designed to determine the current language preferences of the chosen sample. The first question in this category was *Do you speak Ukrainian outside of school?* 58 percent (63 participants) answered "no" and 42 percent (45) - "yes". Although 58 percent is over a half of the participants, 42 percent is still a high number which shows a tendency of the younger

generation to choose Ukrainian. Half of the 42% who use Ukrainian outside of school specified that they started speaking Ukrainian during their teenage years, which can indicate a conscious decision as well as the influence of changing political and language ideologies.

Table 10.2 Q #13 Do you speak Ukrainian outside of school?

Answers	Frequency	Percentage
No	63	58
Yes	45	42

The open-ended question *Can you explain why you started speaking Ukrainian?* revealed common patterns and themes in the responses.

- *Because I am Ukrainian* was mentioned 13 times

- *Because Ukrainian is the language of my country* - 12 times

- *Because I had to speak Ukrainian in school* – 11 times

- *Because Ukrainian is beautiful* – 6 times

- *As a symbol of being against Russian cultural and political dominance* – 5 times

- *Because someone in the family spoke Ukrainian* – 4 times

- *Because a friend started speaking Ukrainian* – 3 times

- *Due to employment necessity* – 2 times

The first two themes, mentioned the most, can be attributed to the changes in current

ideologies and the effort to construct and encourage Ukrainian identity. Education might

look like it has the next most powerful influence, but interestingly 10 out of the 11 times

education was mentioned, the participants used Russian to respond to all open-ended

questions of the survey, while 99% of the respondents using Ukrainian to answer the

questions mentioned other reasons. This discrepancy with the reported use of Ukrainian

and its actual usage can indicate a faulty perception due to ideological changes and the

belief that Ukrainians should speak Ukrainian, and since it is enforced through education,

it must be the reason for the language change.

The anti-Russian attitudes caused by the military and political conflicts with Russia have

had more influence on language change than social influence. The reported language

change due to social influence (family and/or friends) is very insignificant (mentioned

four and three times respectively). The low mention of instrumental reasons for the use of

Ukrainian, such as employment opportunities, shows that the language is not used in the

public sphere and that the language policies concerning language use in public sphere are

not strictly enforced.

Several questions were designed to determine the domains of the Ukrainian language.

When asked to indicate the level with which they agreed to the statement *I speak

Ukrainian at home*, 42% disagreed and 23% somewhat disagreed, while 35% somewhat

agreed. With the statement, *My parents speak Ukrainian at home most of the time,* 61%

disagreed, 12% slightly disagreed, and only 17% somewhat agreed, with none who

completely agreed. This is an indication that home is not the domain where those who claim to use Ukrainian outside of school normally use it.

Figure 10.1

The question *Which of your family members and relatives speak Ukrainian most of the time? a*lso shows that parents of most of the participants do not speak Ukrainian. Only the parents of 14% of the participants speak Ukrainian most of the time. To the same question, only 1% indicated that their siblings and/or cousins speak Ukrainian. Forty-nine percent of the participants do not have any family members or relatives who speak Ukrainian most of the time. Fifty percent indicated that their grandparents speak Ukrainian, and 2% that their aunts and uncles speak Ukrainian most of the time. These numbers agree with the speculation that the home is not the domain where Ukrainian is being used by those who claim to speak it outside of school. Additionally, we can see a pattern which indicates that the use of Ukrainian correlates with the generational pattern.

Those who speak Ukrainian are at least two generations away from the participants of this study.

Table 10.3 The use of Ukrainian by generations

Those who speak Ukrainian at home (including extended family members)	%
Grandparents	50
Parents	14
Aunts/uncles	2
Siblings/cousins	1
None	41

Generational patterning of the use of Ukrainian was also confirmed when the participants were asked to indicate the level with which they agreed to the statement *I speak Ukrainian with friends:* 47% disagreed and 20% slightly disagreed, while only 2% agreed or slightly agreed. To the question *How many of your friends speak Ukrainian regularly?* 16% answered "none", 55.5% answered "1-4", and 24% answered "5-10". Again, these numbers indicate that the majority of the younger generation still prefers to speak Russian among themselves.

Table 10.4 Number of friends who speak Ukrainian

How many friends speak Ukrainian regularly	Frequency	%
None	23	21
1-4	59	55
5-10	26	24
11 or more	0	0

Personal language preference and the strength of the ideological conviction (or its lack thereof) can also be seen through the choices of language use in the mass media and entertainment. In contrast with the youth in the West, who pledged not to watch movies without Ukrainian dubbing, 25% of the participants never chose Ukrainian-dubbed movies, 33% sometimes, 29% choose Ukrainian-dubbed movies half the time, 13% most of the time, and none of them always chose Ukrainian-dubbed movies.

Figure 10.2

When you are spoken to in Ukrainian outside of school, do you reply in Ukrainian?

The preference of Russian over Ukrainian is especially seen in the answers to the question *What language did you use for selling/advertising goods or labor?* 74.5% of those who ever had to use a newspaper, billboard, internet site, or any other medium for selling/advertising used Russian and only 21.5% used Ukrainian. Those who used Russian explained their choice by:

‒ *The audience is mostly Russian-speaking* (45%)

‒ *Russian is my native language* (38%)

‒ *It is easier to use Russian* (9.5%)

‒ *It is a habit* (7.5%)

In order to determine the participants' opinions about where Ukrainian can be used, the following question was asked. *In what spheres do you think Ukrainian is the most useful?* The participants were allowed to choose everything that applied. *Education* was checked 98 times, *employment* – 55 times, *friendship* – 13 times, *other* – 3 times, *religion* – 2 times, and *Ukrainian is not useful in any sphere* – 6 times. We can see that a mandatory education through the medium of Ukrainian has had its effects on the associations of the participants of practicality of the language with education. This response suggests that the primary domain in which Government mandated Ukrainian education has an impact on Ukrainian usage, is in school.

Table 10.5 Usefulness of Ukrainian

| Domains where Ukrainian is considered to be useful	How many times the category was mentioned
Education	98
Employment	55
Friendship	13
Other	3
Religion	2
Not useful	6

The questions about the usage of Ukrainian in educational institutions show that education is indeed a domain where the language is used more than in any other domain. Fifty-five percent of the participants agreed that most of their teachers in secondary schools taught their subjects in Ukrainian. With the statement *My professors speak Ukrainian during lectures,* 39% agreed, 32% somewhat agreed, and only 8% disagreed or somewhat disagreed. The numbers are higher for the usage of Ukrainian by the professors than the numbers by the students are. We can see this by the results to the statement *I speak Ukrainian in classes most of the time,* with only 19% stating they agreed, 21% somewhat agreed, and 36% disagreed or somewhat disagreed. This can be explained by the fact that the professors are under stricter obligation to comply with the language policies than the students are. Though the numbers for the usage of Ukrainian in education are higher than in other domains, there is still evidence of the strong presence of Russian in the sphere of education. Some of it is by the professors, but most of it by the students.

Figure 10.3

We can speculate that even though professors use Ukrainian as a medium for instruction, they themselves are less competent in it than in Russian. They did not have as much exposure to Ukrainian as those they teach. This is due to the fact that during their school years, school instruction was accomplished by means of Russian. The statement *My professors make grammatical and lexical mistakes regularly when they speak Ukrainian* aimed to evaluate competency of professors in Ukrainian from the perspective of the students. It yielded the following results: 61% agreed and somewhat agreed, while only 15% somewhat disagreed. Professors' language preference is evident with the results of the statement *My professors speak Ukrainian outside of classes.* Thirty-seven percent of participants disagreed or somewhat disagreed with the statement, and only 28% somewhat agreed. We can conclude that professors feel less obligated to speak Ukrainian outside of classrooms and therefore switch to the language of their preference.

Figure 10.4

There are indications that the fluency in Ukrainian of the younger generation is higher than that of the generation of their parents who were taught in Russian-medium schools. Fifty-two percent agreed and 35% slightly agreed with the statement *I am fluent in Ukrainian,* while only 2% disagreed or slightly disagreed. With the statement, *Most of my friends are fluent in Ukrainian*, only 6% disagreed and 13% slightly disagreed. This difference in fluency in Ukrainian between the different generations is, most likely, a result of Ukrainian-medium education. We can also conclude that while the lack of fluency in Ukrainian is one of the obstacles to the daily use of the language for the older generation, it cannot be one of the reasons why the language is not being used by the youth.

Figure 10.5

In spite of speaking Ukrainian fluently and on a regular basis in school, the results to the question *When you are spoken to in Ukrainian outside of school, do you reply in Ukrainian?* revealed the following results. Twenty-four percent always reply in Ukrainian, 30% most of the time, 20% about half the time, 15% sometimes, and 11% never reply in Ukrainian. These numbers indicate the strong presence of *non-accommodating bilingualism* mentioned by Bilanuk and Melnyk (2008) in the area and the tendency of the youth to support Ukrainianization through the use of the language.

Figure 10.6

Throughout most of the questions, we can see inconsistencies of self-reported usage of Ukrainian with actual usage. An additional piece of data in this research comes from the purposely built-in option of language choice which was reduced to only two languages: Russian or Ukrainian. By offering a choice of the two languages, I intended to avoid 'subjective loyalty' to the native language that is often influenced by the current ideologies and usually present in self-reported data. For example, such 'subjective loyalty' can be observed through the discrepancy between the number of participants who reported their native language as Ukrainian (53% or 57 participants) but at the same time indicated that the language they were raised with was Russian (all participants of this study were raised with Russian as their first language).

Table 10.6 Discrepancy between the number of those who indicated Ukrainian as a native language and the number of those who said they were raised with Ukrainian as their first language

Survey results	Frequency	%
Participants who were raised with Russian as their first language	108	100
Participants who indicated Ukrainian as their first language	57	53

If we assume that the language the participants chose for this survey is the language they normally choose for their daily interactions, we can see that it falls short of the self-reported data of their usage of Ukrainian. Seventy-one participants (66%) chose the Russian language for the survey, and 37 participants (34%) chose Ukrainian. This is yet another evidence of the still dominant position of the Russian language among the Russian-speaking youth of the East and of the changing ideologies favoring Ukrainian.

Table 10.7 Self-reported data vs. actual usage of Ukrainian by participants

Survey results	Frequency	%
Those who claim to speak Ukrainian outside of school	45	42
Those who chose Ukrainian for the survey	37	34

What are the attitudes of the Russian-speaking youth toward Ukrainian?

A set of questions (17.10 – 17.12, 19, 26, 28 – 32) was designed to evaluate the attitudes of Russian-speaking youth toward Ukrainian. Seventy-five percent agreed and 16% somewhat agreed with the statement *Ukrainian is useful,* while only 8% disagreed or

somewhat disagreed. These numbers do not match the previous results of the actual usage

of Ukrainian and the results to the question *In what spheres do you think Ukrainian is the*

most useful? They can indicate that while the usage of Ukrainian has not risen very high,

the attitude toward it has. From the perspective of the majority of the participants,

Ukrainian is a useful language even though they do not use it regularly themselves. In

addition, even more participants (87%) agreed with the statement *Ukrainian is beautiful*,

with none disagreeing with this statement.

Most of the participants (78%) answered "yes" to the question *Do you think Ukrainian*

government should encourage the use of Ukrainian? This can also indicate a positive

attitude toward the Ukrainian language and Ukrainianization in general. When the

participants were asked to explain how the Ukrainian government should encourage the

use of Ukrainian, the following common themes and patterns were revealed:

–   *by means of financial stimuli* was mentioned 19 times

–   *through entertainment* - 18 times

–   *not by force* - 17 times

–   *by teaching about Ukrainian history* – 8 times

–   *by example from the government officials* – 7 times

–   *by stricter laws* – 5 times

–   *by publishing more literature in Ukrainian* – 4 times

–   *by penalties for speaking Russian* – 3 times

–   *through education* - 2 times

–   *by offering free community classes that teach Ukrainian* – 2 times

– *by producing books, animations, computer programs etc. for kids of all ages in Ukrainian* – 1 time

– *offering extra credits in education for the use of Ukrainian* – 1 time

The 22% who said "no" to the question *Do you think Ukrainian government should encourage the use of Ukrainian* offered the following explanation as to why they thought so:

– *forcing a language cannot bring positive results* – 11 times

– *speaking Ukrainian is not important* – 8 times

– *people should have the right to choose what language to speak* – 7 times

– *forcing a language is violation of human rights* – 2 times

– *Russian has the right to exist in Ukraine because it is a part of the Ukrainian history* – 2 times

– *It is more important that people speak the language of their preference* – 1 time

These results indicate that even though the attitudes toward Ukrainian are mostly positive, there is strong opposition (even from those who think that the government should encourage the use of Ukrainian) to applying forceful measures to promote its use.

The influence of current political ideologies favoring Ukrainian national identity can also be seen in the discrepancy between the number of participants whose parents are Russian by nationality and the number of those who identified themselves as Russian. Twenty-one out of 33 participants whose parents are Russian identified themselves as Ukrainian.

Despite the fact that the status of Ukrainian has risen significantly even in the East of Ukraine and there is a tendency to choose Ukrainian national identity over Russian national identity by the youth, we can also see that there is a weak connection between Ukrainian identity and use of the language. The question *What does it mean to you to be a Ukrainian?* yielded the following common themes:

‒ *to care about the future of the country and work toward improving its conditions in all spheres* was mentioned 23 times

‒ *to love the country* - 20 times

‒ *to feel pride for the country* – 19 times

‒ *to live in Ukraine* – 16 times

‒ *to follow Ukrainian traditions* – 12 times

‒ *to be patriotic* – 11 times

‒ *to be born in Ukraine* – 9 times

‒ *to speak Ukrainian* – 8 times

‒ *to be a good person* – 7 times

‒ *to know the history of Ukraine* – 6 times

‒ *to be yourself* – 6 times

‒ *to love Ukrainian culture* – 5 times

‒ *to have Ukrainian citizenship* – 4 times

‒ *to know the language* – 3 times

‒ *to love the language* – 2 times

‒ *to promote the Ukrainian language* – 1 time

‒ *to pass Ukrainian to the next generation* – 1 time

The above answers reveal that there is still a weak connection between the growing prestige of having Ukrainian identity and the use of the language. The themes mentioned most often are the ones that underline noble personal qualities that have more to do with benefitting the county and its people in a practical way rather than upholding ideological principles. The latter themes are usually characteristic of radical nationalists such as in the West. The themes that have any kind of relation to the Ukrainian language were mentioned the least. Along with these results, all the participants unanimously said "yes" to the question *Do you think Ukrainian patriotism can be expressed through the Russian language?* These attitudes differ from the radical attitudes in Western Ukraine and suggest that there is still a strong influence from and ties to the Russian language and culture among the Russian-speaking youth of Eastern Ukraine.

Chapter 11: Summary and conclusion

The results of this study have answered the two basic questions: *What are the current language preferences of the Russian-speaking youth in the East?* and *What are their attitudes toward Ukrainian?* From the quantitative data we can see that some young people who grew up in Russian-speaking homes started speaking Ukrainian outside of school. This means that the number of speech events in the Ukrainian language among youth has increased. However, Russian still remains the language of preference for most of the young people. This is evident from the self-reported data and even more so from the language of the survey they chose and from the language they used to answer the open-ended questions. While 53% of the participants identified Ukrainian as their native language and 42% claimed to use it outside of school, only 34% chose Ukrainian as the language of the survey and answered the open-ended questions in Ukrainian. The discrepancy between the reported data and actual usage of the language can be seen as evidence of the change in attitudes toward the Ukrainian language. The state language is gaining prestige among youth in the East.

In spite of the growing prestige of Ukrainian and the Ukrainian national identity among the Russian-speaking youth, the actual usage of the language is very low. This can be explained by the size and concentration of the Russian-speaking population in the East, the linguistic environment that is more supportive to continue the habit of speaking Russian, and the absence of domains where the usage of Ukrainian can be encouraged. The former two reasons are a result of the weak implementation of the legislative

language policies in the East. The law of the market satisfying customer preferences to ensure financial success will triumph over legislative decisions concerning use of the state language in the public sphere (A'Backett 2013).

The results of this study point to the fact that the only sphere where the language laws are enforced is education. There is little doubt that mandatory education by means of Ukrainian-medium instruction has produced youth who are fluent in the Ukrainian language. However, it has been less successful in producing a generation who use the language regularly. The majority of young people speak Ukrainian only in one domain, school. This agrees with what Hornberger and De Komo (2018) said about the role of education: "Education institutions are always dependent on the wider sociopolitical and economic contexts in which they exist, meaning that their initiatives cannot succeed when crucial supports are absent" (95).

There are many drawbacks in the attempts to promote Ukrainian in the East. There is a weak connection between the increased visibility of Ukrainian and its actual functioning as a living language in families and the community. The scant number of those who speak Ukrainian outside of school suggests that there is a tendency among the Russian-speaking youth to oppose language shift and that those who choose to speak Ukrainian do it not so much because of policies concerning education but as a result of other factors. The qualitative data suggests that the youth in the East have negative attitudes toward the forceful measures of the government to assimilate the Russian-speaking population into the Ukrainian-speaking population with its attendant culture. While homogeneous

national identity and a common language may seem to have advantages in terms of social

cohesion, forced assimilation as a political tool can cause separatism among people who

otherwise would be tolerant to each others' differences.

Appendices

Appendix A: A chronology of key events

Date	Historical Event
9th century	Founding of Kievan Rus', the first major Eastern Slavonic state.
10th century	Rurik dynasty established, and the rule of Prince Volodymyr the Great heralds start of a golden age.
988	Prince Vladimir the Great accepts Orthodox Christianity and begins conversion of Kievan Rus', thus setting the course for Christianity in the east.
11th century	Kievan Rus' reaches its peak under Yaroslav the Wise (1019-1054), with Kyiv becoming eastern Europe's chief political and cultural center.
1237-1240	Mongols invade the Rus' principalities, destroying many cities and ending Kievan Rus's power. The Tatars, as the Mongol invaders became known, establish the empire of the Golden Horde.
1349-1430	Poland and later the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth gradually annex most of what is now western and northern Ukraine.
1441	Crimean Khanate breaks free of the Golden Horde and conquers most of modern southern Ukraine.
1596	Poland establishes Greek-Catholic or Uniate Church, in union with Rome, which comes to predominate in western Ukraine. The rest of Ukraine remains overwhelmingly Orthodox.
1648-1657	Cossack uprising against Polish rule establishes Hetmanate, regarded in Ukraine as the forerunner of the modern independent state.
1654	Treaty of Pereyaslavl begins process of transforming Hetmanate into a vassal of Russia.
1686	Treaty of Eternal Peace between Russia and Poland ends 37 years of was with the Ottoman Empire in what is now Ukraine, and partitions the Hetmanate.
1708-1709	Mazepa uprising attempts to free the eastern Hetmanate from Russian rule, during the prolonged Great Northern War that ranged Russia against Poland and Sweden at the time.
1764	Russia abolishes the eastern Hetmanate and establishes the Little Russia governorate as a transitional entity until the full annexation of the territory in 1781.

1772-1795	Most of western Ukraine is absorbed into the Russian Emrire through the partitions of Poland.
1783	Russia takes over southern Ukraine through the annexation of the Crimean Khanate.
19th century	National cultural reawakening sees the development of Ukrainian literature, education, and historical research. Habsburg-run Galicia, acquired during the partitions of Poland, becomes a centre for Ukrainian political and cultural activity, as Russia bans the use of the Ukrainian language on its own territory.
1917	Central Rada council set up in Kyiv following collapse of Russian Empire
1918	Ukraine declares independence. Numerous rival governments vie for control for some or all of Ukraine during ensuing civil war.
1921	Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic established when Russian Red Army conquers two-thirds of Ukraine. Western third becomes part of Poland.
1920s	The Soviet government encourages Ukrainian language and culture within strict political bounds, although this process is reversed in the 1930s.
1932	Millions die in a man-made famine during Stalin's collectivisation campaign, known in Ukraine as the Holodomor.
1939	Western Ukraine is annexed by the Soviet Union under the terms of the Nazi-Soviet Pact.
1941	Ukraine suffers terrible wartime devastation as Nazis occupy the country until 1944.
1944	Stalin deports 200,000 Crimean Tatars to Siberia and Central Asia following false accusations of collaboration with Nazi Germany.
1954	In a surprise move, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev transfers the Crimean peninsula to Ukraine.
1960s	Increase in covert opposition to Soviet rule, leading to repression of dissidents in 1972.
1986	A reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power station explodes, sending a radioactive plume across Europe. Desperate efforts are made to contain the damaged reactor within a huge concrete cover.
1991	Ukraine declares independence following attempted coup in Moscow.

1990s	About 250,000 Crimean Tatars and their descendants return to Crimea following collapse of Soviet Union.
1994	Presidential elections: Leonid Kuchma succeeds Leonid Kravchuk, conducts policy of balancing overtures to the West and alliance with Russia.
1996	New, democratic constitution adopted, and hryvnya currency introduced.
2000	Chernobyl nuclear power plant is shut down, 14 years after the accident. Well over ten thousand people died as a direct result of the explosion, the health of millions more was affected.
2002 March	General election results in hung parliament. Parties opposed to President Kuchma allege widespread electoral fraud.
2002 May	Government announces decision to launch formal bid to join Nato.
2004 November	Opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko launches mass protest campaign over rigged elections that gave victory to pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych. Supreme Court later annuls poll result.
2005 December	Viktor Yushchenko becomes president after winning December election re-run. Relations with Russia sour, leading to frequent disputes over gas supplies and pipeline transit fees.
2006 July	Socialist Party abandons Orange Revolution allies to form coalition with Viktor Yanukovych's Party of Regions and the Communists.
2008 October	Global financial crisis leads to decline in demand for steel, causing price of one of the country's main exports to collapse. Value of Ukrainian currency falls sharply and investors pull out.
2010 February	Viktor Yanukovych is declared winner of second round of presidential election.
2010 June	Parliament votes to abandon Nato membership aspirations.
2011 October	A court jails former Yulia Tymoshenko for abuse of power over a gas deal with Russia in 2009.
2013 November	Tens of thousands of protesters take to the streets to protest at the government's sudden decision to abandon plans to sign an association agreement with the EU, blaming Russian pressure.
2014 February	Security forces kill at least 77 protesters in Kyiv. President Yanukovych flees to Russia, opposition takes over.

2014 March	Russian forces annex Crimea, prompting biggest East-West showdown since Cold War. US and European Union impose ever-harsher sanctions on Russia.
2014 April	Pro-Russian armed groups seize parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions on Russian border. Government launches military operation in response.
2014 May	Leading businessman Petro Poroshenko wins presidential election on pro-Western platform.
2014 July	Pro-Russian forces shoot down Malaysian airliner over eastern Ukraine conflict zone, killing all 298 people on board.
2014 September	Nato confirms Russian troops and heavy military equipment entering eastern Ukraine.
2014 October	Parliamentary elections produce convincing majority for pro-Western parties.
2015 February	Germany and France broker a new Donbass deal at talks in Belarus, resulting in a tenuous ceasefire.
2016	Economy returns to fragile growth after two years of turmoil.
2017 July	Ukraine's association agreement with the European Union is ratified by all signatories, and comes into force on 1 September.
2018 May	Russian President Putin officially opens a bridge linking southern Russia to Crimea, an action Ukraine calls illegal.
2018 October	The Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople agrees to allow Ukraine to set up its own Orthodox Church independent of Russian ecclesiastical supervision.
2019 April-July	Television comedian Volodymyr Zelensky wins presidential election run-off in a landslide victory over incumbent Petro Poroshenko.
2019 August	Parliament appoints President Zelensky's aide Oleksiy Honcharuk prime minister.
2019 September	Russia and Ukraine swap prisoners captured in the wake of Moscow's seizure of Crimea and intervention in the Donbass.
2019 October	Ukraine becomes embroiled US impeachment row over allegations of President Trump attempting to put pressure on the country over investigating possible Democrat president rival Joe Biden.
2020 March	President Zelensky appoints former businessman Denys Shmyhal prime minister with a mandate to stimulate industrial revival and improve tax receipts.

(BBC NEWS 2020)

Appendix B: Note on Transliteration

Russian and Ukrainian words are followed by phonemic representations of their pronunciations using IPA symbols and are surrounded by slashes (/). Romanization is employed to represent pronunciation of Ukrainian names of cities and places, which are written according to their spelling and pronunciation in the Ukrainian language.

Letters and symbols of the Ukrainian alphabet			Letters and symbols of the Russian alphabet		
Letter	**Romanization**	**IPA**	**Letter**	**Romanization**	**IPA**
А а	A a	/ɑ/	Аа	A a	/a/
Б б	B b	/b/	Бб	B b	/b/ or /bʲ/
В в	V v	/w/	Вв	V v	/v/ or /vʲ/
Г г	H h	/ɦ/	Гг	G g	/g/ or /gʲ/
Ґ ґ	G g	/g/	Дд	D d	/d/ or /dʲ/
Д д	D d	/d/, /dʲ/	Ее	Je je	/je/, /ʲe/ or /e/
Е е	E e	/ɛ/	Ёё	Jo jo	/jo/ or /ʲo/
Є є	Ye ye	/jɛ/ or /ʲɛ/	Жж	Zh zh	/ʐ/
Ж ж	Zh zh	/ʒ/	Зз	Z z	/z/ or /zʲ/
З з	Z z	/z/, /zʲ/	Ии	I i	/i/ or /ʲi/
И и	Y y	/ɪ/	Йй	J j	/j/
І і	I i	/i/, /ʲi/	Кк	K k	/k/ or /kʲ/
Ї ї	Yi yi	/ji/	Лл	L l	/ɫ/ or /lʲ/
Й й	Y y	/j/	Мм	M m	/m/ or /mʲ/
К к	K k	/k/	Нн	N n	/n/ or /nʲ/
Л л	L l	/l/, /lʲ/	Оо	O o	/o/
М м	M m	/m/	Пп	P p	/p/ or /pʲ/
Н н	N n	/n/, /nʲ/	Рр	R r	/r/ or /rʲ/
О о	O o	/ɔ/	Сс	S s	/s/ or /sʲ/
П п	P p	/p/	Тт	T t	/t/ or /tʲ/
Р р	R r	/r/, /rʲ/	Уу	U u	/u/
С с	S s	/s/, /sʲ/	Фф	F f	/f/ or /fʲ/

Т т	T t	/t/, /tʲ/	Хx	Kh kh	/x/ or /xʲ/
У у	U u	/u/	Цц	Ts ts	/ts/
Ф ф	F f	/f/	Чч	Ch ch	/tɕ/
Х х	Kh kh	/x/	Шш	Sh sh	/ʂ/
Ц ц	Ts ts	/t͡s/, /t͡sʲ/	Щщ	Shch shch	/ɕ:/, /ɕ/
Ч ч	Ch ch	/t͡ʃ/	Ъъ	″	
Ш ш	Sh sh	/ʃ/	Ыы	y	[ɨ]
Щ щ	Shch shch	/ʃt͡ʃ/	Ьь	'	/ʲ/
Ь ь	' (apostrophe)	/◌ʲ/	Ээ	E e	/e/
Ю ю	Ju ju	/ju/ or /ʲu/	Юю	Ju ju	/ju/ or /ʲu/
Я я	Ja ja	/jɑ/ or /ʲɑ/	Яя	Ja ja	/ja/ or /ʲa/

Q4 Скільки Вам років?

○ 18-25

○ 26-35

○ 36 років та старше

Q5 Скільки років Ви навчалися в університеті?

○ 1

○ 2

○ 3

○ 4

○ 5 і більше

Q6 Як довго Ви живете в Україні?

○ менше року

○ 1-5 років

○ 6-10 років

○ 11-15 років

○ 16 і більше

Q7 Де Ви виросли?

○ Запоріжжя

○ Запорізька область

○ інший

Q8 Якої Ви національності?

○ українець(ка)

○ росіянин(ка)

○ інша національність

Q9 Якої національності Ваші батьки? (позначте все, що стосується)

☐ українець(ка)

☐ росіянин(ка)

☐ інша національність

Q10 Яку мову Ви вважаєте своєю рідною?

○ українську

○ російську

○ іншу

Q11 Якою мовою Ви переважно розмовляли в дитинстві?

○ українською

○ російською

○ іншою

Q12 Хто з Ваших родичів переважно розмовляє українською? (позначте все, що стосується)

- [ ] мати
- [ ] батько
- [ ] рідний брат
- [ ] бабуся
- [ ] дідусь
- [ ] тітка
- [ ] дядько
- [ ] двоюрідний брат
- [ ] інший родич
- [ ] ніхто не розмовляє українською

Q13 Ви розмовляєте українською поза університету?

- ○ Так
- ○ Ні

Display This Question:
If Do you speak Ukrainian outside of school? = Yes

Q14 Якого віку Ви були, коли Ви почали розмовляти українською?

- ○ 1-5 років
- ○ 6-10 років
- ○ 11-15 років
- ○ 16 або старше

Q15 Я відчуваю опір інших, коли я розмовляю українською.

- ○ Абсолютно згодний(на)
- ○ Дещо згоден(на)
- ○ Ні погоджуюсь, ні не погоджуюсь
- ○ Дещо не згоден(на)
- ○ Категорично не згоден(на)

Q16 Чи можете Ви пояснити, чому Ви почали розмовляти українською?

_____

Q17 Оберіть варіант, який найбільше стосується Вас:

	Погоджуюсь	Дещо згоден(на)	Ні погоджуюсь, ні не погоджуюсь	Дещо не згоден(на)	не погоджуюсь
Вдома я розмовляю українською переважну більшість часу.	○	○	○	○	○
Поза уроками я переважно розмовляю українською мовою.	○	○	○	○	○
Я переважно розмовляю українською на заняттях.	○	○	○	○	○
Я переважно розмовляю українською з друзями.	○	○	○	○	○
На роботі я переважно розмовляю українською.	○	○	○	○	○
Я вільно володію українською мовою.	○	○	○	○	○

Вдома мої батьки вдома розмовляють українською.	○	○	○	○	○
Більшість моїх друзів вільно володіє українською мовою.	○	○	○	○	○
Більшість моїх викладачів у середній школі викладали свої предмети українською мовою.	○	○	○	○	○
Українська мова корисна в спілкуванні.	○	○	○	○	○
Українська мова прекрасна.	○	○	○	○	○
Українська мова є частиною моєї ідентичності.	○	○	○	○	○

Q18 Скільки Ваших друзів розмовляють українською?

○ жоден

○ 1-4

○ 5-10

○ 11 і більше

Q19 У яких сферах, на Вашу думку, українська мова є найкориснішою? (позначте все, що стосується)

☐ релігія

☐ освіта

☐ робота

☐ дружба

☐ інше

☐ ні у яких сферах

Q20 Коли Ви дивитесь фільми в онлайн режимі, як часто надаєте перевагу українському перекладу?

○ Завжди

○ Більшість часу

○ Близько половини часу

○ Іноді

○ Ніколи

Q21 Коли з Вами розмовляють українською мовою поза навчальним закладом, Ви

відповідаєте українською?

○ Завжди

○ Більшість часу

○ Близько половини часу

○ Іноді

○ Ніколи

Q22 Чи використовували Ви такі способи розміщення реклами для продажу товаров та послуг як газета, рекламний щит, інтернет-сайт тощо ?

○ так

○ ні

Q23 Якою мовою Ви користувалися?

☐ українською

☐ російською

☐ іншою

Q24 Чому Ви користувалися російською?

_____

Q25 Якій мові Ви б надали перевагу в системі освіти в університетах?

○ українській

○ російській

Q26 Чи повинна російська мова бути обов'язковим предметом у школі?

○ Так

○ Ні

Q27 Оберіть варіант, який найбільше стосується Вас:

	Погоджую сь (1)	Дещо згоден(на) (2)	Ні погоджуюс я, ні не погоджуюс я (3)	Дещо не згоден(на) (4)	Не погоджуюс ь (5)
Мої викладачі вільно володіють українською	○	○	○	○	○
Мої викладачі розмовляют ь українською на заняттях.	○	○	○	○	○
Мої викладачі часто помиляютьс я, коли розмовляют ь українською .	○	○	○	○	○
Мої викладачі спілкуються українською мовою поза заняттями.	○	○	○	○	○

Q28 Як Ви вважаєте, український уряд повинен заохочувати використання української мови?

○ так

○ ні

Q29 Як український уряд повинен заохочувати використання української мови?

_____

Q30 Будь ласка, поясніть, чому український уряд не повинен заохочувати використання української мови.

_____

Q31 Що для Вас означає бути українцем?

_____

Q32 Як Ви вважаєте, чи може людина вважатися патриотом України, якщо вона розмовляє російською?

○ так

○ ні

Appendix D: Survey Questions (Russian)

Q4 Сколько Вам лет?

○ 18-25 лет

○ 26-35

○ 36 или старше

Q5 Сколько лет Вы отучились в университете?

○ 1

○ 2

○ 3

○ 4

○ 5 или больше

Q6 Как долго Вы живете в Украине?

○ меньше, чем год

○ 1-5 лет

○ 6-10 лет

○ 11-15 лет

○ 16 или больше

Q7 Где Вы выросли?

○ г.Запорожье

○ Запорожская область

○ Другое

Q8 Какая Ваша национальность?

- ○ украинец(ка)
- ○ русский(ая)
- ○ другая национальность

Q9 Какой национальности Ваши родители? (выберите все что подходит)

- ☐ украинка(нец)
- ☐ русская(ий)
- ☐ другой национальноси

Q10 Какой язык Вы считаете своим родным языком?

- ○ украинский
- ○ русский
- ○ другой

Q11 На каком языке Вы говорили в детстве большую часть времени?

- ○ на украинском
- ○ на русском
- ○ на другом языке

Q12 Кто из Ваших родственников говорит по-украински большую часть времени?
(отметьте все, что походит)

- ☐ мать
- ☐ отец
- ☐ родной брат
- ☐ бабушка
- ☐ дедушка
- ☐ тетя
- ☐ дядя
- ☐ двоюродный брат
- ☐ другие родственники
- ☐ никто не говорит по-украински

Q13 Вы говорите по-украински вне университета?

- ◯ да
- ◯ нет

Q14 Сколько Вам было лет, когда Вы начали говорить по-украински?

- ○ 1-5 лет
- ○ 6-10 лет
- ○ 11-15 лет
- ○ 16 или старше

Q15 Я испытываю сопротивление со стороны других, когда говорю на украинском языке.

- ○ Полностью согласен(на)
- ○ Отчасти согласен(на)
- ○ Ни согласен(на), ни несогласен(на)
- ○ Несколько не согласен(на)
- ○ Категорически не согласен(на)

Q16 Можете ли Вы объяснить, почему Вы начали говорить по-украински?

_____

Q17 Укажите уровень, с которым Вы согласны со следующими утверждениями:

	Согласен(на) (1)	Отчасти согласен(на) (11)	Ни согласен(на), ни несогласен(на) (3)	Отчасти не согласен(на) (12)	не согласен(на) (7)
Я говорю по-украински большую часть времени.	○	○	○	○	○
Я говорю по-украински в школе вне занятий большую часть времени.	○	○	○	○	○
Я говорю по-украински в классах большую часть времени.	○	○	○	○	○
Я говорю по-украински с друзьями большую часть времени.	○	○	○	○	○

Я говорю по-украински на работе большую часть времени.	○	○	○	○	○
Я свободно говорю по-украински.	○	○	○	○	○
Мои родители большую часть времени говорят по-украински дома.	○	○	○	○	○
Большинство моих друзей свободно говорят по-украински.	○	○	○	○	○
Большинство моих учителей в средней школе преподавали свои предметы на украинском языке.	○	○	○	○	○
Украинский полезный в общении.	○	○	○	○	○

Украинский красивый язык.	○	○	○	○	○
Украинский является частью моей идентичности.	○	○	○	○	

Q18 Сколько Ваших друзей говорят на украинском?

- ○ никто
- ○ 1-4
- ○ 5-10
- ○ 11 или больше

Q19 Когда Вы смотрите фильмы онлайн, как часто Вы выбираете те, которые имеют украинский перевод?

- ○ Всегда
- ○ Большую часть времени
- ○ Примерно в половине случаев
- ○ Иногда
- ○ Никогда

Q В каких сферах украинский язык Вы считаете наиболее полезным? (отметьте все, что подходит)

- [ ] религия
- [ ] образование
- [ ] трудоустройство
- [ ] дружба
- [ ] другое
- [ ] ни в каких сферах

Q21 Когда к Вам обращаются по-украински вне школы, Вы отвечаете по-украински?

- ○ Всегда
- ○ Большую часть времени
- ○ Примерно в половине случаев
- ○ Иногда
- ○ Никогда

Q22 Вы когда-нибудь пользовались газетой, рекламным щитом, интернет-сайтом или любым другим средством для продажи/ рекламы товаров или услуг?

- ○ да
- ○ нет

Display This Question:
If Have you ever used a newspaper, billboard, internet site, or any other medium for selling/adverti...
= yes

Q23 Какой язык Вы использовали для продажи или рекламы предметов или Ваших

способностей?

☐ украинский

☐ русский

☐ другой

Q24 Почему Вы использовали русский язык?

_____

Q25 Какой язык Вы бы предпочли в системе образования в университетах?

○ украинский

○ русский

Q26 Должен ли русский язык быть обязательным в средних школах?

○ да

○ нет

Q27 Укажите уровень, с которым Вы согласны со следующими утверждениями

	Согласен(на) (1)	Отчасти согласен(на) (2)	Ни согласен(на), ни несогласен(на) (3)	Отчасти не согласен(на) (4)	не согласен(на) (5)
Мои профессора свободно говорят по-украински	○	○	○	○	○
Мои профессора используют украинский язык во время лекций.	○	○	○	○	○
Мои профессора регулярно делают грамматические и лексические ошибки, когда говорят на украинском языке.	○	○	○	○	○
Мои профессора говорят по-украински вне занятий.	○	○	○	○	○

Q28 Как Вы думаете, должно ли украинское правительство поощрять использование украинского?

○ да

○ нет

Q29 Как украинское правительство должно поощрять использование украинского?

_____

Q30 Пожалуйста, объясните, почему украинское правительство не должно поощрять использование украинского языка.

_____

Q31 Что для Вас значит быть украинцем?

_____

Q32 Как Вы думаете, можно ли выразить украинский патриотизм через русский язык?

○ да

○ нет

Appendix E: English Translation of the Survey Questions

Q4 How old are you?

○ 18-25

○ 26-35

○ 36 or older

Q5 How many years of college have you accomplished?

○ 1

○ 2

○ 3

○ 4

○ 5 or more

Q6 How long have you lived in Ukraine?

○ less than a year

○ 1-5 years

○ 6-10 years

○ 11-15 years

○ 16 or longer

Q7 Where did you grow up?

○ Zaporozhie

○ Zaporozhskaya oblast

○ other

Q8 What is your nationality?

○ Ukrainian

○ Russian

○ other

Q9 What nationality are your parents? (choose all that apply)

☐ Ukrainian

☐ Russian

☐ other

Q10 What language do you consider to be your first language?

○ Ukrainian

○ Russian

○ other

Q11 What language did you speak as a child most of the time?

○ Ukrainian

○ Russian

○ other

Q12 Which of your relatives speak Ukrainian most of the time? (check all that apply)

- ☐ mother
- ☐ father
- ☐ sibling
- ☐ grandmother
- ☐ grandfather
- ☐ aunt
- ☐ uncle
- ☐ cousin
- ☐ other
- ☐ none

Q13 Do you speak Ukrainian outside of school?

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

Display This Question:

If Do you speak Ukrainian outside of school? = Yes

Q14 How old were you when you started speaking Ukrainian? (if applicable)

○ 1-5 years old

○ 6-10 years old

○ 11-15 years old

○ 16 or older

Q15 I experience resistance from others, when I speak Ukrainian.

○ Strongly agree

○ Somewhat agree

○ Neither agree nor disagree

○ Somewhat disagree

○ Strongly disagree

Q16 Can you explain why you started speaking Ukrainian?

_____

Q17 Indicate the level with which you agree with the following statements:

	Agree (1)	Somewhat agree (11)	Neither agree nor disagree (3)	Somewhat disagree (12)	disagree (7)
I speak Ukrainian at home most of the time.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
I speak Ukrainian at school outside of classes most of the time.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
I speak Ukrainian in classes most of the time.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
I speak Ukrainian with friends most of the time.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
I speak Ukrainian at work most of the time.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
I am fluent in Ukrainian.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
My parents speak Ukrainian at home most of the time.	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

Most of my friends are fluent in Ukrainian.	○	○	○	○	○
Most of my teachers in middle school taught thier subjects in Ukrainian.	○	○	○	○	○
Ukrainian is useful.	○	○	○	○	○
Ukrainian is beautiful.	○	○	○	○	○
Ukrainian is part of my identity.	○	○	○	○	○

Q18 How many of your friends speak Ukrainian regularly?

○ none

○ 1-4

○ 5-10

○ 11 or more

Q19 In what spheres do you think Ukrainian is the most useful? (check all that apply)

- [ ] religion
- [ ] education
- [ ] employment
- [ ] friendship
- [ ] other
- [ ] not useful in any sphere

Q20 When you watch movies on-line, how often do you choose the ones that have Ukrainian translation?

- ○ Always
- ○ Most of the time
- ○ About half the time
- ○ Sometimes
- ○ Never

Q21 When you are spoken to in Ukrainian outside of school, do you reply in Ukrainian?

- ○ Always
- ○ Most of the time
- ○ About half the time
- ○ Sometimes
- ○ Never

Q22 Have you ever used a newspaper, billboard, internet site, or any other medium for

selling/advertising goods or services?

○ yes

○ no

Q23 What language did you use for selling/advertising items of labor?

☐ Ukrainian

☐ Russian

☐ other

Q24 Why did you choose Russian?

_____

Q25 What language would you prefer as a medium in education system in universities?

○ Ukrainian

○ Russian

Q26 Should Russian language be a required class in middle schools?

○ Yes

○ No

Q27 Indicate the level with which you agree with the following statements:

	Agree (1)	Somewhat agree (2)	Neither agree nor disagree (3)	Somewhat disagree (4)	Disagree (5)
My professors are fluent in Ukrainian.	○	○	○	○	○
My professors speak Ukrainian during lectures.	○	○	○	○	○
My professors make grammatical and lexical mistakes regularly when they speak Ukrainian.	○	○	○	○	○
My professors speak Ukrainian outside of classes.	○	○	○	○	○

Q28 Do you think Ukrainian government should encourage the use of Ukrainian?

○ yes

○ no

Q29 How do you think Ukrainian government should encourage the use of Ukrainian?

_____

Q30 Please, explain why the Ukrainian government shouldn't encourage the use of Ukrainian.

_____

Q31 What does it mean to you to be a Ukrainian?

_____

Q32 Do you think Ukrainian patriotism can be expressed through the Russian language?

○ yes

○ no

Appendix F: The invitation to participate in the survey sent to students of ZNU (in Russian).

Здравствуйте! Меня зовут Лена Контор. Я студентка Университета штата Айдахо на магистратуре антропологической лингвистики. В рамках своей степени я провожу исследование языковых идеологий в двуязычном контексте. Ваше участие в этом исследовании очень важно для этого исследования и для области лингвистики. Я была бы очень признательна, если бы Вы уделили время, чтобы ответить на вопросы, что займет у вас около 10 минут. 15 долларов будут разыграны среди каждых 50 участников. Моя цель - привлечь как минимум 200 участников. Нажмите на эту ссылку **https://tinyurl.com/yy7locs8**, чтоб принять участие в анкетировании.

English translation of the invitation to participate in the survey sent to students of ZNU

Hello! My name is Lena Contor. I am a student at the Idaho State University pursuing Master's Degree in Anthropological Linguistics. As part of my degree, I am conducting a study of linguistic ideologies in a bilingual context. Your participation in this study is very important for this study and for the field of linguistics. I would really appreciate it if you took the time to answer the questions of the survey. This would take you about 10 min. $10 will be raffled off among every 50 participants. My goal is to have at least 200 participants. Click on this link https://tinyurl.com/yy7locs8 to take part in the survey.

Figure 1 A sign advertising computer services (in Russian); placed by a small business. Paper bulletins on the right and under the sign are placed by individuals (in Russian). Photograph by Lena Contor, June 2018.

Figure 2 A sign advertising roofing services (in Russian). Photograph by Lena Contor, June 2018.

Figure 3 A sign advertising plumbing services (in Russian). Photograph by Lena Contor, June 2018.

Figure 4 A sign to advertise a beer kiosk. The two smaller signs advertise trips to the seaside and to Russia. Paper bulletins on the lamppost were placed by individuals. All the signs are in Russian. Photograph by Lena Contor, June 2018.

Figure 5 Shoe store (all writings are in Russian). Photograph by Lena Contor, June 2018.

Figure 6 Beauty salon (the name and all services are written in Russian). Photograph by Lena Contor, June 2018.

Figure 7 Car parts store (in Russian). Photograph by Lena Contor, June 2018.

Figure 8 Build-it-yourself store and other smaller businesses (in Russian). Photograph by Lena Contor, June 2018.

Figure 9 A store equivalent to a 1$ store (in Russian). Photograph by Lena Contor, June 2018.

Figure 10 A sign advertising attorney services (in Ukrainian). Photograph by Lena Contor, June 2018.

Figure 11 A bank sign (in Russian on the left and Ukrainian on the right). Photograph by Lena Contor, June 2018.

Appendix H: Figures for Chapter 9

Figure 12 Zaporizhzhia hydroelectric station. Photographer is unknown.

Figure 13 Zaporizhzhia hydroelectric station. Photographer is unknown.

Figure 14 Factories of Zaporizhzhia. Photographer is unknown.

Figure 15 Factories of Zaporizhzhia. Photographer is unknown.

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