

Use Authorization

In presenting this dissertation in partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree at Idaho State University, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for inspection. I further state that permission to download and/or print my dissertation for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Dean of the Graduate School, Dean of my academic division, or by the University Librarian. It is understood that any copying or publication of this dissertation for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Signature _____

Date _____

**CIEDRA: An Anomaly or the Death Knell of Collaborative
Decision Making for Idaho Public Lands Use Issues?**

by

E. Scott Lee

A dissertation

submitted in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Arts in the Department of Political Science

Idaho State University

Fall 2014

Copyright ©2014 E. Scott Lee

All rights reserved.

To the Graduate Faculty:

**The members of the committee appointed to examine the dissertation of
E. SCOTT LEE find it satisfactory and recommend that it be accepted.**

**Mark McBeth
Major Advisor**

**Donna Lybecker
Committee Member**

**Mark Johnson
Graduate Faculty Representative**

Idaho State UNIVERSITY

Office for Research Integrity
921 South 8th Avenue, Stop 8046 • Pocatello, Idaho 83209-8046

January 28, 2014

Elwood Lee
Stop 8073
Pocatello, ID 83209

RE: Your application dated 1/27/2014 regarding study number 4039: Dissertation
Research - E. Scott Lee

Dear Mr. Lee:

I agree that this study qualifies as exempt from review under the following guideline: 2. Anonymous surveys or interviews. This letter is your approval, please, keep this document in a safe place.

Notify the HSC of any adverse events. Serious, unexpected adverse events must be reported in writing within 10 business days.

You are granted permission to conduct your study effective immediately. The study is not subject to renewal.

Please note that any changes to the study as approved must be promptly reported and approved. Some changes may be approved by expedited review; others require full board review. Contact Patricia Hunter (208-282-2179; fax 208-282-4529; email: humsubj@isu.edu) if you have any questions or require further information.

Sincerely,

Ralph Baergen, PhD, MPH, CIP
Human Subjects Chair

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would first like to acknowledge and thank the ISU Political Science Department for funding me through the latter part of my doctoral studies. The funding was invaluable and without it, I would not have been able to study full-time and complete my program of study when I did.

I would like to thank all my professors who endeavored successfully to “teach an old dog new tricks.” I am especially grateful to Mark McBeth, Donna Lybecker, and Jeff Callen for their constant support and guidance as I made my way through the process.

I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee: Mark McBeth, my committee chair and advisor; Donna Lybecker, my department faculty member; and Mark Johnson, my GFR. I recognize the untold hours spent on reviewing my prospectus and dissertation, and in participating in their defenses. Thank you.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for their unending support. And I especially thank my wife Karen, for without her I would not have undertaken this adventure. She has been by my side the whole time, encouraging me, helping me, not making me feel bad for the hours I spent on my classes and my dissertation, and graciously surrendering the kitchen table and guest bedroom for my dissertation stuff. As she asked me just before my dissertation defense, “do I get my husband and kitchen table back now?” To that I answer . . . “Yes my dear, you do.”

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables	ix
Abstract	x
Chapter One – Introduction	1
Chapter Two – Background and History	6
Chapter Three – Literature Review	17
Intractable or “Wicked” Problems	17
Collaborative decision making	22
Benefits of Collaborative Decision Making	24
Underlying Principles of Collaborative Decision Making	26
Characteristics of Collaborative Decision Making	27
Commitments and Rules for Collaborative Decision Making	30
Importance of Values in Collaboration	32
Barriers to Collaboration	33
The Collaborative Decision Making Process	35
Research Question	65
Chapter Four – The Stakeholders	67
Ranchers	67
Motorized Recreationists	70
Idaho Recreation Council	74
Local Government	75
Wilderness Proponents	80
Individuals or Groups Contacted	82
Chapter Five – Methodology	87

Qualitative Methodology	89
Quantitative Methodology	96
Chapter Six – Results	99
Collaboration Chronology	99
Interviews With Those Attending Combined Collaborative Meetings	108
Interviewees Not Participating in Combined Collaborative Meetings	123
Summary of Interviews	135
Quantitative Results	135
Quantitative Summary	144
Chapter Seven – Discussion	145
Steps of Collaboration	145
Why Collaboration Was Not Used	164
Chapter Eight – Limitations and Future Research	180
References	182
Appendices	192

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1. Mean responses on a 7 point Likert-type scale (1= “not at all” to 7= “to a great extent” for statements 1 through 14, and 1= “strongly disagree” to 7= “strongly agree” for statements 15 through 17.	137
TABLE 2. Aggregated mean responses on a 7 point Likert-type scale (1=“not at all” to 7=“to a great extent” for statements 1 through 14, and 1=“strongly disagree” to 7=“strongly agree” for statements 15 through 17 for each of the five aspects of collaboration for all interviewees.	140
TABLE 3. Aggregated mean responses on a 7 point Likert-type scale (1=“not at all” to 7=“to a great extent” for statements 1 through 14, and 1=“strongly disagree” to 7=“strongly agree” for statements 15 through 17 for each of the five dimensions of collaboration for Motorized and Mechanized Groups and Wilderness Proponents.	143

**CIEDRA: An Anomaly or the Death Knell of Collaborative
Decision Making for Idaho Public Lands Use Issues?
Dissertation Abstract – Idaho State University (2014)**

This study examines Idaho U.S. Representative Mike Simpson's touted, yet to date unsuccessful, collaboration efforts to pass the Central Idaho Economic Development and Recreation Act (CIEDRA) covering the Boulder-White Cloud Mountains area in central Idaho. Rep. Simpson has stated that he brought together different stakeholders, representing local ranchers, local, state, and federal government officials, recreationists, wilderness proponents, and other interested groups and individuals, to work toward resolution of a wicked land use problem facing the Boulder-White Clouds area. On its face it appeared to be a perfect example of collaboration. Yet, CIEDRA has failed every time it has been introduced in Congress. This study focuses on why it failed.

Analysis of the collaboration process utilized by Rep. Simpson and his office staff reveals that the collaboration failed because there was, in fact, no collaboration. The necessary steps for collaboration were not followed and ultimately, when resistance to the collaboration was encountered early on in the process, a conscious switch was made to "shuttle diplomacy" rather than to continue pursuing collaboration.

It is asserted that some underlying reasons why collaboration did not take place include a deficiency in strategic thinking, the nature of coalitions, and real world considerations such as time and cost constraints, loss of control at federal level, a desire to make rational choices in non-rational world, the effect of social psychological heuristics and traps on individuals involved in the collaborative process, and that it was

easier to do what has been done in the past (shuttle diplomacy) rather than continue in the collaboration process.

This is not to say that Rep. Simpson was unsuccessful in building relationships that might come to fruition in the future. Should the current discussion over monument status for the area under the Antiquities Act not result in such a designation, Rep. Simpson's demonstrated willingness to work with multiple groups, including those with strong Democratic Party ties, may yet help resolve this issue that affects all Idahoans and other users of the Boulder-White Clouds area.

CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION

As Deborah Stone (2002) has so eloquently stated, symbolic representation is the essence of problem definition, and thus problem solution. Two enduring symbols of America are the American Cowboy, majestically astride his steed while rounding up the doggies, and the Bald Eagle, soaring over pristine wilderness untouched by human presence. Add logging, mining, hunting and fishing, and then stir in the activities of the “new” West such as 4-wheeling, snowmobiling, motorcycling, mountain biking, hiking, cross-country skiing, tourism, and other forms of outdoor recreation, and you have the ingredients for a titanic clash of iconic cultural symbols and the impetus for the perfect storm of a wicked or intractable dispute over public lands use. Such disputes are often set apart from other policy disputes by their complexity, relentlessness, interdependency, and may touch on core beliefs of concepts such as identity, values, and beliefs. They tend to involve polarized perceptions that have evolved over long periods of time. As Nie (2003) states, intractable disputes are not ever solved, but are resolved again and again over time.

When such a dispute erupts, the full panoply of rhetorical mechanisms comes into play, with participants digging in their heels, to convince the other sides that they are wrong. These rhetorical and other mechanisms are designed to resist, obstruct, frame, conceptualize, and expand or contract the issue, and to demonize, generalize, trivialize, homogenize, or marginalize the other disputants.

A simple review of written statements made by various public land users on their websites demonstrates the deep divide between these parties and the sense of absolute

rightness or wrongness on the part of the respective parties. For instance, Jon Marvel, founder of Western Watersheds Project, has stated that its purpose is “the total removal of domestic livestock from Western public lands, some 250 million acres of desert, forest, grassland, rivers, and streams stretching from Montana to California” (Western Watersheds Project, n.d.). The BlueRibbon Coalition “champions responsible use of public lands and waters for the benefit of all recreationists by educating and empowering its members to: secure, protect, and expand shared outdoor recreation access and use, work collaboratively with natural resource managers and other recreationists, educate the general public, media, elected officials, and other decision makers on recreation and access issues, promote equitable and responsible natural resource management, affect the political and administrative process, support recreation on, and promote respect for, private property, [and] encourage appropriate enforcement of the law” (BlueRibbon Coalition, n.d.). “The mission of the Idaho Cattle Association is to coordinate and advance the economic well being [sic] of the Idaho Beef Industry through innovative and effective political, educational, and marketing programs accepted and supported by all industry segments, partners, and coalitions” (Idaho Cattle Association, n.d.). The Idaho Conservation League hopes “to influence local, state and federal policies to ensure adequate protections for clean water, clean air, healthy families and Idaho's unique way of life” (Idaho Conservation League, n.d.). The Sawtooth Society is dedicated to “serving as an advocate for the Sawtooth National Recreation Area, preserving open space in the Sawtooth National Recreation Area, [and] enhancing recreation facilities and services in the Sawtooth National Recreation Area”

(Sawtooth Society, n.d.). The Idaho State Snowmobile Association is “dedicated to preserving, protecting, and promoting snowmobiling in the great state of Idaho” (Idaho State Snowmobile Association, n.d.). The Idaho Trail Machine Association is “devoted to single-track trail [motorcycle] riding and maintenance [that works] with the BLM, National Forest Service, Idaho Parks and Recreation, Idaho Recreation Council and other groups to promote, preserve and protect motorized access to the great trails of Idaho” (Idaho Trail Machine Association, n.d.). The Boulder-White Clouds Council works “to bring permanent protection for the 500,000 acre Boulder-White Cloud Mountains by securing designation with the National Wilderness Preservation System” (Boulder-White Clouds Council, n.d.).

Simple discourse is insufficient to resolve intractable disputes. It is through a persistent, carefully orchestrated, collaborative decision making process that there exists a methodology with a chance to resolve these types of wicked environmental disputes. While there is no set formula for this methodology, the literature sets forth several steps and characteristics needed for collaboration to occur and succeed.

The process itself involves actions such as issue definition, stakeholder identification, considering the decision timing, identification of possible objectives, alternatives, and types of decisions that could be made, identification of possible analytical tools and evaluation measurement metrics, and consideration of possible levels and types of expert consultation for the process. It continues with developing alternatives while acknowledging objectives and values of stakeholders that can be measured, evaluated, and ultimately accepted by the stakeholders. Tradeoffs need be

used in the evaluation and acceptance process. Finally, the chosen alternative is implemented, monitored, evaluated, and reviewed for possible changes as time goes on.

The conflict over the different uses of the Boulder-White Cloud Mountains area in central Idaho by various groups has been the focus of an intractable policy dispute despite the concerted efforts by many, and in particular U.S. Representative Mike Simpson ("Simpson"). After his election to office, Simpson began working with the various stakeholders in an attempt to put together legislation that would clarify and solidify public use of the area and remove the uncertainty of future uses. To date, his self-proclaimed collaborative efforts have been for naught, as his legislation, commonly referred to as the Central Idaho Economic Development and Recreation Act ("CIEDRA"), has not been enacted into law.

This dissertation will explore the collaborative actions taken to pass CIEDRA and the failure of said collaborative efforts. It is not intended to provide a history of congressional action taken in regard to CIEDRA or to discuss the social psychology that impacts collaborative decision making. It will, however, explore what hindered, obstructed, or prevented successful collaborative efforts and ultimate passage. It will analyze specifically the collaborative steps taken or not taken and their consequences. It will discuss methods to ameliorate the issues preventing action in the future and opine whether collaborative decision making is still a viable method to resolve wicked environmental issues regarding public lands use in Idaho.

As an advisory note, much of the information in this study comes from interviews with individuals who personally participated in the collaborative efforts relating to CIEDRA. The first time one of these interviewees is referenced, the date will be provided. All subsequent references to interviewees will not provide a date. All interviews took place in 2014.

CHAPTER TWO – BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

Since the first Earth Day in 1970, the U.S. environmental movement had high levels of public support because of the movement's insistence on tougher laws to protect the nation's air, water, and natural resources. The movement's legislative focus at various times brought it into conflict with natural resource industries, ranchers, outdoor recreation groups, and landowners. In the late 1970s to early 1980s, the Wise Use movement, led by Ron Arnold and Alan Gottlieb, began to successfully counter environmental regulation (Peeples, 2005). Consequently, from the mid-1980s on, some environmental activists adopted a new strategy. Instead of following the "sue-the-bastards" adversarial proceedings, green movement leaders began to look at win-win environmentalism. This was a market-friendly approach to environmentalism that encouraged more eco-friendly business practices through corporate volunteerism and market incentives (Livesy, Hartman, Stafford, & Shearer, 2009). Consequently, over the years there have been a number of highly visible successful collaborative efforts in the environmental arena such as the CIRES/NOAA (Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Science/ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) Western Water Assessment where the mission was to identify and characterize regional vulnerabilities to climate variability and change, and to develop information, products and processes to assist water-resource decision-makers throughout the Intermountain West (University of Colorado at Boulder, 2014).

On the other hand, however, there remain a number of intractable, "wicked" environmental disputes that continue playing out today. One of these disputes involves

public lands use in central Idaho, particularly in the Boulder-White Cloud Mountains area (Boulder-White Clouds”). Simpson has actively engaged stakeholders for over a decade on this issue, only to fail in his efforts to have CIEDRA enacted into law. The changing proposed statutory language of CIEDRA has been crafted and re-crafted only after countless hours spent in what has been described as collaborative-type efforts with apparent supporting consensus by some, but not all, stakeholders during different congressional sessions.

Simpson (2012) has stated:

I have worked for over a decade with local ranchers, elected officials, recreationists, and other affected parties to address land use issues in the Boulder-White Cloud Mountains in Central Idaho. Idahoans’ access to these pristine areas has been in jeopardy for years because decades-long land management issues have not been resolved. To address these issues once and for all, I have introduced the Central Idaho Economic Development and Recreation Act (CIEDRA). CIEDRA moves us beyond the old debates of how to manage the Boulder-White Clouds and towards a more secure future for this rugged, beautiful, and productive heart of Idaho.

I am confident that with passage of CIEDRA, we can put to rest many long standing conflicts and move ahead to a stronger, more secure economy in Central Idaho. By ensuring that people can maintain their

livelihoods and enjoy their favorite recreational activities, we have achieved a win-win for everyone.

The input of Idahoans, especially those who are directly impacted by this legislation, continues to be of utmost importance to me, and I appreciate hearing the comments, concerns, and input of those who are affected by these issues. I would encourage you to learn more about CIEDRA and the long-standing land management challenges I am working to address by viewing the maps, public testimony, and editorials, and facts and figures about this bill linked [here](#).

Unfortunately, when the times came for passage in both chambers of Congress, sufficient support had dissipated and even Idaho's U.S. Senators, after indicating initial support, failed to support the bill as presented. On its face, this failure bodes ill for collaborative efforts in Idaho for public lands use issues.

U.S. Representative Mike Simpson

Simpson, raised in Blackfoot, Idaho, was a practicing dentist until his election to Congress in 1998, representing Idaho's 2nd Congressional District. In addition to his dentistry practice, he served for seven terms in the Idaho Legislature and was Speaker of the House for the six years immediately preceding his election to Congress. He currently is a member of the House Appropriations Committee; Chairman of the House Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee; member of the House Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Subcommittee; and

member of the House Transportation, Housing and Urban Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Subcommittee.

Boulder-White Clouds

The Boulder-White Clouds area is located in the upper Salmon River country in central Idaho. It is north of Sun Valley and Ketchum, east of the Sawtooth Valley, south of the Salmon River, and west of Mackay. It is the largest intact roadless area in the Lower 48 states that is not designated as wilderness and covers over 500,000 acres. Four major rivers (the East Fork of the Salmon River, the Big Wood River, the Big Lost River, and tributaries of the main Salmon) originate in the area and more than 100 lakes and 150 peaks higher than 10,000 feet are located there. Castle Peak, at 11,815 feet is the highest peak in the Boulder-White Clouds and from its peak one can see 25 neighboring lakes.

The area is home to an abundance of wildlife, including the grey wolf, wolverine, Canada lynx, chinook salmon and steelhead trout that return from the Pacific Ocean to spawn each year, bull trout, mountain goats, bighorn sheep, antelope, cougars, black bears, moose, elk, and mule deer. The area is also the habitat of two endangered species, the peregrine falcon and the sockeye salmon.

There are three different types of ecosystems in the Boulder-White Clouds. Part of the area is covered with sagebrush, chokecherry, snowberry, and serviceberry bushes. The lower elevation woodlands include Douglas-firs. At the higher elevations one finds Douglas-firs, ponderosa pines, lodge pole pines, aspens groves, and Engelmann spruces.

The Boulder-White Clouds are one of Idaho's premier outdoor recreation venues and are prized by outdoor enthusiasts, including mountain bikers, motorcyclists, ATV riders, snowmobilers, skiers, snowshoers, hikers, backpackers, horsemen, and fishermen. These are among the 66 licensed activities in the area.

Part of the Boulder-White Clouds area is the grazing ground for numerous cattle operations. Homesteading at the beginning of the twentieth century brought cattle ranchers to the area and ranching families going back six generations call the East Fork of the Salmon River home.

Parts of these lands have been considered before for either monument or protected wilderness status. In 1972, as part of the Sawtooth National Recreation Act, which created the Sawtooth National Recreation Area, Congress designated approximately half of the Boulder-White Clouds area a Wilderness Study Area. This designation placed restrictions on the land use, preventing some prior uses from continuing. With the continuing failure to pass CIEDRA, there is currently a movement for designation of the area as a national monument by President Obama under his authority pursuant to the Antiquities Act (16 USC §§ 431–433).

Wilderness in Idaho has been a controversial subject, with many Idahoans believing that there is enough wilderness already and that there is no need for any more (S. Mitchell, personal communication, March 3, 2014; C. Gehrke, personal communication, February 26, 2014). On the other hand, various groups' stated mission is to increase the number of acres under wilderness designation (Gehrke; L. Kincannon, personal communication, March 10, 2014). Idaho currently has approximately

4,521,206 acres that have been designated as wilderness by seven separate legislative acts. The most recent in 2009, commonly referred to as the Owyhee Initiative, set aside approximately 517,226 acres in Southwest Idaho in six separate wilderness areas.

Appendix A sets forth the wilderness in Idaho, the enacting legislation, date of creation, number of acres, and managing agency. CIEDRA would add approximately an additional 300,000 acres to wilderness (White Clouds Wilderness – 90,888 acres; Hemingway-Boulders Wilderness – 110,370 acres; Jerry Peak Wilderness – 131,670 acres) while releasing approximately 131,616 acres from wilderness study areas (Jerry Peak Wilderness Study Area, Jerry Peak West Wilderness Study Area, Corral-Horse Basin Wilderness Study Area, Boulder Creek Wilderness Study Area).

Congressional History of CIEDRA

This study deals with the collaborative efforts with stakeholders and does not focus on the congressional deal making that goes on in Washington. Thus, this history does not delve into the inner working of Congress, but instead provides a succinct congressional history of CIEDRA.

Shortly after his election to Congress in 1998, Simpson began the CIEDRA process after meeting with a group of ranchers and members of the Idaho Conservation League. He stated that ranchers “were under the constant threat of losing their livelihoods because of lawsuits filed against them. I agreed to bring together county commissioners, recreationists, and conservationists to find long-term stability for all interested parties in the face of serious land management conflicts in this area” (Simpson, 2010). At the same time, he was meeting with the Idaho Conservation

League (Kincannon) and the Sawtooth Society where he outlined his thinking for the Boulder –White Clouds (R. Hayes, personal communication, March 5, 2014), which would eventually form the basis for the first version of CIEDRA (L. Slater, personal communication, February 7, 2014).

On October 8, 2004, Simpson introduced H.R. 5343 - Central Idaho Economic Development and Recreation Act of 2004. On November 8, 2004, it was referred to the Subcommittee on National Parks, Recreation and Public Lands. As it was introduced at the end of the session, Simpson did not expect any action on the bill. No action was taken and it died at end of session. His purpose for introducing it, however, was to indicate his willingness to work on the issues surrounding the Boulder-White Clouds (Slater).

On May 19, 2005 Simpson introduced H.R. 2514 - Central Idaho Economic Development and Recreation Act. On May 31, 2005 it was referred to the House Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health. As a result of technical revisions and changes based upon public comment and subcommittee input, Simpson introduced H.R. 3603- Central Idaho Economic Development and Recreation Act on July 28, 2005, which was referred to the House Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health on August 10, 2005.

On October 27, 2005, the House Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Subcommittee on Public Lands and Forests conducted a hearing on CIEDRA. The following were invited to the hearing as witnesses:

Joel Holtrop, Deputy Chief for the National Forest System;

Ed Shepard, BLM Assistant Director, Renewable Resources;

Carole King, NREPA Network, Stanley, Idaho;

Dan Hammerbeck, President, Salmon River Snowmobile Club;

Cliff Hansen, County Commissioner, District 2, Custer County;

Mike Webster, President-elect, Idaho Cattle Association;

Rick Johnson, Executive Director, Idaho Conservation League; and

F. Carl Pence, Citizen, Former Forest Supervisor.

As a result of Subcommittee concerns, minor changes were made to CIEDRA prior to the markup session in the House Energy and Natural Resources Committee on July 19, 2006. It passed the House Energy and Natural Resources Committee on July 19th and went to the House floor. On July 24, 2006 CIEDRA (as H.R. 3603) was on the House suspension calendar, a result of a deal relating to a Northern California wilderness bill and it passed in the House on a two-thirds affirmative voice vote and was referred to the U.S. Senate.

On September 27, 2006 the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, chaired by Idaho senior Senator Larry Craig (R), held a hearing on CIEDRA (H.R. 3603 version). Those individuals invited to participate as witnesses included:

Chad Calvert, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Land and Minerals

Management, Department of the Interior;

Honorable Mark Rey, Undersecretary, Natural Resources and the Environment,

Department of Agriculture;

Rick Johnson, Executive Director, Idaho Conservation League;

Cliff Hansen, County Commissioner, District 2, Custer County;

Grant Simonds, Executive Director, Idaho Outfitter and Guides;

Brett Madron, President, Idaho Trail Machine Association;

Mike Webster, President, Idaho Cattle Association; and

Ms. Carole King, Citizen of Custer County.

Of these individuals, only Rick Johnson of the Idaho Conservation League and Custer County Commissioner Cliff Hansen spoke in favor of the bill. Senator Craig offered Simpson his support in exchange for some conditional amendments. Simpson objected to the amendments. The day after the hearing Congress adjourned to campaign for the mid-term elections. Nationally, the Democrats won control of both the Senate and the House. Idaho U.S. House of Representative Butch Otter was elected governor and Otter had gone on the record as opposing CIEDRA. Senator Craig began insisting on up-front approval of appropriations in the bill prior to CIEDRA's wilderness designation taking effect, the so called "trigger language."

Still, based upon input from the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, various modifications were made (except the trigger language) and CIEDRA was reintroduced as H.R. 6409 on December 7, 2006 with the agreement that it would be attached to a tax cut extension and trade bill on December 8th. For reasons unknown, it was not attached and was eventually referred to the House Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health on December 18, 2006 and died at the end of the congressional session.

On January 4, 2007 Simpson reintroduced CIEDRA as H.R. 222. It was referred to the House Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests, and Public Lands on February 7, 2007. On March 27, 2008, Simpson substituted a new H.R. 222 in place of the original bill. No action was taken and it died at the end of the congressional session.

On April 30, 2010 Idaho's Senators Crapo and Risch introduced CIEDRA as S. 3294 and it was referred to the Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands and Forests. On May 4, 2010 Simpson introduced CIEDRA as H.R. 5205. It was referred to the House Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests, and Public Lands on May 6, 2010. On June 16, 2010, the Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands and Forests held a hearing on S. 3294.

Those testifying included:

Senator Mike Crapo;

Representative Simpson;

Carl Rountree, Director, National Landscape Conservation System, Bureau of
Land Management, Department of the Interior;

Joel Holtrop, Deputy Chief, National Forest System, Forest Service, Department
of Agriculture;

Rick Johnson, Idaho Conservation League; and

Bill Dart, Idaho Recreation Council. (The Idaho Recreation Council is an

“umbrella” organization that supports all types of recreational groups in
Idaho, including those groups that recreate in the Boulder-White Clouds
(Mitchell).

On January 5, 2011 Simpson introduced CIEDRA as H.R. 163, which was subsequently referred to the House Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests and Public Lands.

On January 3, 2013 Simpson introduced H.R. 145, the latest introduction of CIEDRA. It was referred to the Subcommittee on Public Lands and Environmental Protection on January 31, 2013. There has been no movement on the bill since referral. In the event that the current push to create a monument for the Boulder-White Clouds fails, Simpson intends to continue his efforts to pass CIEDRA (Slater).

CHAPTER THREE - LITERATURE REVIEW

Intractable or “Wicked” Problems

Environmental disputes are often noted for their “intractable” or “wicked” nature (Ludwig, Mangel, & Haddad, Brent, 2001; McBeth & Shanahan, 2004; Rittel & Webber, 1973). Intractable or wicked (used interchangeably herein) disputes do not have “bumper sticker” solutions or a single, optimal solution and are often found at the boundaries of natural and social systems (Dryzek, 1997).

Wicked problems come about when social problems are so complex that people disagree about problem definition and solution, and uncertainty about future environmental resources and differences in social values makes it practically impossible to define appropriate solutions (Chapin, Trainor, Huntington, Lovecraft, Zavaleta, Natcher et al, 2008; Gunderson, 1999; Shindler & Cramer, 1999). They can arise when social groups have competing visions for future environmental issues (Hurley & Walker, 2004). They may come about as a result of differing values or core beliefs (Gregory, Failing, Harstone, Long, McDaniels, & Ohlson, 2012), but may also arise out of conflicting priorities or competing economic interests (Schmidtz, 2000), use of different mental frames (Bolman & Deal, 2008; Keeney, 1992), or competing visions for the future (Hurley & Walker, 2004).

Further, Abigail and Cahn (2011) posit that intractable disputes can arise from (1) the denial of a person’s or group’s sense of self, or legitimacy on identity; (2) the denial of fundamental needs such as security or ability to pursue goals; (3) attempts by a person or group to put themselves ahead of others in the social, political, or economic

structure; and (4) attempts by one group to control resources in a win/lose situation where no expansion of the resources is possible.

Various factors or characteristics have also been identified with respect to intractability. Abigail and Cahn (2011) set forth the following characteristics:

1. In terms of actors, intractable issues involve states or other actors with a long sense of historical grievance, and a strong desire to redress or avenge these.
2. In terms of duration, intractable issues take place over a long period of time.
3. Intractable issues involve intangibles such as identity, sovereignty, or values and beliefs.
4. In terms of relationships, intractable issues involve polarized perceptions of hostility and enmity, and behavior that is violent and destructive.
5. In terms of management, intractable issues resist many conflict management efforts and have a history of failed peacemaking efforts.

Yaffee (1997) argues that other factors in wicked disputes include short-term rationality outcompeting long-term rationality, competitive behavior driving out cooperative behavior, the fragmentation of interests and values, the fragmentation of responsibilities and authorities, and the fragmentation of information and knowledge.

Additionally, McBeth and Shanahan (2004) argue that technical, scientific, or economic solutions rarely resolve wicked problems, that economic arguments for adaptation rarely resolve them, and that market-based solutions are rarely used to resolve them.

Finally, Nie (2003) adds additional factors involved in intractability. These include 1) scarcity of resources; 2) use of the problem by policy actors as a surrogate for larger and more controversial issues; 3) the sacred and spiritual aspects of some natural resources; 4) policies designed in a particular historical context; 5) policy frames whereby conflicts are part of a larger story being told by various political actors; 6) scientific disagreement and uncertainty over what to do and whether it will work; 7) electoral politics and wedge issues where political actors use “symbolic” issues to win or keep office, or to show interested parties where one stands; 8) use of issues by political and interest groups for political or institutional purposes such as raising or maintaining membership or raising money; 9) media framing focusing on how issues are playing politically rather than objectively analyzing the issues; 10) adversarial institutions and processes that encourage parties to start at opposing ends of the spectrum while fighting; 11) vague or contradictory constitutional, statutory, and administrative language that allows parties to find support for any interpretation desired; and 12) distrust between parties that undermines constructive debate and public inquiry.

Wicked problems are unstructured, relentless, and occur in interconnected policy domains and levels of government (Weber & Khademian, 2008). They are never really solved, but are instead, over time, resolved again and again (Nie, 2003). This is in part a result of the fact that parties are often unwilling to make societal tradeoffs necessary for conclusive resolution (Rittel & Webber, 1973).

In addition, wicked problems bring together various stakeholder groups who would not otherwise traditionally come together and require each to buy-into the

process and share expertise as well as competence and willingness to actually work together (Schmidt, 2011). These different stakeholders hold different values and priorities, and the problems at hand cannot be resolved or dominated by one group or sector of society as none have the power and authority to create and enforce a solution (Camillus, 2008; Roberts, 2000; Sachs, Ruhli, & Meier, 2010). Many times it is not clear what separates the scientists, the policy makers, the politicians, and other stakeholders as they may not openly share what their stakes are – each has their own interests, agendas, and solutions (van de Kerkhof, 2006).

Wicked problems typically resist resolution (McBeth, Shanahan, Hathaway, Tigert, & Sampson, 2010), cut across policy and services areas (Keast, Mandell, Brown, & Woolcock, 2004), and solutions that do come have no “stopping rule” whereby the problem-(re)solver knows when the issue has been finally resolved (Ludwig et al, 2001; Nie, 2003). Nie (2003, pp. 307-308) further adds that wicked problems are “value-based political conflicts grounded in deep core human values . . . [that are] acrimonious, symbolic, intractable, divisive, and expensive.”

Problems may be wicked by their very nature and context, or they may be deemed wicked by design (e.g., where political actors, institutions and decision-making processes compound the problems) (Nie, 2003). “In a sense, an intractable conflict transcends the people involved because it is a clash of their social or cultural, religious or political, and economic philosophies” (Abigail & Cahn, 2011, p. 261), and those involved behaviorally “tend to treat each other as mad, bad, sick, or stupid, and they

experience a crisis of rationality, feeling that they cannot reason with people ‘like that’” (Freeman, Littlejohn, & Pearce, 1992, p. 315).

Ultimately, intractable disputes may be deemed to involve moral issues (Abigail & Cahn, 2011; McBeth & Shanahan, 2004) and, as disputants are loath to admit being morally wrong, or that their core beliefs (Sabatier & Weible, 2007) are incorrect, intractability persists. When parties to a dispute believe that their view is the only possible way to view an issue, intractability persists (Gray, 2003). Many times moral conflicts are also referred to as culture wars (Pearce & Littlejohn, 1997). Ranching on public lands in Idaho, as elsewhere, has been accurately described as a cultural war (McBeth & Shanahan, 2004).

Simple discourse between parties to wicked problems is, unfortunately, insufficient to address the issues. The political discourse moves from robust deliberations into policy marketing efforts by stakeholders or policy entrepreneurs that result in lose-lose policy processes and contested policies (McBeth & Shanahan, 2004). Discourse between groups can often become perceived as hysterical by one or more groups. This may result in the other groups responding in actual like manner (Killingsworth & Palmer, 1995), all of which hinder the discourse. Many times participants in the dispute have every reason in the world to dislike each other because of actions seen as unwarranted taken against them by other disputants (Livesy et al, 2009). A helpful example of this is the lack of trust by ranchers against environmental groups that continually file lawsuits against ranchers or ranching practices. Parties in intractable conflict may fall under the lure of the “devil shift” where parties assume the

other side is more powerful than they actually are (Leach & Sabatier, 2005). They may also behave immorally or irrationally, arguing that it was the actions or policies of the other side that forced such a response. At the extreme, one side may regard the other as a morally depraved enemy that should be demonized or dehumanized (Pearce & Littlejohn, 1997). “When stakes are high, moral principle is strong, and the will to prevail runs deep, then confrontation can take sinister forms” (Littlejohn, 2004, p. 337). Disagreement is based on issues, but also on the deeply held differences in participants’ assumptions about fundamental reality (Sabatier & Weible, 2007) and values (Gregory et al, 2012; Keeney, 1992). This greatly impedes finding common methods of resolution (Freeman et al, 1992).

All of the foregoing characteristics and behaviors occur when social worlds, such as wilderness, environmentalism/conservatism, ranching, resource extraction, and outdoor recreation collide. The resultant issues and problems are intractable and self-sustaining, interminable, and morally and rhetorically attuned. Based up the characteristics and behavioral aspects and factors at play in public lands use issues, they certainly qualify as wicked, intractable problems.

Collaborative Decision Making

Intractable conflicts such as public land use issues may be managed and resolved through transcendent discourse in which an emergent shared language is created through which the parties can bridge their differences (Pearce & Littlejohn, 1997), where all participants attempt in good faith to meet the interests of all stakeholders (van de Kerkhof, 2006). The issues and possible solutions become clear when diverse

stakeholders, each representing their own respective views, values, needs, and interests, come together to deal with them. Wicked problems are best addressed through a democratic problem-solving approach that acknowledges the pluralistic, social nature of the problem and progress, where it is believed that everyone that comes to the table has something to offer and to learn (Abigail & Cahn, 2011; Clemons & McBeth, 2009) and where parties' values are not only acknowledged, but are part of the discussion (Gregory et al, 2012; Keeney, 1992). This process is referred to generally as collaborative decision making.

There are various permutations of collaborative decision making, such as structured decision making (Gregory et al, 2012), "doing democracy" (Clemons & McBeth, 2009), Actor-Network theory (Schmitt, 2011), "negotiated agreements" (Sabatier & Weible, 2007), collaborative capacity building (Weber & Khademian, 2008), interdisciplinary problem solving workshops (Rutherford, Gibeau, Clark, & Chamberlain, 2009), "some talk" (Fox & Miller, 1996), multi-attribute utility theory (Raiffa, 1968), collaborative institutions (Gerlak & Heikkila, 2007), "futuring" (Clemons & McBeth, 2009), negotiations as described in *Getting to Yes* (Fisher & Ury, 1991), multi-stakeholder partnerships (Poncelet, 2001), and "authentic participation" (King, Feltey, & Susel, 1998).

For purposes of this dissertation, I define collaborative decision making as the application of multiple objective decision making and group deliberation methods in a collaborative and facilitative manner to understand complex problems and generate and evaluate creative alternatives for their resolution.

Benefits of collaborative decision making

Leach (2006) describes some of the democratic merits of collaborative decision making. These include being: 1) an inclusive process that places few formal restrictions on participation; 2) a representative process that ensures that the interests of affected stakeholders are effectively advocated; 3) an impartial process that treats all stakeholders equally; 4) a transparent process that governs itself through clear and public rules; 5) a deliberative process that allows stakeholders to brainstorm, critically examine arguments, identify common interests, and build shared knowledge and social capital; 6) a lawful process that upholds existing statutes, rules, and regulations; and 7) an empowered process that enables stakeholders to influence policy outcomes. This inclusive process is a form of public participation. Public participation “seems to hold a sacrosanct role in U.S. political culture” (Day, 1997, p. 1), the underlying assumption being that when citizens become active participants in their democracy, the resultant governance emerging as a result of the process will be more effective and democratic (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). King et al (1998) argue that “authentic public participation” tends to be collaborative, sought early in the process with citizens being treated as equal partners, where the participants trust each other in a dynamic, open, and visible process. Unfortunately, in the U.S. public participation is many times constrained by administrative structures and processes, and policy administrators come between the issue and the citizens’ participation, meaning that policy administrators act as “gatekeepers” and prevent the public from participating in the administrative structures and processes (King et al, 1998).

Advantages of public participation include the ability to learn from and inform other participants, persuade and enlighten other participants, gain activist citizenship skills, gain some control over the policy process, create better policy and implementation decisions, build trust and allay fears, anxiety and hostility, gain legitimacy of decisions, break gridlocks, achieve outcomes, and avoid litigation (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004).

Rutherford et al (2009) discuss five ways that collaborative efforts can help the policy decision-making process. First, they encourage comprehensive thinking about the context for problems, thus ensuring that all important variables are included in the discussion. Second, they help participants move beyond simply arguing about trends and preferred alternatives. Third, they help participants consider goals to be achieved. Fourth, they force participants to examine their own standards and values and consider how these shape their biases and thinking. Finally, they help participants find common ground, even if they cannot agree on specific policies.

Additional benefits include “finding win-win solutions, improving relationships and social capital, fostering mutual learning, and generating more broadly supported and implementable outcomes” (Rutherford et al, 2009, p. 178).

Finally, Daniels and Walker (2001) identify eight additional benefits of collaboration. They are as follows:

- It is less competitive.
- It features mutual learning and fact finding.
- It allows for exploration of differences in underlying values.

- It resembles principled negotiation, focusing of interests rather than positions.
- It allocates the responsibility for implementation across many parties.
- Its conclusions are generated by participants through an interactive, iterative, and reflexive process.
- It is often an ongoing process.
- It has the potential to build individual and community capacity in such arenas as conflict management, leadership, decision making, and communication.

Underlying principles of collaborative decision making

Underlying principles of collaborative decision making include the integration of scientific information, local knowledge, and values into the policy process, facilitation of problem identification, and an interdisciplinary understanding of the issue (Cockerill, Daniel, Malczynski, & Tidwell, 2009). Additional conceptual foundations for collaborative decision making (Gregory et al, 2012) include:

- Multi-attribute utility theory and analysis (MAUT) - a prescriptive approach to multi-objective decision making under conditions of uncertainty (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Raiffa, 1968).
- Integration of analysis and deliberation – integrations of systematic analysis and deliberation.
- Constructed preferences – preferences are constructed in response to knowledge of both facts and values.
- Separation of facts and values – these are necessary to separate as each is treated differently in the collaborative decision making process.

- Value-focused thinking – must first explore what is wanted (values) rather than just focusing on what is typically available (alternatives).
- Two systems of thinking – people use an intuitive system which is fast and many times automatic (System 1), and an analytical system that is slower and more thoughtful (System 2) when making decisions.
- Mental shortcuts and biases (heuristics) – all people are influenced by judgment biases and cognitive short cuts that can negatively influence decision making.
- Best available information – necessary information comes from many sources and its quality can only be judged in the context of the decision to be made and analysis and deliberation.
- Group wisdom and dysfunction – groups can both enhance and impair the decision making process as they bring both insight and biases based upon group members.

As can be seen from the conceptual foundations, social psychology provides insight into the collaborative decision making process itself (Howarth & Wilson, 2006).

This dissertation refers to generally, but does not specifically discuss the social psychological aspects of collaborative decision making.

Characteristics of collaborative decision making

While there have been instances of notable, successful collaborative decision making in environmental disputes such as the Energy and Climate Action Pact signed in 2013 by California, Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia (ocean acidification), the Oregon BLM Scattered Apples Timber Sale Mediation between April - October 2005

(first successful mediation of a BLM timber sale in Oregon), the Coeur d'Alene Lake Lake Management Plan – 2005-2009 (Lake Management Plan and process for continued participation), the Escalante River Watershed Partnership (collaborative partnership working on action plan for the Utah watershed), the Cultus Lake Salmon recovery plan (Gregory et al, 2012), the “Quincy Library Group” plan for logging in the Sierra Nevada mountains (Pralle, 2006), and the water use agreements entered into between Israel and Jordan, India and Pakistan, and Bangladesh and India (Islam & Susskind, 2012), most public lands use issues do not result in competing parties cozying up to each other to work out differences. In most instances, disputes are only temporarily decided by lengthy court proceedings. Yet, as there have been successful examples of collaborative environmental decision making, we can identify decision making characteristics and methodologies that can increase underlying practical and psychological understanding of collaborative decision making and subsequently increase possibilities for success.

Collaborative decision making uses integrative behaviors to develop mutually agreeable decisions to solve the dispute once and for all (Abigail & Cahn, 2011). It can be considered a bottom up process (Gregory et al, 2012; Pralle, 2006) where a core group of people get together repeatedly and work side by side to build a common understanding of complex issues and create implementable win-win solutions (Gregory et al, 2012). This is achieved when the parties work in unison to satisfy their own interests and the interests of all other parties (Abigail and Cahn, 2011; Domenici and Littlejohn, 2001; Thomson, Perry, & Miller, 2009). It requires that, among other things, “conflicting views be viewed not as problems to be hushed or appeased, but as

opportunities to clarify the reasons behind apparent differences in values and the various interpretation given to factual information” (Gregory et al, 2012, p. 5). Fox and Miller (1996, p. 11) state that “we can expect a struggle over meanings, we expect argumentation, claiming, and counterclaiming, not harmonious consensus, as the participants try to resolve what to do next.” Even though this may make people uncomfortable, there is evidence that the process can lead to changed personal views (Poncelet, 2001), decision consensus, and better idea generation (Cockerill et al, 2009). There is, however, some evidence that collaborative style dialogue may harden participants in their views (Gregory et al, 2012; Sunstein, 2002).

Participants in collaboration undergo what Connolly (1999) refers to as selective self-sanctification of the elements of self. This is a balancing act where participants must be willing to open up to change through finding common ground, while accepting each other’s differences and bolstering certain aspects of one’s own identities. Sometimes this requires the participants to rethink their own subjectivity and practice. When stakeholders can admit that problems reflect the psychological aspects of their own culture, worldview, and attitudes as much as scientific or technical problems, a greater scope of possible responses and resolutions is possible (Ludwig et al, 2001).

Thomson et al (2009) add additional characteristics of collaboration. They include jointly-made rules that govern behavior and relationships within the collaboration itself (governance), the ability to get things done such as coordinating communications, and monitoring activities (administration), the recognition that participants have dual identities – that of a member of their group pursuing self-

interested goals and that of a member of the collaboration pursuing collective goals (organizational autonomy, mutually beneficial interdependencies based on differing or shared interests (mutuality), and reciprocity and trust (norms).

Finally, it is essential to recognize the psychology of small group decision-making as it affects culture, worldview and attitudes. Research on the dynamics of social influence (Asch, 1956; Burnstein & Vinokur, 1977) has led to identifiable consistent patterns that tend to emerge during group discussions (Howarth & Wilson, 2006; Schittekatte & Van Hiel, 1996; Stasser & Stewart, 1992). For instance, Domenici and Littlejohn (2001) posit that in collaborative environments, participants have shared goals or priorities, rely on each other for achievement of these goals or priorities, assert their own position without demeaning other positions, commit to processes in which all appropriate people participate, and show concern for work goals as well as relational goal.

Commitments and rules for collaborative decision making

Weber and Khademian (2008) identify six commitments for effective collaborative efforts. They include participant commitments to 1) governance with government; 2), governance within the rules while thinking creatively; 3) having participants act as partners; 4) allowing those trying to facilitate to be anyone, not just government officials; 5) recognizing that performance and accountability are inseparable; and 6) being persistent in following the collaborative process. Sabatier and Weible (2007) add that other design requirements for the collaboration process, including incentives to negotiate seriously, inclusion of participants from all

relevant stakeholders, having the “right” leader or facilitator, decision by consensus to avoid use of other venues to prevent implementation, commitment to seeing the process through, the need to deal mostly with empirical issues rather than normative issues, and the importance of building trust.

Fox and Miller (1996) describe other rules of the process, including sincerity of claims made by the participants, situation-regarding intentionality, willing attention, and making substantive contributions in the process. Done correctly, “discourse can . . . connect people to problems and issues by establishing integral relationships between the parts that contribute to the whole of a resource crisis” (Moore, 2003, p. 75), but only if the participants follow the rules of discourse and do not prevent rational discussion.

In the actual meetings, there are also rules of conduct. Etzioni (1996) sets out several rules for the process.

1. Contesting parties should not demonize one another; they should refrain from depicting the other side’s values as completely negative, as when they are characterized as “satanic.”
2. Do not affront the deepest moral commitments of other groups.
3. Use less of the language of right and more of that of needs, want, and interests.
4. Leave some issues out of the debate.

This discourse must involve a “deliberate exchange of both facts and various values in an environment designed to peel away biases and traps, and allow for

reasoned exchange” (Gregory et al, 2012, p. 25.) This is especially true when the goals include open communication with opponents, away from the polarizing spotlight of media coverage; building relationships of mutual respect and understanding; shifting away from arguing for their respective cause, to listen openly and speak candidly, to allow ideas to be challenged but not attacked; helping deescalate the rhetoric of a “deep divide” controversy; and reducing the risk of future violence (Bone, Griffin, & Scholz, 2008). Collaborative discourse, with trust built up over time, can help antagonists to break down stereotypes and frames, and develop new, positive working relationships grounded in trust (Stevens, 2006).

Importance of values in collaboration

Keeney (1992) clearly articulates the necessity for value-focused thinking in the process. “Values provide the foundation or interest in any decision situation. Since the values that are of concern in a given decision situations are made explicit by the identification of objectives, this process [of identifying objectives] is crucial” (Keeney, 1992, p. 55). Primarily, value focused thinking allows the discovery of underlying reasoning for stakeholder objectives and relation to other objectives. This is especially true since in decisions with multiple objectives, one party can’t have it all (Keeney, 2002). In addition, it facilitates the following aspects, each in itself an integral part of collaboration: 1) uncovering hidden objectives; 2) guiding the information gathering process; 3) improving communication; 4) facilitating involvement in multiple-stakeholder decisions; 5) interconnecting decisions; 6) creating alternatives; 7) evaluating alternatives; 8) identifying decision opportunities; and 9) guiding strategic

thinking. It is defining what is really wanted and then working to achieve it (Gregory et al, 2012).

Barriers to collaboration

Collaborative decision making is not, however, without barriers. Unfortunately, the list of tricks that can be used to prevent collaborative discussion is long and varied and includes things such as demonizing others, generalization of the other (treating person as non-individuals), trivializing what others say, refusing to acknowledge the presence of another, exhausting all the allotted time, skirting around the issue without ever getting to the issue, attacking the person and their position rather than addressing their argument, arguing about the methods used rather than the issues, deliberate deceptions, less than full disclosure, good-guy/bad-guy routines, threats, escalating demands, changing the demands, take it or leave it stances, positional pressure tactics, and refusals to negotiate at all (Abigail & Cahn, 2011; Clemons & McBeth, 2009; Fisher & Ury, 1991).

Weber and Khademian (2008) identify additional impediments. First, long-standing adversaries must be willing to share information that would typically be hidden. While this may lead to innovative and better solutions, shared information may also be used by participants that withdraw from the process for their own advantage. Second, the shape of the final agreement is less predictable as the realm of information grows. Finally, there is nothing to prevent participants from falling back on the tried-and-true methods of litigation, public relations campaigns, and appeal to governmental officials with the ability to override the agreed-upon resolution. For collaboration to

work, stakeholders must agree to not go outside the collaborative venue for issue resolution.

On this final point Pralle (2006) agrees, and argues that stakeholders will attempt to affect the outcome by either expanding or containing the institutions or venues for decision making. Strategies for so doing are as follows:

Strategies for Expansion

- expand jurisdictions of institutions and blur jurisdictional boundaries
- move conflict up the ladder of authority
- relax rules governing access

Strategies for Containment

- maintain clear jurisdictional boundaries
- prevent conflict from moving to higher levels of authority and move down to lower levels if possible
- support rules that restrict access

Additional disadvantages of collaboration can include the following: 1) the time needed to adequately use the process; 2) it can be dull; 3) it will be pointless if decision is ignored; 4) it can be costly; and 5) it may create more hostility, especially against other participants if participants feel the participation was simply a marketing tool by other stakeholders (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). If not carefully performed, even collaborative decisions may be rushed, following failure-prone practices, and wasting resources to find and defend a “single” resolution (Nutt, 2004).

Summary

Evolving through debate and dialogue, conflict and collaboration, resistance and acceptance, collaborative decision making can become a space for managing the ambiguities and contradictions of a natural/odd relationship (Livesey et al, 2009). Collaborative decision making is the best hope for resolving intractable, wicked land use problems.

The Collaborative Decision Making Process

While scholars differ as to an exact order of collaborative actions, all agree there are various steps to take in the process. These include identifying and clarifying the context within which the decision is to be made, determining the objectives of the stakeholders, defining the measurements for analyzing and comparing alternatives, developing and analyzing alternatives, identifying and evaluating value trade-offs between alternatives, and selecting, implementing, monitoring, reviewing, and evaluating the decision.

Step 1. Identifying and clarifying the context.

The individual or group that is organizing or facilitating the collaborative decision making efforts (e.g., facilitator, instigator, policy entrepreneur) needs to undertake a broad overview of the process before beginning. Gregory et al (2012) call this “decision sketching.” This broad overview consists of a quick, overarching review of the first few steps on the collaboration decision making process and typically involves initial issue definition, identifying stakeholders to participate in the process, timing for the decision, identifying the initial range of objectives and alternatives, identifying the possible types

of decisions that could be made, identifying possible analytical tools that might be used, and considering possible levels and types of consultation needed in the process. It should be noted that many of these steps consist of major steps in the collaborative process, but this initial review must be undertaken by the facilitator or policy entrepreneur before the process begins to determine the scope of the issue and create the collaborative process itself. Failure to do so can lead to loss of control over the scope of the conflict.

Controlling the scope of the conflict is essential as this affects whether the issue gets put on the political agenda and the ability of involved participants to either expand or contain the scope of the issue (Pralle, 2006). Expansion, in this sense, includes the salience of the issue, the intensity of the conflict, the number of participants, and the interaction of interest groups with policymakers and members of the public (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Cobb & Elder, 1972; Pralle, 2006; Schattschneider, 1960). Schattschneider (1960) argues that outsiders attempt to expand the scope of conflict in order to change the balance of power.

Pralle (2006) identifies three main focal points that relate to expansion and containment strategies. These are: 1) issue definition (dealing with the importance, visibility, publicness, and political significance of an issue); 2) policy actors (those who participate in policy conflicts - either mobilized or demobilized); and 3) institutions and venues (the rules of the game and the venues in which the policy conflicts will take place). As can be expected, the strategies for conflict expansion and containment tend to be polar opposites. What works for one is detrimental to the other. Consequently,

the basic strategy to either expand or contain an issue tends to be fairly clear. But it is also true that “the devil is in the detail.” How to actually effectuate either expansion or containment of a public land use conflict will depend upon the facts and circumstances in which the participants find themselves.

A. Problem/issue definition

Rocheffort and Cobb (1993) posit that issue definition is fundamental to policy making and that the dimension of the issue affects definition options. Dimension includes problem causation, nature, characteristics of the affected population, the nature of the solution, and the ends-means orientation of the issue definer(s). Issue definition encompasses the “processes by which an issue (problem, opportunity, or trend) having been recognized as such and placed on the public policy agenda, is perceived by various interested parties; further explored, articulated, and possibly articulated, and possibly quantified; and in some but not all cases, given an authoritative or at least provisionally acceptable definition in terms of its likely causes, components, and consequences” (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984, p. 109).

Stone (2002) stresses the importance of issue definition because the way an issue is defined affects participants’ perceptions of the issue and thus influences their action or inaction. The importance of the issue definition cannot be overstated as the person/group that defines the issue will be the person/group that tends to be the one that defines the solution (Schattschneider 1960). Thus, the decision to allow stakeholders to participate in the issue definition process or to have the facilitator define the issue may be determinative as to the solution. But failure to allow

stakeholders to participate in defining the issue may result in a violation of the basic tenant of consensus building that participating stakeholders must have a sense of ownership of the process (Carpenter, 1999).

Once the issue has been defined, however, stakeholders may attempt to expand or contain the issue. Successful expansion or containment by stakeholders may interfere with resolution of the issue. Pralle (2006) describes methods for expanding and containing issue definition as follows:

Strategies for Expansion

- frame the issue in broadest terms possible
- link the issue to other important problems on the agenda
- expand the boundaries of the issue
- encourage broader ownership while dislodging dominant party's claim of ownership

Strategies for Containment

- frame the issue in narrow terms
- deny links to other problems
- treat the issue in isolation
- limit boundaries of issue
- categorize people out of the issue
- limit ownership of issue to original set of policy claimants

B. Stakeholders to participate

At its very basic level, a stakeholder is a person who has a stake in the outcome of a policy. In a sense, every American is a stakeholder in public lands use policies. More directly affected, however, are those whose livelihoods are positively or negatively influenced by policy such as ranchers, outdoors enthusiasts, environmental groups, wilderness proponents, and resource extractors. These groups can be deemed a necessary “critical mass” (Schmitt, 2011). “Stakeholder” is a relative term, however, as it refers to a specific time, place, or issue (Glicken, 2000). Questions that identify those whose support for implementation is needed, those who control resources, those who have traditionally been involved in the issue, those who have expertise regarding the issue, and those who would grant legitimacy to the process, should be asked and answered (Clemons & McBeth, 2009).

There are a number of methods to identify and gauge stakeholders. The first is the power versus interest grid (Bryson, Cunningham, & Lokkesmoe, 2002; Eden & Ackermann, 1998). Under this method, four categories of stakeholders are identified. These include “Players” (those who have an interest and significant power), “Subjects” (those who have an interest but little to no power), “Context Setters” (those who have power but have little direct interest), and the “Crowd” (those with little interest or power) (Bryson et al, 2002). A power versus interest grid can be used to array stakeholders in terms of their interest in the policy and their power and influence to produce it (low to high). After determining which group stakeholders fall into, policy

promoters can then determine how best to move stakeholders, especially those in the context setter and player quadrants, higher on the interest and power scale.

Once the power versus interest grid is completed, a stakeholder influence diagram (Bryson et al, 2002; Eden & Ackermann, 1988; Finn, 1996) can be created. Using the power versus interest grid, lines are drawn indicating the direction power flows between stakeholders. Once finalized, the stakeholder influence diagram highlights the multiple influence relationships among the stakeholders.

After the stakeholder influence diagram is completed, the central stakeholders can be identified and a “Bases of Power – Directions of Interest” diagram (Bryson et al, 2002) can be created. This document indicates the sources of power upon which shareholders can draw and the goals or interests the stakeholders seek to achieve. This can allow a visual representation of commonalities of interests across stakeholders or stakeholder subgroups.

Alternatively, a stakeholder map (Clemons & McBeth, 2009) can be created to identify characteristics of stakeholders such as whether they are internal or external stakeholders, whether they are cooperating or opposing the policy, the values and objectives that shape stakeholders attitudes toward the issue, the salience of the issue to the stakeholder, the stakeholder’s power to adopt and power to implement, who the stakeholder influences, and who influences the stakeholder.

A subsequent step can be the creation of a “Finding the Common Good and the Structure of a Winning Argument” diagram (Bryson et al, 2002). This outlines the interests, themes, or values that appear to have support from a significant number of

stakeholders. If persuasive arguments can be made to show how support for a specific policy or program will further the interest of a significant number of central stakeholders, the possibility of forming a coalition necessary to adopt and implement the policy or program increases.

Thus, when determining who should participate in the collaborative efforts, it is important to have the right stakeholders. Under the Rule of Five (Clemons & McBeth, 2009), there tends to be a small group of stakeholders that has the formal or informal power to push change through or to prevent change from happening. These stakeholders must be identified and included. But just having the right stakeholders is not sufficient. Each must be given assistance to make their voice heard and convincingly framed in the process (Renn, 2006). If those who should be there are not or those who need not be there are included, collaborative efforts may come to naught.

Consequently, it is imperative that the number of participants neither be needlessly contained nor expanded. In this regard, those who are “losing” tend to try and expand the number of participants while those who are “winning” try to contain the number (Pralle, 2006). Pralle (2006) describes strategies for expansion and containment of participant numbers as follows:

Strategies for Expansion

- label opponents as enemies
- encourage conflict and the appearance of conflict

Strategies for Containment

- label opponents as subversive extremists to discredit them

- encourage consensus, cooperation and appearance of these

In essence, it is necessary to perform an in-depth stakeholder analysis. To be successful, the facilitator must determine who the stakeholders are, who should be included in the collaboration, their respective positions on the issue, the power they have, their stance on the issue, influence by and on each stakeholder, and other relevant characteristics that may impact the collaborative efforts. These different forms of stakeholder analyses can help identify these individuals. After stakeholders have been identified, appropriate stakeholder representatives must be invited and encouraged to participate in all the collaborative efforts, including possibly issue definition.

C. Timing for Decision

In the U.S. policy system, advocacy groups have numerous opportunities to approach alternate policy arenas as a result of separation of powers, overlapping jurisdictions, and easy access to different types and levels of policymakers (Pralle, 2006). It is also possible for public land use stakeholders to do nothing and hope no unfavorable policy ensues. This, however, ignores the Antiquities Act (16 U.S.C. §§ 431–433), whereby the president of the United States, without stakeholder participation, may make public land use decisions unilaterally within the parameters of that Act. At this time, for instance, there is a public push for President Obama to create a “monument” in the Boulder-White Clouds area. While Simpson has attempted over the years to garner sufficient support to pass CIEDRA and has introduced it various times

since 2004, it has only passed in the House once and never in the Senate. Various theories attempt to explain timing, and success or failure of those attempting change.

Conceptual frameworks give insight as to timing for successful policy change. Without discussing arguments from detractors, two such frameworks include Multiple Streams Theory and the Advocacy Coalition Framework. Multiple Streams Theory, originally conceptualized by John Kingdon (1984) and expanded by others (e.g., Boscarino, 2009; Zahariadis, 2007) describes changing policy as the result of the successful unification of the problem stream, the policy stream and the political stream. The Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Sabatier & Weible, 2007) is a framework that focuses on policy change being the result of the interaction of advocacy coalitions, each consisting of actors from a variety of institutions who share a set of policy beliefs within a policy sub-system.

Multiple Streams Theory

The Multiple Streams Theory (Boscarino, 2009; Kingdon, 1995; Zahariadis, 2007) deals with policy making under conditions of ambiguity. This ambiguity comes from three factors. First, participation in the policy process is fluid, with high participant turnover and moving from one decision to another; second, people don't know what they want; and finally, the process that turn inputs into products is unclear. This is exacerbated by the struggle to know what the problem is because its definition is vague and shifting (Zahariadis, 2007). At the heart of multiple streams theory is the garbage can model of choice. "Choice is conceptualized as a garbage can into which participants,

who drift in and out of decisions, dump largely unrelated problems and solutions. No one person controls the process of choice, and fluctuating attendance, opportunities and attention give the process highly dynamic and interactive qualities” (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 66).

Multiple-streams theory operates under three assumptions. First, individuals can only attend to one issue at a time (serial processing), while government can attend to many issues simultaneously (parallel processing). Second, policy makers operate under significant time constraints. Third, the streams all operate independently. The three streams consist of the problem stream, the policy stream and the political stream.

The problem stream deals with conditions/issues that policy makers and citizens want addressed. Not all conditions or issues become problems. In order for a condition or issue to reach the level of a problem it must be “found out” by indicators, focusing events, or feedback, all of which can be influenced by how many problems there currently are in the load.

The policy stream is that “soup of ideas that compete to win acceptance in policy networks” (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 72). In order for a policy to be adopted, it must be technically feasible and conform to the values of the policy makers. Difficulty in implementation or failure to conform to the values of the policy makers may result in the streams not coupling.

The political stream relates to the national mood, i.e., what a large number of people think, how and if pressure/interest groups get involved, and whether or not there is legislative or administrative turnover.

The theory argues that new policies are adopted when the three streams are coupled or joined within a policy window. A policy window is that period of time which presents an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pat solutions or to push attention to their special problems (Kingdon, 1995). Typically, this policy window is opened by a focusing event, but can also be opened by compelling problems or events in the political stream. Those advocates of proposals are referred to as policy entrepreneurs. They attempt to couple the multiple streams. Policy entrepreneurs who are successful tend to be skilled at coupling problems to their solutions and finding politician receptive to their ideas.

Boscarino's (2009) research suggests that advocacy groups employ a linking process she refers to as problem-surfing. She argues that when advocacy groups engage in problem-surfing, they attach their preferred policy solution to whatever problems are salient at that time. The higher the salience the more interest these advocacy groups have. Thus, advocacy groups associate their policy proposal with high profile issues and stand to benefit from increased attention to and resultant energy created relating to that policy solution. Advocates consistently bring attention to a specific type of policy proposal by continually re-inventing the proposal as a solution to new problems.

Multiple Streams is useful when looking at the various stages of policy making under a single frame. It addresses the ideas of public policy and appears to work well in an ambiguous and rapidly changing world. It is "a good way of exploring the impact of

ideas without necessarily denying the importance of self-interest” (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 84).

Advocacy Coalition Framework

Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Sabatier & Weible, 2007) is a framework that focuses on the interaction of advocacy coalitions, each consisting of actors from a variety of institutions who share a set of policy beliefs within a policy subsystem. It identifies three levels of belief, which in turn affect the willingness of stakeholders to change their views of issues. Deep core beliefs are general normative and ontological assumptions about human nature, the priority of fundamental values, the priority of the welfare of different groups, the role of government and markets, and who should participate in policy making. These deep core beliefs cover most policy subsystems and are very difficult to change. Policy core beliefs are applications of deep core beliefs that span one entire policy subsystem and are also very difficult to change within that subsystem. Secondary beliefs are narrow in scope and deal with detailed applications of policies. Since they tend not to cover an entire subsystem, they are less difficult to change. The ACF “predicts that stakeholder beliefs and behavior are embedded within informal networks and that policymaking is structured, in part, by the networks among important policy participants” (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 196). Policy participants will seek allies from those who hold similar core values, which result in advocacy coalitions.

Policy change can result from policy-oriented learning, internal shocks, or external shocks. Sabatier and Weible (2007) also posit that policy change can occur under the ACF by way of negotiated agreements between coalitions that have been fighting for decades (wicked problems) by combining ACF policy-oriented learning across coalitions and alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Both the ACF and ADR assume that disputants “(1) are grouped into coalitions consisting of individuals with similar beliefs and interests, (2) often interpret the same piece of information in very different ways, (3) distrust their opponents’ ability to negotiate fairly and to keep their promises, and (4) distrust their opponents’ ability to understand, let alone recognize as legitimate, their own goals and interests” (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 205).

Sabatier and Weible (2007) identify nine requirements for successfully completing negotiated agreements. These include a policy stalemate that provides an incentive to negotiate seriously, inclusion of representatives from all relevant stakeholders, having a respected “neutral” acting as chair of the group, consensus decision rule to prevent a stakeholder from using other venues to impede the collaborative process, funding for the process comes from sources (typically government related) who are members of different coalitions, that the stakeholders agree to participate over an extended period of time ensuring continuity of efforts, that the issue in dispute be mainly empirical rather than normative, participants must work to build and achieve trust, and BATNAs (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) (Fisher & Ury, 1991), are few in number or unappealing to the stakeholders. Under these conditions, the ACF becomes adaptable to collaborative decision making.

D. Initial range of objectives of stakeholders and possible alternatives

In this broad overview an estimate of probable stakeholder objectives and possible alternatives are identified by the facilitator. This helps in the preparation of the “roadmap” for the process itself. The specific discussions for objectives and alternatives are more fully discussed *infra*.

E. Possible types of decisions

There are various types of decisions that can be made in resource-management issues. Five common ones (Gregory et al, 2012) are:

1. Choosing single preferred alternative
2. Developing a system for making decisions
3. Making linked choices
4. Ranking things (risks, problems, actions)
5. Routing things to receive appropriate treatment

Depending on the issue involved in the collaborative decision making activities, one or more of the types of decisions may be appropriate to completely resolve the issue.

F. Analytical tools

There are numerous analytical tools available to assist in collaborative decision making. Gregory et al (2012), Clemons and McBeth (2009), and Bardach (2009) provide a fairly comprehensive list of analytical tools that can be utilized. Not all tools may be applicable for any given situation, but identifying the possible tools allows advance preparation for the analysis steps in the process. These analytical tools include the following:

- Belief Networks, Bayes Nets, Event Trees, and Fault Trees (structure, clarify, and document technical inferences)
- Consequence Table (matrix that characterizes consequences of proposed actions)
- Cost/Benefit Analysis (comparison of the costs to benefits of alternatives)
- Decision Tree (illustrates and structures sequences of decisions and probabilistic consequences)
- Discounting (method for estimating the present value of costs and benefits in the future)
- Extrapolation (method for predicting the value of something in the future)
- Goeller Scorecard with weighted criteria (matrix that displays and scores different policy alternatives by using weighting of criteria used in the decision making process)
- Influence Diagram (diagram showing visual representations of the cause and effect chain)
- Means Ends Networks (clarify the relationship between means and ends, and demonstrate how concerns of stakeholders are being addressed)
- Measures of Central Tendency (clustering values of a statistical distribution that is usually measured by the arithmetic mean, mode, or median)
- Objectives Hierarchy (a hierarchy of objectives – things that are fundamentally important to stakeholders - that can be used to evaluate alternatives)

- Outcomes Matrix (format that places policy alternatives down the rows and evaluative criteria across columns with projected outcomes of the alternatives as assessed by the criterion)
- Strategy Table (table that organizes alternatives into logical strategies)

G. Consideration of levels of consultation

By undertaking a broad overview, the probable levels of consultation can also be identified. Historically, expertise in resource management issues has come from science. It can identify and characterize risk and estimate the consequences of risk management decisions. While science is critical, it is not sufficient in itself as it does not help in risk management structuring or balancing risk trade-offs, cannot indicate what to do or who should be involved, or identify the final balancing that must be done to make decisions (Gregory et al, 2012).

There is, however, need for expert involvement throughout the collaborative process. “[A]n expert is considered to be someone who by virtue of their training, experience, or professional standing has specialized knowledge not available to most people (Gregory et al, 2012, p. 185). Experts are not necessarily scientists, as lay individuals, by virtue of real world experience and knowledge of local realities, may well qualify as experts. Further, “[t]he type of information provided by non-scientists is different from that provided by technical experts. This non-technical information enters the decision-making process and informs the decision in a different manner than scientific information. It should not therefore substitute for science, but supplement or augment it” (Glicken, 2000, p. 306).

Finally, there are different types of expertise (Gregory et al, 2012). For instance, there is substantive expertise (based upon training, expertise, and problem solving skills in the domain relating to the issue), analytical expertise (based upon knowledge relating to guiding the expert judgment process, decision making dynamics, and pros and cons of different procedures), interactional expertise (based upon the ability to communicate and explain technical information to lay persons and to work with groups), predictive expertise (based upon the ability to predict future consequences of alternatives), and implementation expertise (based upon opining on the effectiveness of the implementations themselves). Experts would be the ones typically to populate consequence tables for questions relating to their type of expertise.

Step 2. Defining the objectives and values of the stakeholders

Objectives are concise statements of the things that matter to the stakeholders (Gregory et al, 2012; Keeney, 1992). Values, on the other hand, are the underlying principles used for evaluation purposes (Keeney, 1992). Domenici and Littlejohn (2001) refer to the two of them as positions and interests. Positions refer to the “whats” while interests refer to the “whys.” It is not only necessary to understand what the stakeholders want, but also why they want it (Domenici & Littlejohn, 2001). Objectives are always context specific and are defined for the purpose of that particular issue.

Good objectives have a number of qualities. Gregory et al (2012) include being complete (no essential objectives are missing), concise (nothing unnecessary or ambiguous), sensitive (influenced by the alternatives being considered), understandable (speak directly to the matter and use terms understandable to all), and independent

(contribute independently to the performance of an alternative). Keeney (1992) adds an additional four characteristics. They include being essential (indicating consequences in terms of fundamental reasons for acting), controllable (address consequences that are influenced only by the alternatives), measurable (able to be defined precisely and with sufficient specificity to determine achievement), decomposable (able to differentiate between different objectives), and operational (able to collect sufficient information required for analysis considering time and effort expended).

There are a number of steps to obtain a good set of objectives, including brainstorming, separating the means from the ends, separating the process and strategy from fundamental objectives, building a hierarchy of objectives, and testing to make sure the objectives are useful (Gregory et al, 2012, Keeney, 1992). Generally speaking, having stakeholders involved in the process of obtaining objectives is beneficial as a comprehensive listing is not possible if all stakeholders are not involved (Keeney, 1992). Further, by making sure all groups participate or are represented results in increased quality of the resulting set of objectives, and increased legitimacy of the process based upon the stakeholders' contributions (Keeney, 1992).

Brainstorming (Abigail & Cahn, 2011; Carpenter, 1999; Clemons & McBeth, 2009; Elliott, 1999; Gregory et al, 2012) for objectives is a process to create a list of all the things that matter to the stakeholders. Brainstorming will be treated again *infra*. Separating the means from the ends allows insight into what is ultimately wanted and the ways to achieve it. Means-ends networks are helpful at this stage. Next is a separation of the process to reach a decision and the strategies of the individual

stakeholders from the underlying objectives or outcomes. A hierarchy of objectives can identify sub-components or sub-objectives and help organize the myriad of objectives presented. Finally, the objectives must be tested to make sure that they are understood and useful. This exercise can be adequately performed by use of the consequence table, one of the analytical tools mentioned *supra*. By analyzing whether the consequence table has all the information needed, you assess whether the objectives listed are sufficient for the process.

It is important that all the participants agree on what things matter and need to be assessed in order to effectively compare alternatives (Gregory et al, 2012). This does not mean that all stakeholders agree that these are the “right” objectives, only that all have been listed.

Step 3. Defining the measurements for analyzing and comparing alternatives

A performance measure is a “specific metric that can be used to consistently estimate and report the anticipated consequences of a management alternative with respect to a particular objective,” and to specifically predict performance of alternatives for the purpose of choosing among alternatives (Gregory et al, 2012, p. 94). Essentially, it determines what people will think about and discuss in the collaborative process. Performance measures are not the same as monitoring indicators, as monitoring indicators are used to keep track of something ongoing.

Further, performance measures serve a number of additional purposes (Gregory et al, 2012; Keeney, 1992). These purposes include 1) clarifying what the objectives really mean; 2) assisting in eliminating ambiguity in objectives; 3) defining what

information will be needed; 4) assisting the accurate and consistent alternative comparison; 5) providing a method for synthesizing large amounts of information into summary format; 6) leveling playing field for participants of varying levels of technical expertise; 7) allowing differentiation between value trade-offs across alternatives; and 8) providing a means for communicating the rationale for decisions (Gregory et al, 2012).

There are various important properties of performance measures. They should be complete and concise (covering the range of consequences without redundancies), unambiguous (having a clear, accurate, and recognized relationship between the measures and consequences), understandable (can be clearly understood and communicated by different persons), direct (measures report directly on consequences and provide sufficient information that informed value trade-offs can be made), and operational (measures can be put into practice and the required information can be appropriately obtained) (Gregory et al, 2012; Keeney & Gregory, 2005).

Patton and Sawicki (1986) argue that there are some universal criteria for measuring objectives. Clemons and McBeth (2009) enunciate these universal criteria as follows:

- Technical feasibility, including effectiveness and adequacy
- Economic feasibility
- Cost effectiveness
- Political viability, including acceptability with stakeholders
- Legality and ethics – both legal and ethical

As values play an essential role in the decision making process, it is important that all stakeholders play a part in performance measure selection (Clemons & McBeth, 2009; Dunn, 2004; Gregory et al, 2012; Keeney, 1992). Additionally, the stakeholders must honestly compile the list, rank the criteria, and openly deal with the values that will come into play at this stage (Clemons & McBeth, 2009; Keeney, 1992).

Gregory et al (2012) identify a process for obtaining a good set of performance measures. The facilitator, instigator, or policy entrepreneur should take the lead in creating a decision sketch with the stakeholders for this stage. A discussion of the different decision frames should take place and ultimately a selection of the decision frame should take place. The structure objectives should be identified and organized. A rough list of alternatives and a consequence table should be created. After reaching this point, if the structure is capturing the desires of the stakeholders, then a second discussion occurs. In this second discussion, the stakeholders brainstorm possible measures, develop influence diagrams, identify different sources of information for estimating the measures, and evaluate and select the most useful measures.

There are three different types of performance measures (Gregory et al, 2012). The first is natural performance measures. These are “quantitative measures that directly report the achievement of an objective” (Gregory et al, 2012, p. 104). These natural measures are direct, unambiguous, and understandable. Unfortunately, there is no apparent natural measure for things such as sustainability, spiritual quality, or public lands well-being.

When a natural measure is not available, proxy measures may be used. While natural measures are direct, proxy measures report indirectly on objectives. Thus, decision makers must make implicit judgments about the relationship between the proxy and the objective. This in turn leads to four interrelated problems (Gregory et al, 2012). First, proxies can hide non-linear relationships between the proxy and the objective. Second, proxies can hide uncertainty as to whether the relationship is linear or not. Third, proxies can hide value judgments. Finally, proxies may shift the power in a collaborative deliberation by allowing those with technical knowledge an ability to manipulate the weight given to the proxy.

The third type is a constructed performance measure. These are used when there are no suitable natural measures or when a proxy's relevance is tenuous. They work well with objectives that are hard to quantify. They include measures such as simple rating scales (e.g., Likert scale), defined impact scales (combination of numerical scale with narrative description), and weighted indices (e.g., Goeller Scorecard).

Step 4. Developing and analyzing alternatives

Alternatives are complete solutions to an issue or problem that can be compared by the decision makers in the decision making process and have three main properties (Gregory et al, 2012). The first property is that the alternatives explore creative and new ways to achieve the objectives. Second, they expose and focus attention on value-based trade-offs. Third, they give the decision makers actual, meaningful choices to make. A good alternative is one that has a “good chance of providing a meaningful

solution to the problem at hand . . . [because] it addresses participants' fundamental objectives" (Gregory et al, 2012, p. 152).

Good alternatives are complete and comparable, value-focused, fully specified, internally coherent, and distinct (Gregory et al, 2012; Keeney, 2002). There are a number of techniques for creating a list of good alternatives. These include:

1. Best practices search. This is a search for effective policies that have been implemented successfully elsewhere (Clemons & McBeth, 2009; Patton & Sawicki, 1986; Weimer & Vining, 1999).
2. Use of experts. In highly technical or scientific arenas, experts can be called upon to give advice or offer alternatives (Clemons & McBeth, 2009; Patton & Sawicki, 1986; Weimer & Vining, 1999).
3. Brainstorming. Participants create a list of possibilities without fear of having their ideas dismissed out of hand. Brainstorming is not the time to critique or reject any idea, but instead to simply get ideas out. In this process, participants will present ideas that have their values embedded within. Brainstorming can also identify new objectives by asking the question, "What makes this a good alternative?" If the answer to the question doesn't appear in the list of objectives, perhaps another objective needs to be listed. Brainstorming works best when the facilitator has received appropriate training (Oxley, Dzindolet, & Paulus, 1996). Those participating can present ideas without agreeing or committing to anything (Abigail & Cahn, 2011; Carpenter, 1999; Clemons & McBeth, 2009; Gregory et al, 2012; McKearnan & Fairman, 1999; Patton & Sawicki, 1986; Weimer & Vining, 1999).

4. Incremental approach. Using existing policies, the system is “tweaked” rather than making large scale changes. When using this technique, it is important to recognize the influence that “anchoring” may have on the process (Clemons & McBeth, 2009; Epley & Gilovich, 2006; Hastie & Dawes, 2010; Kahneman et al, 1999; Patton & Sawicki, 1986; Plous, 1993; Weimer & Vining, 1999).

5. Primary research. Surveys and focus groups may be used to gather information about possible policies (Clemons & McBeth, 2009; Patton & Sawicki, 1986; Weimer & Vining, 1999).

6. Generic solutions. Orienting the alternative search in terms of general policy approaches such as deregulation to stimulate markets, privatization, using taxes or subsidies as incentives, or using regulation or legislation to change rules (Clemons & McBeth, 2009; Patton & Sawicki, 1986; Weimer & Vining, 1999).

After the list of actions has been created, time should be spent strategically creating logical combinations of the actions. Gregory et al (2012) define this step as developing strategies. Actions are classified into different categories and none, one, or more from each category are chosen to put together the final alternative. Categories can refer to standards or fundamental objectives of the stakeholders. Strategy tables are useful for organizing and structuring in the alternative development process. Sometimes it may be necessary to create sequenced alternatives, e.g., when strategies have temporal aspects (Gregory et al, 2012). By looking at issues at various temporal junctions, it becomes clearer whether initial action should be taken in the first place.

It may be helpful to create a reference case, typically the status quo or something close to it. This then gives the stakeholders something to refer to as they look at and compare various alternatives.

In this process, risk and uncertainty should be acknowledged and dealt with up front. Risk means different things to different people (Slovic, 1986). “Choices of alternatives involving gains relative to a reference point are often consistent with risk aversion, whereas choices involving losses are consistent with risk taking” (Keeney, 1992, p. 165). Failure to adequately deal with risk and uncertainty can lead to failure in collaboration.

Finally, alternatives should be developed iteratively (Gregory et al, 2009). As alternatives are generated, discussed, and analyzed, new and better alternatives are created as a result of the learning that has taken place. Clearly inferior alternatives may be dropped or modified based upon what has been learned. Several rounds of this process may take place in the process of creating alternatives.

Weimer and Vining (1999) have identified what they refer to as key “no-nos” in the alternative creation process. These include:

- Expecting to find a dominant or perfect alternative.
- Setting up a Hobson choice (pitting the “preferred” alternative against “dummy” or “straw man” alternatives.
- Having a “favorite” alternative until all alternatives have been created and evaluated.
- Producing alternatives that are not mutually exclusive.

- Failing to recognize that the list of alternatives may be endless. Why create alternatives that are so similar that it is a waste of time to compare?
- Offering “kitchen sink” or “do-it-all” alternatives. In today’s political reality, there are always legal, monetary, ethical, personnel, and time constraints.
- Offering alternatives inconsistent with available resources.
- Confusing goals with alternatives (as cited in Clemons & McBeth, 2009).

Furthermore, stakeholders may feel discounted or alienated when their participation is not treated seriously, the decision has already been made, or input is sought as simply a pro-forma measure, and their input is not treated as equally valuable to that provided by scientists (Glicken, 2000).

Additional practical tips and traps in the alternative creation process include watching for decisions within decisions, failing to use neutral labels for alternatives, choosing too few or too many alternatives (between four and twelve is the preferred number), and preventing psychological and behavioral traps such as sunk costs, anchoring, satisficing, stereotyping, and loss aversion, from hampering the process (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Gregory et al, 2012; Hastie & Dawes, 2010; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 2000; Kahneman, Ritov, & Schkade, 1999; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000; Plous, 1993; Pralle, 2006).

Step 5. Selection of Alternative

A major portion of the alternative selection process involves trade-offs. Because of the myriad of interests at play in public lands use issues, value trade-offs are inevitable. Multiple objectives and alternatives will deliver a difference balance across objectives, and trade-offs “involve making judgments about how much you would give up on one objective in order to achieve gains on another objective” (Gregory et al, 2012, p. 209).

Collaboration goals should include avoiding unnecessary trade-offs by iteratively developing win-win alternatives, exposing unavoidable trade-offs and promoting constructive dialogue about them, making trade-offs explicit and transparent, and creating a basis for communicating a decision’s underlying rationale to the public (Gregory et al, 2012).

Keeney (1992) and Gregory et al (2012) set forth various standards for addressing value trade-offs. These include making sure that the trade-offs are informed (based upon good information), context–specific (based upon context-specific estimates or outcomes), consistent (if Alternative A is preferred over alternative B, and Alternative B is preferred over alternative C, then Alternative A should be preferred over Alternative C), stable (enduring past a single situation), and transparent (rationale for the decision is openly communicated).

It is important in this process to recognize the influence of psychological and behavior traps and heuristics. People involved in complex decision making

rely on both intuitive and cognitive systems for constructing value

judgments and expressing their preferences. It's typical to anchor on some bits of information and ignore others, according to what is most salient or accessible. It's typical – for any stakeholder . . . – to be influenced by framing effects, overconfidence, perceptions of losses and gains, affective responses and emotions, often in ways that aren't recognized and that we have no reason to believe would support good decisions (Gregory et al, 2012, pp. 213-214).

The use of multiple framings and multiple elicitation methods can “ameliorate the negative outcomes and instead allow for proper inclusion of both our intuition (system 1) and deliberative thought processes (system 2)” (Gregory et al, 2012, pp. 211, 213-214).

One way to approach trade-offs is with a generalized multi-method approach (Gregory et al, 2012). This methodology utilizes both a direct and weighting process and shifts the dialogue away from positions toward performance-based or value-based deliberations. The steps, adapted from Table 9.1 (Gregory et al, 2012, p. 220) are as follows:

1. The group reviews and confirms understanding of the objectives, measures, alternatives, and consequences.
2. Each participant directly ranks and scores the alternatives.
3. Each participant weights the performance measures and then scores and ranks each alternative according to the weights assigned.

4. Each participant reviews their results for each alternative under the two methods and examines inconsistencies across the two methods.
5. The results from all participants are aggregated. The group identifies areas of agreement and difference and these areas are discussed among group members.
6. Each participant provides a final ranking based upon what they have learned.
7. The group clarifies key areas of agreement and disagreement and sets forth reasoning. Varying levels of agreement are noted. First is “endorse” meaning enthusiastic support. Second is “accept” meaning support. Finally is “oppose” meaning no support. A consensus decision is one where all participants either endorse or accept the decision.

Hammond, Keeney, and Raiffa (1998) describe the “even-swap” method that can also be used to force participants to think of values and objectives in terms of each other. This process essentially cancels out “equal” aspects while the remaining aspects can then be compared.

Signs of deliberative quality in the alternative selection process (Gregory et al, 2012) are where participants are able to demonstrate:

- An understanding of the decision scope and context, how it relates to other decisions, why it is important, and who is concerned about the consequences.
- An understanding of the alternatives, their relative performance, and the key trade-offs made between the alternatives.

- An understanding of the key uncertainties and how they affect the performance of the alternatives.

However, when developing trade-offs, care must be taken to avoid various common pitfalls and traps (Gregory et al, 2012). These include:

- Asking participants to decide without a full range of alternative.
- Moving too fast to identify a single “recommended” alternative.
- Trying to get participants to agree on weights to be used.
- Failing to make context-specific choices.
- Over-relying on quantitative methodologies.
- Assuming that non-technical participants will not accept quantitative methodologies.
- Trying too hard for the participants to reach consensus.
- Asking participants to decide without addressing uncertainty of consequences

Collaborative decision making in public lands issues requires trade-offs. The process necessarily includes the discussion of values held by stakeholders and the fact that no one gets all they want in the process. Trade-offs will happen for collaboration to be successful. The process can be messy, relentless, argumentative, and acrimonious (Abigail & Cahn, 2011; Fox & Miller, 1996; Nie, 2003; Weber & Khademian, 2008), yet trust, learning, and sharing in the process lead to trade-offs requisite to resolution (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; King et al, 1998; Stevens, 2006).

In addition to the quantitative and qualitative evaluations described above, it is also necessary to evaluate the effectiveness, feasibility, equity, political acceptability, and ethics of the alternatives (Clemons & McBeth, 2009). This is done in part while setting forth the objectives and creating the alternatives. When finally selecting the alternative, these issues need be revisited.

Step 6. Implementing, monitoring, evaluating, and reviewing decision

As this dissertation centers on collaborative decision making process, I do not focus on the implementation, monitoring, evaluating and reviewing the alternative chosen with one exception. Effective collaboration requires a group of stakeholders willing to invest in a process that may take many meetings over a substantial time period (Gregory et al, 2012). As the group works together, trust can be generated, and a desire to continue to work together may exist (Thomson et al, 2009). Gerlak and Heikkila (2007) identify additional factors supporting continued collaboration over time in environmental issues. They include trust and reciprocity, common preferences for resource use, shared knowledge about the resources, and experience working together previously. Collaborative discourse, in collaborative relationships that have built up trust over continued meetings, can help participants break down stereotypes and frames, and develop new, positive working relationships grounded in trust (Stevens, 2006). Considering that public land use issues may change over time based upon changing circumstances, it makes sense for the group to continue to work together to monitor, evaluate, and review the decision made.

Research Question

Simpson has clearly stated that he has engaged in collaboration in attempts to get CIEDRA passed. Yet, CIEDRA failed to pass. There was a process that was used for the collaboration. Consequently, the research question for this dissertation is why it failed to pass, particularly what part(s) of the collaboration process failed in Simpson's efforts relating to CIEDRA's passage?

CHAPTER FOUR – THE STAKEHOLDERS

Slater initially identified four separate stakeholder groups to involve in the joint meetings eventually held in February 2001, June 2001, July 2002, and on September 26, 2005 (“Combined Collaborative Meetings”). They were ranchers, local government, motorized recreationists, and wilderness proponents. Over time, other stakeholder groups and individuals were involved, but did not participate in the Combined Collaborative Meetings. Various motorized, mechanized, and other recreational groups came together under the auspice of the Idaho Recreation Council in 2004 and from that time it played a major part in the CIEDRA process for all those recreation groups that it represented. Slater also indicated that he had in excess of two hundred contacts with individuals over the process period where he met with or talked to individuals or groups by themselves. Sayer (L. Sayer, personal communication, February 17, 2014) indicated that she had approximately 100 such contacts. Typically, these contacts were made to discuss particulars of the proposed CIEDRA provisions that would affect these specific individuals or groups. These individuals or groups did not participate in Combined Collaborative Meetings. Some participated, however, in meetings where some, but not all, of the four major stakeholders participated, typically those of like-minded opinions. The four stakeholder groups that participated in the Combined Collaborative Meetings are described in the following paragraphs.

Ranchers

Ranching in Custer County began as early as 1885. Challis, Idaho was set up as a supply depot for nearby mining camps and cattle ranchers. “Homesteading at the turn

of the twentieth century brought ranching to the Boulder-White Clouds. Like other families who settled Idaho, the Baker family began ranching a century ago along the East Fork of the Salmon River in the White Clouds. Six generations of Bakers have lived and worked along the East Fork. 'My husband's family, my brother-in-law and his father know every inch of this country,' said Melodie Baker. 'We love it. We care for it. We want to see it continue in the same kind of operation, the same way of life, and the style that it has always been. . . . It's about the way we should be raising our kids and everything. That's what makes this place so special'" (Idaho Public TV, 2014).

The 2012 USDA Agricultural Census for Custer County indicated there were 25,681 head of livestock in Custer County.

Related to ranchers was the Idaho Cattle Association ("ICA"). The ICA is an Idaho nonprofit trade association formed in 1984 through a merger of the Idaho Cattlemen Association and the Idaho Cattle Feeders Association. In 1998 the Idaho Cattlewomen's Association merged into ICA.

The Idaho Cattle Association (ICA) is the official voice for all segments of the beef business in Idaho - seedstock breeders, commercial operators and cattle feeders. It is the grassroots policy development organization for Idaho's leading agricultural industry, cattle. Through the ICA, cattlemen and women work to create a positive business environment, while providing consumers with a safe and wholesome product.

. . .

ICA . . . perform[s] three basic functions:

1. Represent the beef cattle industry to the legislative and administrative branches of government;
2. Explain beef production, including product safety, use of natural resources, animal care and beef economics to the public and opinion influencers. In addition, interpret economic, social and political developments for the industry;
3. Provide economic and other information to members to aid them in their own planning and management.

...

The mission of the Idaho Cattle Association is to coordinate and advance the economic well-being of the Idaho Beef Industry through innovative and effective political, educational, and marketing programs accepted and supported by all industry segments, partners, and coalitions (Idaho Cattle Association, 2014).

Simpson specifically wanted relief for ranchers in his CIEDRA efforts. "I began this process ten years ago after a meeting with ranchers. They were under the constant threat of losing their livelihoods because of lawsuits filed against them. I agreed to bring together county commissioners, recreationists, and conservationists to find long-term stability for all interested parties in the face of serious land management conflicts in this area" (Simpson, 2010a, n.p.). "CIEDRA provides a solution for ranching families who are on the verge of losing their livelihoods by making them eligible for

compensation from private sources, should they voluntarily retire grazing permits” (Simpson, 2010b, n.p.).

Motorized Recreationists

1. Idaho State Snowmobile Association (ISSA)

The Idaho State Snowmobile Association (“ISSA”) is an Idaho nonprofit corporation with 34 local clubs within nine regions “dedicated to preserving, protecting, and promoting snowmobiling in the great state of Idaho. [Its] members may come from every corner of the state, but they all share one thing in common: their love for snowmobiling” (Idaho State Snowmobile Association, 2014).

Its purposes include, among others:

- (a) To direct, encourage, organize and assist the development of activities, functions, and recreational uses of motor-powered vehicles designed and intended for travel and use over snow and /or other surfaces; to assist and protect all persons, groups, and organizations in lawful use of all such vehicles . . .
- (b) To direct, develop, encourage, organize, supervise, assist and sponsor regular and special activities, events, and functions, including annual snowmobile roundups, with participation by local clubs and organizations and persons, and to provide bulletins and other materials to assist clubs, members, associations, and other entities and persons interested in all objects and purposes hereof.

(c) To afford an enlightened and organized cooperative relationship with all levels of government relative to the use of such vehicles, with a primary objective to protect the proper enjoyment and use of the recreational aspects of all public lands, including particularly wilderness areas, and to give full cooperation to conservation departments (Idaho Secretary of State, 2014).

2. BlueRibbon Coalition (BRC)

The BlueRibbon Coalition is an Idaho nonprofit corporation organized in 1987. It came into being

shortly after Clark Collins, Founder and first Executive Director, was told by then Idaho Governor John Evans that recreationists were not politically significant and implied that Wilderness was more important than motorized access to public lands.

...

Today, the BlueRibbon Coalition is a respected national recreation group that champions responsible use of public and private lands, and encourages individual environmental stewardship. With members in all 50 states, BRC is focused on building enthusiast involvement with organizational efforts through membership, outreach, education, and collaboration among recreationists. BRC currently employs seven full-time people, in addition to two contractors.

...

The successful BRC strategy of working administratively, legislatively, and legally for effective recreational advocacy is now a quarter of a century time tested and ground proven. The BRC TEAM looks forward to continuing its mission to "champion responsible use of public lands for the benefit of all recreationists" into the future (BlueRibbon Coalition, 2014).

BRC's Articles of Incorporation list its corporate purposes as follows:

(a) . . . The Coalition shall be dedicated to the defense and enhancement of recreational access, via motorized, mechanized, and nonmechanized means, to public lands, and to the protection of the environment, including the preservation of natural resources and natural values in concert with opportunities for humans to gain access to and interact directly with their physical environment. In advancing these purposes, the Coalition shall be guided by the principle that viable, sustainable and healthy ecosystems, including the animal and plant communities, sensitive, threatened and endangered species, marketable commodities, and recreational and aesthetic opportunities within such functioning ecosystems, can be best fostered, maintained, and supported by elected officials, administrators, and an interested public who are able to gain access to, directly observe, and actively manage those ecosystems and the lands, waters and physical components comprising them. The coalition shall embody principle of multiple use and sustained yield, and

that our culture and government should protect our natural resources
FOR the public instead of FROM the public (Idaho Secretary of State,
2014).

3. Idaho Trail Machine Association and local chapter clubs (ITMA)

The Idaho Trail Machine Association was originally created in 1968 as a non-profit corporation for the purpose of promoting and fostering interest in motor driven trail and pack vehicles. Local chapters organize family campouts and trail rides. In 1971 its purpose expanded to include the promotion of pleasurable and recreational use of cycles, insuring the continued availability of areas to ride, both public and private. In 1984 its corporate charter was forfeited. In 2008 it was reincorporated as a nonprofit corporation with, among others, the following corporate purposes:

- (a) To encourage, organize and assist the development of opportunities, activities, and functions, for the recreational uses of motorized trail machines; to assist in the formation and growth of ITMA chapter clubs; to assist all persons, groups and organizations in active support of lawful use of all such vehicles; and to encourage safe operation of such vehicles.
- (b) The organization shall embody principles of multiple use and sustained yield and that our nation's public lands should be for the benefit of all Americans.
- (c) To defend and enhance recreational access, via motorized means, to public lands. The organization will also work toward the preservation of natural resources and natural values in concert with opportunities for

humans to gain access to and interact directly with their physical environment.

(d) To afford an enlightened and organized advocacy in all levels of government relative to the use of motorized trail machines, with the primary objective to protect the proper enjoyment and use of the recreational aspect of all public lands.

(e) To develop, encourage, organize, assist and sponsor regular and special activities, events, and functions, including an annual convention.

(f) To encourage all members to cooperate and to exhibit good sportsmanship among themselves and in all relationships with other members and groups; and to promote unity in the effort to protect recreations access for motorize trail machines (Idaho Secretary of State, 2014).

Combination of Recreational Users Under the Auspice of the Idaho Recreation Council (IRC)

The Idaho Recreation Council was created on February 10, 2004 as an Idaho unincorporated nonprofit association (Idaho Secretary of State, 2014). Its purpose was to provide statewide leadership for recreational user groups in the state. Groups affiliated with the IRC included ATV, UTV, backcountry, 4x4, motorcycle, mountain bike, and RV user groups (Mitchell; C. Cook, personal communication, March 12, 2014). After organization, it took the lead in CIEDRA for many of these user groups that had interest in the proposed legislation.

Local Government

Simpson focused on the two counties that would be most affected by CIEDRA, Custer and Blaine counties. Custer County Commissioners participated in Combined Collaborative Meetings and Blaine County participated by individual meetings with Slater and Sayer. Individual contacts were also made with city mayors in the area.

1. Custer County, Idaho

Custer County was founded on January 8, 1881 and is located in Central Idaho. It has an area of 4,938 square miles. It is named for the General Custer mine, which was named in honor of General George Custer who died at the Battle of Little Bighorn. The county seat is Challis, with a population of just over 1000 out of the approximate 4,368 total county population. Other towns in the county include Mackay, Stanley, and Clayton. Custer County relies on ranching, mining, and tourism as its main resources.

Fur traders lead by Michael Bourdon and other pathfinders were in the area as early as 1822 to 1824. Prospectors and miners came in the 1860s and 1870s and set up mining operations and camps on the Yankee Fork and at Galena, Robinson's Bar, Jordan Creek, Crystal City, Lost River, Clayton, Concord, Bay Horse, Custer, Cape Horn, Oro Grande, Round Valley, Bonanza City, Kinnikinick, and Fisher. Some of these areas now remain as ghost towns that provide some of the county's tourist destinations. Today, mining still plays an important part in the Custer County economy, with Thompson Creek Mining Company operating a molybdenum mine in Clayton, Idaho, employing approximately 200-250 workers depending on the need (Thompson Creek Mining

Company, 2014). It has proposed a 430 acre expansion that will extend its operations for an additional ten years over its current operating plan.

Ranchers began operations in the area by 1885 with ranching homesteaders moving into the East Fork of the Salmon River area in the early twentieth century. Today ranching continues to play an important part in the local economy with numerous ranching operations with approximately 25,000 head of livestock in the county.

The Custer County landscape consists of arid desert, flat green valleys, and rugged rocky peaks. It contains many of the highest peaks in Idaho, including Idaho's highest mountain, Mount Borah at 12,662 feet. The county contains much of the storied Frank Church River of No Return Wilderness as well as the Sawtooth National Recreation Area (Custer County, Idaho, 2014).

Of the 4938 square miles, approximately 4691 (approximately 95.2%) are public lands managed by federal agencies, broken down as follows: Salmon-Challis National Forest (43.1%), Bureau of Land Management (26.3%), Sawtooth National Recreation Area (15.1%), and the Frank Church River of No Return Wilderness (10.7%). This leaves approximately 247 square miles of land as the property tax base for Custer County (University of Idaho Extension, 2014).

2. Blaine County, Idaho

Blaine County describes itself as follows:

Blaine County's history is as varied as its topography. Prospectors entered the Wood River area soon after the beginning of the 1862 Boise Basin mining boom.

The County's first permanent settlers were farmers who arrived in 1879. The 1880 Wood River mining boom brought the first large population influx, including a significant number of Irish, Welsh, German and Chinese immigrants. Towns like Bellevue and Hailey grew overnight in the frantic scramble for gold, silver and lead. The Wood River area had gained renown as the Idaho Territory's most progressive area. The main reason was through the prosperity brought in by mining. The first electric light plant in the Idaho Territory was installed by the Philadelphia Mining and Smelting Company just west of Ketchum. The first telephone system was installed in Hailey in 1883.

Although not as prominent as the mining industry, a parallel economic force in the early years, starting in 1880, was the feeding and shipping of sheep. By 1900, more than 2 million sheep had been raised or trailed through the Wood River Valley. Between 1910 and 1920, more than one million head of sheep a year were trailed through the area, making Ketchum one of the largest sheep shipping centers in the United States. The area's sheep industry has substantially diminished in recent years, but continuing signs of this once important sheep migration route can still be found in the Annual Trailing of the Sheep throughout Blaine County in the Fall.

With the construction of Sun Valley Resort in 1936, Blaine County experienced a second boom. Averell Harriman, Chairman of the Board of

the Union Pacific Railroad, conceived the idea of establishing, near Ketchum, a first-class resort for skiers, the first in the United States. Harriman sent Count Felix Schaffgotsch to the Ketchum area after Schaffgotsch had researched the western United States looking for appropriate terrain. The name "Sun Valley" was coined by UPRR publicist, Steve Hannagan, a warm weather fan who decided one of the Resort's outstanding features was its ample supply of sun. Amid the flurry of publicity Hannagan created, celebrities from Hollywood and other areas began to pour into the Wood River Valley.

Blaine County's topography, geographic location and seasonal variation in climate create a unique and varied natural environment, ranging from the scenic, high alpine country in the north to the desolate lava plains and high-desert mountains in the south. As a recreational area, Blaine County is known throughout the world for the quality and beauty of its natural environment and recreational opportunities.

Renowned as a winter haven, Sun Valley's addition of Elkhorn Resort in 1970 brought a new perspective to Blaine County – year-round recreation. Summer's slower pace disappeared in the wave of enthusiasm for activities like kayaking, backpacking, ice skating, hiking, golf, swimming, water-skiing, jogging, horseback riding, mountain biking, camping, sailing and fishing. These pursuits-- including the world-class fly

fishing both on the Big Wood River and on legendary spring-fed Silver Creek--attract recreation lovers from around the world.

The Salmon River, also known as the River of No Return, with its headwaters in the north and the Snake River in the south offer solitude and spectacular white water rafting. Bald Mountain, due to its great variety of terrain and snow conditions, has been consistently rated as one of the finest ski facilities in the United States. The Sawtooth, Boulder, Smokey, and Pioneer Mountain ranges provide high alpine country as beautiful and inspiring as any to be found in the United States and breathtaking heli-ski opportunities. The Great Rift area in the southeast portion of the County is a unique land form with lava formations similar to a lunar landscape. It is this diversity of environment, recreational opportunity and quality of life that has attracted many people to Blaine County to live on a full-time basis (Blaine County, Idaho, 2014).

One of the lingering problems for Blaine County is the lack of affordable housing (S. Michael, personal communication, March 14, 2014). The existence of a world renowned ski resort has skewed the property values in the area. The median value of owner-occupied homes in Blaine County for the years 2008-2012 was \$404,900 versus \$167,100 for the state of Idaho (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014).

“Sun Valley's status as a resort, second-home playground for the rich means many residents are priced out of the northern end of the Wood River Valley. Homes average more than two million dollars, and even standard, two-bedroom condos go for

upwards of \$800,000 in Ketchum. However, residents can find affordable housing in Hailey and Bellevue, where prices range from \$450,000 to \$600,000. These towns house many of the workers that keep their northern resort neighbors in business” (Find Your Spot Reports, 2014).

Wilderness Proponents

While there were numerous wilderness proponent groups, Slater decided only to include two to participate in the Combined Collaborative Meetings. They were the Idaho Conservation League and The Wilderness Society.

1. Idaho Conservation League (“ICL”)

The Idaho conservation League was formed in 1973 and incorporated in 1974 as a nonprofit corporation around the phrase “Keep Idaho *Idaho*.” It currently has offices in Boise, Ketchum, and Sandpoint, Idaho. It strives to be the leading voice in Idaho for conservation issues and works to protect Idaho’s environment. “ICL works to create an informed and engaged conservation majority in Idaho. By building a robust conservation community, we hope to influence local, state and federal policies to ensure adequate protections for clean water, clean air, healthy families and Idaho's unique way of life” (Idaho Conservation League, 2014).

As set forth in its Articles of Incorporation, corporate purposes include:

(a) To help people of Idaho retain, protect, and pass on to succeeding generations a quality living environment, including streams, lakes, wild areas, watersheds, wildlife, agricultural lands, air and water;

- (b) To provide information to citizens and organizations by maintaining files and disseminating information on legislation, performance records of elected officials, activities of federal, state and local agencies, and environmental issues;
 - (c) To help improve communications and coordination between existing conservation organizations and interested citizens;
 - (d) To promote attractive, livable communities;
 - (e) To help pass on to succeeding generations a quality living environment;
 - (f) To encourage citizen, legislative and administrative action toward the protection and restoration of our natural and historical heritage and the creation of communities which reflect these values through creative planning, education and wise stewardship;
 - (g) To monitor and work with the state legislature;
 - (h) To monitor and work with federal, state, and local agencies;
 - (i) To help provide information to citizens and organizations;
 - (j) To record, analyze and disseminate records of public officials and candidates;
 - (k) To strengthen communication between conservation groups and citizens; and
 - (l) To assist existing conservation and environmental organizations
- (Idaho Secretary of State, 2014).

2. The Wilderness Society (“TWS”)

The Wilderness Society describes itself as follows:

Since 1935, The Wilderness Society has led the effort to permanently protect nearly 110 million acres of wilderness in 44 states. We have been at the forefront of nearly every major public lands victory.

...

The Wilderness Society's mission is to protect wilderness and inspire Americans to care for our wild places. We contribute to better protection, stewardship and restoration of our public lands, preserving our rich natural legacy for current and future generations.

...

The Wilderness Society has a presence on Capitol Hill and in communities across the nation. We have regional offices in Alaska, California, Idaho, New Mexico, Utah, the Northeast, the Pacific Northwest, the Rockies and the Southeast U.S. (The Wilderness Society, 2014).

Individuals or Groups Contacted

As mentioned previously, Slater indicated that he had private meetings/visits with approximately 200 individuals or groups in addition to those invited to participate in collaborative group meetings. Sayer indicated that she had private meetings/visits with approximately 100 individuals or groups. Some of these meetings/visits overlapped in that both Slater and Sayer met with these individuals or groups. A partial listing of these individuals and groups is as follows:

- Backcountry Horsemen (Val Johnson)
- Blaine County Commissioners (Sarah Michael)
- Blue Ribbon Idaho Trail Machine Users (Adena Cook)
- Boulder White Clouds Council (Lynn Stone)
- Burley Kiwanis Club
- Campaign for America's Wilderness (Doug Scott)
- Challis Mayor (Donnie Rowles)
- Challis Chamber of Commerce
- City Club of Boise
- City Club of Idaho Falls
- City of Bellevue
- City of Sun Valley
- Congressman Walt Minnick
- Cooperative Wilderness Handicapped Outdoor Group
- Custer County Farm Bureau (Rod Evans)
- Joel Holtrop (Deputy Chief, National Forest Service)
- Ed Shepard (BLM Assistant Director of Renewable Resources)
- F. Carl Pence (former Forest Supervisor)
- Chad Calvert (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Land and Minerals
Management, Department of Interior)
- Mark Rey (Department of Agriculture – Undersecretary, Natural Resources and
Environment)

- Idaho Governor Butch Otter
- Idaho Governor Dirk Kempthorne
- Idaho Governor/Senator Jim Risch
- Hailey City Council
- Idaho AFL-CIO
- Idaho Department of Lands
- Idaho Environmental Forum
- Idaho Falls Chamber of Commerce
- Idaho Falls Downtown Rotary
- Idaho Office of Species Conservation
- Idaho Outfitters and Guides (Grant Simmonds)
- Idaho Parks and Recreation (Bob Meinen)
- Idaho Water Users Association (Norm Semanko)
- International Mountain Biking Association (Chris Cook – President)
- Erik Schultz (Disabled access proponent)
- Nate Helm (Fish & Wildlife)
- Jeff Bitton (local outfitter)
- Margaret Fuller
- Isaak Walton League of America
- Ketchum City Council
- Ketchum Mayor (Ed Simon)
- Living Independent Network Corporation

- Mackay City Council
- National Public Lands Grazing Campaign
- National Wildlife Federation
- NREPA Network (Carol King)
- Outdoor Industry Association
- Public Lands Council
- Pulp and Paper Workers Resource Council
- Rupert Rotary
- Sawtooth Society (Bob Hayes)
- Senator Larry Craig
- Senator Mike Crapo
- Sierra Club
- Stanley City Council
- Stanley Mayor
- State of Idaho Fish and Game
- Sun Valley Adaptive Sports
- Sun Valley/Ketchum Chamber & Visitors Bureau
- Thompson Creek Mine (Bert Dougherty)
- Trout Unlimited
- United Steelworkers Local 712 & 608
- Western Lands Project (Janine Blaeloch)
- Western Watersheds (Jon Marvel)

- Wilderness Watch
- Winter Wildlands Alliance

CHAPTER FIVE - METHODOLOGY

In order to better analyze the issues presented herein, both qualitative and quantitative research methods were used. My research was influenced by Sarah B. Pralle's research as set forth in her 2006 book, *Branching Out, Digging In Environmental Advocacy and Agenda Setting*, where she analyses and contrasts two separate environmental policy conflicts, one in British Columbia and another in northern California. The Clayoquot Sound dispute involved British Columbia forest policy. In the northern California case, a group of (at first) three community activists, referred to as the "Quincy Library Group," and representing three competing interests in the forest logging debate, attempted to defuse the logging debate in the Sierra Nevada mountains occurring in the mid-1980s and early 1990s. In her research and analysis of the two cases, Pralle interviewed the core group of environmental activists involved in the Clayoquot Sound campaign, and key members of the Quincy Library Group, forest service officials, and environmental organizations opposing the Quincy Library Group in the northern California case. She included in her book questions she used for her interviews.

I created sets of interview questions that followed Pralle's interview question format. I expanded on her format by inquiring specifically about the meetings that took place in Simpson's collaborative efforts. I also followed her format by identifying and then contacting key individuals with a request that they participate in an interview relating to their participation in those collaborative efforts.

Thereafter, interviews were conducted with consenting individuals who participated in the CIEDRA collaborative efforts. Interviewees included the two main participants from Simpson's office (Lindsay Slater, Simpson's Chief of Staff, and Laurel Sayer, Simpson's Idaho office representative responsible for natural resource and INL issues throughout Idaho); a majority (six of the eleven) of those individuals who participated in the four Combined Collaborative Meetings, representing the four major stakeholder groups that Slater had identified; and various individuals with whom Simpson, Slater, or Sayer held individual or group meetings, representing seven different stakeholder groups. Slater was Simpson's CIEDRA focal person/facilitator, with Sayer working directly with him.

Slater and Sayer were both asked a set of questions that were different than other interviewees in the collaborative process. Depending on the level of participation in the collaborative process, the remaining interviewees were given one of two sets of interview questions. One consisted of the full set of the questions and the other consisted of a subset of the full set of questions. Interviewees except Slater and Sayer were then also given one of two questionnaires using a Likert-type scale patterned after the research of Thomson et al (2009) on conceptualizing and measuring collaboration. Prospective interviewees were contacted by telephone with a script approved by the Idaho State Human Subject Committee. Prior to actual participation in the interview and questionnaire, each interviewee was given the informed consent notice at the beginning of the interview questions and was given the opportunity to consent to participation and to consent to allowing their names to be used. All interviewees

consented to the interview. One interviewee consented to the interview but requested that interviewee's name be withheld. One participant in the collaborative efforts, Mel Quale, during the initial contact call, provided a two sentence statement regarding his opinion of the collaboration, but did not participate further.

Qualitative Methodology

For the qualitative portion of the research, interviews were conducted with Slater and Sayer, a majority of the participants in the combined collaborative meetings, and a representative number of those who did not participate in the combined collaborative meetings. With this latter group, individuals from various stakeholder groups were chosen to round out the panoply of different stakeholder groups.

For those individuals who participated in the Combined Collaborative Meetings, I was not able to interview ranchers or county commissioners. I was able, however, to interview a member of the Idaho Cattle Association and another county commissioner as participants in individual meetings with Slater or Sayer. Thus, interviews were held with a representative of all four stakeholder groups identified by Slater as the major stakeholders groups to participate in the collaboration. Furthermore, eight interviews were held with members of seven additional stakeholder groups, each of which represented users of the Boulder-White Clouds area. I believe the interviewees represented a fair cross-section of stakeholder user groups. I further believe that the individuals interviewed are a fair representation of individuals comprising members of the stakeholder groups.

1. Interview Questions for Slater and Sayer.

Slater, with the assistance of Sayer, was in control of the collaborative process and acted as the facilitator. As such, their interview questions were different than those with whom they worked with in the process. Slater's and Sayers's interview questions related to the process they set up and participated in. In sum, their questions requested information that would show whether or not their actions aligned with the characteristics and steps outlined in the literature for collaboration. A copy of the questionnaire for Slater and Sayer is attached as Appendix C. First, questions dealt directly with:

1. Their personal background and background with CIEDRA.
2. Their responsibilities relating to CIEDRA.
3. The problems that CIEDRA purported to resolve.
4. Their definition of collaboration.
5. How they set up the CIEDRA collaborative efforts including:
 - a. Preparation (theirs and that of the participants).
 - b. System or outline for the efforts.
 - c. Stakeholders and how they were chosen to participate.
 - d. Framing of issues.

The next portion of their interview questions dealt with the four Combined Collaborative Meetings that were held in February 2001, June 2001, July 2002, and September 2005. Questions centered on who was involved, why they were chosen to participate, what was done and accomplished at the meetings, the values and interests

identified by the participants, and decisions that were made in the meetings. Slater and Sayer were asked about changes to the proposed CIEDRA language and why changes were made. They were asked about attempts to expand or contract the issues or participants. In total, there were eleven persons besides Slater and Sayer who participated in one or more of these four Combined Collaborative Meetings. Six of the eleven were willing to be interviewed and one of the eleven provided a two sentence description of the process as he perceived it, but was unwilling to be interviewed. Between these six individuals, they represented two of the four stakeholder groups that Slater initially identified. In particular, there were three motorized users and three wilderness proponents.

The next area of inquiry for Slater and Sayer was into other meetings or contacts they had with individuals or groups other than those participating in the Combined Collaborative Meeting participants. Slater and Sayer were specifically asked about their use of “shuttle diplomacy” and the percentage of these shuttle diplomacy contacts as contrasted with collaborative meetings with stakeholders. Finally, they were asked about support for CIEDRA by U. S. congressional and Idaho state leaders.

Slater indicated that he had in excess of 200 contacts, meetings, or presentations with various individuals or groups relating to CIEDRA, not including the Combined Collaborative Meetings, while Sayer had approximately 100 such contacts, meetings, or presentations. These meetings or contacts were with, among others, a representative of disabled individuals, wilderness proponents, outfitters and guides, backcountry

horsemen, the Idaho Cattle Association, and a Blaine County commissioner. Eight individuals representing these stakeholder groups were interviewed.

2. Interview Questions for Stakeholder Interviewees

As Simpson's office staff, Slater and Sayer were essentially the facilitators for the collaborative efforts, and as such, had control of stakeholder participation, either in meetings or otherwise. For purposes of the interviews, Slater provided a list of persons who participated in the Combined Collaborative Meetings, and then others that he or Sayer had contact with, either by name, position, or group. During interviews, when interviewees identified persons not previously known, these persons were added to the cohort of possible interviewees.

From the group of eleven participants in the combined collaborative meetings, Clark Collins (BlueRibbon Coalition), Sandra Mitchell (Idaho State Snowmobile Association and then later on the Idaho Recreation Council), Linn Kincannon (Idaho Conservation League), Craig Gehrke (The Wilderness Society), Bart Koehler (The Wilderness Society), and Chad Cobbley (Treasure Valley Trail Machine Association) were interviewed. Mel Quale (Magic Valley Trail Machine Association), after sharing a short two-sentence opinion of the collaborative efforts, declined to participate in the interview. His shared opinion will be discussed *infra*. The remaining participants in the Combined Collaborative Meetings either failed to return multiple messages requesting their participation or indicated they would participate but then never provided a day and time for the interview.

In addition to those eight individuals, interviewees not participating in the combined collaborative meetings included Erik Schultz (disabled access advocate), Robert (“Bob”) Hayes (Executive Director of the Sawtooth Society), Rick Johnson (Idaho Conservation League), Chris Cook (International Mountain Biking Association), Grant Simonds (Idaho Outfitters and Guides Association), Val Johnson (Backcountry Horsemen of Idaho), Sarah Michael (Blaine County Commissioner) and an unnamed member of the Idaho Cattle Association. All of these individuals had individual contacts with Simpson, Slater, or Sayer relating to CIEDRA.

The interview questions for stakeholders were designed to elicit information directly relating to the collaborative actions taken or attempted as they relate to the collaboration process. There were two sets of interview questions. Individuals who participated in the Combined Collaborative Meetings were asked the complete set of interview questions. This set of questions may be found at Appendix D – Interview Questions with Consent Language. All other interviewees were asked an abbreviated set of interview questions taken from the complete set. The abbreviated set of interview questions may be found at Appendix E - Abbreviated Interview Questions.

The complete set of interview questions first requested the interviewees to identify which stakeholder group they either belonged to or identified with. Information relating to the stakeholder group was acquired, including general background information and information specific to the CIEDRA process they participated in. Actions each group/person had taken relating to CIEDRA were discussed, identifying strategies, tactics, media usage, and attempts to expand or

contract the issues or participants. Interviewees were asked about the groups or individuals they worked with, whether these groups or individuals supported or opposed their views, and how that relationship developed and functioned. Detailed questions about each meeting in which the interviewee participated were asked to determine who the other participants were, who organized and facilitated the meeting, what actually happened at the meeting, the meeting's effectiveness, expectations of the participants for the meetings, preconceptions interviewees had relating to the process and other participants, and whether other participants exhibited anticipated traits or characteristics (stereotypes) expected by the interviewee. The interviewees were asked to identify values, ideals, or views that they were willing to change and those that they were completely unwilling to change as they went into the collaboration. They were further asked to identify any values, ideals, or views that they that did change during the collaborative process. The second to last substantive question requested the interviewee to define what collaboration meant to him or her, including the different elements of collaboration (e.g., who should participate, whether face-to-face meetings were required, how many meetings were needed, how long the collaborative efforts needed to last, whether there needed to be any structure or organization). After the interviewee defined collaboration, the last substantive interview question then asked them to subjectively calculate whether or not they or their group participated in enough collaborative activities so that they could say they participated meaningfully in collaboration.

The interviewees who did not participate in the Combined Collaborative Meetings were not asked all of the interview questions, but were given an abbreviated version of the questionnaire, asking question numbers 1 through 4, 14-16, and 29 from the complete set of questions. Thus, this group of interviewees was asked which stakeholder group they either belonged to or identified with, and whether they had worked with any other organization, group, public official, interest groups, advocacy groups, policy actors, or individuals on the CIEDRA campaign, and who they worked the most closely with and why. They were asked about their contacts or communications with Simpson, Slater, or Sayer). If it became apparent during the interview that they had in fact worked with all or substantially all of the major stakeholders from the four stakeholder groups, they were asked the remaining interview questions from the complete set. They were also asked to define collaboration and then asked whether they thought they participated in enough collaborative activities so that they could say they also participated meaningfully in collaboration.

While there are psychological and cultural worldview aspects to collaboration, this dissertation focuses on the process itself, rather than the underlying psychological and cultural worldview assumptions and heuristics. Thus, the questions did not dwell on those social psychology aspects of collaboration.

In sum, the interview questions were designed to provide evidence of the elements of successful collaboration as identified in the literature, or the lack thereof.

Quantitative Methodology

Based upon their answer to the interview question of whether or not they participated in meaningful collaborative activities, all interviewees, except Slater and Sayer, were also given a corresponding short questionnaire utilizing a 7-point Likert-type scale. Thomson et al (2009) identified five different dimensions of a theoretical model of collaboration (governance, administration, organizational autonomy, mutuality, and norms). They further identified a set of 17 statements covering the five dimensions that has statistically been shown to positively correlate to successful collaboration. Interviewees who subjectively believed they had participated in meaningful collaborative activities (question 29 from the interview questions) were given Questionnaire MP-1 (attached as Appendix F). The statements in Questionnaire MP-1 were phrased in such a way as to gauge what the interviewees saw, heard, and believed/perceived happened in their collaborative activities. Those who did not believe that they participated in meaningful collaborative activities were given Questionnaire NMP-1 (attached as Appendix G) and were asked to reply in a way that would reflect what they expected or anticipated they would have seen, heard, or perceived or believed would have happened if they had participated meaningfully in collaborative activities.

To operationalize the dimensions of governance, administration, organizational autonomy, and mutuality, the questionnaires were composed of closed-ended statements that asked the participants to state the extent to which they or their organization/group or the other participating organization/group did or would engage in

certain behaviors or exhibit certain characteristics or attitudes. Responses on the Likert-type scale ranged from 1 = “not at all” to 7 = “to a great extent.” For the dimension of norms, the closed-ended statements presented asked participants to state the extent to which they strongly disagreed or strongly agreed with the statements. Responses on the Likert-type scale ranged from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 = “strongly agree.”

Statements 1 and 2 related to “governance.” Statements 3 through 6 related to “administration.” Statements 7 through 9 related to “autonomy.” Statements 10 through 14 related to “mutuality.” Statements 15 through 17 related to “norms” (trust).

The higher the number on the Likert-type scale, the more correlation with a successful collaboration is exhibited. For purposes of scoring Statement numbers 7, 8, and 9 on both Questionnaire forms, however, reverse-coding was used. For instance, Statement 7 reads “The collaboration hindered your organization/group from meeting its own organizational/group mission.” The scale for the statement runs from 1 = “not at all” to a 7 = “to a great extent”. In this instance, a lower number correlates more positively with successful collaboration than a higher number. Statements 8 and 9 are similar in that a lower number correlates more positively with successful collaboration than a higher number. For this reason, interviewees’ scores on these three statements were reverse coded to be consistent with the scoring of the remaining statements where a higher number correlates more positively with successful collaboration than a lower number.

All of the interviews were done over the telephone and were done at the convenience of the interviewees. Interviews involving the full set of questions would

average approximately one and a half hours. Interviews involving the abbreviated set of questions would average approximately 30 minutes. Most of the interviewees struggled with memory issues as the time period being discussed began in 2001. Most had general recollection of many of the questions, but only a few had specific recollection of details of activities they participated in.

Some interviewees located documents that helped clarify what they had discussed and were willing to forward them for review. In some instances they helped clarify days and events.

CHAPTER SIX – RESULTS

As outlined in the literature review, *supra*, collaboration is a process with a number of steps. While not every step is given the same importance, and in some instances steps may be skipped or minimized, scholars have identified generally the steps necessary for successful collaboration. While much was said regarding the “collaboration” efforts by Simpson and his office, the reality was that there was no collaboration as described by the literature, but instead was what is sometimes referred to as “shuttle diplomacy.” Brahm and Burgess (2003, n.p.) describe the essence of shuttle diplomacy as “the use of a third party to convey information back and forth between the parties, serving as a reliable means of communication less susceptible to the grandstanding of face-to-face or media-based communication. The intermediary serves not only as a relay for questions and answers, but can also provide suggestions for moving the conflict toward resolution and does so in private.” This chapter will review the information and data garnered from the interviews and the questionnaires.

COLLABORATIVE CHRONOLOGY

Shortly after his election to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1998, Simpson began the CIEDRA process after meeting with a group of ranchers. He stated that “[t]hey were under the constant threat of losing their livelihoods because of lawsuits filed against them. I agreed to bring together county commissioners, recreationists, and conservationists to find long-term stability for all interested parties in the face of serious land management conflicts in this area” (Simpson, 2010a, n.p.). At the same time, he was meeting with the Idaho Conservation League at *Wild Idaho* (the annual meeting for

the Idaho Conservation League held at Redfish Lake in Custer County, Idaho) (Kincannon), with The Wilderness Society (B. Koehler, personal communication, March 21, 2014), and with the Sawtooth Society (Hayes) where he outlined his thinking for the Boulder –White Clouds, and which would eventually form the basis for the first version of CIEDRA (Slater). Both the Idaho Conservation League and The Wilderness Society were impressed and frankly amazed that an Idaho Republican U. S. Congressman would be willing to discuss and consider designating additional wilderness (Gehrke; R. Johnson, personal communication, March 19, 2014; Koehler). While wilderness bills had historically been “clean” (dealing just with wilderness), Simpson was only willing to attempt to designate additional wilderness if other issues were included in the legislation (Koehler). Under this “new” type of wilderness bill, other stakeholder concerns would be addressed and language incorporated to resolve their concerns (Koehler).

In 2000, Slater was hired as Simpson’s chief of Staff, in part because of his success in resolving land use issues in Oregon. Slater identified four broad categories of stakeholder groups to include in the collaboration Simpson desired. These were ranchers, local counties (Custer and Blaine Counties), motorized recreationists, and wilderness proponents (environmental/conservation groups). Slater and Sayer decided which specific stakeholders to include in the collaboration. Slater had worked previously with environmental groups while Sayer, Simpson’s environmental and INL (Idaho National Laboratory) liaison, had worked previously with ranchers and motorized

recreationists. They purposefully did not include stakeholders that they anticipated would be a detriment to the process (Slater; Sayer).

In February of 2001 Slater held the first of the four meetings where most, if not all of the four stakeholder groups were represented (hereafter referred to “Combined Collaborative Meetings”), which he referred to as an initial conceptual discussion. Those stakeholders invited to participate were Clark Collins (“Collins”) of the BlueRibbon Coalition, Sandra Mitchell (“Mitchell”) of the Idaho State Snowmobile Association (and then later also of the Idaho Recreation Council), Linn Kincannon (“Kincannon”) of the Idaho Conservation League, Craig Gehrke (“Gehrke”) of The Wilderness Society, Jim Bennetts (“Bennetts”), a Custer County rancher and attorney, and Melodie Baker (“Baker”), a rancher and Custer County Commissioner. Because of Baker’s busy schedule, this was the only group meeting that she attended, although she remained in contact with Slater and Sayer (Slater). Thus, this meeting had at least one representative from each of the four broad stakeholder groups. Mitchell recalls that this meeting was just a general discussion with no specifics being mentioned. Kincannon added that they took turns going around the table talking about what each person wanted and what they didn’t want. The end result of this meeting was a general “thanks for coming.”

Five months later, in June of 2001 Slater, Sayer, Collins, Mitchell, Kincannon, and Bart Koehler of The Wilderness Society met in Hailey, Idaho, for the second of the four Combined Collaborative Meetings, and in what Slater characterized as a CIEDRA Exploratory Meeting of Principles (Slater). This meeting involved motorized

recreationists and wilderness proponents. It did not include ranchers or county government representatives. Slater and Sayer both indicated that during this time they had many conversations with ranchers such as Baker. Sayer indicated that at the beginning of the meeting, there were “walls” up between the participants, particularly between the motorized groups and the wilderness proponents, but that Mitchell and Koehler began talking and that they “broke the ice.” Sayer stated that the meeting went well, that everyone wanted delineated lines/boundaries for uses, and that she anticipated each of the participants would go back and discuss with their individual groups that Simpson was putting together a plan for the Boulder-White Clouds area and that they should decide what they wanted and needed out of CIEDRA. One of the proposals discussed at this meeting was a new designation called “backcountry recreation.” This was less than wilderness and provided motorized recreation. Collins (C. Collins, personal communication, February 24, 2014) was interested in this but Mitchell was not enamored with the idea as the area was already open to snowmobiles (Mitchell). Collins remembers that Koehler had no interest in this type of designation. Kincannon described the meeting as not very useful because the debate devolved into a discussion as to why there should be any more wilderness. Both Kincannon and Koehler were surprised at this being the major topic of the meeting and Slater seemed discouraged after this meeting (Sayer).

In July of 2002, Slater, Kincannon, Koehler, Collins, Mel Quale (“Quale”) of the Magic Valley Trail Machine Association (motorized recreation group), Brett Madron (“Madron”) of the Idaho Trail Machine Association (motorized recreation group), and

Chad Cobbley ("Cobbley") of the Treasure Valley Trail Machine Association (motorized recreation group) met in Simpson's Boise office as the third of the Combined Collaborative Meetings, in what Slater characterized as a CIEDRA Meeting of Principles. In addition, Slater remembers that this meeting also included some mountain bikers as the motorized groups had previously let the mountain bikers know what was going on. Collins remembered that the wilderness proponents did not exhibit much flexibility on wilderness while Koehler remembered that they were, in fact, willing to talk. During this meeting maps of the area were reviewed, and in particular, the motorized corridors identified. The Idaho Conservation League stance was that some motorized corridors (those that were technically difficult) needed to be closed and the riders wanted them open. Quale, Madron, and Cobbley all had advanced motorcycle riding skills and were actually riding these technically difficult trails. (C. Cobbley, personal communication, June 16, 2014).

On June 16, 2003, a meeting with Slater, Sayer, and representatives of the BlueRibbon Coalition, Idaho Trail Machines Association, Treasure Valley Trail Machine Association, Idaho State Snowmobile Association, Idaho Department of Parks and Recreation, and the International Mountain Biking Association, took place in Boise. As a result of an expansion of participants to include mountain bikers, Chris Cook (President of the International Mountain Biking Association) became involved in the discussions. Wilderness proponents, ranchers, and counties were not included in this meeting. Slater set out the history of the SNRA and indicated that a bill designating some

wilderness and releasing the rest from wilderness study areas would be beneficial. He then went on to set out the different components (Slater).

On June 18, 2004, Slater released the “framework” for what would be later introduced in Congress as CIEDRA. A copy of the framework is attached as Appendix G. The framework was intentionally released prior to the September 1, 2004 town hall meetings set up by Simpson. This framework set out what the proposed legislation would include and was based upon Simpson’s resolution vision and the input received in the Combined Collaborative Meetings and individual meetings and communications to date. It contained various provisions, including the following:

- Lands within the area that become wilderness would be managed as wilderness by the current managing district.
- Lands within the area that were not designated as wilderness would be managed by the same managing agency (e.g., Sawtooth National Recreation Area, Challis National Forest, and Challis Bureau of Land Management).
- The Champion Lakes Trail (USFS#105) would not be reopened to motorized use.
- The 4th of July Basin would remain open to snowmobiling from Blackman Peak to Patterson Peak (West Side), including the 4th of July Basin. The 4th of July Basin would be closed to all other motorized or mechanized activities. A wheelchair accessible trail would be established to 4th of July Lake from the Phyllis Lake cutoff.
- Three OHV motorized recreation parks would be developed near Boise, Twin Falls, and Pocatello. Land for the parks would be transferred from the BLM to

the State of Idaho. Each park would include a beginner track to teach safe, responsible riding techniques as well as advanced riding techniques. Funding for this proposal would come from Off-Highway Vehicle Fund monies as developed for this proposal.

- The Secretary of the Interior could close any trail for purposes of resource protection or public safety. In the event closure occurred, the Secretary would take steps to mitigate the loss of user miles and capacity.
- Approximately 10,000 acres in the Spring Gulch, Dry Hollow area north of the Herd Creek road would not be included as wilderness.
- The proposed wilderness boundary on the east side of the private lands on the East Fork Road would be moved to the ridgeline on the east side of the East Fork of the Salmon River.
- The proposed creation of the Hemingway Wilderness Area in Blaine County, including a description of areas included in the wilderness and areas not included in the wilderness.
- That there would not be “buffer zones” or a “protective perimeter” created around the wilderness so that uses allowed outside the wilderness could continue even though those uses could be seen or heard within the wilderness.

On September 1, 2004 three town hall meetings took place to allow citizen input on the CIEDRA framework released in June. These meetings took place in Ketchum, Stanley, and Challis, Idaho. These three towns would be directly impacted by CIEDRA and Simpson wanted to obtain public input and to gauge public sentiment to the

proposal. Slater reported on attendance and participation at the three meetings. At the Ketchum town hall meeting there were 33 speakers, including representatives from Western Watersheds Project, the Idaho Conservation League, the NREPA (Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Act) Network, the Sawtooth Society, Magic Valley Trail Machine Association, the Boulder White Clouds Council, and the Mayor of the city of Ketchum. At the Stanley town hall meeting there 32 speakers including representatives from the Sawtooth Society, the Idaho State Snowmobile Association, the International Mountain Biking Association, the Idaho Outfitters and Guides Association, and the BlueRibbon Coalition. At the Challis town hall meeting there were 29 speakers, including representatives from the Sawtooth Society, the Idaho State Snowmobile Association, Custer County, NREPA Network, the Idaho Cattle Association, the Challis Chamber of Commerce, the Sierra Club, Backcountry Horsemen of Idaho, Thompson Creek Mine, and the Idaho Conservation League.

On October 8, 2004 Simpson introduced H.R. 5343 - Central Idaho Economic Development and Recreation Act of 2004 (CIEDRA). The 108th congressional session ended without action on the bill. Simpson reintroduced it in the 109th congressional session as H.R. 2514 on May 19, 2005. For more details on the congressional history of H.R. 5343 and H.R. 2514, see Chapter 2.

On September 26, 2005, the last of the four Combined Collaborative Meetings occurred. Slater went on what he referred to as a field tour in the Boulder-White Clouds area with Cliff Hansen ("Hansen")(local rancher and Custer County Commissioner), Gehrke, Kincannon, Cobbley, and Madron. They went up Railroad Ridge and also Pole

Creek. Part of the discussion this trip centered on ATVs and the damage that they could do to the area. The Idaho Conservation League was willing to allow more trails in Pole Creek (Kincannon). Unfortunately, under the plan as it was being discussed, the motorcyclists stood to lose riding trails. Gehrke described this meeting as “great” and it was successful in humanizing the other parties, leading to a better attitude toward the other participants, and making him feel it was easier to try and resolve the other participants’ problems as they were decent guys. He also indicated that a statement by Slater stuck with him. This statement was that Gehrke should not let one trail take 100,000 acres off the table. Kincannon, however, opined that these joint meetings just served to create opposition at the table.

On October 27, 2005, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Subcommittee on Public Lands and Forests held a hearing on CIEDRA (H.R. 3603). For more details on the congressional history of H.R. 3603, see Chapter 2.

On October 13, 2005 Blaine County held a public hearing on CIEDRA (H.R. 3603). Witnesses included Carole King (NREPA Network), George Nickas (Executive Director – Wilderness Watch), Janine Blaeloch (Director – Western Lands Project), Kaz Thea (NREPA Network), Linn Kincannon (Idaho Conservation League), Doug Scott (Campaign for America’s Wilderness), and Jon Marvel (Western Watersheds Project).

On July 24, 2006, H.R. 3603 passed the House and was sent to the Senate. On September 27, 2006, the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources held a hearing on CIEDRA. Based upon conversations with senatorial staff after the September 27th hearing, modifications were made to H.R. 3603 and Simpson reintroduced CIEDRA

as H.R. 6409 on December 18, 2006. It died at the end of the 109th congressional session. For more details on the congressional history of H.R. 3603, see Chapter 2.

On January 4, 2007, Simpson reintroduced CIEDRA as H.R. 222. This bill was the same as H.R. 6409 that had been introduced three weeks earlier. For more details on the congressional history of H.R. 222, see Chapter 2.

On April 30, 2010 Idaho Senators Crapo and Risch introduced CIEDRA as S. 3294 and it was referred to the Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands and Forests. On May 4, 2010 Simpson introduced CIEDRA as H.R. 5205. It was referred to the Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests, and Public Lands on May 6, 2010. For more details on the congressional history of S. 3294 and H.R. 5205, see Chapter 2.

On January 5, 2011 Simpson introduced CIEDRA as H.R. 163, which was subsequently referred to the Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests and Public Lands. On January 3, 2013 Simpson introduced H.R. 145, the latest introduction of CIEDRA. It was referred to the Subcommittee on Public Lands and Environmental Protection on January 31, 2013. There has been no movement on the bill since referral. In the event that the current push to create a monument for the Boulder-White Clouds fails, Simpson intends to continue his efforts to pass CIEDRA (Slater).

Interviews With Those Attending Combined Collaborative Meetings

Of the eleven individuals who attended one or more of the Combined Collaborative Meetings in February 2001, June 2001, July 2002, and September 2005, interviews were conducted with Chad Cobbley (attended the July 2002 and September 2005 meetings), Clark Collins (attended the February 2001, June 2001, and July 2002

meetings), Craig Gehrke (attended the February 2001 and June 2001 meetings), Linn Kincannon (attended all four meetings), Bart Koehler (attended the June 2001 and July 2002 meetings), and Sandra Mitchell (attended the February 2001 and June 2001 meetings).

Chad Cobbley (Interviewed on June 16, 2014)

Chad Cobbley ("Cobbley") was a member of the Treasure Valley Trail Machine Association. Treasure Valley Trail Machine Association is one of a number of local clubs affiliated with the Idaho Trail Machine Association ("ITMA"). Cobbley was involved with CIEDRA from the beginning and volunteered to stay current on CIEDRA and to disseminate information to ITMA and the local clubs. Initially, he provided maps to Slater and Sayer. In the beginning he was in favor of CIEDRA as a concept of resolving the issues completely. To him, it made sense to put the mountain tops in wilderness, leave the trails alone, and memorialize existing uses by legislation. After seeing the legislation and participating in combined and separate meetings, his view changed. He now opposed CIEDRA and felt that Slater was simply telling people what they wanted to hear. He felt that CIEDRA contained many provisions that did not need to be there, including the land exchanges/transfers. He indicated that the core function of the legislation was not land and use protection, but was instead pork barrel legislation. He participated in the July 2002 and the September 2005 Combined Collaborative Meetings.

He described the July 2002 meeting as one where they went around the table and introduced themselves. Cobbley was disappointed in the interaction between the

groups when discussing why the different groups wanted what they did. The wilderness proponents simply repeated their reasoning as “because.” Cobbley is an engineer and as such, nebulous concepts without data were insufficient. He had the distinct impression that what the wilderness proponents wanted was to lock down the area completely. It appeared to him that some wilderness proponents didn’t want anyone there. Keeping people off the land was like a religion to them.

The September 2005 Combined Collaborative Meeting was the field tour. Cobbley described it as “joy riding” around and was a complete waste of time. He attempted to build some comradery with the wilderness proponents but does not feel that they left with any appreciation for him and his views.

Cobbley remembered possibly three meetings in Simpson’s office with wilderness proponents but does not remember who was there or what took place. Most of the meetings he had were with motorized recreationists and Slater. Cobbley kept making suggestions and finally realized that the process had stopped.

Cobbley indicated that there was no collaboration, but instead group meetings simply devolved into a simple “you can do this or that, but you can’t do both.”

Cobbley defined collaboration as a process lead by data on real issues. It revolved around the greatest good for the greatest number of people. All stakeholders needed to be involved in the process. Depending on the circumstances, meetings didn’t necessarily need to be face-to-face although some should be face-to-face. He thought that he had meaningful participation in collaboration and he filled out questionnaire Form MP-1.

Clark Collins (Interviewed February 24, 2014)

Clark Collins (“Collins”) was the founder of the BlueRibbon Coalition (the “BRC”) and was its executive director from 1988 until 2003 when he retired. He is also a member of the Pocatello Trail Machine Association and the Pocatello Pathfinders Snowmobile Club. The BRC is comprised of motorized recreation interests, mountain biking interests, and equestrian interests.

As soon as Simpson announced his desire to create CIEDRA, BRC got involved. In general, there was little support in the groups as some access currently available would be lost. Collins was interested in a new designation, entitled “backcountry”, to protect existing uses and access. This was something less than wilderness. As some of the areas were not currently accessible to motorized recreationists, he was willing to support wilderness for those areas in exchange for this new “backcountry” designation. Motorized groups and mountain biking groups were fairly limited in their access to existing trails. Snowmobilers, however, had problems with the idea they would be limited in areas they could access under the terms of CIEDRA.

Wilderness advocacy groups were not willing to allow protection for motorized use or for a “backcountry” designation. Koehler clearly indicated that the Wilderness Society had no interest in a new designation. Kincannon was not interested in any designation that was not set out in existing wilderness legislation. Furthermore, BRC’s membership strongly felt that there was no need for further wilderness because there was already enough wilderness designated. Finally, BRC’s membership was not willing to accept any wilderness designation under any terms because there was no current

threat of wilderness being designated. Collins also remembers little flexibility from the wilderness advocates.

Collins indicated that the motorized and mechanized recreationist groups opposed CIEDRA and Simpson was never able to work out the controversies. Both groups drew a line in the sand whereby they should not be asked to give up any access opportunities for more wilderness designation. Collins thought a compromise might be achievable whereby the groups would give up access to areas where they didn't already have access. He was unable to get anyone to go along with this compromise possibility. Collins also thought that if BRC could get legislated protection for the group's recreational interests, then there might be a willingness to accept more wilderness. His perception was that the wilderness advocates were not willing to accept this. He recalls little flexibility from the wilderness proponents. In fact, he felt that his group was never really heard or listened to. These in turn hardened the stances of the motorized and mechanized groups. Unfortunately for Clark, many in the BRC were unwilling to consider a compromise. His feeling was that neither BRC members nor the wilderness advocates were willing to compromise.

Collins had limited recollection of the two Combined Collaborative Meetings he attended (February 2001 and July 2002). He does remember, however, that both motorized and mechanized groups drew a "line in the sand" in that they should not be asked to give up any access opportunities for more wilderness. In any event, Collins did not believe that all of the stakeholders were involved. In his view, motorized and mechanized recreationists stopped CIEDRA.

Collins defined collaboration as different groups with different points of interest getting together and reaching some compromise that all could accept. It required multiple face-to-face meetings for as long as needed to get the job done. It needed some structure and organization. He felt that he had participated in meaningful collaboration and completed questionnaire Form MP-1.

Craig Gehrke (Interviewed on February 26, 2014)

Craig Gehrke ("Gehrke") was a Regional Director of The Wilderness Society (TWS) and was also a member of the Idaho Conservation League (ICL). In the mid-1980s he was a forest planning specialist, spokesperson, advocate and lobbyist, and the on-the-ground person in Idaho for TWS.

TWS was involved with CIEDRA from the beginning. Discussions had been going on with Simpson's staff long before the February 2001 meeting regarding wilderness designation in the area. Gehrke never took the position that CIEDRA should be "killed," instead he always encouraged Simpson to continue. He felt that continuing discussions were worthwhile and that it was also worthwhile to continue working on making CIEDRA provisions "better." He was excited that there was a wilderness proposal, but was disappointed that some areas had not been included.

One of the challenges Gehrke faced was getting Wilderness Society members on board. Gehrke recognized that CIEDRA was a "Republican" bill and almost automatically, members' guards went up. Another challenge was the position of the left wing of environmental groups. They did not see anything good that could come from CIEDRA and pressed Gehrke for the reasons behind his support. Carole King was

hammering environmental groups that were working with Simpson. Finally, the Democratic-controlled House was wary of anything coming from Republicans. Consequently, Democratic staff members were not amenable to consider the issue or schedule hearings. Carole King was a big fund raiser for Democrats and consequently has some level of influence there.

Gehrke attempted to put positive spin on the wilderness topic in Idaho, always focusing on the good parts. He really wanted to break the logjam of not having any new wilderness legislation. He had lots of meetings with Slater. He termed the CIEDRA process a “Henry Kissinger diplomacy” and not collaboration. Slater was the go-between the parties and Slater and Sayer would meet with the individual groups. Unfortunately, when the various groups did meet together, discussion of the actual topic generally did not take place.

Gehrke indicated that this type of “Henry Kissinger diplomacy” will not work today and that instead what is needed is the type of efforts as what happened in the Owyhee Initiative efforts where the stakeholders met in group meetings until something was worked out.

Gehrke believed there was too much Forest Service land going to Custer County. Furthermore, he did not want language that would completely protect adjoining lands from ever becoming wilderness in the future.

Gehrke believed the field trip in September of 2005 was very helpful. Everyone got along well and thus it was easier to do things. The trip humanized the participants

resulting in a better attitude toward others. This made it easier to solve these guys' problem since they were decent guys.

Gehrke's level of support increased as time went on. He is not sure whether the proposed legislation got better or if his standards dropped. He remembers Slater telling him "don't let one trail take 100,000 acres off the table."

Gehrke defined collaboration as bringing one's goals to the group, understanding others' positions, and working together to solve someone else's problem. This required a shared vision. You needed to make sure you had a "good enough" group. This meant making sure that those who have the power to stop you were in the group. If they didn't have the power to stop you, then they were not needed. There needed to be a sufficient number of meetings in order to keep things moving forward, and to ultimately reach a resolution and implementation of the resolution. Collaboration needed some structure. It could be loose, but needed to be there. He likened it to "adult supervision." Everyone needed to be able to speak and be heard.

Gehrke believed that he participated in meaningful collaboration and completed questionnaire form MP-1.

Linn Kincannon (Interviewed on March 10, 2014)

Linn Kincannon ("Kincannon") was the Central Idaho Director of the Idaho Conservation League. In the beginning of the CIEDRA process, she told Simpson that the Idaho Conservation League was interested in wilderness for the area. Simpson was concerned for problems of other stakeholders (e.g., lawsuits against ranchers) and consequently he put lots of things into his bill that the Idaho Conservation League was

not happy about but could live with. Simpson would tell her “Don’t let perfect be the enemy of the good.” In meetings with Kincannon, Slater, and Simpson, Simpson would say “here’s what I’m thinking about” to get the discussion going.

Kincannon did not think that regular collaboration would work because the motorized users did not want more wilderness and their leadership was unwilling to make any type of deal. She characterized the major problem with working with the motorized users was that there was no pressure or outside threat on motorized users (e.g., a monument designation not ever being spoken of). Without a threat of negative action, the motorized groups saw no reason to consider compromise.

Further, The Idaho Conservation League was not willing to put new language into CIEDRA that did not follow the Wilderness Act of 1964 (16 U.S. C. §§ 1131-1136) (and thus no willingness for “backcountry designation”), was not willing to have a bill without “substantial” wilderness designated, and was not willing to allow “substantial” land transfers to Custer County. It was willing, however, to look at all other things and to make tradeoffs.

Differences between the wilderness proponents’ level of support for CIEDRA came down to whether or not the group was a “purist” or an ideologue. Purists and ideologues were those who would only consider pure wilderness bills (nothing else included) with no give and take. The other group, consisting of groups like the Idaho Conservation League and The Wilderness Society, made a conscious decision to be pragmatic and were willing to compromise to get some wilderness now and would work for more later. For the latter group, it was more important to get something good

rather than get nothing. These groups recognized that attitudes about wilderness were changing and they made a conscious decision to follow Simpson's quip and get what they could and not allow "perfect to be the enemy of the good."

Simpson used shuttle diplomacy, which Kincannon considered to be a form of collaboration. The stakeholders told Simpson (or Slater or Sayer as the case might be) what they needed or wanted. Slater would come back with what Simpson would or could do. In Kincannon's view, the collaboration was essentially done when CIEDRA was introduced as a bill. After introduction, there was just negotiation around the fringes.

Kincannon defined collaboration as having most of the stakeholders sitting around a table working on problems, recognizing that there would be opposing views. She indicated that some of the parties were intractable without an outside threat to move them. She characterized Simpson as a "trusted person" in the process.

Kincannon believed that she had participated in meaningful collaboration and completed questionnaire form MP-1.

Bart Koehler (Interviewed March 21, 2014)

Bart Koehler ("Koehler") was the Director of Wilderness Support at The Wilderness Society. Koehler had worked with Kincannon previously and considered himself the most pragmatic of the group of stakeholders. He helped Slater with the initial draft of CIEDRA and the area boundaries. Simpson was very definite in wanting a balanced bill and was interested in the land use success in Clark County, Nevada that Koehler had worked on.

Koehler noticed early on the problem of groups being entrenched in their positions. His perception was that the motorized recreationists and then the mountain biking groups would not sit down on anything. Mountain bikers were completely unwilling to change early on. Part of the problem from Koehler's point of view was that motorized recreationists and mountain bikers were continually moving further into areas where they had not been previously and did not want to move out.

Because Koehler was not from Idaho, he tended to participated in the public meetings/hearings but otherwise tried to stay behind the scenes.

Koehler knew Slater from working on previous land use issues. In early 2001, Koehler was talking with Slater about the Boulder-White Clouds area. Koehler knew about Simpson's appreciation and desire for protection for the area. Simpson hiked in the area and had his staff hike and camp in the area.

Koehler professed clear recollection of the June 2001 meeting. Slater called the meeting and indicated that he wanted everyone to meet each other and to see if they could work together. Koehler knew who the participants would be but had not actually met any of them. All tried to be on their best behavior, and were successful for the most part but did slip occasionally. Koehler in particular wanted to work something out with motorized guys (Collins and Mitchell). The Wilderness Society was willing to talk but wilderness proponents and motorized users were at odds with each other. Koehler thought the meeting was effective in that all got to say their piece. Koehler tried to talk about values. He felt the meeting did get to the point that it was okay to keep going on as shuttle diplomacy and that Slater started shuttle diplomacy.

In an effort to keep things moving, Koehler and Kincannon met with ranchers between the June 2001 and July 2002 meeting. Koehler also met individually with Slater and rancher and Custer County Commissioner Melodie Baker during this time period.

Koehler also professed to have a good recollection of the July 2002 meeting. It was held in Simpson's Boise office and Koehler remembers that the talkers were the Boise-based motorized groups (e.g., Treasure Valley Motorized Trail Machine Association). Koehler expressed surprise when one of the group members took a tactic right from the wilderness proponents' playbook. One of the motorized group members took out a picture of himself and his father in the mountains riding on a tote-gote. He explained that he went up into the Boulder-White Clouds area with his father on that tote-gote and that he wanted to have the same experience with his kids and grandkids. The discussion then transitioned into trails. In one instance, the motorized groups wanted to keep both non-technical and technical trails open. They were told by Slater that they could not keep both the East Fork and Germania trails open. Originally, they chose the East Fork trail but then changed and picked the Germania trail. Koehler was happy about that choice as it put more wilderness area in one contiguous unit. The motorized groups also agreed to close the 4th of July trail to motorized use in the summer months. Koehler was excited because they had actually agreed upon something.

Koehler indicated that while The Wilderness Society and the Idaho Conservation League were in favor of moving forward with CIEDRA, other individuals were not. He stated that Carole King's group (NREPA Network) and some former U.S. government

employees were adamantly opposed to CIEDRA. He further stated that King had teamed up with U.S. Senator Mitchell and worked to defeat CIEDRA. She had “star” power and got support from various Washington D.C. congressional members.

Additionally, Koehler believed that the motorized groups got to Idaho U.S. Senator Risch. After the senate hearing, Koehler and senate committee staff members were very surprised. He could not ever remember a situation where both senators from a state had an agreement and then have one break the promise. The democrats had approval to get CIEDRA on the senate floor the next day but Risch walked away from CIEDRA and that ended it.

Koehler defined collaboration as working with a variety of interests in a respectful way. All would listen and understand the history, values, and stories told by the participants. All or a substantial number of the stakeholders were needed. There needed to be enough meetings to get the job done. Face-to-face meetings were required, but not all the meetings needed to be face-to-face.

While Koehler characterized the collaboration as “initial meetings and then Henry Kissinger shuttle diplomacy,” he did indicate that he thought he participated in meaningful collaboration and he completed questionnaire form MP-1.

Sandra Mitchell (Interviewed March 3, 2014)

Sandra Mitchell (“Mitchell”) was the Public Lands Director for the Idaho State Snowmobile Association (“ISSA”) and after the Idaho Recreation Council (“IRC”) was created in 2004, she became the IRC Executive Director. While the ISSA is made up of snowmobile groups, the IRC is a statewide leadership organization representing ATV,

UTV, 4x4, backcountry, motorcycle, mountain bike, and RV groups. The policy stance of both groups was that Idaho had enough wilderness. She believed from the beginning that most Idahoans believed that there was enough wilderness and that between the SNRA (Sawtooth National Recreation Area) and the related wilderness study for adjoining areas, there was sufficient protection for the area. Neither ISSA nor IRC could see very many reasons for more wilderness and both were very concerned with public access as wilderness takes away use. The SNRA and wilderness study status for adjoining lands provided all the protection that was needed. In support of these suppositions was a poll commissioned by the IRC and conducted by the Terrance Group. This poll was used to unite opposition to CIEDRA.

Mitchell has only a very general recollection of the February 2001 meeting. She indicated that there was a very general discussion of the topic with no specifics being mentioned.

The June 2001 combined collaborative meeting was a turning point for her. She considered the collaboration process a “Christmas tree” situation. By this she meant that everyone was going to get something (e.g., there would be some wilderness and recreationists would get a “backcountry recreation” designation which was something short of wilderness). Mitchell indicated that Clark Collins of the BlueRibbon Coalition supported this idea. Mitchell, on the other hand, was not enamored with the idea.

In August of 2004, the IRC outlined a conceptual framework for CIEDRA that the IRC could accept (attached as Appendix H). This framework included the following:

- Wilderness was limited to 40,000 acres (most important)

- Negation of buffer zones restrictions on multiple use outside the wilderness
- Preservation of various existing motorized, mechanized, and equestrian access points
- Trigger language (implementation of wilderness designation contingent upon implementation of all other portions of the bill)
- Hard release of all areas in the current wilderness study boundaries not included in the new wilderness from further wilderness review, with the released areas subject to multiple-use
- User conflict would not be a basis for trail closure
- Provision negating Congressional intent to create a federal water rights reservation

Mitchell believed that the environmentalists had the ability to trump everything but Simpson tried to the best of his ability to help groups. She described a difficult part of the process as fighting good friend (Simpson) since Simpson had helped them on many issues. Today the ISSA and IRC are more locked into their position unless a compelling reason presents itself for designating more wilderness. This is based upon the feeling that wilderness is restrictive and there are many other ways to protect land short of wilderness that will allow people to use the land in a responsible manner.

Mitchell described collaboration as a long process where people sit down, look at each other, and discuss issues. The parties are each heard and each participates. It is a process that takes a long time and needs structure, but the structure can develop over time. Mitchell indicated that the collaboration process did not happen, but instead

Simpson's approach was shuttle diplomacy. Mitchell stated that the different stakeholders never did sit down and talk together. She indicated, however, that she talked to Slater a lot. She also indicated that the CIEDRA process was not like the Owyhee Initiative process. In contrast to her definition of collaboration, she stated that she believed she had participated in meaningful collaboration and she completed questionnaire form MP-1.

Mel Quale (Contacted on March 3, 2014)

Mel Quale ("Quale") was a member of the Magic Valley Trail Machine Association. He participated in the July 2002 combined collaborative meeting with Kincannon, Koehler, Collins, Madron, and Cobbley. Quale refused to participate in the interview. When initially contacted to participate in this research, he flat refused. He did indicate, however, that in his view there was no collaboration at all. Instead, participants were told what they had to do or were going to get. He further indicated that his refusal to participate in the interview was based upon the belief that environmental groups would use the research herein to their benefit in future "collaborative efforts" and that he wanted no part of it.

Interviewees Not Participating In Combined Collaborative Meetings

Interviews with those not attending the Combined Collaborative Meetings in February 2001, June 2001, July 2002, and September 2005 included Chris Cook, Robert Hayes, Rick Johnson, Val Johnson, Sarah Michael, Erik Schultz, Grant Simmonds, and an unnamed interviewee who requested anonymity.

Chris Cook (Interviewed March 12, 2014)

Chris Cook (“Cook”) was the Idaho representative of the International Mountain Biking Association, a mechanized user group. He also belonged to the BlueRibbon Coalition.

On September 23, 2002, Cook and Harley Parsons (another mountain biker) met with Slater in Boise. Cook and Parsons had previously met in meetings with representatives of The Wilderness Society and the Idaho Conservation League. Cook had a list of trails that mountain bikers wanted open, but he was willing to give up some trails and allow them to be closed. Unfortunately, he was informed by Slater that The Wilderness Society and the Idaho Conservation League were not willing to budge on the demand for closure of various trails and after a couple more meetings with Slater, it became apparent that there was not any progress being made. Soon after this Cook started opposition to CIEDRA.

On June 16, 2003 Cook met again with Slater, Sayer, and other recreation groups. Those participating in this meeting were representatives of the BlueRibbon Coalition, Idaho Trail Machine Association, Idaho Department of Parks and Recreation, Treasure Valley Trail Machine Association, Idaho State Snowmobile Association, and the SW Idaho Mountain Bikers. Slater indicated to the group that the recreationists not only had input but were “driving the train.” Slater then presented the plan which included components to address the economy, recreation, private property, and wilderness. When asked what the “greens” thought of the plan, Slater indicated that he did not know.

At some point Cook convinced REI (Recreational Equipment, Inc.) to set up a mediation session between the mountain bikers and the Idaho Conservation League. The Idaho Conservation League was not interested in participation and refused to participate. Consequently, no mediation took place.

Cook indicated that he met with Mitchell, Collins, and Brett Madron (Idaho Trail Machine Association) and that these individuals bounced ideas off each other. They did not formally work together.

During the collaborative process Cook met with representatives of The Wilderness Society and the Idaho Conservation League. The theme Cook presented in all of these meetings was that mountain bikers were low impact on the land and there was no real environmental reason to keep them off the land. The sentiment of both wilderness groups was that people just didn't want to see bikes when they were hiking. Wilderness values did not include mountain bikes as it ruined the personal experience.

Cook also met with representatives of the BlueRibbon Coalition. They discussed Collin's idea of the creation of a "back country" designation or expanding the national recreation area into the Boulder-White Clouds area. Slater later told Cook that the Idaho Conservation League's and the Wilderness Society's reaction to both of these ideas was "no way."

Cook defined collaboration as the parties sitting down together, discussing, giving and taking, with all giving up something. It needed to include all the parties, not just the ones the facilitator agreed with. The participants keep working until they are able to "get it done." Cook described the CIEDRA process as a "semi-collaboration" with

groups that agreed with Slater. He also indicated that it was a “convenient collaboration,” or working with the easy people. Regardless of his definition of collaboration, he indicated that he participated in meaningful collaboration and completed questionnaire form MP-1.

Robert Hayes (Interviewed on March 5, 2014)

Robert (“Bob”) Hayes (“Hayes”) was the Executive Director of the Sawtooth Society. He indicated that he did not participate in any collaboration. He did have, however, numerous meetings and phone calls with Simpson, Slater, and Sayer. He did not participate in any meetings with other groups. To his knowledge, the Idaho Conservation League, The Wilderness Society, and the Sawtooth Society all supported CIEDRA. The Sawtooth Society entered the discussion as a proponent of the Sawtooth National Recreation Area (“SNRA”). During the CIEDRA process he was in ongoing communication with those environmental groups opposing CIEDRA (e.g., the Sierra Club, Boulder White Clouds Council, and Carole King’s group - the NREPA Network). He thought it interesting that there was a split in support for CIEDRA between the various wilderness proponents.

Hayes defined collaboration as an attempt to reach a consensus across a broad range of legitimate stakeholders. He indicated that in collaboration there were no pre-conditions and discussions would be constructive and all would listen. Participants would attempt to reach a common ground or consensus. He indicated that the participants in collaboration may be large in number at the beginning, but that they typically self-select down to a dozen or so at the table. There must be face-to-face

meetings with structure and organization. Hayes indicated that the CIEDRA process was not a normal collaboration, but was in fact a different type of collaboration. He indicated that the Owyhee Initiative in southwest Idaho was a better model of collaboration. The Owyhee Initiative came as a result of the Owyhee County Commissioners' and Idaho U.S. Senator Crapo's efforts.

Regardless of Hayes definition and his statement that he did not participate in any collaboration, he answered that specific question in the affirmative and completed questionnaire form MP-1.

Rick Johnson (Interviewed March 19, 2014)

Rick Johnson ("R. Johnson") was the Executive Director for the Idaho Conservation League. He was a former D.C. lobbyist. The Idaho Conservation League had been involved in the Boulder-White Clouds area before Simpson got involved. It had approached Dirk Kempthorne when he was in the U.S. Senate representing Idaho. Since 1984, wilderness bills had been statewide bills to resolve wilderness issues. Johnson wanted to break out of this mold and focus on just one area, build a constituency of supporters, and move on it. Johnson considered the Boulder-White Clouds area one of the most pristine in Idaho as well as in the nation and that it deserved the designation of wilderness.

Johnson indicated that the collaboration process used by Simpson was really shuttle diplomacy. He believed that shuttle diplomacy might work for a short period of time, but would not work over long periods of time because it did not create

relationships. He did admit that at the time Simpson started the process he did not know if sitting down in the same room with all stakeholders would work.

Johnson's described his working relationship with Simpson. He indicated that when the Idaho Conservation League would advocate values, Simpson would indicate that he wanted to see what other groups thought and then there would be meetings on how to accomplish what the other groups needed. Simpson would tell Johnson what goal he needed accomplished and Johnson would go to D.C. and talk with his group and try to figure out what to do. In total, Johnson estimated he participated in at least a couple hundred emails or telephone calls and 40-50 formal meetings relating to CIEDRA, mostly in D.C. or Boise.

The Idaho Conservation League noted three different problems associated with CIEDRA. First, the federal government never treated areas in the SNRA wilderness study areas as such and allowed motorized groups to continue to ride in the area, and in fact to expand areas where they rode. The Forest Service was recommending wilderness but were not managing that way. Second, land transfers to local counties were unpopular except for the county commissioners. Finally, the ranchers needed some sort of accommodation relating to grazing allotments. Johnson indicated that eventually it was the motorized groups that were able to stop the legislation. While Simpson had reached some agreements early on, the legislative process lasted too long and the motorized groups realized that they could win if they lasted long enough. Johnson indicated that Collins (BlueRibbon Coalition) was originally adamantly opposed to more

wilderness but eventually came into Johnson's office and said that he thought Simpson's bill was "okay."

The Idaho Conservation League commissioned a questionnaire relating to CIEDRA in September of 2005 by Moore Opinion to measure voter opinion on CIEDRA. At the time of the poll, CIEDRA was favored by a margin better than two to one (59% favor, 25% oppose).

Johnson indicated that the Idaho Conservation League was willing to compromise because of the belief that as time went on it was going to be harder and harder to get any wilderness bill done. As part of that realization, Johnson was willing to look at other things with the proviso that there had to be wilderness with coherent land management. He became a believer in the CIEDRA process. Through the process, Johnson became realistic on what they could and couldn't get. His feeling was that there could and would have been more compromise on CIEDRA as it got closer to the president's desk, but Idaho U.S. Senator Risch walked away from it.

Johnson defined collaboration as a willingness to sit down with all interests and move forward. The participants would identify common values and challenges before them. Ultimately, collaboration is about people, relationships, and the end goal.

Johnson indicated that he participated in meaningful collaboration and completed questionnaire form MP-1.

Val Johnson (Interviewed March 14, 2014)

Val Johnson ("V. Johnson") was the National Director of the Back Country Horsemen of America and belonged to the Back Country Horsemen of Idaho. He did not

remember his involvement in CIEDRA. He remembers one meeting or hearing in Challis. The person he had contact with was in Simpson's Idaho Falls office (Sayer). He never met Simpson and corresponded with Slater but had no phone calls or personal meetings with Slater. Johnson was worried that CIEDRA would curtail the use of saddle and pack stock in the wilderness area. He expressed this concern to Slater and felt that he was very successful in getting Simpson to consider the issue. Johnson specifically desired language in CIEDRA that would authorize the use of saddle and pack stock in the wilderness and considered that this goal was accomplished.

Johnson defined collaboration as people sitting down in personal, face-to-face meetings and reaching a reasonable solution. It was important to have a facilitator and that there be enough meetings to accomplish the resolution.

Johnson indicated that he believed that he had participated in meaningful collaboration and completed questionnaire form MP-1.

Sarah Michael (Interviewed March 14, 2014)

Sarah Michael ("Michael") was a Blaine County commissioner. Michael considered Blaine County's issues fairly narrow and while she was willing to meet with other stakeholders, did not see the necessity of participating in group meetings with other stakeholders. She had noticed early on in the process that Custer County was going to get money/land to help with the economic situation there. She thought that there might be a possibility of obtaining federal land upon which affordable housing might be built for Blaine County residents. Consequently, she initiated a discussion with

Simpson's office about the transfer of federal lands to Blaine County for low-cost housing purposes.

On October 13, 2005 Blaine County held a public hearing on CIEDRA. This hearing dealt with two issues, general support for CIEDRA and a land transfer. The county commission wanted to allow participation in the local government process. The result of this meeting was support for CIEDRA and a request for a land transfer. Ultimately, the land transfer to Blaine County was removed from CIEDRA.

Michael felt that the Blaine County Commission was heard even though they did not get what they wanted.

Michael defined collaboration as sitting down with people who have differences of opinion in face-to-face meetings that have structure and organization until they reach an agreement that benefits all sides. She indicated that what happened with CIEDRA was shuttle diplomacy, which is a form of collaboration.

She indicated that she believed that she participated in meaningful collaboration and she completed questionnaire form MP-1.

Erik Schultz (Interviewed on March 10, 2014)

Erik Schultz ("Schultz") was a member of the Idaho Conservation League and The Wilderness Society and was an advocate for wheelchair bound individuals. He was personally involved in advocating for disabled individuals in the CIEDRA process. His thesis (completed in partial fulfillment of the Master of Arts degree in Environmental Studies from Prescott College) focused on the legislative process of CIEDRA up to 2005. He personally visited with Simpson, Slater, and Sayer in conjunction with his thesis and

as an advocate. He believes he met with Simpson and Slater together three or four times and with Simpson and Sayer once or twice.

Schultz helped Simpson draft language for disabled access and to get appropriations for the construction of a wheelchair accessible path along the Phyllis Lake trail and Murdock Creek, along with a couple of foot bridges. He felt he was very successful in the disabled access issue.

Schultz defined collaboration as a substantial number of stakeholders working toward a goal. Face-to-face meetings are not necessarily needed as long as an honest effort is being made. There is no set length for the collaboration, but instead it is whatever is needed to ensure that all stakeholders' interests are heard and addressed. The process needs a "driver" pushing people for input and information. Schultz indicated that Simpson was the driver at first but eventually figured that consensus was impossible so the process shifted to shuttle diplomacy instead of the classic roundtable meetings.

Schultz indicated that he participated in meaningful collaboration and completed questionnaire form MP-1.

Grant Simonds (Interviewed on February 21, 2014)

Grant Simonds ("Simonds") was a staff member of the Idaho Outfitters and Guides Association ("IOAG"). IOAG is committed to the conservation and enhancement of quality outdoor experiences on Idaho's lands and waters. IOAG did not take a formal position on CIEDRA. It did have conversations with local governmental officials in Stanley and Challis. Most of the outfitters who outfitted in areas affected by CIEDRDA

wanted to see it continue to be managed as it currently was. Both Simonds and individual IOAG members provided input directly to Simpson or his staff throughout the shaping of CIEDRA. Simonds had a number of informal meetings with the Idaho Conservation League and The Wilderness Society, especially relating to mapping and specific language on outfitting, trails, wildlife management, and access or lack of access.

Simonds felt that IOGA's primary areas of concern relating to CIEDRA language on outfitting, trails, wolves, and other wildlife management were included in the proposed legislation.

Simonds did not think the style of collaboration used was conducive to overall success. He also did not think CIEDRA had the gubernatorial support or support from Idaho congressional representatives.

Simonds was a member of the Owyhee Initiative work group established by the Owyhee County Commission and endorsed by Idaho U.S. Senator Mike Crapo. This group was successful largely due to dynamic leadership and facilitation that didn't have a lot of burdensome guidelines. Since Congress approved legislation in 2009 establishing wilderness in southwestern Idaho (see Appendix A), the Owyhee Initiative work group has maintained itself as an Owyhee Initiative board of directors and they meet five to six times per year. The group continues to meet to sort out the details of an agency management plan.

Simonds defined collaboration as "teamwork, group work, and cooperation of affected parties who initially sign onto the overall goal and principles of the group that initially establishes a collaborative effort. Eventually, everyone at the table needs to

feel like they got something significant out of the effort.” He was one of two individuals that felt they did not participate in meaningful collaboration and completed questionnaire Form NMP-1.

Unnamed Interviewee (Interviewed on March 10, 2014)

Interviewee was willing to provide information as to interviewee’s participation in the CIEDRA process but asked to remain anonymous. Interviewee was in the cattle business and was very much against CIEDRA.

Interviewee remembers one general meeting with the Idaho Cattle Association membership. There was also a meeting with the Custer County Commissioners that Interviewee attended. Interviewee indicated that the commissioners didn’t really like CIEDRA. Furthermore, ranchers felt they would not be able to run cattle on their allotments under CIEDRA.

Interviewee attended a couple of meetings with Slater and Sayer but does not really remember what happened. Interviewee also hiked one of the trails with an elderly lady. Interviewee remembers seeing a sign within the SNRA that indicated the area was for recreation, cattle, and mining. Later that sign was changed to say only recreation. Interviewee indicated that the problem was not with the SNRA, but was instead with wilderness and changing the rules of land use.

Interviewee talked with timber folks, Simpson’s office staff, but never spoke with wilderness proponents.

Interviewee defined collaboration as a “blood sport.” It involves sitting down and give and take with no one getting all they want. Both sides typically dig in their heels on some things and will not give in. This is what makes it the blood sport.

Interviewee indicated that there was not meaningful collaboration and completed questionnaire form NMP-1.

Summary of Interviews

The majority of the interviewees did not believe that Simpson engaged in collaboration, but rather in shuttle diplomacy. Almost without exception, each described collaboration as a process with enough face-to-face meetings, where all necessary stakeholders are present, over a long enough period of time, dealing with the objectives and values, that the participants are able to reach a resolution. According to their own stated experiences with CIEDRA, however, none of the interviewees participated in such a process.

QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

Thomson et al (2009) posited that there was a way to conceptualize and measure collaboration that they defined as “a process in which autonomous or semi-autonomous actors interact through formal and informal negotiation, jointly creating rules and structures governing their relationships and ways to act or decide on the issues that brought them together; it is a process involving shared norms and mutually beneficial interactions” (p. 25). They argued that there were five dimensions or aspects of collaboration, those being governance, administration, autonomy, mutuality, and norms. Governance deals with the ability to jointly make rules to govern how

participants will act. Administration deals with the need to move from governance to action of some sort. Autonomy addresses the tension that exists between a participant's need to act for the organizational need versus the collective need of the collaboration. Mutuality deals with the interdependencies that exist between participants. Norms relate to the ideas of trust and reciprocity. In their study they included 56 possible indicators of the five dimensions. As a result of their analysis, they identified seventeen of the 56 indicator statements that were theoretically and statistically valid measures of the five dimensions or aspects.

The questionnaires used for the interviewees in this study were based upon those seventeen indicator statements as determined by Thomson et al (2009). These statements were designed for interviewees to respond on a scale of "1" to "7" indicating their level of agreement with each individual statement. The five dimensions each had between two and four statements that correlated with that specific dimension. Some of the statements were identical to those determined by Thomson and associates. Others were changed slightly to more perfectly fit the environmental aspect of the CIEDRA process. Those changes, however, did not change the construct of the statement.

It seems prudent to lay out the acquired data in a clear and comprehensive fashion. Table 1 details the mean response of the fourteen interviewees for each of the seventeen statements. The responses to statements 7, 8, and 9 have been reverse-coded so that a higher number indicates a response that more supports collaboration in conformity with the other statements. Twelve of the questionnaires were Form MP-1, meaning that the interviewees believed they participated in meaningful collaboration.

The remaining two interviewees completed Form NMP-1, meaning that they did not believe they had participated in meaningful collaboration. The responses from both Form MP-1 and NMP-1 were analyzed both in an aggregated fashion and then separately by those completing Form MP-1 and then by those completing Form NMP-1. This is because while Form MP-1 asked about what the interviewee saw, heard, or perceived in certain scenarios, Form NMP-1 asked interviewees to anticipate what they believed they would have seen, heard, or perceived in those same circumstances. For instance, Statement 1 reads as follows from Forms MP-1 and NMP-1, respectively: “Other participating organizations/groups took your organization’s/groups opinion seriously when decisions were made about the collaboration” and “Other participating organizations/groups would take your organization’s/groups opinion seriously when decisions were made about the collaboration.” To see how the two interviewees affected the mean responses aggregated by dimension, however, the number followed by two asterisks (**) in Table 1 and Table 2 represents the mean response when not taking into consideration the responses by those two interviewees. Table 3 is not affected as interviewees whose responses are included in Table 3 all indicated that they had participated in meaningful collaboration.

TABLE 1 - The results listed below reflect the mean responses on a 7 point Likert-type scale (1= “not at all” to 7= “to a great extent” for statements 1 through 14, and 1= “strongly disagree” to 7= “strongly agree” for statements 15 through 17.

Dimension/ Aspect	Statement	Mean
Governance	1. Other participating organizations/groups took your organization’s/group’s opinions seriously when decisions were made about the collaboration.	5.15
		5.18**

Governance	2. Your organization/group brainstormed with other participating organizations/groups to develop solutions to mission-related problems facing the collaboration.	5.43 5.41**
Administration	3. You, as a representative of your organization/group in the collaboration, understood your organization's/group's roles and responsibilities as a member of the collaboration.	6.28 6.58**
Administration	4. Organization meetings accomplished what was necessary for the collaboration to function well.	4.86 5.0**
Administration	5. Participating organizations/groups (including your organization/group) agreed about the goals of the collaboration.	3.71 3.67**
Administration	6. Your organization's/group's tasks in the collaboration were well coordinated with those of other participating organizations/groups.	4.07 3.92**
Autonomy	7. The collaboration hindered your organization/group from meeting its own organizational/group mission. *This statement has been reverse-coded so that the higher the number, the less the agreement with the statement.	6.28 6.25**
Autonomy	8. Your organization's/group's independence was affected by having to work with other participating organizations/groups on activities related to the collaboration. *This statement has been reverse-coded so that the higher the number, the less the agreement with the statement.	5.93 5.83**
Autonomy	9. You, as a representative of your organization/group, felt pulled between trying to meet both your organization's/group's expectations and the collaboration's expectations. *This statement has been reverse-coded so that the higher the number, the less the agreement with the statement.	4.21 4.25**
Mutuality	10. Participating organizations/groups (including your organization/group) combined and used each other's resources so all participating organizations/groups benefited from collaborating.	3.57 3.17**
Mutuality	11. Your organization/group shared information with other participating organizations/groups that strengthened their	4.5

	operations and programs	4.25**
Mutuality	12. You feel what your organization/group brought to the collaboration was appreciated and respected by participating organizations/groups.	4.93 4.75**
Mutuality	13. Your organization/group achieved its own goals better by working with other participating organizations/groups than by working alone.	5.86 5.83**
Mutuality	14. Participating organizations (including your organization) worked through differences to arrive at win-win solutions.	3.43 3.17**
Norms	15. The people who represented participating organizations/groups in the collaboration were trustworthy.	5.07 4.83**
Norms	16. Your organization/group could count on each participating organization/group to meet its obligations to the collaboration.	4.57 4.58**
Norms	17. Your organization/group felt it worthwhile to stay and work with participating organizations/groups rather than leave the collaboration.	6.21 5.25**
Aggregated	Mean for all five dimensions	5.05 4.82**

As can be seen, in most instances the mean responses were fairly consistent when contrasting the mean responses from Form MP-1 and Form NMP-1. The largest difference occurred in statement 17 where the addition of the responses by the two interviewees who did not feel they had participated in meaningful collaboration actually increased the mean to the statement “Your organization/group felt it worthwhile to stay and work with participating organizations/groups rather than leave the collaboration” from 5.25 to 6.21 (.96).

When the responses to the statements are aggregated separately across all five dimensions of collaboration, we see that the lowest mean response is 4.46 (Mutuality) and the highest mean response is 5.48 (Autonomy) for all fourteen interviewees. When only using the responses from the twelve interviewees who felt they had participated in meaningful collaboration, the highest mean response is 4.23 (Mutuality) and 5.44 (Autonomy). The largest difference is in “Norms” where addition of the responses from the two interviewees decreased the mean from 5.29 to 4.88, a decrease of .41.

Otherwise the mean responses are fairly consistent when comparing Form MP-1 and Form NMP-1. This is set out in Table 2.

Table 2 - The results listed below reflect the aggregated mean responses on a 7 point Likert-type scale (1=“not at all” to 7=“to a great extent” for statements 1 through 14, and 1=“strongly disagree” to 7=“strongly agree” for statements 15 through 17 for each of the five aspects of collaboration for all interviewees. The mean is calculated by taking the sum of all responses for the statements in that particular dimension and dividing it by the number of statements that correspond with that particular dimension. For example, the dimension of governance has two questions that have been aggregated, while mutuality has five.

Aspect	Statement	Mean (Aggregated Within Each Dimension)
Governance	1. Other participating organizations/groups took your organization's/group's opinions seriously when decisions were made about the collaboration.	5.29
	2. Your organization/group brainstormed with other participating organizations/groups to develop solutions to mission-related problems facing the collaboration.	5.3**
Administration	3. You, as a representative of your organization/group in the collaboration, understood your organization's/group's roles and responsibilities as a member of the collaboration.	4.73 4.79**

	<p>4. Organization meetings accomplished what was necessary for the collaboration to function well.</p> <p>5. Participating organizations/groups (including your organization/group) agreed about the goals of the collaboration.</p> <p>6. Your organization's/group's tasks in the collaboration were well coordinated with those of other participating organizations/groups.</p>	
Autonomy	<p>7. The collaboration hindered your organization/group from meeting its own organizational/group mission. *This statement has been reverse-coded so that the higher the number, the less the agreement with the statement.</p> <p>8. Your organization's/group's independence was affected by having to work with other participating organizations/groups on activities related to the collaboration. *This statement has been reverse-coded so that the higher the number, the less the agreement with the statement.</p> <p>9. You, as a representative of your organization/group, felt pulled between trying to meet both your organization's/group's expectations and the collaboration's expectations. *This statement has been reverse-coded so that the higher the number, the less the agreement with the statement.</p>	<p>5.48</p> <p>5.44**</p>
Mutuality	<p>10. Participating organizations/groups (including your organization/group) combined and used each other's resources so all participating organizations/groups benefited from collaborating.</p> <p>11. Your organization/group shared information with other participating organizations/groups that strengthened their operations and programs.</p> <p>12. You feel what your organization/group brought to the collaboration was appreciated and respected by participating organizations/groups.</p> <p>13. Your organization/group achieved its own goals better by working with other participating organizations/groups than by working alone.</p> <p>14. Participating organizations (including your organization) worked through differences to arrive at</p>	<p>4.46</p> <p>4.23**</p>

	win-win solutions.	
Norms	<p>15. The people who represented participating organizations/groups in the collaboration were trustworthy.</p> <p>16. Your organization/group could count on each participating organization/group to meet its obligations to the collaboration.</p> <p>17. Your organization/group felt it worthwhile to stay and work with participating organizations/groups rather than leave the collaboration.</p>	<p>5.29</p> <p>4.88**</p>

As most of the Combined Collaborative Meetings were attended by members of motorized groups (mechanized groups are included as being part of the Idaho Recreation Council) and wilderness proponents, a comparison of the mean responses by those two groups is informative. Table 3 sets forth the mean aggregated response by aspect for motorized groups (including mechanized) and wilderness proponent groups. The individual responses for the motorized and mechanized group include those of Clark Collins (BlueRibbon Coalition), Sandra Mitchell (Idaho State Snowmobile Association and the Idaho Recreation Council), Chris Cook (International Mountain Biking Association), and Chad Cobbley (Treasure Valley Trail Machine Association). The individual responses for the wilderness proponent group include those of Craig Gehrke (The Wilderness Society), Robert Hayes (The Sawtooth Society), Linn Kincannon (the Idaho Conservation League), Rick Johnson (the Idaho Conservation League), and Bart Koehler (The Wilderness Society).

Table 3 - The results listed below reflect the aggregated mean responses on a 7 point Likert-type scale (1="not at all" to 7="to a great extent" for statements 1 through 14, and 1="strongly disagree" to 7="strongly agree" for statements 15 through 17 for each

of the five dimensions of collaboration for Motorized and Mechanized Groups and Wilderness Proponents. The mean is calculated by taking the sum of all responses for the statements in that particular dimension and dividing it by the number of statements that correspond with that particular dimension. For example, the dimension of governance has two questions that have been aggregated, while mutuality has five.

Aspect	Motorized & Mechanized Groups	Wilderness Proponents
Governance	4.57	5.7
Administration	4.31	4.95
Autonomy	5.0	4.87
Mutuality	3.05	4.44
Norms	5.17	5.27

While the differences in responses were not significantly different, however, one should note the actual mean responses. For instance, on the scale of 1 to 7, with 7 corresponding with a successful collaboration, the mean response of 3.05 for mutuality by motorized groups indicates that these groups do not see many mutually beneficial interdependencies between them and wilderness proponents. That seems borne out by the perception by motorized recreationists that wilderness proponents wanted to keep them off the land (Cobbley, Collins, Mitchell). The motorized groups also appear to be indicating that there was no joint effort to set out the rules for the collaboration. This conforms to the evidence that Simpson and his staff directed how the process would proceed with the process quickly transforming into shuttle diplomacy, regardless of how it may have started. While the responses may be overlapping when considering the standard deviation for each dimension response, none exceeds 5.7 on a scale of 1 to 7

by any group. This could indicate no group was very strong in their belief that any of the five dimensions was indicative of collaboration.

Quantitative Summary

Furthermore, a mean response of 5.05 across all interviewees (and 4.82 across those twelve who felt they had participated in meaningful collaboration) and all seventeen statements, on a scale of 1 to 7 does not indicate very strong belief in those things that are indicative of a successful collaboration. The lowest mean was 4.23 for mutuality and the highest was 5.48 for autonomy. While research since Thomson et al (2009) has not quantified what the means need to be for a successful collaboration, this study, limited as it has been, may help establish levels for which successful collaboration must exceed in order to be successful.

CHAPTER SEVEN – DISCUSSION

As outlined in the literature review, *supra*, collaboration is a process with a number of steps. While not every step is given the same importance, and in some instances steps may be skipped or minimized, scholars have identified generally the steps necessary for successful collaboration. While much was said regarding the “collaboration” efforts by Simpson and his office staff, the reality was that there was no collaboration as defined herein and described by the literature, but instead what is sometimes referred to as “shuttle diplomacy.” Furthermore, the evidence provides limited support for a lower level threshold above which mean responses are needed under Thomson and associates’ position that the five dimensions of collaboration are indicative of successful collaboration. This chapter will review the steps of collaboration and compliance or lack thereof of those steps and the applicability of Thomson’s et al (2009) five aspects of collaboration by way of the information garnered from the interviews and the questionnaires. Finally, I will address the “why” question – why didn’t Simpson and his staff use the collaboration outlined herein in their CIEDRA efforts.

STEPS OF COLLABORATION

Step 1 in the collaborative process focuses more on the actions taken by the facilitator in preparation for the collaboration. Most will be performed by the facilitator. Some of the preparation may involve stakeholders (e.g., issue definition, stakeholder list compilation, and possible objectives and alternatives). After Step 1 stakeholders are actively involved in every step. Active involvement by necessity

requires “enough” meetings with stakeholders to accomplish what needs to be accomplished. Collaboration at its best is where a core group of people get together repeatedly and work side by side to build a common understanding of complex issues and create implementable win-win solutions (Gregory et al, 2012). This core group works in unison to satisfy their own interests and the interests of all other parties (Abigail & Cahn, 2011; Domenici & Littlejohn, 2001; Thomson et al, 2009). Participants must be willing to open up to change from finding common ground, while accepting each other’s differences and bolstering certain aspects of one’s own identities (Connolly, 1999). In the ensuing discourse, there will be struggles over meanings, argumentation, and claiming and counterclaiming by the participants (Fox & Miller, 1996). But above all, there must be enough meetings where the necessary stakeholders can jointly participate. Thus, Steps 2 through 6, while not explicitly mentioning stakeholder meetings, all require such meetings.

Step 1. Identifying and clarifying the content by facilitator

Simpson, or his staff, needed to undertake a broad overview of the whole process before beginning. This broad overview consists of a quick, overarching review of the first few steps on the collaboration decision making process and typically involves initial issue or problem definition, identification of stakeholders to participate in the process, determination of the timing for the decision, identification of the initial range of objectives and alternatives, identification of the possible types of decisions that could be made, identification of possible analytical tools that might be used, and consideration of possible levels and types of consultation needed in the process.

Problem/Issue Definition

Simpson identified the problems/issues for the collaboration as protecting the ranchers from unnecessary lawsuits relating to grazing rights, to clarify public land uses by legislation, and to provide an economic boost to local counties (Simpson, 2010b; Slater). The stakeholders were apprised of the issues that Simpson was looking to resolve and he sought their input relating to those issues. Slater indicated that input was sought from the stakeholders regarding the issues, but the stakeholders did not share that view. The stakeholders felt they did not play a part in problem/issue definition. This may have resulted in the lack of stakeholders' ownership of the process (Carpenter, 1999). One individual, who declined to participate in the survey, not only indicated that there was no ownership of the process, but that there was no process at all. Another interviewee stated that his group was told what they were going to do and what they were going to receive in the process (Anonymous, personal communication March 3, 2014). Not a single interviewee indicated that they had any input in defining the issue. At best, in meetings with Kincannon and Slater, Simpson would say "here's what I'm thinking about" to get the discussion going (Kincannon).

Part of the opposition faced by Simpson stemmed from the fact that some stakeholders did not see that there was even a problem or issue that needed resolved (Collins; Kincannon; Mitchell). Some simply indicated that they were happy with how the land was being managed and that there was no need for change (Collins; Kincannon; Mitchell). Mitchell indicated that there were so many different ways to manage and protect the land short of wilderness so that people could use the area responsibly that

there was no reason for more wilderness. Kincannon and Koehler both indicated that there was no “hammer” so it was not possible to get everyone around the table to discuss any issue. In sum, the stakeholders were not given the opportunity to determine the problem or issue and some stakeholders did not even see a problem.

Stakeholders to participate

Slater initially identified four basic stakeholder groups (ranchers, motorized recreationists, local counties, and wilderness proponents) to be involved in the collaboration. He had prior knowledge of wilderness proponents from his previous work with U.S. House of Representative Walden’s (R-OR) office and public lands use legislation there. Sayer had prior knowledge of ranchers and motorized recreationist groups from her work statewide with natural resource issues. Using their personal knowledge of groups who had been involved in similar issues, Slater and Sayer decided which stakeholder groups and individuals from those groups would be involved. Using their personal knowledge of groups or individuals, they also purposefully kept some groups out (e.g., Western Watersheds Project and Carole King’s NREPA Network) that they thought would prevent resolution of the issues (Slater; Sayer). Other than this general knowledge of various groups, no stakeholder analysis was ever performed (Slater; Sayer). Thus, there was no power versus interest grid (Bryson, Cunningham, & Lokkesmoe, 2002; Eden & Ackermann, 1998), no stakeholder influence diagram (Bryson et al, 2002; Eden & Ackermann, 1988; Finn, 1996), no “Bases of Power – Directions of Interest” diagram (Bryson et al, 2002), no stakeholder map (Clemons & McBeth, 2009),

and no “Finding the Common Good and the Structure of a Winning Argument” diagram (Bryson et al, 2002).

This is not to say that Slater and Sayer did not reach out to many groups and individuals. Slater indicated that he had in excess of 200 meetings or communications of some sort with individuals or groups. Sayer indicated that she had approximately 100 such meetings or communications. However, only four stakeholder groups were included in the Combined Collaborative Meetings and not every group was represented in each of the four Combined Collaborative Meetings. Of the eleven individuals representing the four groups, Kincannon was the only individual who participated in all four of the meetings. Collins participated in three of the four meetings. Mitchell, Koehler, Gehrke, Madron, and Cobbley each participated in two of the four meetings. Baker, Bennetts, Quale, and Hansen each participated in a single meeting.

It is possible, however, that even without a stakeholder analysis, many of the necessary stakeholders under the Rule of Five (Clemons & McBeth, 2009) were chosen for participation. These would have included ranchers (the Bakers are six generation ranchers on the East Fork), wilderness proponents (the Idaho Conservation League and the Wilderness Society), Custer and Blaine County Commissioners (both Baker and Hansen were Custer County Commissioners and Michael was a Blaine County Commissioner), motorized recreationists (the BlueRibbon Coalition and the state and local Trail Machine Associations), winter motorized recreationists (the Idaho State Snow Machine Association), and non-motorized recreationists (the Idaho Mountain Biking Association who was brought in by the Trail Machine Association groups, but which did

not participate in any Combined Collaborative Meetings). While more difficult to achieve because of position, Simpson failed to include Idaho's governor and Idaho's U.S. Senators. Governor Otter and Senators Larry Craig and Jim Risch all failed to support CIEDRA at critical times in the congressional process (Gehrke; Koehler; Otter, 2010; Sayer; Schultz, 2006). As Gehrke noted, those who have the power to stop the policy need to be included in the process.

If, however, Simpson, Slater, or Sayer would have used a power versus interest grid (Bryson et al, 2002; Eden & Ackermann, 1998) they could have identified the "Players," the "Subjects," the "Context Setters," and the "Crowd." After making such a determination, they could have determined how to best move the Players and Context Setters higher in the interest and power scale.

Once the power versus interest grid was completed, a stakeholder influence diagram (Bryson et al, 2002; Eden & Ackermann, 1988; Finn, 1996) could have been created highlighting the multiple influence relationships among the stakeholders.

After the stakeholder influence diagram was completed, the central stakeholders could have been identified and a "Bases of Power – Directions of Interest" diagram (Bryson et al, 2002) created. This document would indicate the sources of power upon which shareholders can draw and the goals or interests the stakeholders seek to achieve. This would provide a visual representation of commonalities of interests across stakeholders or stakeholder subgroups that could indicate natural or possible coalitions.

Alternatively, a stakeholder map (Clemons & McBeth, 2009) could have been created to identify characteristics of the individual stakeholders to determine whether

they were internal or external stakeholders, whether they were cooperating or opposing the policy, the values and objectives that shaped stakeholders attitudes toward the issue, the salience of the issue to the stakeholders, the stakeholder's power to adopt and power to implement, who the stakeholder influenced, and who influenced the stakeholder. Under a stakeholder map or Power vs. Interest Grid it would have been more apparent that the motorized stakeholders, gubernatorial and Idaho's senatorial members were lacking in support and steps could have been taken to attempt to ameliorate that lack of support.

Any of the above analyses might have predicted and ensuing action ameliorated motorized, gubernatorial, and senatorial opposition. If not possible, then analysis needs to occur to devise strategies to either overcome or neutralize those with power to impede the process or outcome.

A subsequent step could have been the creation of a "Finding the Common Good and the Structure of a Winning Argument" diagram (Bryson et al, 2002). This would outline the interests, themes, or values that appear to have support from a significant number of stakeholders. Public opinion polls did indicate support early on, but this support dissipated over time. If persuasive arguments could have been made to show how support for a specific land use policy would further the interest of a significant number of central stakeholders, the possibility of forming a coalition necessary to adopt and implement the policy or program would increase.

Timing for Decision

One of Simpson's stated reasons for moving forward with CIEDRA was to help various stakeholder groups address issues that Simpson had identified. He saw those issues as ranchers needing help with the lawsuits they had been dealing with, wilderness proponents wanting more wilderness designation, local governments needing economic stimulus, and recreationists needing better defined uses and use locations. His use of a bill that would deal with multiple issues as contrasted to simply wilderness would be a way to get sufficient support from various groups to ensure passage.

Unfortunately, Clark, Mitchell, Kincannon, and Koehler all identified a significant impediment to collaborative success. Many groups were satisfied with how the area was being used and saw no need for a change. Without a "hammer" or threat to the motorized groups, Mitchell, Kincannon and Koehler correctly surmised that the motorized groups would not move off of their positions. Furthermore, motorized and mechanized recreationists were unwilling as a whole to consent to more wilderness when they perceived a loss in access and use by their groups rather than a win. Quattrone and Tversky (1988) suggest that loss aversion can impede bargaining and negotiation because parties may view their own concessions as losses that loom larger than any gains realized by concessions of adversaries. Individuals tend to remember their defeats more than they remember their victories (Sabatier & Weible, 2007).

Multiple streams theory posits that change occurs when the problem stream, policy stream, and political stream all converge, typically a result of a focusing event, in turn opening a policy window for change to occur (Boscarino, 2009; Kingdon, 1995;

Zahariadis, 2007). While there appeared to have been a policy stream (i.e., CIEDRA), a major portion of the stakeholders did not see a problem that necessitated change.

There was no apparent focusing event that opened a policy window. Simpson unsuccessfully attempted to use ranchers, the economy, and a need for wilderness as a focusing event. Unfortunately, the motorized groups did an excellent job of “selling” the idea that there was no need for more wilderness as evidenced by the Terrance Group poll. This, along with opposition by Senator Risch and Governor Otter, evidence a lack of the political stream. In this instance, there is arguably no convergence of the three streams as there was no problem stream and possibly no political stream either.

Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Sabatier & Weible, 2007) focuses on the interaction of advocacy coalitions, each consisting of actors from a variety of institutions who share a set of policy beliefs within a policy sub-system. Policy participants will seek allies from those who hold similar core values, which result in advocacy coalitions. Stakeholders formed different coalitions relating to CIEDRA.

Wilderness proponents were split over CIEDRA. More pragmatic groups such as the Idaho Conservation League and The Wilderness Society were willing to negotiate other issues in order to get some wilderness in CIEDRA. The “purist” groups were those who would only support “pure” wilderness bills (those bills that only dealt with wilderness and no other issue) such as Sierra Club, the Boulder White Clouds Council, and Carole King’s group - the NREPA Network. They consistently opposed CIEDRA.

The motorized groups sought allies in all outdoor recreation groups and were successful in forming a coalition in opposition to CIEDRA. This coalition was comprised of the motorized groups, including the Idaho Snow Machine Association, the Idaho Trail Machine Association and related local clubs, the BlueRibbon Coalition, and other groups that fell under the auspice of the Idaho Recreation Council. This group appears to have been successful in influencing Idaho U.S. Senator Risch, who withdrew his support for CIEDRA (Koehler; Mitchell). Furthermore, Idaho Governor Otter was also adamantly opposed to further wilderness being designated in Idaho. Politically speaking, failure of Senator Risch and Governor Otter to support land use legislation in their own state increased the difficulty of passage exponentially.

Initial range of objectives of stakeholders and possible alternatives

In this broad overview process Simpson, Slater, or Sayer would make an estimate of probable stakeholder objectives and possible alternatives. This step helps in the preparation of the “roadmap” for the process itself.

Other than Simpson’s identification of issues to be resolved through CIEDRA, there is no evidence that Simpson or his office made a determination of the initial range of stakeholder objectives and possible alternatives. Instead, Simpson determined what the objectives were and floated his ideas for alternatives either to groups or to individuals. All interviewees indicated that they informed Simpson, Slater, or Sayer what they wanted, but this information may or may not have been communicated to other stakeholders. Some groups felt that they were not listened to in any event. Thus, it appears that there was some attempt to determine stakeholders’ objectives, but this

may or may not have been done with the stakeholders all present. There did not appear to be a roadmap created, but instead some effort to get a small group together which quickly devolved into shuttle diplomacy.

Possible types of decisions

Gregory et al (2012) identify five common types of decisions that can be made in resource-management issues. They include choosing a single preferred alternative, developing a system for making decisions, making linked choices, ranking things (risks, problems, actions), and routing things to receive appropriate treatment.

There is no evidence that Simpson, Slater, or Sayer considered the possible types of decisions that could be made.

Analytical tools

There were a number of analytical tools available to assist in the CIEDRA collaborative efforts. Gregory et al (2012), Clemons and McBeth (2009), and Bardach (2009) provide a fairly comprehensive list of such analytical tools. While not all tools may be applicable for any given situation, identification in advance of possible tools allows preparation for the analysis steps in the process. These analytical tools include belief networks, Bayes nets, event trees, and fault trees; consequence tables; cost/benefit analyses; decision trees; discounting; extrapolation; Goeller Scorecard with weighted criteria; influence diagrams; means ends networks; measures of central tendency; objectives hierarchies; outcomes matrixes; and strategy tables. More information about these different analytical tools may be found in Chapter 3.

There is no evidence that Simpson, Slater, or Sayer identified possible analytical tools to be used in the collaboration process.

Consideration of levels of consultation

In this broad overview, the probable levels of consultation should also be identified. There is need for expert involvement throughout the collaboration (Gregory et al, 2012). Experts may, but do not have to be scientists. Lay individuals by virtue of training, real-world experience, and knowledge of local realities may also qualify as experts. Non-technical knowledge is not a substitute for science, but is a supplement to it (Glicken, 2000). Expertise may take the form of substantive expertise, analytical expertise, interactional expertise, predictive expertise, and implementation expertise.

There is no evidence that Simpson, Slater, or Sayer identified the probable levels of consultation needed for the collaboration.

Step 2. Defining the objectives of the stakeholders

In order to succeed in any collaboration it is necessary to determine the objectives of the stakeholders. Objectives are concise statements of what matters to the stakeholders (Gregory et al, 2012; Keeney, 1992). In contrast, values are the underlying principles used for evaluation purposes (Keeney, 1992). Domenici and Littlejohn (2001) refer to these two concepts as positions and interests, with positions referring to the “whats” and interests referring to the “whys.” It is not only necessary to understand what the stakeholders want, but also why they want it (Domenici & Littlejohn, 2001). It is also important that all the stakeholders agree on what things matter and need to be assessed in order to effectively compare alternatives (Gregory et

al, 2012). Objectives must be tested to make sure that they are understood and useful, typically by use of the consequence table (see chapter 3 for a description of the consequence table).

Steps for obtaining objectives include brainstorming, separating the means from the ends, separating the process and strategy from fundamental objectives, building a hierarchy of objectives, and testing to make sure the objectives are useful (Gregory et al, 2012, Keeney, 1992). Keeney (1992) argues that having all stakeholders participate in setting out the objectives results in a more comprehensive list and the legitimacy of the collaboration is increased.

Brainstorming allows all stakeholders to participate in a non-threatening manner to create a list of all the things that matter to the stakeholders (Abigail & Cahn, 2011; Carpenter, 1999; Clemons & McBeth, 2009; Elliott, 1999; Gregory et al, 2012). At this point in the process, it is not time to discuss objectives, but instead to find all the objectives held by the various stakeholders.

In addition to objectives, values or the “whys” need to be uncovered. Values play a more important part in alternate selection as value trade-offs must be made. But knowing the underlying values early on assists in the collaboration process as it allows stakeholders to better understand where other stakeholders are coming from in their actions relating to the collaborative efforts.

There is a lack of evidence of meetings where objectives and values were systematically uncovered and shared among stakeholders. Simpson (2012) has indicated that he visited with various groups and uncovered problems that needed

resolved. There were only four Combined Collaborative Meetings spread out over a period of approximately four and one half years and numerous individual contacts made. Even with the Combined Collaborative Meetings, participation by the same individuals in the individual meetings was sporadic. There is some evidence that objectives and values were discussed to some extent, but participants hold differing views of the effectiveness of the discussion. Cobbley reported that wilderness proponents simply said “because” when asked about reasons (the “why”) for their demands. He and Cook perceived that wilderness proponents simply wanted to keep all people off the land and this objective was akin to religion to them. Kincannon indicated that Slater would ask what the individual stakeholders needed and he would then come back with Simpson’s response. Koehler did indicate that he had opportunity to talk about values and was touched when a member of the motorized group explained that he wanted to have the same experience with his children and grandchildren that he had experienced with his own father riding a tote-gote in the Boulder-White Clouds. Cobbley indicated that he and Madron did not believe that the wilderness proponents actually listened to the motorized groups. Mitchell did set out her group’s objectives in the August 2004 conceptual framework that she provided to Slater (see Appendix H). Cook expressed his objectives to the Idaho Conservation League and The Wilderness Society and tried to get across the point that mountain bikers had a negligible impact on wilderness. Wilderness proponents simply indicated that mountain bikes were not things people wanted to see when hiking and that wilderness values did not include mountain bikes as it ruined the personal experience. Rick Johnson indicated that when

he attempted to advocate the Idaho Conservation League's values, Simpson would tell Johnson that Simpson needed to see what the other groups thought about Johnson's thoughts. Conversely, Johnson's perception was that Simpson would tell Johnson what the other stakeholders needed and Johnson would go to D.C. to see what he and his group could put together to address the other stakeholders needs. The one objective that the wilderness proponents would not change was the need for "substantial" wilderness to come from CIEDRA and all stakeholders seemed to know this. There was never any definitive amount of acreage set, but Kincannon, Gehrke, Koehler, and Rick Johnson all insisted that wilderness designation for some amount of acreage was essential in CIEDRA.

Val Johnson of the Back Country Horsemen of America was successful in making his objectives known to Simpson and getting satisfactory language in CIEDRA to protect its objective (V. Johnson, personal communication, March 14, 2014). There was no evidence that the four main stakeholder groups were privy to the discussions Val Johnson had with Simpson and his staff.

Sarah Michael (Blaine County Commissioner) approached Simpson's office directly to present the county's objective, that being a land transfer to the county for low cost housing. There is evidence that this became well known to the four main groups as most were opposed to it.

Schultz felt that his objective of handicapped access was heard by Simpson and language was inserted into CIEDRA covering this objective. There is no evidence that other groups were privy to the discussions about wheelchair access in the area.

Simonds also felt that Idaho's outfitters and guides had their objective heard and met by Simpson (G. Simonds, personal communication, February, 21, 2014). There is no evidence that the four main stakeholders were privy to the discussions Simonds had with Simpson and his staff.

Thus, it is apparent that while some objectives were discussed, it was not in an organized fashion and there is little support for the argument that all objectives were discovered and shared between all the stakeholders.

Step 3. Defining the measurements for analyzing and comparing alternatives

Performance measures are metrics used to analyze and predict the anticipated consequences and performance of an alternative when choosing between alternatives (Gregory et al, 2012). Universal performance measures include being technically feasible, economically feasible, cost effective, politically viable (including acceptability with stakeholders), legal, and ethical (Clemons & McBeth, 2009). Measures specific to the collaboration would also need to be determined. Gregory et al (2012) describe three different types of performance measures. These include natural performance measures, proxy measures, and constructed performance measures, their use being determined by the collaboration's circumstances. (See Chapter Three for additional description of these performance measures.)

It is important that all stakeholders play a part in performance measure selection (Clemons & McBeth, 2009; Dunn, 2004; Gregory et al, 2012; Keeney, 1992). In this selection process the stakeholders must honestly compile the list, rank the criteria, and

openly deal with the values that will come into play (Clemons & McBeth, 2009; Keeney, 1992).

Performance measures help clarify the meaning of objectives, define information needed, provide accurate and consistent consideration of alternatives, level the playing field for stakeholders regardless of expertise, differentiate between value trade-offs, and provide method of communication for decision rationale (Gregory et al, 2012).

There is no evidence to indicate that performance measures were ever established. No interviewee remembered any discussion about performance measures.

Step 4. Developing and analyzing alternatives

Gregory et al (2012) describe alternatives as complete solutions to an issue or problem that address stakeholders fundamental objectives that can be compared by the decision makers in the decision making process and have three main properties. First, alternatives explore creative and new ways to achieve the objectives. Second, alternatives expose and focus attention on value-based trade-offs. Third, alternatives give the decision makers actual, meaningful choices to make.

Techniques for creating alternatives include best practices search (Clemons & McBeth, 2009; Patton & Sawicki, 1986; Weimer & Vining, 1999), use of experts (Clemons & McBeth, 2009; Patton & Sawicki, 1986; Weimer & Vining, 1999), brainstorming (Abigail & Cahn, 2011; Carpenter, 1999; Clemons & McBeth, 2009; Gregory et al, 2012; McKearnan & Fairman, 1999; Patton & Sawicki, 1986; Weimer & Vining, 1999), incremental approach (Clemons & McBeth, 2009; Epley & Gilovich, 2006; Hastie & Dawes, 2010; Kahneman et al, 1999; Patton and Sawicki, 1986; Plous, 1993; Weimer &

Vining, 1999), primary research (Clemons & McBeth, 2009; Patton & Sawicki, 1986; Weimer & Vining, 1999), and generic solutions (Clemons & McBeth, 2009; Patton & Sawicki, 1986; Weimer & Vining, 1999). Further description of these alternative creation techniques may be found in Chapter 3.

Alternative development and analysis requires meetings of stakeholders. Further, as alternatives are generated, discussed, and analyzed, learning takes place allowing alternatives to be developed iteratively (Gregory et al, 2012). Alternatives that looked good in the beginning may lose their luster through the analysis process. Inferior alternatives may be dropped or modified based upon what has been learned. This process may take time as multiple rounds of this process may be necessary to create alternatives. In this process, the stakeholders should beware of psychological and behavioral traps such as sunk costs, anchoring, satisficing, stereotyping, and loss aversions (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Gregory et al, 2012; Hastie & Dawes, 2010; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 2000; Kahneman, Ritov, & Schkade, 1999; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000; Plous, 1993; Pralle, 2006) that can impede the process.

When stakeholder participation is not treated seriously, when input is sought as a pro forma measure, when stakeholder input is not treated as equally valuable as to scientific input, and when the alternative decision has already been made, stakeholders may feel discounted or alienated (Glicken, 2000).

Interviewees varied in their perception of alternative creation. These perceptions ranged from not developing alternatives with the stakeholders simply being told what they would do and get (Quale), being told that “you can do this or that but

you can't do both" (Cobbley), to shuttle diplomacy (Gehrke; R. Johnson; Kincannon; Keohler; Michael; Mitchell; Sayer; Schultz; Slater). Kincannon indicated that she felt that collaboration only lasted until CIEDRA was introduced and after that time, it became simple negotiation on the fringes. Multiple interviewees indicated that ideas were presented to them by Simpson or his staff with the expectation that they and their group would think about the proposal and get back to Simpson. No interviewee mentioned meetings where alternatives were developed and analyzed.

Thus, the evidence does not support this step. Alternatives were not developed and analyzed by the stakeholders. At worst the stakeholders were told what was going to happen and at best, proposals and responses were made by way of shuttle diplomacy.

Step 5. Selection of Alternative

After alternatives have been formulated, the selection process eliminates alternatives until one is chosen. Part of the selection process involves trade-offs. Because of the myriad of interests at play in the Boulder-White Clouds area, value trade-offs are inevitable and involve consideration of what one would give up on one objective in order to achieve another (Gregory et al, 2012). The trade-off process can be extremely difficult (Abigail & Cahn, 2011; Fox & Miller, 1996; Nie, 2003; Weber & Khademian, 2008;), yet the personal relationships created between the stakeholders can in time lead to trust, learning, and sharing in the process, all that lead to the trade-offs requisite to resolution (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; King et al, 1998; Stevens, 2006).

In order to create these personal relationships, it is necessary for the

stakeholders to work together over a period of time. This may have been the biggest obstacle facing the collaboration. The stakeholders never took the time together to develop this type of relationship. Neither Cobbley nor Collins felt that the wilderness proponents actually heard what they were saying. Mitchell was even more negative in her assessment. She indicated that even though meetings were held, the stakeholders never did sit down and really talk. Kincannon felt that once CIEDRA was introduced, the collaboration as it were was over and it was just negotiating around the fringes after that. Arguably, there was just one alternative, the one Simpson introduced as CIEDRA. The stakeholders never participated in the trade-off process as there was not one.

Step 6. Implementing, monitoring, evaluating, and reviewing decision

With CIEDRA, there was never an alternative chosen or policy adopted. Thus, Step 6 of the collaborative process is superfluous.

WHY COLLABORATION WAS NOT USED

For all the talk of collaboration, one might wonder why it was not actually utilized in the CIEDRA process. There are a number of possibilities, including doing what had been done previously, strategic thinking deficiency, the nature of coalitions, and real world considerations. Each is discussed below.

Doing what had been done previously

Prior to working for Simpson, Slater indicated that he worked for Rep. Greg Walden (R- OR) and was closely involved in the Steens Mountain Cooperative Management and Protection Act of 2000. This legislation was prompted by the real intent to designate a monument covering the area under the Antiquities Act (16 U.S.C.

§§431-433) by President Clinton. Over a period of twelve months two citizen committees followed by an ad hoc collection of legislative staff members wrestled with ideas on how to protect Steens Mountain (Marlett, 2000). These committees and staff members were not able to reach consensus. Eventually four individuals, two ranchers and two wilderness proponents, were chosen to work together with the idea that they might actually be able to finalize a deal (Kerr, 2006). Over a two-day negotiation marathon the four individuals hammered out a deal. Ultimately, with the support of Oregon's congressional delegation, Oregon's governor, and the Secretary of the Interior, the Act passed and was signed into law by President Clinton.

Slater seems to have followed somewhat the same format for CIEDRA in the beginning. The process started out with gathering input from numerous sources, some from meetings and others with individual contacts. These meetings included representatives from the four major stakeholder groups. When consensus did not occur in the first two Combined Collaborative Meetings, the number of meetings and participants was reduced and shuttle diplomacy ensued. A major difference, however, between CIEDRA and Steens Mountain was the fact that there was simply not the sheer number of joint meetings as in the Steens Mountain efforts. Further, there was no negotiation marathon between stakeholders in an attempt to reach consensus. This may be the result of the motorized group resisting so forcefully that Slater deemed it not productive to meet jointly. It may also simply be the result of the unique dynamics of the Steens Mountain activity – monument status was going to happen unless

legislative action was taken. The hammer was in place and ready to fall, whereas in CIEDRA there was no such threat.

One other way to analyze this possibility is to look at the state of collaboration as defined herein at the time. The majority of the literature on collaboration as defined herein is dated 2005 or later. It could be that the perception was that the methodology had not been adequately vetted in environmental wicked problems and its applicability and viability had not been firmly established in real practice. Collaboration is difficult, with struggles over meanings, argumentation, counterclaiming (Fox & Miller, 1996), and pushing people out of their comfort zones by selective self-sanctification whereby participants open up to change through finding common ground while accepting each other's differences and bolstering one's own identity (Connolly, 1999). Sometimes this requires the participants to rethink their own subjectivity and practice. When stakeholders are able and willing to admit that problems reflect the psychological aspects of their own culture, worldview, and attitudes as much as scientific or technical problems, the number of possible responses and resolutions increases (Ludwig et al, 2001). Through all of this, the participants must be willing to work together until the process is completed (Sabatier & Weible, 2007).

Kincannon indicated that Slater was very discouraged after the second of the Combined Collaborative Meetings (June 2001). The time between the second and the third of the meetings was thirteen months. The final Combined Collaborative Meeting took place three years and two months after the third meeting.

It may be that when the collaboration process didn't move as fast or as well as anticipated, Slater simply shifted to what was historically done (shuttle diplomacy) instead of pushing further into the difficult collaboration process itself.

Strategic thinking deficiency

Pralle (2006) enunciates clear strategies for expanding and containing issue definition, policy actors, and institutions and venues. Underlying these strategies is the assumption that whenever any participant in the process takes action to expand or contain, other participants must reevaluate and adjust their strategy as necessary to counteract the action. Failure to adequately do this results in failure to achieve the desired outcome. In a real sense, it is similar to a chess match where current and future moves are constantly considered, analyzed, and evaluated. Similarly, good strategic thinking considers, analyzes, and evaluates every participant's past, current, and anticipated future action, including one's own actions. "It is fair to say that the game of politics may be getting more complicated, thus putting a premium on good strategic thinking" (Pralle, 2006, p. 230).

In this instance, Simpson and his staff either did not anticipate the extreme opposition by motorized and mechanized groups and then the Idaho Recreation Council (Mitchell; Cook) or did not adequately recognize it, and under either view, did not adjust their strategy to counteract the opposition. Mitchell indicated that they were very successful in getting the word out about the negative aspects of CIEDRA as they perceived it. The results of the poll they commissioned showing opposition to CIEDRA

were heralded throughout the local area and the state without any apparent, successful counter from Simpson.

It does not appear that this strategic thinking exercise took place as the CIEDRA process unfurled. At most, it might be argued that Slater, through shuttle diplomacy, attempted to deal with actions or positions taken by stakeholders after the fact.

Nature of coalitions

Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Sabatier & Weible, 2007) focuses on the interaction of advocacy coalitions. Coalitions consist of actors who share a set of policy beliefs within a policy sub-system. ACF identifies three levels of belief (deep core, policy core, and secondary beliefs), which in turn affect the willingness of stakeholders to change their views of issues. Deep core beliefs cover most policy subsystems and are very difficult to change. Policy core beliefs are applications of deep core beliefs that span one entire policy subsystem and are also very difficult to change within that subsystem. Secondary beliefs deal with detailed applications of policies that do not tend to cover an entire subsystem and are less difficult to change. Advocacy coalitions result from policy participants seeking allies from those who hold similar core values, beliefs, and interests. Sabatier and Weible (2007) argue that policy change can occur under the ACF by way of negotiated agreements between coalitions that have been fighting for decades (wicked problems) by combining ACF policy-oriented learning across coalitions and alternative dispute resolution (ADR).

With the CIEDRA collaboration, there were some interesting coalitions. First, there was a split between wilderness proponents. Those that were included in the collaborative efforts were those groups that were willing to consider legislation that encompassed issues in addition to wilderness designation (i.e., The Wilderness Society, Idaho Conservation League). Those who were only willing to consider “pure” wilderness designation legislation (not willing to allow other issues to be combined in wilderness designation bill) were opposed to CIEDRA (e.g., Sierra Club, NREPA, Wilderness Watch). Gehrke, Kincannon, R. Johnson, and Hayes, all wilderness proponents, each mentioned the split between the two sides. The Wilderness Society and the Idaho Conservation League were much more pragmatic and willing to consider legislation combining issues with wilderness designation in order to get some wilderness designated now with the idea of continuing working for more wilderness in the future (Gehrke, Kincannon, Koehler).

On the motorized group side, Collins of the BlueRibbon Coalition was willing to look at CIEDRA but had trouble getting members on board. Mitchell (Idaho State Snowmobile Association) was opposed from the beginning. Later, when the Idaho Recreation Council was created and Mitchell was its Executive Director, the underlying Idaho Recreation Council member groups (ATV, UTV, back country users, 4x4, motorcycle, mountain bikers, RV) all joined in opposition to CIEDRA. Originally, mountain bikers were in favor of CIEDRA, but this changed over time (Cook). The Idaho Recreation Council was very active in advertising and sending letters opposing CIEDRA. It, along with some of the existing motorized groups like the Idaho State Snowmobile

Association and Idaho Trail Machine Association worked at the grassroots level and up to defeat CIEDRA (Mitchell; Cook). It is very difficult to “achieve policy closure in a system with multiple policy venues and highly mobilized interest groups” (Pralle, 2006, p. 217).

Simpson and his staff did not appear to take steps to influence the member groups of the Idaho Recreation Council from joining in opposition to CIEDRA. They took no steps to prevent them from becoming involved (Slater; Sayer). It also appears that they did not strategically consider the existing, possible, and probable coalitions and how they would affect the collaboration. Proper stakeholder analyses would have provided insight to this and possibly allowed Simpson to influence or prevent coalitions in opposition.

Real world considerations

It is always easy to state, at a theoretical level, what should be done in any given set of circumstances. Unfortunately, real world issues (or how the world really works) may negatively affect any collaboration. These issues include, but are not limited to, time constraints, meeting location and time, cost of collaboration, loss of control at federal congressional level, the desire to make rational choices while living in a non-rational world, and the effect of psychological heuristics and traps on human interaction.

In any collaboration, it takes time to go through the process. Time is limited and many decisions are made in a reactive mode rather than a proactive mode (Clemons & McBeth, 2009). For instance, it takes time to gather information needed to proceed

(with both the problem of having too little and too much information), and to prepare for and participate in meetings. Those involved have other things that need their attention and time. “Faced with an extremely full plate, [one] does not have the luxury of devoting all of his or her, or the organization’s, attention to a single problem . . .” (Clemons & McBeth, 2009, p. 56). For instance, Baker, a Custer County rancher and County Commissioner, simply did not have time to meet in group meetings and consequently, visited with Slater individually numerous times (Slater) after the first of the four Combined Collaborative Meetings. For Simpson, Slater, and Sayer, CIEDRA was just one act of many that needed attention.

In addition, it takes time to go through the congressional process, with its imposed deadlines and session terminations. Add in the complexity of scheduling action on various calendars in two separate congressional chambers, each with committees and subcommittees, obtaining a rule from the applicable rules committee, and the time component becomes increasingly difficult to coordinate action. The first time CIEDRA was introduced, it died shortly thereafter as the congressional session ended. CIEDRA has died similar deaths over the years since it was originally introduced. Furthermore, once CIEDRA is introduced, it is assigned to various committees and subcommittees within which it can be held up, amended, or killed at the various levels. This loss of control over the bill is something that Simpson cannot effectively change. Simpson did, however, skillfully maneuver CIEDRA through some of the vagaries of Congress, but not all and it never passed both chambers.

Any time that group meetings are scheduled, regard for those participating must be factored in. With CIEDRA, participants in the Combined Collaborative Meetings lived in Washington, D.C., Pocatello, Boise, Idaho Falls, Ketchum, Challis, and Stanley.

Coordinating schedules could be difficult. All the participants, except individuals whose full-time position was to deal with issues such as CIEDRA, had to work around their employment and other obligations. Additionally, some might have seasonal activities that would prevent or seriously impede participation (e.g., ranchers during calving season). Finding a location with far-flung participants means that some will always be traveling considerable distances. Participants' costs could include travel, lodging, and loss of income for missing work.

In every policy decision there is the desire to achieve a rational resolution. "The rational model suggests the determination, clarification, weighting, and specification of goals/objectives/values. . . . Next, all plausible, available alternative means should be listed and their likelihood of achieving the ends carefully scrutinized. All relevant consequences and reactions . . . would be listed. Then methods are to be ranked, and the most appropriate method and implementing agent(s) chosen, to achieve the most desirable outcome" (Clemons & McBeth, 2009, p.43). Unfortunately, there are significant barriers to rationality, including the human problem -- "we are not omnipotent, totally rational, or blessed with unlimited intellectual capabilities" (Clemons & McBeth, 2009, p. 53). Additionally, policy decisions are made in the political arena and the "political system is based upon value conflict, politics, self-interest, the public interest, and coalition building; it is fragmented and tied to political

culture, and as a result, the making of policy is far from rational” (Clemons & McBeth, 2009, p. 58). Finally, we must acknowledge the importance of values, the part they play in policy making and collaboration, and that choosing is about values, not rationality (Clemons & McBeth, 2009; Keeney, 1992).

In collaboration, there are various psychological heuristics and traps that can negatively affect participants. Heuristics are shortcuts based upon bounded rationality and are characterized by limited information, use of judgmental rules, and satisficing (stopping once something meets the “range”) (Hastie & Dawes, 2010). Heuristics make it easier to deal with uncertainty.

For example, in situations where stakeholders produce a quantifiable number, such as the number of acres, cattle, snowmobilers, hikers, bikers, etc., they are susceptible to the anchoring effect (Kahneman et al, 1999). Stakeholders begin with an anchor (starting reference point) and then make insufficient adjustments up or down to their anchor (Hastie & Dawes, 2010; Kahneman et al, 1999; Plous, 1993). One reason that insufficient adjustments are made is that people “satisfice,” or stop once a reasonable or plausible point is reached (Epley & Gilovich, 2006; Hastie & Dawes, 2010; Simon, 1956). One common anchor is the status quo (Hastie & Dawes, 2010; Plous, 1993). While not necessary, many times one simply begins from where he or she is, especially when determining whether a decision will be beneficial or detrimental. The status quo becomes the “zero point” for determining gains or losses. Mitchell indicated that motorized groups could consider a proposition of an additional 40,000 acres of

wilderness if additional concessions were made (see Appendix H). This number never changed.

Additionally, under Stone's (2002) analysis, all numbers, while on their face appearing to have a rational basis, are political. The mere fact that a count (of acres, hikers, board feet, trail, roads, cow-calf units, etc.) is made has political undertones. Not only are numbers strategically selected, but they are also strategically presented. "Numbers never stand by themselves in policy debates; they are clothed in words and symbols and carried in narrative stories" (Stone, 2002, p. 185). For example, in public lands use issues, how does one count the number of "sufficient" acres of wilderness or a "good" number of trails? The words "sufficient" and "good" have political and ambiguous meanings.

Another example is loss aversion, where the value of losses (outcomes below the reference or anchor point) loom larger than gains (outcomes above the reference or anchor point) (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000; Plous, 1993; Sabatier & Weible, 2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). Quattrone and Tversky (1988) suggest that loss aversion can impede bargaining and negotiation because parties may view their own concessions as losses that loom larger than any gains realized by concessions of adversaries. Individuals tend to remember their defeats more than they remember their victories (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). This can, in turn, encourage status quo bias, which is the preference for leaving things the way they are (status quo) because of the perceived disadvantages of leaving them. A possible loss from leaving the status quo is perceived to be larger than a possible gain (Plous, 1993). When motorized and mechanized groups

argued that there was enough wilderness and no more was needed (Mitchell; Collins; Cook), they were arguing for the status quo. The loss of what those groups had currently (existing access and use) might have been perceived to be larger than what they could have (access designated and protected from future changes and use codified).

A final example is stereotyping which can act as a reinforcement agent of cultural norms and similarities with stereotype-based discrimination arising when people are treated differently as a function of their group membership based upon beliefs about the group as a whole (Brewer, 2007). People derive important aspects of their identities from belonging to groups (Koval, Laham, Haslam, Bastian, & Whelan, 2012) such as wilderness proponent, ranching, and outdoor recreation groups. Group membership activates the stereotype in the perceiver's mind, making other traits and attributes associated with the stereotype highly accessible. While such stereotypes can be consciously overcome, the attitude and change in beliefs take time, attention, and effort. Consequently, many are unable to achieve it and are affected unknowingly by stereotypes throughout their lives (Devine, 1989).

In fact, automatic stereotyping is prevalent. There is evidence that "[a]utomatic evaluation of the environment is a pervasive and continuous activity that individuals do not intend to engage in and of which they are largely unaware. It appears to have real and functional consequences, creating behavioral readiness, within fractions of a second to approach positive and avoid negative objects, and, through its effect on mood, serving as a signaling system for the overall safety versus danger of one's current

environment. All of these effects tend to keep us in touch with the realities of our world in a way that bypasses the limitations of conscious self-regulation capabilities” (Bargh and Chartrand, 1999, pp. 475-476). Thus, one reacts to unconscious stereotyping in decision making activities.

Both the motorized and wilderness proponent groups had preconceived notions of the other. Wilderness proponents were surprised when motorized groups showed up for meetings in suits and ties instead of “redneck” attire (Kohler). Wilderness proponents were also pleased to find out that the motorized groups were actually “okay” after spending time on the ground with them during the fourth of the Combined Collaborative Meetings (Gehrke). Still, both groups persisted in their views that the other group was completely unwilling to sit down, negotiate, and make any concessions, while insisting that their own group was ready and willing to do so (Collins; Cook; Gehrke; Kincannon; Kohler; Mitchell).

It is apparent that psychological heuristics and traps were in play in the collaboration efforts. Awareness of these different heuristics and traps allow facilitators or participants to redirect and guide the process to ameliorate their effects, while failure to be aware can lead to collaboration failure. Neither Slater nor Sayer indicated any awareness of these heuristics and traps. There was no evidence that Simpson and staff attempted to remedy the effects of these heuristics and traps.

SUMMARY

Simpson did not use collaboration with CIEDRA as defined herein. While he may have started the process with collaboration as the goal, with the lack of strategic

thinking and planning it quickly devolved into shuttle diplomacy. There were only a total of four meetings (Combined Collaborative Meetings) over four and one half years involving those groups identified by Slater as “principals” in the process. Further, there was not consistent attendance by the principals in those four meetings. It appears that Simpson gave up too soon on the group meetings and moved to shuttle diplomacy. Collaboration cannot work when the stakeholders do not meet and work together.

This is not to say that Simpson was unsuccessful in building relationships that might come to fruition in the future. He was successful in demonstrating his resolve to work with multiple groups, including those with strong ties to the Democratic party, in order to resolve issues that affect all Idahoans and other users of the Boulder-White Clouds area. His continued attendance at the Idaho Conservation League’s *Wild Idaho* has made inroads into the wilderness proponent community. As indicated by The Wilderness Society, Simpson was seen as the “trusted” person.

However, effective collaboration for wicked problems does not resolve quickly. It requires stakeholders willing to invest in a lengthy process over many meetings (Gregory et al, 2012). As stakeholders work together, trust can be generated, and a desire to continue to work together may be created or exist (Thomson et al, 2009). Stereotypes can be recognized and attempts to overcome them can be attempted. Other psychological heuristics can be identified and brought to participants’ attention to lessen or terminate their impact.

It is true that many individual meetings and other contacts took place between Simpson and his office staff with many other groups and individuals, but these did not

establish the personal relationship between stakeholders that must exist for trust to be built up over time. Nor did these meetings and other contacts help stakeholders recognize or create mutually beneficial interdependencies. The mean response of the norm (trust and reciprocity) dimension was 5.17 and 5.27 for the motorized groups and wilderness proponents, respectively. Interestingly, it was the only dimension where both groups had a mean response over five on the seven point scale. This dimension measures the belief that others will (1) make good-faith efforts to act in accordance with commitments made, (2) be honest in negotiations, and (3) not take excessive advantage of others (Thomson et al, 2009). No interviewee mentioned actions taken by others that would run counter to these three beliefs. What was apparent, however, was the perception that there were no broken commitments (as none were made), all were honest in their unwillingness to move off their positions, and thus none was taken advantage of.

Furthermore, the mean responses on the dimension of mutuality were 3.05 and 4.44 for the motorized groups and wilderness proponents, respectively. These mean responses were the lowest mean response for both groups. Both means are substantially below the maximum of seven. The dimension of mutuality deals with mutually beneficial interdependencies between the parties. The interviews clearly established that the motorized groups and the wilderness proponents did not perceive mutually beneficial interdependencies between their two groups. Each group on the whole considered the other group to be unwilling to move off their respective positions. The literature indicates that continually meeting over time may help establish trust and

allow the stakeholders to either discover or create mutually beneficial interdependencies. Unfortunately, there were not continual meetings where all or most participated over a period of time.

It may be that Simpson and Slater simply decided to pursue shuttle diplomacy after seeing such a divide between the CIEDRA principals. One should not necessarily fault this move as at the time, the idea of collaboration as described in the literature was a newer concept and shuttle diplomacy was a tried methodology. Still, the failure to continue holding meetings with the CIEDRA principles with much shorter times in-between meetings prevented the collaboration described herein to take place.

Finally, the failure to follow the steps identified in the literature may have also contributed to the failed collaborative efforts. Should the area not be protected by a “monument” designation under the Antiquities Act, it seems prudent for Simpson and his office staff to follow the steps set forth herein.

CHAPTER EIGHT – LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Both the interview questions and the questionnaire statements required the interviewees to recall actions that took place as far back as February 2001, more than 13 years ago. Research indicates that autobiographical recall can be faulty (Schwarz, 2007). Many of the interviewees had general recollections of the events discussed, but only a handful professed clear recollections of specific events. Another limitation with this study was the number of participants, caused by the fact that only eleven individuals participated in the Combined Collaborative Meetings. Of these eleven, only six made themselves available for interview. There were a substantial number of individuals who participated to some extent in Simpson's collaborative efforts, but after 13 years, contact information has changed and many individuals simply did not respond to the invitation to participate, possibly due to their limited individual roles.

Another item worth noting is the fact that all but two of the interviewees indicated that they had participated in meaningful collaboration with CIEDRA, yet most of them defined collaboration in a way completely inconsistent with their descriptions of collaborative actions they participated in. When asked about this, most indicated that what they participated in was a form of collaboration and thus they felt comfortable with the questionnaire for those who participated in meaningful collaboration. It is possible that they may have answered in a way to self-select into the questionnaire.

This study will serve as a basis for future research in collaborative decision making in public land use issues. These types of conflicts appear to be increasing in

number and intensity. In particular, a review of the Owyhee Initiative that produced additional wilderness being designated in Idaho in 2009 is of interest as there was a time overlap with CIEDRA and the Owyhee Initiative led to a successful public land use collaboration. Furthermore, research into the effect of social psychology on collaborative efforts will provide additional insight into successful collaboration. The effect of stakeholders' worldviews will also provide insight on the collaborative process.

This study can serve as a baseline for Thomson and associates' research into what number on the seven point scale is necessary for successful collaboration. Continued research into successful collaborations using the five dimensions and seven point scale will provide better understanding of what it will take for successful collaboration.

Finally, this study will serve as a basis for future research on the collaboration process in general. Various steps in the process have been identified and further research on the individual steps may shed light on their interrelationship and necessity in any given collaborative scenario.

References

- Abigail, R. A., & Cahn, D. (2011). *Managing Conflict through Communication* (4th ed.) Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
- Antiquities Act. 16 U.S.C. §§431-433.
- Asch, S. E. (1956). Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority. *Psychological Monographs: General and Applied*, Vol. 70, No. 9, pp. 1-70.
- Bardach, E. (2009). *A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis – the Eightfold Path to More Effective Problem Solving* (3rd ed.). Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
- Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (1999). The Unbearable Automaticity of Being. *American Psychologist*, Vol. 54, No. 7, pp. 462-479.
- Baumgartner, F. R., & Jones, B. D. (1993). *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Blaine County, Idaho. Retrieved on March 25, 2014 at http://www.co.blaine.id.us/index.asp?SEC=2C86BABD-6D50-4F85-AC89-330E068D3D77&Type=B_BASIC
- BlueRibbon Coalition. Retrieved on March 25, 2014 at <http://www.sharetrails.org/about/history>
- BlueRibbon Coalition. Retrieved on January 19, 2014 at Idaho Secretary of State, [http://www.sos.idaho.gov/tiffpilot/tiffpilot.exe?FN=\\sosimg\corp\\$\%5C11022007%5CCORPAMEN07306094506.tif](http://www.sos.idaho.gov/tiffpilot/tiffpilot.exe?FN=\\sosimg\corp$\%5C11022007%5CCORPAMEN07306094506.tif)
- Bolman, L. G., & Deal, T. E. (2008). *Reframing Organizations: Artistry, Choice, and Leadership* (4th ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Bone, J. E., Griffin, C. L., & Scholz, T. M. (2008). Beyond Traditional Conceptualizations of Rhetoric: Invitational Rhetoric and a Move Toward Civility. *Western Journal of Communication*, Vol. 72, No. 4, pp. 434-462.
- Boscarino, J. E. (2009). Surfing for Problems: Advocacy Group Strategy in U.S. Forestry Policy. *The Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 415-434.
- Boulder White Clouds Council. Retrieved on January 19, 2014 at <http://wildwhiteclouds.org>
- Brahm, E., & Burgess, H. (2003). Shuttle Diplomacy. *Beyond Intractability*. The Beyond Intractability Project, The Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado. Retrieved on August 11, 2014 at <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/shuttle-diplomacy>

- Brewer, M. B. (2007). The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations: Social Categorization, Ingroup Bias, and Outgroup Prejudice. In A. Kruglanski, W. Arie W. & E. Higgins (Eds.), *Social Psychology: Handbook of basic principles* (2nd ed., pp. 695-715). New York, NY, US: Guilford Press.
- Bryson, J. M., Cunningham, G. L., & Lokkesmoe, K. J. (2002). What to do When Stakeholders Matter: The Case of Problem Formulation for the African American Men Project of Hennepin County, Minnesota. *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 62, No. 5, pp. 568-586.
- Burnstein, E., & Vinokur A. (1977). Persuasive Argumentation and Social Comparison as Determinants of Attitude Polarization. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 315-332.
- Camillus, J. C. (2008). Strategy as a wicked problem. *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. 86, pp. 99-106.
- Carpenter, S. (1999). Choosing Appropriate Consensus Building Techniques and Strategies. In L. Susskind, S. McKearnan, & J. Thomas-Larmer (Eds.), *The Consensus Building Handbook* (pp. 61-97). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Chapin, F. S., Trainor, S. F., Huntington, O., Lovcraft, A. L., Zavaleta, E., Natcher, D. C., et al (June 2008). Increasing Wildfire in Alaska's Boreal Forest: Pathways to Potential Solutions of a Wicked Problem." *BioScience*, Vol. 58, No. 6, pp. 531-540.
- Clemons, R. S., & McBeth, M. K. (2009). *Public Policy Praxis. A Case Approach for Understanding Policy and Analysis* (2nd ed.). San Francisco, CA: Pearson.
- Cobb, R. W., & Elder, C.D. (1972). *Participation in American politics: The dynamics of agenda-building*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
- Cockerill, K., Daniel, L., Malczynski, L., & Tidwell, V. (2009). A Fresh Look at a Policy Sciences Methodology: Collaborative Modeling for More Effective Policy. *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 211-225.
- Connelly, W. E. (1999). *Why I am not a secularist*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Custer County, Idaho. Retrieved on March 25, 2014 at <http://www.co.custer.id.us>
- Daniels, S. E., & Walker, G. B. (2001). *Working through Environmental Conflicts: the Collaborative Learning Approach*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Day, D. (1997). Citizen Participation in the Planning Process: An Essentially Contested Concept. *Journal of Planning Literature*, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 421-434.

- Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 56, No. 1, 5-18.
- Domenici, K., & Littlejohn, S. W. (2001). *Mediation: Empowerment in Conflict Management*, (2nd ed.). Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, Inc.
- Dryzak, J. S. (1997). *The politics of the earth: Environmental discourses*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dunn, W. N. (2004). *Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction* (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Eden, C., & Ackermann, F. (1998). *Making Strategy: The Journey of Strategic Management*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Elliot, M. L. P. (1999). The Role of Facilitators, Mediators, and Other Consensus Building Practitioners. In L. Susskind, S. McKernan, & J. Thomas-Larmer (Eds.), *The Consensus Building Handbook* (pp. 199-197). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Epley, N., & Gilovich, T. (2006). The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic – Why the Adjustments Are Insufficient. *Psychological Science*, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 311-318.
- Etzioni, A. (1996). *The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society*. New York: Basic Books.
- Find Your Spot Reports. Retrieved on March 26, 2014 at <http://www.findyourspot.com/ID/Blaine%20County>
- Finn, C. B. (1996). Utilizing Stakeholder Strategies for Positive Collaborative Outcomes. In C. Huxham (Ed.), *Creating Collaborative Advantage* (pp. 152–164). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Fisher, R., and Ury, W. (1991). *Getting to yes: Negotiation agreement without giving in* (2nd ed.). New York: Penguin Books.
- Fox, C. J., & Miller, H. T. (1996). *Postmodern Public Administration: Toward Discourse*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Freeman, S. A., Littlejohn, S. W., & Pearce, W. B. (1992). Communication and Moral Conflict. *Western Journal of Communication*, Vol. 56, pp. 311-329.
- Gerlak, A. K., & Heikkila, T. (2007). Collaboration and Institutional endurance in U.S. Water Policy. *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 55-60.
- Glicken, J. (2000). Getting stakeholder participation 'right': a discussion of participatory processes and possible pitfalls. *Environmental Science and Policy*, Vol. 3, pp. 305-310.

- Gray, B. (2003). Strong Opposition: Frame-Based Resistance to Collaboration. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, Vol. 14, pp. 166-176.
- Gregory, R., Failing, L., Harstone, M., Long, G., McDaniels, T., & Ohlson, D. (2012). *Structured Decision Making: A Practical Guide to Environmental Management Choices* (1st ed.). West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Gregory, R., and Keeney, R. L. (1994). Creating Policy Alternatives Using Stakeholder Values. *Management Science*, Vol. 40, No. 8, pp. 1035-1048.
- Gunderson, L. H. (1999). Assessing for understanding in complex regional systems. In K. N. Johnson, F. J. Swanson, M. Herring, & S. Greene (Eds.), *Bioregional Assessments: Science at the Crossroads of Management and Policy*. Washington, DC: Island Press.
- Hammond, J. S., Keeney, R. L., & Raiffa, H. (1998). Even Swaps: A Rational Method for Making Trade-offs. *Harvard Business Review*, March-April 1998.
- Hastie, R., & Dawes, R. M. (2010). *Rational Choice in an Uncertain World – the Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Hogwood, B. W., & Gunn, L. A. (1984). *Policy analysis for the real world*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Howarth, R. B., & Wilson, M. A. (2006). A Theoretical Approach to Deliberative Valuation: Aggregation by Mutual Consent. *Land Economics*, Vol. 82, No. 1, pp. 1-16.
- Hurley, P. T., & Walker, P. A. (2004). Whose vision? Conspiracy theory and land use planning in Nevada County, California. *Environment and Planning*, Vol. 36, pp. 1579-1547.
- Idaho Cattle Association. Retrieved on March 4, 2014 at <http://www.idahocattle.org/about.aspx>
- Idaho Conservation League. Retrieved on March 4, 2014 at <http://www.idahoconservation.org/about/mission-and-vision#sthash.E3hyOlKH.dpuf>
- Idaho Conservation League. Retrieved on March 5, 2014 at Idaho Secretary of State's Office at [http://www.sos.idaho.gov/tiffpilot/tiffpilot.exe?FN=\\sosimg\corp\\$\%5C04041999%5CCORPARTICLE%2350515.tif](http://www.sos.idaho.gov/tiffpilot/tiffpilot.exe?FN=\\sosimg\corp$\%5C04041999%5CCORPARTICLE%2350515.tif)
- Idaho Public Television. Retrieved on July 2, 2014 at <http://idahoptv.org/outdoors/whiteclouds/ranching.cfm>

- Idaho Recreation Council. Retrieved from Idaho Secretary of State website on May 5, 2014 at [http://www.sos.idaho.gov/tiffpilot/tiffpilot.exe?FN=\\sosimg\corp\\$\%5C02182004%5CUNINC%23OR0449094843.tif](http://www.sos.idaho.gov/tiffpilot/tiffpilot.exe?FN=\\sosimg\corp$\%5C02182004%5CUNINC%23OR0449094843.tif)
- Idaho State Snowmobile Association. Retrieved on March 25, 2014 at <http://www.idahosnow.org>
- Idaho State Snowmobile Association. Retrieved from Idaho Secretary of State website on March 25, 2014 at ([http://www.sos.idaho.gov/tiffpilot/tiffpilot.exe?FN=\\sosimg\corp\\$\%5C04041999%5CCORPARTICLE%2334794.tif](http://www.sos.idaho.gov/tiffpilot/tiffpilot.exe?FN=\\sosimg\corp$\%5C04041999%5CCORPARTICLE%2334794.tif))
- Idaho Trail Machine Association. Retrieved from Idaho Secretary of State website on March 25, 2014 at ([http://www.sos.idaho.gov/tiffpilot/tiffpilot.exe?FN=\\sosimg\corp\\$\%5C07292008%5CCORPARTI08211092950.tif](http://www.sos.idaho.gov/tiffpilot/tiffpilot.exe?FN=\\sosimg\corp$\%5C07292008%5CCORPARTI08211092950.tif))
- Irvin, R., & Stansbury, J. (2004). Citizen Participation in Decision Making: Is It Worth the Effort? *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 64, No. 1, pp. 55-65.
- Islam, S., & Susskind, L. (2012). *Water Diplomacy: A Negotiated Approach to Managing Complex Water Networks*. New York: The RFF Press Water Policy Series, Routledge.
- Kahneman, D., Ritov, I., & Schkade, D. (1999). Economic Preferences or Attitude Expressions – An Analysis of Dollar Responses to Public Issues. *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 19:1-3, pp. 203-235.
- Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (2000). Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias. In D. Kahneman, & A. Tversky (Eds.), *Choices, Values, and Frames* (pp. 159-170). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (2000). Conflict Resolution A Cognitive Perspective. In D. Kahneman, & A. Tversky (Eds.), *Choices, Values, and Frames* (pp. 473-487). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Keast, R., Mandell, M. P., Brown, K., & Woolcock, G. (2004). Network Structures: Working Differently and Changing Expectations. *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 64, No. 3, pp. 363-371.
- Keeney, R. L. (1992). *Value-Focused Thinking A Path to Creative Decisionmaking*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Keeney, R. L. (2002). Common Mistakes in Making Value Trade-offs. *Operations Research*, Vol. 50, No. 6, pp. 935-945.
- Keeney, R. L., & Gregory, R. (2005). Selecting attributes to measure the achievement of objectives. *Operations Research*, Vol. 53, pp. 1-11.

- Keeney, R. L., & Raiffa, H. (1976). *Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Trade-offs*. Cambridge University Press, UK.
- Kerr, Andy. (2006). The Steens Mountain Cooperative Management and Protection Act of 2000 (Oregon). A Western Governors' Association White Paper.
- Killingsworth, M.J., & Palmer, J. S. (1995). The discourse of environmentalist hysteria. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, Vol. 81, 1-19.
- King, C. S., Feltey, K. M., & Susel, B. O. (1998). The Question of Participation: Toward Authentic Public Participation in Public Administration. *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 58, No. 4, pp. 317-326.
- Kingdon, J. (1984/1995). *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (2nd ed.). New York: HarperCollins College Publishers.
- Koval, P., Laham, S. M., Haslam, N., Bastian, B., & Whelan, J. A. (2012). Our Flaws Are More Human Than Yours: Ingroup Bias in Humanizing Negative Characteristics. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, Vol. 38, No. 3, 283-295.
- Leach, W. D. (2006). Collaborative Public Management and Democracy: Evidence from Western Watershed Partnerships. *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 66, pp. 100-110.
- Leach, W. D., & Sabatier, P. A. (2005). To Trust an Adversary: Integrating Rational and Psychological Models of Collaborative Policymaking. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 99, No. 4, pp. 491-503.
- Littlejohn, S. W. (2004). The Transcendent Communication Project: Searching for a Praxis of Dialogue. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 337-359.
- Livesey, S. M., Hartman, C. L., Stafford, E. R., & Shearer, M. (2009). Performing Sustainable Development through Eco-Collaboration. *Journal of Business Communication*, Vol. 46, No. 4, 423-454.
- Ludwig, D., Mangel, M., & Haddad, B. (2001). Ecology, Conservation, and Public Policy. *Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics*, Vol. 32, pp. 481-517.
- Marlett, B. (2000). Clinton signs Steens Protection Act! Nation's first cow-free desert wilderness among gains in bill. *Desert Ramblings*, (Fall 2000). Retrieved on June 15, 2014 at <http://onda.org/publications/newsletter/archived-newsletters-pre-2009/Fall%2000.pdf>
- McBeth, M. K., & Shanahan, E. (2004). Public opinion for sale: The role of policy marketers in Greater Yellowstone policy conflict. *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 37, pp. 319-338.

- McBeth, M. K., Shanahan, E. A., Hathaway, P. L., Tigert, L. E., & Sampson, L. J. (2010). Buffalo tales: interest group policy stories in Greater Yellowstone. *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 43, pp. 391-409.
- McKernan, S., & Fairman, D. (1999). Producing Consensus. In L. Susskind, S. McKernan, & J. Thomas-Larmer (Eds.), *The Consensus Building Handbook* (pp. 325-373). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Moore, C. M., Lengo, G., & Palmer, P. (1999). "Visioning." In Susskind, Larry, McKernan, Sarah, and Thomas-Larmer, Jennifer (Eds.), *The Consensus Building Handbook* (pp. 557-590). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Moore, M. P. (2003). Making Sense of Salmon: Synecdoche and Irony in a Natural Resource Crisis. *Western Journal of Communications*, Vol. 67 No. 1, pp. 74-96.
- Nie, M. A. (2003). Drivers of natural resource-based political conduct. *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 36, No. 3/4, pp. 307-341.
- Nutt, P. C. (2004). Expanding the Search for Alternatives during Strategic Decision-Making. *The Academy of Management Executive (1993-2005)*, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 13-28.
- Otter, C. L. June 14, 2010 letter to Senator Mike Crapo, included in Congressional Record.
- Oxley, N. L., Dzindolet, M. T., & Paulus, P. B. (1996). The effects of facilitators on the performance of brainstorming groups. *Journal of Social Behavior and Personality*, Vol. 11, pp. 633-646.
- Patton, C. V., & Sawicki, D. S. (1986). *Basic methods of policy analysis and planning*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
- Pearce, W. B., & Littlejohn, S. W. (1997). *Moral Conflict: When Social Worlds Collide*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Peeples, J. A. (2005). Aggressive Mimicry: The Rhetoric of Wise Use and the Environmental Movement. In S. L. Senecah, & S. Depoe (Eds.) *The Environmental Communication Yearbook*: Vol. 2 (pp. 1-17). New York: Routledge.
- Plous, S. (1993). *The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making*. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.
- Poncelet, E. C. (2001). Personal Transformation in Multistakeholder Environmental Partnerships. *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 34, No. 3/4, pp. 273-301.
- Pralle, S. B. (2006). *Branching Out Digging In - Environmental Advocacy and Agenda Setting*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

- Quattrone, G. A., and Tversky, A. (1988). Contrasting rational and psychological analyses of political choice. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 82, pp. 719-736.
- Raiffa, H. (1968). *Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choices Under Uncertainty*. Addison-Wesley, Reading.
- Renn, O. (2006). Participatory processes for designing environmental policies. *Land Use Policy*, Vol. 23, pp. 34-43.
- Rittel, H., & Webber, M. (1973). Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning. *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 155-169.
- Roberts, N. (2000). Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution. *International Public Management Review*, Vol. 1, pp. 1-19.
- Rocheftort, D. A., & Cobb, R. W. (1993). Problem Definition, Agenda Access, and Policy Choice. *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 56-71.
- Rutherford, M. B., Gibeau, M. L., Clark, S. G., & Chamberlain, E. C. (2009). Interdisciplinary Problem Solving Workshops for Grizzly Bear Conservation in Banff National Park, Canada. *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 163-187.
- Sabatier, P. A., & Jenkins-Smith, H. (1988). An Advocacy Coalition Model of Policy Change and the Role of Policy Oriented Learning Therein. *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 21, pp. 129-168.
- Sabatier, P. A., & Jenkins-Smith, H. (1993). *Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Sabatier, P. A., & Jenkins-Smith, H. (1999). The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment. In P. Sabatier (Ed.), *Theories of the Policy Process*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Sabatier, P. A., & Weible, C. M. (2007). The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Innovations and Clarifications. In P. Sabatier (Ed.), *Theories of the Policy Process* (2nd ed., pp.189-220). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Sachs, S., Ruhli, E., & Meier, C. (2010). Stakeholder Governance as a Response to Wicked Issues. *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 96, pp. 57-64.
- Sawtooth Society. Retrieved on March 25, 2014 at <http://www.sawtoothsociety.org>
- Schattschneider, E. E. (1960/1975). *The Semisovereign People, A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press.

- Schittekatte, M., & Van Hiel, A. (1996). Effects of Partially Shared Information and Awareness of Unshared Information on Information Sampling. *Small Group Research*, Vol. 27 (August), pp. 431-449.
- Schmitt, R. (2011). Dealing with Wicked Issues: Open Strategizing and the Camisea Case. *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 96, pp. 11-19.
- Schmidtz, D. (2000). Natural Enemies: An anatomy of environmental conflict. *Environmental Ethics*, Vol. 22, pp. 397-408.
- Schwarz, N. (2007). Retrospective and Concurrent Self Reports: The Rationale for Real Time Data Capture. In S. Stone, S. Shiffman, A. Atienze, & L. Nebeling (Eds.), *The Science of Real Time Data Capture: Self Reports in Health Research* (pp. 11-26). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schultz, E. (2006). *A New Approach to Idaho Wilderness: History and Politics of the Boulder-White Clouds*. Unpublished Master's Thesis, Prescott College, Prescott, Arizona.
- Shindler, B. A., & Cramer, L. A. (1999). Shifting public values for forest management: Making sense of wicked problems. *Western Journal of Applied Forestry*, Vol. 14, pp. 28-34.
- Simon, H. A. (1956). Rational choice and the structure of the environment. *Psychological Review*, 19 (11), pp. 1118-1123.
- Simpson, M. (2010a). CIEDRA: An Idaho Solution to Idaho Land Management. Retrieved on March 1, 2014 at <http://simpson.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=198795>
- Simpson, M. (2010b). CIEDRA: A Comprehensive Solution. Retrieved on March 1, 2014 at <http://simpson.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=199828>
- Slovic, P. (1986). Informing and Educating the Public About Risk. *Risk Analysis*, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 403-415.
- Stasser, G., & Stewart, D. D. (1992). Discovery of Hidden Profiles by Decision-Making Groups: Solving a Problem Versus Making a Judgment. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, Vol. 63 (September), pp. 426-434.
- Stevens, S. M. (2006). Activist Rhetorics and the Struggle for Meaning: The Case of 'Sustainability' in the Reticulate Public Sphere. *Rhetoric Review*, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 297-315.
- Stone, D. (2002). *Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making Revised Edition*. New York, New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

- Sunstein, C. R. (2002). The law of group polarization. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, Vol. 10, pp. 175-193.
- The Wilderness Society. Retrieved on March 25, 2014 at <http://wilderness.org/about-us>
- Thomson, A. M., Perry, J. L., & Miller, T. K. (2009). Conceptualizing and Measuring Collaboration. *Journal of Public Administration Research*, Vol. 19, pp. 23-56.
- Thompson Creek Mining Company. Retrieved on April 10, 2014 at <http://tcreek.com>
- Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991). Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice A Reference-Dependent Model. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 106, No. 4, pp. 1039-1061.
- University of Colorado. Retrieved on March 5, 2014 at <http://cires.colorado.edu/about/noaa>
- University of Idaho Extension. Retrieved on March 25, 2014 at <http://www.extension.uidaho.edu/custer>
- U.S. Census Bureau. Retrieved on March 25, 2014 at <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/16/16013.html>
- van de Kerkhof, M. (2006). Making a Difference: On the Constraints of Consensus Building and the Relevance of Deliberation in Stakeholder Dialogues. *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 279-299.
- Yaffee, S. L. (1997). Why Environmental Policy Nightmares Recur. *Conservation Biology*, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 328-337.
- Weber, E. P., & Khademian, A. M. (2008). Wicked Problems, Knowledge Challenges, and Collaborative Capacity Builders in Network Settings. *Public Administration Review*, March-April, 2008, pp. 334-349.
- Weimer, D. L., & Vining, A. R. (1999). *Policy analysis: concepts and practice* (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
- Western Watersheds Project. 2013. Public Lands Ranching – The Ecological Costs of Public Land Ranching. Retrieved on May 8, 2013 at <http://www.westernwatersheds.org/issues/public-lands-ranching>
- Wilderness Act of 1964. 16 U.S. C. §§ 1131-1136.
- Zahariadis, N. (2007). The Multiple Streams Framework: Structure, Limitations, Prospects. In P. Sabatier (Ed.), *Theories of the Policy Process* (2nd ed., pp. 65-92). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A	Legislative History of Wilderness in Idaho
APPENDIX B	Slater and Sayer Interview Questions
APPENDIX C	Full Set of Interview Questions
APPENDIX D	Abbreviated Set of Interview Questions
APPENDIX E	Questionnaire MP-1
APPENDIX F	Questionnaire NMP-1
APPENDIX G	Simpson's CIEDRA Framework (7-19-2004)
APPENDIX H	Idaho Recreation Council Framework (8-16-2004)

APPENDIX A - Legislative Background of Wilderness in Idaho

<u>Name</u>	<u>Creating Legislation</u>	<u>Date Enacted</u>	<u>Public Law</u>	<u>Total Acres</u>	<u>Management</u>
Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness	The Wilderness Act	September 3, 1964	PL 88-577	1,089,144*	USFS
Craters of the Moon National Wilderness Area	No official title	October 23, 1970	PL 91-504	43,234	NPS
Sawtooth Wilderness	Sawtooth Wilderness and Recreation Area Act	August 22, 1972	PL 92-400	217,088	USFS
Hells Canyon Wilderness	No official title	December 31, 1975	PL 94-199	81,811**	BLM and USFS
Gospel Hump Wilderness	Endangered American Wilderness Act	February 24, 1978	PL 95-237	205,796	USFS
Frank Church – River of No Return Wilderness	Central Idaho Wilderness Act	July 23, 1980	PL 96-312	2,366,907	BLM and USFS
Big Jacks Creek Wilderness	Omnibus Public Land Management Act	March 30, 2009	PL 111-11	52,684	BLM
Bruneau-Jarbridge Rivers Wilderness	Omnibus Public Land Management Act	March 30, 2009	PL 111-11	89,777	BLM
Little Jacks Creek Wilderness	Omnibus Public Land Management Act	March 30, 2009	PL 111-11	51,491	BLM
North Fork Owyhee Wilderness	Omnibus Public Land Management Act	March 30, 2009	PL 111-11	43,413	BLM
Owyhee River Wilderness	Omnibus Public Land Management Act	March 30, 2009	PL 111-11	267,328	BLM
Pole Creek Wilderness	Omnibus Public Land Management Act	March 30, 2009	PL 111-11	12,533	BLM

* 1,089,144 acres of the Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness are in Idaho with the remaining 251,443 acres in Montana

** 81,811 acres of Hells Canyon Wilderness are in Idaho with the remaining 217,927 acres in Oregon

APPENDIX B – SLATER AND SAYER INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Interview Questions for Individuals working for or in Representative Simpson's Office.

Interview Questions (With Consent Form Language)

My name is Scott Lee. I am a doctoral student at Idaho State University. This interview and short written questionnaire are part of the research for my doctoral dissertation in Political Science. I am asking people like you who have been involved in the collaboration process with Representative Mike Simpson's office about the Central Idaho Economic and Recreation Act, commonly called CIEDRA, to help me. I am seeking to understand how various stakeholders view the Central Idaho Economic and Recreation Act process with the goal of understanding both the purpose of the CIEDRA and why its passage ultimately failed. You obviously do not have to participate in this interview and questionnaire and you can stop either at any time. You will not be penalized in any way for not participating or not finishing and any relationship you might have with ISU will not be affected in any way either. You will not have to pay anything to participate and you will not be paid anything for your participation. Being in this study will not directly help you, but may help people who participate in collaboration in the future.

The only people who will have access to the information you give me will be the people who work on the study and those legally required to supervise my study. The interview will be recorded audibly and I will take notes throughout the interview. If you have any documents that relate to what we discuss and you give me copies of them, they will be kept in a locked cabinet. At some point, all written documents relating to the interview will be scanned to create an electronic copy and all paper copies will be destroyed or returned to you. The audio file and all scanned documents will be protected in a password protected file.

Your interview and written questionnaire will be used for my dissertation and for possible further research and writing on collaboration. When I share the results of my study in my dissertation, future scholarly papers, or at conferences, I may include your name or position unless you tell me that you want to remain anonymous. There is always a chance that someone could find out that you were in this study and learn something about you that you do not want them to know. However, if you do not want

me to include your name or position, I will do my best to make sure no one outside the study will know that you are a part of the study. May I include your name or position?

If you have any questions about this study, have questions about your rights, or if you feel you have been injured in any way, please call me at (208) 390-2001. You may also call the Idaho State University Human Subjects Committee Office at (208) 282-2179 to ask questions about your rights as a research participant.

Are you willing to participate in this interview and questionnaire?

Thank you.

When I say “you,” please use it in the context of Representative Simpson’s office unless the context is clearly meant for you personally.

1. Name and contact information.
2. Tell me about your background in Mr. Simpson’s office?
3. Who in Mr. Simpson’s office has been involved with CIEDRA?
4. How long have you been involved with CIEDRA?
5. In what capacity have you been involved? What are your responsibilities with the campaign?
6. Describe the problem that CIEDRA attempts to resolve.
7. What was the impetus for it or specific event that started it?
8. Mr. Simpson has indicated he has undertaken collaborative efforts his office has taken relating to CIEDRA. Could you describe the collaborative efforts or actions your office has made or taken relating to CIEDRA?
9. How would you define collaboration or collaborative efforts?
10. Did you have a system or outline for the collaborative efforts? If yes, please describe it for me.
11. What preparation was made for the collaboration?
12. How were participants chosen? Were there any stakeholder analyses of any kind made in preparation for choosing participants? If yes, please describe them.
13. Do you have a list of those who participated? May I have access to it?

14. Were participants placed into categories relating to support or opposition? If yes, please describe the categories and who was placed into which category.
15. Please describe the issues regarding CIEDRA.
16. How were those issues framed?
17. Were issues linked together? If so, which ones?
18. Was there any attempt to expand the issues? If so, who attempted it and what was done? Was it successful?
19. Was there any attempt to contain the issues (prevent it from becoming larger)? If so, who attempted it and what was done? Was it successful?
20. What were participants asked to do in preparation for the meetings?
21. What were participants asked to do at the meetings?
22. Were there any materials prepared for or as a result of the meetings? What were they, may I have access to them?
23. How many collaborative meetings were held?
24. How many times has Mr. Simpson or members of his staff had collaborative meetings with all or a significant numbers of stakeholders identified?
25. For each collaborative meeting that was held, please:
 - a. identify each participant and what group they represented
 - b. described what happened at the meeting
 - c. please clarify what you meant by . . .
 - d. identify any decisions made at this meeting (what they were and who was in agreement)
 - e. identify any documents created by you or your office as a result of this meeting
26. Have you worked individually with any advocacy groups or policy actors? If yes, please:
 - a. identify each person or group
 - b. describe what was done or what was accomplished
27. What were the major disagreements between the participants?

28. Who held what position or value?
29. Were any of these positions or values resolved between participants? Which ones and who was involved?
30. Could you describe the support or lack of support by Idaho's congressional members relating to CIEDRA? Why do or did they support or not support it?
31. Could you describe the support or lack of support by Idaho's governor relating to CIEDRA?
32. Could you describe the support or lack of support by the Idaho Conservation League for CIEDRA?
33. Why do you believe CIEDRA has not passed?
34. Were there any groups or individuals in particular that would not participate in the collaborative efforts? If so, why didn't they participate?
35. Describe the changes in CIEDRA's language over time. How did these changes come about? What was the impetus for the changes?
36. Did you use shuttle diplomacy? By this I mean that you would visit with stakeholders or stakeholder groups individually to see what language would be acceptable to that individual or group and then repeat this process with other participants or stakeholder groups?
37. Could you give me an idea of the percentage of collaboration meeting versus the shuttle diplomacy meetings?
38. What were the biggest challenges at the time Mr. Simpson first started collaborative efforts?
39. Have these challenges changed over time? If so, how?

Thank you. May I contact you if I have further questions?

APPENDIX C – FULL SET OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Interview Questions (With Consent Form Language) Name/Date

My name is Scott Lee. I am a doctoral student at Idaho State University. This interview and short written questionnaire are part of the research for my doctoral dissertation in Political Science. I am asking people like you who have been involved in the collaboration process with Representative Mike Simpson's office about the Central Idaho Economic Development and Recreation Act, commonly called CIEDRA, to help me. I am seeking to understand how various stakeholders view the CIEDRA collaborative process with the goal of understanding both the purpose of the CIEDRA and why its passage ultimately failed. You obviously do not have to participate in this interview and questionnaire and you can stop either at any time. You will not be penalized in any way for not participating or not finishing and any relationship you might have with ISU will not be affected in any way either. You will not have to pay anything to participate and you will not be paid anything for your participation. Being in this study will not directly help you, but may help people who participate in collaboration in the future.

The only people who will have access to the information you give me will be the people who work on the study and those legally required to supervise my study. The interview will be recorded audibly and I will take notes throughout the interview. If you have any documents that relate to what we discuss and you give me copies of them, they will be kept in a locked cabinet. At some point, all written documents relating to the interview will be scanned to create an electronic copy and all paper copies will be destroyed or returned to you. The audio file and all scanned documents will be protected in a password protected file.

Your interview and written questionnaire will be used for my dissertation and for possible further research and writing on collaboration. When I share the results of my study in my dissertation, future scholarly papers, or at conferences, I may include your name or position unless you tell me that you want to remain anonymous. There is always a chance that someone could find out that you were in this study and learn something about you that you do not want them to know. However, if you do not want to me include your name or position, I will do my best to make sure no one outside the study will know that you are a part of the study. May I include your name or position?

I will ask you the questions in an interview format and then give you a short written survey. Depending on how fast we talk, I anticipate the interview and questionnaire to take about an hour to complete.

If you have any questions about this study, have questions about your rights, or if you feel you have been injured in any way, please call me at (208) 390-2001. You may also call the Idaho State University Human Subjects Committee Office at (208) 282-2179 to ask questions about your rights as a research participant.

Are you willing to participate in this interview and questionnaire?

Thank you.

First, a few definitions:

- a. When I use the term “group” I mean the group or organization you belong to, or the group or organization that you identify with.
- b. When I use the term “CIEDRA campaign” or “campaign” I am referring to the efforts of Representative Simpson or his office to work in a collaborative fashion with different groups interested in what happens in the Boulder – White Clouds Area.

QUESTIONS

- 1. Name and contact information.
- 2. Are you a formal member of any group involved in CIEDRA in any way? Which one?
- 3. If you aren’t a formal member of any group involved in CIEDRA, which group do you identify with?
- 4. Is the information that you are going to share with me today coming from being a member of a group or is it personal to you?

Based upon the answer to question #4, the rest of the questions will either be framed from a “group” perspective or an “individual” perspective. Thus, if a member of a group, the questions will ask about “your group.” If not a member of a group, the questions will ask about “you” or “your.”

5. Can you provide me with some background information about your group?
When was it founded, what are your group's goals/campaigns/interests? Where is it headquartered? Since 2000, who have been members of group's leadership?
6. What is your position in the group? How long have you been a member? What other positions have you held in the group? What are your responsibilities in your position?
7. What are your group's feelings about CIEDRA? What are your group's feelings about the land that would be included in CIEDRA? What does your group feel should be done with this land?
8. How, when, and why did your group get involved with the CIEDRA campaign? In what capacity did it do so? Is it still involved with the campaign?
9. What strategies has your group used during the campaign? Have the strategies changed over the time of the campaign? If so, how?
10. What has been your group's most important strategy or tactic in the campaign?
11. What were some of the biggest challenges with the campaign at the time your group became involved in it? Please explain.
12. What were some of the biggest challenges later on? Please explain.
13. What has been your group's media strategy? Are you generally satisfied with the coverage given the CIEDRA issue? Are you satisfied with the media coverage of your group or group's ideas or concerns?
14. Has your group worked with any other organization, group, public official, policy actors, or individual on the CIEDRA campaign? Who did your group work the most closely with and why? What was the nature of your work/collaboration? Please explain.
15. Has your group participated in any meeting with any other advocacy group(s), interest group(s), policy actor(s), or individuals on the CIEDRA campaign? Please describe each meeting.

16. To the extent the person does not provide the following information in their narrative answer, the following questions will be asked to elicit information or clarify the response:
- a. When and where did the meeting take place?
 - b. Who was there/involved/participated at the meeting (names or group names)?
 - c. Who organized, set up, and ran the meeting?
 - d. Who invited the participants? Do you know how the participants were chosen?
 - e. Who would you have included or left out as a participant?
 - f. What materials were you given before the meeting? Did they influence you in any way? May I have a copy of them?
 - g. Were notes or a written record made of the meeting by anyone?
 - h. Describe the process of the meeting/what happened in the meeting?
 - i. Did you think the meeting was effective? Why or why not? What could have been done to make it more effective?
 - j. What was your expectation or goal for this meeting before the meeting? Was it met? How so or how not?
 - k. What characteristics or traits did you feel the other groups or group members had coming into the meeting? If you felt the group or group members exhibited these characteristics or traits during the meeting, what exactly did they do?
 - l. Did you have any preconceptions of those who were at the meeting as to how they would act or what they would say? Were the preconceptions right? Explain.
 - m. Did your idea of these characteristics or traits or preconceptions change over time? If they did, how so? Why did they change?
 - n. When did you last participate in any meeting with a group made up of groups or persons representing different views on the CIEDRA campaign?

17. How did you rate the power of your group and other groups in the CIEDRA campaign? What is this power based on? Has the power changed over time? How and why? Do you think the power has actually changed or has your perception of it changed?
18. Did your group consider any state or federal politicians to be allies in the CIEDRA campaign? If so, who were they? What did they do to help your group's cause? Did they do anything that hurt that cause? Are they still active in the CIEDRA campaign?
19. Has your group ever used the court system to try and change policy relating to those things that CIEDRA attempts to remedy? If yes, please describe what your group did and the result.
20. Did your group bring in or attempt to bring in any other person or group into the CIEDRA campaign? Who were they? Were you successful in bringing them into the campaign? Do you feel they were helpful or not? Why or why not?
21. Did your group attempt to keep any other group or individual from joining the CIEDRA campaign? Who were they? Were you successful? Why didn't you want them involved?
22. In your opinion, why did CIEDRA fail to pass?
23. Are there some values, ideals, or views relating to the CIEDRA issue that your group is completely unwilling to change? If yes, please explain. Why can't your group change its values, ideals, or views on it?
24. Are there some values, ideals, or views relating to the CIEDRA issue that your group would be willing to change? If yes, please explain.
25. In the CIEDRA campaign, did your group change any of its values, ideals, or views? If yes, what did it change? Why?
26. Was there a minimum point where, if your group was able to achieve certain things or concessions, it could live with CIEDRA? If yes, please explain.
27. Did your group support Mr. Simpson's proposed legislation at any point? If yes, when or what form of the legislation did it support? If no, what part of it could it

not support? Was there something that could have been changed in order for your group to support it? If yes, what could have been changed to get its support?

28. Does your group think that CIEDRA will pass in some form in the future? If yes, what does your group think will need to change in it in order for it to pass?
29. How do you define collaboration? (If necessary, clarify the following elements: with all or a substantial number of the stakeholders, face-to-face meetings, how many meetings, duration of collaborative efforts, structure, organization, etc.) Would you or your group say that you or your group participated in enough collaboration activities with enough other groups in the CIEDRA efforts so that it would be considered meaningful participation?

Now is the time for the short questionnaire. It deals only with the collaboration relating to CIEDRA. Please read and respond to each statement by circling the number or by indicating which number I should circle for you on the scale that you think best indicates your level of agreement with the statement. Lower numbers indicate less while higher numbers indicate more. For instance, if you do not agree at all or strongly disagree with the statement, you would circle the number “1” and if you agree to a great extent or strongly agree with the statement, you would circle the number “7”. You may circle any number in-between if you feel your level of agreement falls somewhere in-between the low and the high. Please respond to all of the statements.

30. May I contact you again if further questions come up?

Thank you for your time.

APPENDIX D – ABBREVIATED SET OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Abbreviated Interview Questions (With Consent Form Language)

Name/Date _____

My name is Scott Lee. I am a doctoral student at Idaho State University. This interview and short written questionnaire are part of the research for my doctoral dissertation in Political Science. I am asking people like you who have been involved in the collaboration process with Representative Mike Simpson's office about the Central Idaho Economic Development and Recreation Act, commonly called CIEDRA, to help me. I am seeking to understand how various stakeholders view the CIEDRA collaborative process with the goal of understanding both the purpose of the CIEDRA and why its passage ultimately failed. You obviously do not have to participate in this interview and questionnaire and you can stop either at any time. You will not be penalized in any way for not participating or not finishing and any relationship you might have with ISU will not be affected in any way either. You will not have to pay anything to participate and you will not be paid anything for your participation. Being in this study will not directly help you, but may help people who participate in collaboration in the future.

The only people who will have access to the information you give me will be the people who work on the study and those legally required to supervise my study. The interview will be recorded audibly and I will take notes throughout the interview. If you have any documents that relate to what we discuss and you give me copies of them, they will be kept in a locked cabinet. At some point, all written documents relating to the interview will be scanned to create an electronic copy and all paper copies will be destroyed or returned to you. The audio file and all scanned documents will be protected in a password protected file.

Your interview and written questionnaire will be used for my dissertation and for possible further research and writing on collaboration. When I share the results of my study in my dissertation, future scholarly papers, or at conferences, I may include your name or position unless you tell me that you want to remain anonymous. There is always a chance that someone could find out that you were in this study and learn something about you that you do not want them to know. However, if you do not want to me include your name or position, I will do my best to make sure no one outside the study will know that you are a part of the study. **May I include your name or position?**

I will ask you the questions in an interview format and then give you a short written survey. Depending on how fast we talk, I anticipate the interview and questionnaire to take about 15-20 minutes to complete.

If you have any questions about this study, have questions about your rights, or if you feel you have been injured in any way, please call me at (208) 390-2001. You may also call the Idaho State University Human Subjects Committee Office at (208) 282-2179 to ask questions about your rights as a research participant.

Are you willing to participate in this interview and questionnaire? _____

Thank you.

First, a few definitions:

- a. When I use the term “group” ” I mean the group or organization you belong to, or the group or organization that you identify with.
- b. When I use the term “CIEDRA campaign” or “campaign” I am referring to the efforts of Representative Simpson or his office to work in a collaborative fashion with different groups interested in what happens in the Boulder – White Clouds Area.

QUESTIONS

- 1. Name and contact information.
- 2. Are you a formal member of any group involved in CIEDRA in any way? Which one?
- 3. If you aren’t a formal member of any group involved in CIEDRA, which group do you identify with?
- 4. Is the information that you are going to share with me today coming from being a member of a group or is it personal to you?
- 5. Did you have any meetings with Lindsay Slater or Laurel Sayer from Mr. Simpson’s office about CIEDRA? How many? When? Did anyone else participate in those meetings?
- 6. Have you or your group worked with any other organization, group, public official, interest groups, advocacy groups, policy actors, or individuals on the CIEDRA campaign? Who did you or your group work the most closely with and

why? What was the nature of your work or collaboration? Please describe/explain.

7. To the extent the person does not provide the following information in their narrative answer, the following questions will be asked to elicit information or clarify the response:
 - a. When and where did the meeting take place?
 - b. Who was there/involved/participated at the meeting (names or group names)?
 - c. Who organized, set up, and ran the meeting?
 - d. Who invited the participants? Do you know how the participants were chosen?
 - e. Who would you have included or left out as a participant?
 - f. What materials were you given before the meeting? Did they influence you in any way? May I have a copy of them?
 - g. Were notes or a written record made of the meeting by anyone?
 - h. Describe the process of the meeting/what happened in the meeting?
 - i. Did you think the meeting was effective? Why or why not? What could have been done to make it more effective?
 - j. What was your expectation or goal for this meeting before the meeting? Was it met? How so or how not?
 - k. What characteristics or traits did you feel the other groups or group members had coming into the meeting? If you felt the group or group members exhibited these characteristics or traits during the meeting, what exactly did they do?
 - l. Did you have any preconceptions of those who were at the meeting as to how they would act or what they would say? Were the preconceptions right? Explain.
 - m. Did your idea of these characteristics or traits or preconceptions change over time? If they did, how so? Why did they change?

- n. When did you last participate in any meeting with a group made up of groups or persons representing different views on the CIEDRA campaign?
8. How do you define collaboration? (If necessary, clarify the following elements: with all or a substantial number of the stakeholders, face-to-face meetings, how many meetings, duration of collaborative efforts, structure, organization, etc.)
9. **Would you say that you or your group participated in enough collaborative activities with enough other groups in the CIEDRA efforts so that it would be considered meaningful participation in collaboration? Yes _____ No _____**

Now is the time for the short questionnaire. It deals only with the collaboration relating to CIEDRA. Please read and respond to each statement by circling the number or telling me which number I should circle for you on the scale that you think best indicates your level of agreement with the statement. Lower numbers indicate less while higher numbers indicate more. For instance, if you do not agree at all or strongly disagree with the statement, you would circle the number "1" and if you agree to a great extent or strongly agree with the statement, you would circle the number "7". You may circle any number in-between if you feel your level of agreement falls somewhere in-between the low and the high. Please respond to all of the statements.

10. May I contact you again if further questions come up?

Thank you for your time.

APPENDIX E – QUESTIONNAIRE MP-1

Questionnaire: MP-1

THIS QUESTIONNAIRE ONLY RELATES TO THE COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS FOR CIEDRA

Name: _____ Organization/Group: _____

Please check your affiliation with the Organization → Formal Member _____ Identify With _____

Please read and respond to each statement by circling the number or indicating which number I should circle for you on the scale that you think best indicates your level of agreement with the statement. Lower numbers indicate less while higher numbers indicate more. For instance, if you do not agree at all or strongly disagree with the statement, you would circle the number “1” and if you agree to a great extent or strongly agree with the statement, you would circle the number “7”. You may circle any number in-between if you feel your level of agreement falls somewhere in-between the low and the high. Please respond to all of the statements.

STATEMENTS:

1. Other participating organizations/groups took your organization’s/group’s opinions seriously when decisions were made about the collaboration.

Not at all To a great extent

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

2. Your organization/group brainstormed with other participating organizations/groups to develop solutions to mission-related problems facing the collaboration.

Not at all To a great extent

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

3. You, as a representative of your organization/group in the collaboration, understood your organization’s/group’s roles and responsibilities as a member of the collaboration.

Not at all To a great extent

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

4. Organization meetings accomplished what was necessary for the collaboration to function well.

Not at all To a great extent

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

5. Participating organizations/groups (including your organization/group) agreed about the goals of the collaboration.

Not at all To a great extent

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

6. Your organization's/group's tasks in the collaboration were well coordinated with those of other participating organizations/groups.

Not at all To a great extent

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

7. The collaboration hindered your organization/group from meeting its own organizational/group mission.

Not at all To a great extent

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

8. Your organization's/group's independence was affected by having to work with other participating organizations/groups on activities related to the collaboration.

Not at all							To a great extent
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

9. You, as a representative of your organization/group, felt pulled between trying to meet both your organization's/group's expectations and the collaboration's expectations.

Not at all							To a great extent
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

10. Participating organizations/groups (including your organization/group) combined and used each other's resources so all participating organizations/groups benefited from collaborating.

Not at all							To a great extent
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

11. Your organization/group shared information with other participating organizations/groups that strengthened their operations and programs.

Not at all							To a great extent
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

12. You feel what your organization/group brought to the collaboration was appreciated and respected by participating organizations/groups.

Not at all							To a great extent
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

13. Your organization/group achieved its own goals better by working with other participating organizations/groups than by working alone.

Not at all						To a great extent
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

14. Participating organizations (including your organization) worked through differences to arrive at win-win solutions.

Not at all						To a great extent
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

15. The people who represented participating organizations/groups in the collaboration were trustworthy.

Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

16. Your organization/group could count on each participating organization/group to meet its obligations to the collaboration.

Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

17. Your organization/group felt it worthwhile to stay and work with participating organizations/groups rather than leave the collaboration.

Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

APPENDIX F – QUESTIONNAIRE NMP-1

Questionnaire: NMP-1

THIS QUESTIONNAIRE ONLY RELATES TO THE COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS FOR CIEDRA

Name: _____ Organization/Group: _____

Please check your affiliation with the Organization → Formal Member _____ Identify With _____

For each question answer it for what you would expect or anticipate would happen if you did participate in a meaningful number of collaboration meetings/actions.

Answer each question by circling the number or indicating which number I should circle for you on the scale that you think best indicates your answer. Lower numbers indicate less while higher numbers indicate more. For instance, if you do not agree at all or strongly disagree with the statement, you would circle the number “1” and if you agree to a great extent or strongly agree with the statement, you would circle the number “7”. You may circle any number in-between if you feel your level of agreement falls somewhere in-between the low and the high. Please answer all of the questions.

STATEMENTS:

1. Other participating organizations/groups would take your organization’s/group’s opinions seriously when decisions are made about the collaboration.

Not at all To a great extent

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

2. Your organization/group would brainstorm with other participating organizations/groups to develop solutions to mission-related problems facing the collaboration.

Not at all To a great extent

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

3. You, as a representative of your organization/group in the collaboration, understand your organization's/group's roles and responsibilities as a member of the collaboration.

Not at all To a great extent

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

4. Organization meetings would accomplish what is necessary for the collaboration to function well.

Not at all To a great extent

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

5. Participating organizations/groups (including your organization/group) would agree about the goals of the collaboration.

Not at all To a great extent

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

6. Your organization's/group's tasks in the collaboration would be well coordinated with those of other participating organizations/groups.

Not at all To a great extent

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

7. The collaboration would hinder your organization/group from meeting its own organizational/group mission.

Not at all To a great extent

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

8. Your organization's/group's independence would be affected by having to work with other participating organizations/groups on activities related to the collaboration.

Not at all

To a great extent

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

9. You, as a representative of your organization/group, would feel pulled between trying to meet both your organization's/group's expectations and the collaboration's expectations.

Not at all

To a great extent

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

10. Participating organizations/groups (including your organization/group) would combine and use each other's resources so all partners would benefit from collaborating.

Not at all

To a great extent

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

11. Your organization/group would share information with other participating organizations/groups that would strengthen their operations and programs.

Not at all

To a great extent

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

12. You feel what your organization/group brings to the collaboration would be appreciated and respected by participating organizations/groups.

Not at all

To a great extent

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

13. Your organization/group would achieve its own goals better by working with other participating organizations/groups than by working alone.

Not at all

To a great extent

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

14. Participating organizations (including your organization) would work through differences to arrive at win-win solutions.

Not at all

To a great extent

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

15. The people who represent participating organizations/groups in the collaboration would be trustworthy.

Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

16. Your organization/group would be able to count on each participating organization/group to meet its obligations to the collaboration.

Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

17. Your organization/group would feel it worthwhile to stay and work with participating organizations/groups rather than leave the collaboration.

Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

APPENDIX G – CIEDRA FRAMEWORK

CENTRAL IDAHO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND RECREATION FRAMEWORK

Changes Based on Comments

- The management area will be named the Boulder-White Clouds Management Area (BWCMA).
- Lands within the BWCMA that become wilderness will be managed as wilderness by the current managing district.
- Those lands within the BWCMA that are not designated as wilderness will continue to be named and managed as they currently are subject to the requirements of the proposed legislation. In particular:
 - Lands managed by the Sawtooth National Recreation Area will continue to be named and managed as the SNRA under the SNRA Act and subject to the requirements of the legislation,
 - Lands managed by the Challis National Forest will continue to be named and managed as the Challis National Forest subject to the requirements of the legislation,
 - Lands managed by the Challis Bureau of Land Management will continue to be named and managed as the Challis Bureau of Land Management subject to the requirements of the legislation.
- The Champion Lakes Trail (USFS#105) will not be reopened to motorized use.
- The 4th of July Basin will remain open to snowmobiling from Blackman Peak to Patterson Peak (West Side) including the 4th of July Basin. The 4th of July Basin will be closed to all other motorized or mechanized activities. A wheelchair accessible trail will be established to 4th of July Lake from the Phyllis Lake cutoff.
- After further investigation, it appears difficult to develop a motorized trail from Phyllis Lake into Washington Basin.
- Three OHV motorized recreation parks will be developed near Boise, Twin Falls, and Pocatello. Land will be transferred from the BLM to the State of Idaho. Each area will include a beginner track to teach safe, responsible riding techniques as well as areas for different skill levels. These areas would be managed by the state Parks with funding from the Off-highway Vehicle Fund as developed for this proposal.

- Nothing in the Framework shall be construed as precluding the Secretary from closing any trail for purposes of resource protection or public safety.
 - In the event the Secretary finds it necessary to close a trail for resource protection or public safety, the Secretary shall make available commensurate motorized recreation opportunities elsewhere within the management area. In considering appropriate mitigation methods, the Secretary shall consider both lost user miles and lost user capacity and shall undertake to—
 - repair resource damage and secure conditions so that closed routes may be reopened to motorized use,
 - construct new trails,
 - upgrade existing routes so as increase user capacity, or
 - use a combination of these and other methods that the Secretary may find reasonable and necessary to achieve the overall objective:
 - Provided, that the Secretary shall only take such action consistent with the overall objectives of the Boulder White Cloud Management Area and that lands within the Sawtooth National Recreation Area shall also be administered in accordance with Public Law 92-400.
- Approximately 10,000 acres in the Spring Gulch, Dry Hollow area north of the Herd Creek road will not be included as Wilderness.
- The proposed wilderness line on the east side of the private lands on the East Fork Road will be pulled back to the ridgeline on the east side of the East Fork of the Salmon River.
- Creation of the Hemingway Wilderness Area in Blaine County.
 - This area is North of Ketchum, to the east of Highway 75, and North of Trail Creek Road and is approximately 40,000 acres.
 - The areas proposed are currently closed to all motorized activity.
 - Would include the BLM lands adjacent to Sun Valley on the north side of Trail Creek Road.
 - Areas that would be wilderness include:
 - Amber Lakes,
 - Goat Creek,
 - The Konrad Creek area northwest of the SNRA headquarters,
 - The Upper Reaches of the North Fork of the Big Wood River above the North Fork Big Wood Trailhead plus the entire East Fork of the North Fork Big Wood River watershed,
 - The Murdock Creek watershed,
 - The upper reaches of Eagle Creek, and Lake Creek including the ridgelines between Eagle Creek and Lake Creek, and between Lake Creek and Trail Creek. (The roads up Eagle Creek and Lake Creek would remain open to provide access.)

- It would also include the south-facing slopes between Trail Creek and Lake Creek Lakes with Trail Creek serving as the Wilderness boundary on the north side of the Trail Creek Road.
- The proposed Hemingway Wilderness would not include:
 - Neal Canyon trail as the boundary will be northeast of Neal Canyon,
 - It will also leave the upper reaches of the West Fork of the North Fork of the Big Wood open to snowmobiling,
 - Additionally, in order to provide more higher elevation recreation opportunities for snowmobilers ---- the upper slopes of the lands between Silver Creek to King Creek will be opened up to snowmobile use, but the lower slopes near and adjacent to the popular cross-country ski trail along the flats at Russian John, will remain closed to snowmobile use.
- No “Buffer Zones” or “Protective Perimeter”- Congress does not intend for the designation of wilderness pursuant to this framework to lead to the creation of protective perimeters or buffer zones around any such wilderness area. The fact that activities or uses can be seen or heard from areas within the proposed wilderness shall not preclude the conduct of those activities or uses outside the boundary of the wilderness area.

(Revised 7-19-2004)

APPENDIX H - Idaho Recreation Council Framework (8-16-2004)

Idaho Recreation Council Proposal: **Central Idaho Economic Development and Recreation Act**

8-16-04

Introduction

This document provides a brief conceptual framework outlining elements of possible legislation addressing Boulder-White Clouds wilderness, presented from the viewpoint of the Idaho Recreation Coalition (the "IRC"). The IRC represents recreation interests from throughout Idaho.

This Proposal is based upon Representative Mike Simpson's "Framework" entitled Central Idaho Economic Development and Recreation Proposal (the "Framework"). The information outlined in Part 3 of the Framework represents the minimum concession to mechanized recreation that IRC will consider supporting. Where not specifically addressed here, the Part 3 provisions addressing mechanized recreation are incorporated by reference and should be deemed a part of this proposal.

Map of Proposed Wilderness

The IRC generally believes that sufficient wilderness has already been designated in Idaho. However, the IRC recognizes this is not a universally shared belief. In the spirit of compromise and as an effort to seek a solution to the current Boulder-White Clouds debate IRC is willing to support legislation that designates approximately 40,000 acres of wilderness, more specifically described on the attached map.

Administrative Provisions

Any legislation must represent a carefully constructed compromise providing a net benefit from the perspective of all significantly affected interest groups, including recreationists. IRC has reviewed previously adopted wilderness legislation, and has considered the unique legal and practical challenges at play in the Boulder-White Clouds. As a result of this review, IRC believes the following provisions must be included in any Boulder-White Clouds legislation:

A. Negation of Buffer Zones. As has been done in many wilderness bills, a provision should be included clarifying that "buffers" will not limit management discretion over multiple-use lands outside any designated wilderness, regardless of whether activities on such lands can be heard within the wilderness.

B. Preservation of Existing Mechanized Access. IRC supports the approach outlined in the second bullet of Part 3 of the Framework, which identifies specific roads or trails that "will remain open to existing motorized and mechanized uses according to the September 1, 2003, USFS and BLM travel plans...." Given past experience, further language clarifying the nature of administrative authority over such sites is further necessary. Specifically, a provision should be included stating, "continued motorized, mechanized and equestrian access along these routes

shall be deemed a valid use of the public lands, and further administrative decisions regulating access along these routes shall not have the effect of prohibiting travel by any presently-authorized vehicle type.” Similar language is appropriate for all provisions addressing re-established or continuing mechanized and equestrian access. Also language that states, “All resource and ESA issues must be mitigated to the point currently feasible by modern science prior to any closure” should also be included.

C. Trigger Language. A provision must be included which requires any implementation of wilderness to be contingent upon the other provisions of the bill, including those outlined herein.

D. Hard Release of Lands from Wilderness Review. Lands within the BWC Recreation Management Area, or within other lands in Idaho shall be released from further wilderness review and shall be released to multiple-use management.

E. Clarification of Closure Authority. The existing bullet in the Framework authorizing “the Secretary [to close] any trail for purposes of resource protection or public safety” must clarify that such authority shall not include a closure for “user conflict” to be defined as an insistence that one form of previously-authorized access be prohibited as a result of the subjective desires of other recreationists in the absence of unacceptable physical resource or public safety concerns.

F. Negation of Federal Reserved Water Rights. A provision negating Congressional intent to create any federal reserved water right(s) should be included.